The Knesset voted 92 to 10 on 28 October 2024 to bar UNRWA from operating “within the sovereign territory of the State of Israel,” and the laws’ sponsors gave their reasons in the Knesset’s own record: alleged participation of UNRWA employees in the 7 October 2023 attack, facilities they said Hamas used, and school content they called incitement. Israel’s Foreign Ministry stated the aim on 5 August 2024 as replacing “UNWRA’s activities with other agencies.” The tension sits in the texts and the counts. Neither law, as translated, names Gaza. Israel’s own 2025 intelligence analysis, a party’s count, identifies 1,462 of 12,521 Gaza staff as faction members. A UN internal inquiry found that 9 of the 19 staff Israel named “may have been involved” in the attack.
Key Findings
- The Knesset passed the UNRWA operations ban by 92 votes to 10 and the no-contact law by 87 votes to 9 at its 28 October 2024 sitting, by the Knesset’s own recorded count (Knesset, 2024).
- Israel’s April 2025 declassified intelligence analysis counts 1,462 of 12,521 UNRWA Gaza employees (12%) as members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad or other factions, and places 1,157 of them in education. This is a party to the conflict’s own count, and the document states that its numbers “may change” (Israeli government, 2025).
- Israel’s Foreign Ministry stated on 5 August 2024 that UNRWA’s activities in Gaza should be replaced “with other agencies,” and it asked countries not to fund UNRWA Gaza. That is a party’s own stated aim (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024).
- COGAT’s Gaza Aid Data dashboard records that “no aid entered the Gaza Strip between March 2 to May 19 2025” under “the directive from the political echelon.” That nil period covers every channel and is published by a party to the events (COGAT, 2026).
- COGAT’s July 2026 report counts 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza from 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026. This is its own self-reported total, and the tonnage rests on shippers’ self-declarations (COGAT, 2026).
Why does Israel say it is shutting UNRWA out?
The Knesset passed the law barring UNRWA from Israel’s sovereign territory by 92 votes to 10 on 28 October 2024, by its own recorded count. The reasons on record are the sponsors’ own. Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Yuli Edelstein cited alleged staff participation in the 7 October attack, school content he called incitement, and press reports that UNRWA’s activity “serves as a cover for terror operations.”
The Knesset’s release of 29 October 2024 carries Edelstein’s three lines in his words (Knesset, 2024). He cited “the participation of the agency’s employees in the Gaza Strip in the murderous terror attack that was launched on October 7.” He said studies before the committee indicate that UNRWA’s education system contains “content that contains incitement to hatred, violence and antisemitism.” He also referred to “reports in the press according to which UNRWA’s activity serves as a cover for terror operations.” These are the stated positions of the laws’ sponsors, quoted by the Knesset. They are not findings of the Knesset or of any inquiry.
Two other sponsors widened the grounds. MK Dan Illouz said UNRWA “cooperates with Hamas. Its facilities are used for the storage of weapons,” and that the agency “perpetuates the refugee status of the Palestinians” (Knesset, 2024). The second point is an objection to UNRWA’s mandate rather than to the conduct of its staff. MK Ron Katz stated the intended scope: “UNRWA will not set foot in the State of Israel, and no official element within the State of Israel will come in contact with UNRWA.”
The executive branch stated the goal more directly. On 5 August 2024 Israel’s Foreign Ministry wrote that “UNRWA is part of the problem and not part of the solution, and anyone who seeks the best interests of Israel, the Gaza Strip and the region should act to replace UNWRA’s activities with other agencies” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). The same statement said “Israel calls on countries not to transfer funds to UNRWA Gaza, as the funds may go to terrorist elements.” Both lines are the stated position of a party to the conflict. The Ministry’s spelling is preserved inside the quotation.
Taken together, the official record gives four stated grounds:
- alleged staff involvement in the 7 October attack;
- alleged Hamas use of UNRWA facilities;
- education content;
- the agency’s role in sustaining refugee status.
The record also states a remedy, which is replacement by other agencies. These sit within the wider set of Israel’s stated objectives in the war that its government has published.
Who accuses UNRWA staff of Hamas ties, and since when?
Israel’s government, in a declassified intelligence analysis dated 23 April 2025, counts 1,462 of 12,521 UNRWA employees in Gaza during 2023 to 2024 (12%) as members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad or other factions. That is a party to the conflict’s own count, and it rests on Israel’s own definition of membership and on material not available for independent check.
The accusation is Israel’s, it is official, and it has grown over time. In January 2024 Israel informed UNRWA of 12 staff members, and UNRWA “identified and terminated the employment of 10, while two were confirmed dead,” according to UN News on 5 August 2024. Israel then supplied seven more cases, five in March and two in April. That brought the number of named individuals to 19.
The Foreign Ministry widened the claim on 5 August 2024. It stated that “many hundreds of UNRWA employees are Hamas and PIJ operatives” and that “Israel has given the UN an additional list of a hundred UNRWA employees who are Hamas operatives” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). The hundred is a list Israel says it submitted, not a verified count.
The April 2025 document attaches figures to that wider claim (Israeli government, 2025). Israel Defense Intelligence cross-referenced UNRWA’s Gaza staff lists, the most recent from September 2024, against captured documents and other intelligence. In that analysis, membership means holding a function, rank and organizational ID in the group, established by matching ID numbers. The same document identifies 18 employees “for whom there is strong evidence of participation in the Hamas-led massacre of October 7th.” Those cases were passed to UN investigators between March and June 2024.
Three limits travel with these figures, all stated in the document itself:
- It says “the numbers in this document may change.”
- Its Annex 1 gives 75 matched examples from the military wing, not the full 1,462.
- The captured material behind the matches is not published.
The 12% is therefore Israel’s own intelligence claim, as a party to the conflict, about its own reading of its own sources.
The direction of the record is plain. Over 16 months, Israel’s government moved from naming 12 individuals to asserting that roughly 1 in 8 Gaza employees belonged to a designated faction. Each step is dated and attributed in Israel’s own publications.
What did the UN’s own investigation find about the 19 staff?
The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found that for 9 of the 19 staff Israel had named, “the evidence obtained by OIOS indicated that the UNRWA staff members may have been involved in the 7 October attacks,” according to UN News on 5 August 2024. In 1 case OIOS obtained no evidence, and in 9 cases the evidence was insufficient.
OIOS applied the phrase “may have been involved” as its standard. That is a narrower statement than “were involved.” Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq described the limit on what investigators could examine: “since information used by Israeli officials to support the allegations have remained in Israeli custody, OIOS was not able to independently authenticate most of the information provided to it,” as UN News reported on 5 August 2024. The full OIOS report, no. 185/24 dated 31 July 2024, is confidential. Its outcome is known from that public summary.
UNRWA acted on the nine. Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini said on 5 August 2024 that “they cannot work for UNRWA. All contracts of these staff members will be terminated in the interest of the Agency.” Secretary-General António Guterres, through Haq, said “any involvement in these attacks would constitute a major betrayal of trust.”
Israel read the same outcome differently. Its Foreign Ministry stated that day that the probe “proves that Israel’s assertions about the involvement of UNRWA employees in the October 7 massacre are credible and true” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). It added that other workers “about whom the team claimed there was insufficient evidence” were “also involved in the massacre.” The words “proves” and “involved” are the Ministry’s characterisation as a party to the conflict. The UN’s published wording is “may have been involved.”
The counts on each side also differ. Israel’s 2025 analysis lists 18 staff with “strong evidence of participation,” which is its own assessment (Israeli government, 2025). OIOS reached its “may have been involved” standard for 9.
The 19 are cases Israel raised, not a sample drawn from UNRWA’s workforce. No share of the wider staff can be derived from them.
Why does Israel single out UNRWA’s schools?
Israel’s 2025 intelligence analysis places 1,157 of the 1,462 employees it identifies as faction members (79%) in “education and teaching.” That is Israel’s own count as a party to the conflict, and it makes the school system the largest occupational group in its case against the agency.
The same document counts 80 of 546 principals and deputy principals (15%) as members of designated organizations: “79 Hamas, including 16 in its military wing, and one in PIJ” (Israeli government, 2025). It also alleges that Hamas “dug terror tunnels intentionally under UNRWA schools” and “operated the advanced server farm of its central intelligence command center underneath UNRWA’s Gaza headquarters.” These are Israel’s intelligence claims, published by a party to the conflict and resting on material not released for independent check.
The legislative record points to the classroom from a second direction, the curriculum. Edelstein told the Knesset that studies before his committee indicate UNRWA’s education system contains “content that contains incitement to hatred, violence and antisemitism” (Knesset, 2024). That is the committee chair’s stated position. The Knesset release does not name the studies.
A UN-commissioned review also identified education as a pressure point, using different evidence and reaching a different overall verdict. The Independent Review Group chaired by former French foreign minister Catherine Colonna reported on 20 April 2024 that UNRWA “possesses a more developed approach to neutrality than other similar UN or NGO entities.” The same report found that “neutrality-related issues persist.” Among those issues it listed staff political expression, problematic textbooks supplied by host countries, and politicised staff unions, and it made 50 numbered recommendations.
The two bodies measured different things. Israel’s figures count individuals by alleged organizational membership. The Colonna Group assessed the agency’s neutrality mechanisms, and its terms of reference stated that it would “not itself investigate any such allegations nor make any findings of fact in respect of them.” Both place education near the centre of the dispute.
What did the UN-commissioned review say about Israel’s evidence?
The Independent Review Group chaired by Catherine Colonna reported on 20 April 2024 that “the Israeli Government has not informed UNRWA of any concerns relating to any UNRWA staff based on these staff lists since 2011.” UNRWA shares the names and functions of its Gaza staff with Israel every year.
On the March 2024 list, which for the first time carried staff ID numbers, the review wrote: “Israel made public claims that a significant number of UNRWA employees are members of terrorist organizations. However, Israel has yet to provide supporting evidence of this.” The review also recorded Israel’s response. Israel told the Group that the earlier lists had no ID numbers, and that it does not treat the annual list as “a screening or vetting process.”
The review found gaps on UNRWA’s side as well. It reported that the agency’s screening measures “do not allow sufficient verifications.” It also noted that Hamas and Islamic Jihad “have not been included” in the UN Security Council sanctions list that UNRWA screens staff against. Both statements are dated 20 April 2024.
The timing limits what the review can speak to. Its “yet to provide supporting evidence” describes the record as of April 2024. Israel’s 78-page intelligence analysis appeared a year later, on 23 April 2025, and drew on staff lists up to September 2024 (Israeli government, 2025). The Colonna statement predates that document and does not assess it.
Israel’s 2025 document gives its own account of both UN inquiries. It states that OIOS and the Colonna Group “declined to assess the information or reach any findings regarding UNRWA staff’s involvement with terrorist groups in Gaza,” and it cites paragraph 25 of the confidential OIOS report (Israeli government, 2025). That description of OIOS’s scope is Israel’s, as a party to the conflict, since the OIOS report itself is not public.
The record therefore holds two dated statements that do not meet. In April 2024 a UN-commissioned review recorded no supporting evidence for the membership claims. In April 2025 Israel’s government published membership counts that the review never examined. Neither the review nor OIOS published a finding on how many UNRWA Gaza employees belong to Hamas or other factions.
Do the two UNRWA laws mention Gaza at all?
The Knesset passed the second UNRWA law, which bars Israeli authorities from contact with the agency, by 87 votes to 9 on 28 October 2024. Neither this law nor the operations ban, in the Knesset’s English translation, names Gaza or the West Bank. The ban is scoped to “the sovereign territory of the State of Israel.”
The operations ban provides that UNRWA “shall not operate any representative office, provide any services, or carry out any activities, directly or indirectly, within the sovereign territory of the State of Israel” (Knesset, 2024). Its stated purpose is “to prevent any UNRWA operations within the territory of the State of Israel.”
The no-contact law reaches further in a different direction. It binds Israeli officials rather than places: “A government authority, including other bodies and individuals performing public duties according to law, shall not have any contact with UNRWA or anyone acting on its behalf” (Knesset, 2024). It also ends the basis on which UNRWA had operated since 1967: “The invitation to UNRWA, based on an exchange of letters between Israel and UNRWA from 6 Sivan 5727 (14 June 1967), will expire on 5 Tishrei 5785 (7 October 2024).” The Foreign Minister was to notify the UN “within seven days of the passage of this law.”
The connection to Gaza runs through that provision on government authorities. COGAT, which runs the crossings into Gaza, is a unit of Israel’s Ministry of Defense by its own description (COGAT, 2026). The statute text says nothing further about Gaza. Any account of the laws’ effect on deliveries inside the Strip rests on sources other than the enacted text.
On timing, both laws state: “This law shall come into force three months from the date of its publication.” The one exception is the no-contact law’s Section 1, which ends the 1967 invitation. It takes effect “on 5 Tishrei 5785 (7 October 2024) or on the date of the publication of this law, whichever is later.” The National Security Council Director must report to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee “every six months and in the first year from the commencement of this law, every two months” (Knesset, 2024).
Did the spring 2025 aid halt apply only to UNRWA?
COGAT’s Gaza Aid Data dashboard, read on 10 September 2026, records that “no aid entered the Gaza Strip between March 2 to May 19 2025,” in line with “the directive from the political echelon.” That is a party’s own record of an eleven-week nil period across every channel, not a measure aimed at UNRWA alone.
The dashboard line gives no reason beyond the directive (COGAT, 2026). It sits on a page whose 5,375-row table classifies entries by date, route, “Classification” and “donating organisation category.” No truck series for UNRWA alone is published alongside it, so the halt’s effect on the agency’s channel cannot be separated from its effect on every other channel using COGAT’s figures.
UNRWA describes its own position differently. In its 2026 flash appeal for the occupied Palestinian territory, the agency states that its own labelled supplies have remained barred from Gaza. That is UNRWA’s account of its own channel, on its own terms.
Two kinds of measure are on the record. The first is specific to UNRWA: two statutes, passed on 28 October 2024, that bar the agency from Israel’s sovereign territory and bar Israeli authorities from dealing with it. The second is general: a political directive under which, by COGAT’s own record, nothing entered Gaza for eleven weeks. Questions about whether Palestinians in Gaza can access humanitarian aid turn on both, and the record dates them separately.
Israel recorded entry resuming after the halt. Its Permanent Mission in France stated that “more than 12,000” aid trucks had entered Gaza “since May 2025,” 80% of them carrying food, as of 14 September 2025 (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission in France, 2025). That is Israel’s own stated total. The page refers readers to COGAT’s data site for detail and does not break the figure down by agency.
How much aid does Israel say enters without UNRWA?
COGAT’s July 2026 ceasefire report counts 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza from 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026. That is its own self-reported total as a party to the events, and the tonnage rests on “the self-declaration of humanitarian organizations and private sector providers” rather than on weighing at the crossings.
COGAT’s footnote 5 sets out how the record is built (COGAT, 2026). Weighing every pallet would “severely” reduce throughput. Instead, “pallet number are counted and contents are compared to the coordination requests and self-reports during the security clearance,” with “only negligible divergence (around 5%)” detected day to day. The truck count is therefore a physical tally COGAT makes at its own crossings, while the tonnage is the shippers’ declared weight. The same report sets its food total at “nearly threefold” the World Food Programme’s monthly requirement benchmark. Only the numerator in that ratio is COGAT’s.
COGAT also describes a larger crossing system than existed before the war. Its December 2025 document lists five inspection points (Kerem Shalom, Ashdod Port, Nitzana, Sha’ar Efrayim, Tarkumiya) and three transfer points (Kerem Shalom, Kisufim, Zikim). It states that “Prior to October 7th, only two crossings operated for transferring goods into the Gaza Strip” (COGAT, 2026).
The route figures above sum to 110,815 trucks. The dashboard qualifies its own categories. Trucks classed as food “carry food items exclusively,” while “mixed aid” and “shelter equipment” trucks “may also contain food items.” The dashboard also states that “Totals do not include fuel” (COGAT, 2026).
These counts describe the channels Israel says are in use. That matches the Foreign Ministry’s stated aim to replace UNRWA’s activities “with other agencies” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). Because COGAT publishes no UNRWA series, none of these tonnages or truck counts can be set against what UNRWA delivered before or would deliver now.
Methodology and limitations
The evidence comes from three tiers.
Primary legislative record. This is the Knesset’s English translation of the two UNRWA laws and its two press releases of 29 October 2024, which record the vote counts and quote the sponsors. The sponsors’ statements are carried as their stated positions.
Israeli government publications. These are the Foreign Ministry’s statement of 5 August 2024, its Permanent Mission in France’s page updated 17 September 2025, the Israel Defense Intelligence analysis dated 23 April 2025, and two COGAT sources: the Gaza Aid Data portal and its July 2026 ceasefire report. Each is published by a party to the events. Each is labelled in the text as that party’s own count or position, and none is presented as independently verified.
UN bodies. These are the OIOS outcome as summarised by UN News on 5 August 2024 and the Independent Review Group’s final report of 20 April 2024. They are cited by name and date for what each stated and found. The full OIOS report is confidential, so its scope limits are known only through the public summary and through the Israeli government’s footnoted account.
Several measurement limits apply.
- Israel’s membership counts. These rest on ID-number matching against captured material that is not available for independent check, and the document states that its figures may change.
- The UN investigation. The OIOS standard, “may have been involved,” applies only to 19 cases Israel raised, not to a sample of the workforce.
- COGAT tonnage. Tonnage rests on supplier self-declaration, while truck counts are tallied at inspection.
- COGAT dashboard figures. These reflect whatever date filter was active when read on 10 September 2026. The dashboard’s route total of 110,815 has not been reconciled with other totals on the same page.
- What the published record does not hold. No published series isolates UNRWA’s own deliveries, and no source here records a calendar date for the laws’ entry into force.
Conclusion
Why is Israel shutting UNRWA out of the work it did in Gaza? On Israel’s own record, the reasons are the four its legislators and ministers wrote down: alleged staff involvement in 7 October, alleged Hamas use of UNRWA facilities, school content, and an objection to the agency’s refugee mandate. The remedy, as its Foreign Ministry stated it in August 2024, is replacement by other agencies.
The record behind those reasons is uneven, and it can be described plainly. The Knesset’s votes are recorded at 92 to 10 and 87 to 9. Israel’s own intelligence count, as a party to the conflict, puts 1,462 of 12,521 Gaza staff in designated factions, with 1,157 in education. A UN inquiry that could not authenticate most of Israel’s material found that 9 of 19 named staff may have been involved. A UN-commissioned review noted that Israel had raised no concern from the annual staff lists since 2011.
The laws themselves name only Israel’s sovereign territory and its own officials. The one eleven-week halt that COGAT’s own record documents stopped every channel, not UNRWA alone. On the other side of the ledger, COGAT’s 1,778,363 tons of food rest on shippers’ declarations, published by the same party that excluded the agency.
The question the record sharpens is not whether UNRWA can be removed, because the statutes already settle that inside Israel. It is what evidence a society would need before an agency is judged replaceable, when the case against it and the count of what replaces it are both, for now, documents published by one party to the war.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did Israel ask other governments to stop funding UNRWA?
Yes. Israel’s Foreign Ministry stated on 5 August 2024 that “Israel calls on countries not to transfer funds to UNRWA Gaza, as the funds may go to terrorist elements” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). That is the stated position of a party to the conflict.
How many donors paused UNRWA funding after the January 2024 allegations?
The Independent Review Group reported on 20 April 2024 that “16 Member State donors suspended or paused funding,” amounting to “around US$450 million.” The figure covers the period immediately after Israel’s January 2024 allegations.
How large is UNRWA’s workforce overall?
The Colonna review counted more than 32,000 UNRWA staff and personnel across all five fields as of April 2024, of whom 99.2% were locally recruited. That figure is agency-wide. The 12,521 Gaza employees in Israel’s 2025 analysis are Israel’s own count for Gaza alone in 2023 to 2024 (Israeli government, 2025).
How many neutrality complaints has UNRWA investigated internally?
The Colonna review reported that UNRWA’s Investigations Division received 151 neutrality-breach allegations between January 2022 and February 2024, mostly concerning social media posts, and that 50 cases were under investigation in April 2024. These are allegations, not substantiated breaches.
Who oversees how the UNRWA laws are applied?
The laws require the National Security Council Director to report to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee every six months, and every two months during the first year after the laws take effect (Knesset, 2024).
Does COGAT count fuel in its aid totals?
No. COGAT’s dashboard states that “Totals do not include fuel.” Its frozen workbook records 335 fuel tanker-trucks and 598 gas tanker-trucks from 1 November 2023 to 31 May 2024, and these sums are floors because the fuel sheet codes nil days inconsistently (COGAT, 2026). Both are a party’s own counts.
How current is COGAT’s truck-level data?
COGAT’s truck-level workbook covers 32,946 trucks from 21 October 2023 to 31 May 2024 and has not been extended since. Its live dashboard is current, carrying the stamp “Data Last Updated: 9/10/2026” (COGAT, 2026). Both publications are drawn from the same record, published by a party to the events.
Sources
- COGAT, 2026. Gaza Aid Data portal: the truck-level entry record (“Humanitarian Aid” workbook), the Aid Data dashboard, and “Aid to Gaza: Common Misleading Claims vs. Facts” (15 December 2025). Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel Ministry of Defense. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/mainhome/ and https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/d15pw0ii/humanitarian-aid.xlsx. Official or primary record (a party’s own operational count).
- COGAT, 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire, October 2025 to June 2026. Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel Ministry of Defense, 9 July 2026. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/e2gjueei/humanitarian-situation-report-during-the-ceasefire-cogat-july-2026.pdf. Official or primary record (self-reported by a party).
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024. UN investigation regarding involvement of UNRWA personnel in the October 7 massacre. MFA Spokesperson, Media Statements, 5 August 2024. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/un-investigation-unra. Official or primary record (a party’s own position and counts).
- Israeli government, Israel Defense Intelligence analysis, 2025. The Connection Between UNRWA and Hamas in Gaza: A summary of declassified intelligence, methodologies, and sources. Government of Israel, 23 April 2025. https://govextra.gov.il/media/d21mw2f3/the-connection-between-unrwa-and-hamas-280425.pdf. Official or primary record (a party’s own intelligence claims and counts).
- Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission of Israel to the Multilateral Organizations in France, 2025. Israel’s Objectives and Current Operation. Updated 17 September 2025. https://embassies.gov.il/multilateral-organizations-france/en/news/israels-objectives-and-current-operation. Official or primary record (self-reported by a party).
- Knesset, 2024. Law to Cease UNRWA Operations, 5785-2024, and Law to Cease UNRWA Operations in the Territory of the State of Israel, 5785-2024, with press releases of 29 October 2024. The Knesset. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/committees/Documents/LawUNRWA.docx; https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press291024q.aspx; https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press291024w.aspx. Official or primary record.