Israel’s government names two objectives for the Gaza war in its own documents, dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities and returning the hostages, of whom its Foreign Ministry counted 48 still held on 14 September 2025, on Israel’s own reported count. The same pairing runs from a Foreign Ministry paper of December 2023 to an IDF page of February 2026, and the October 2025 ceasefire plan, as the IDF describes it, wrote both aims into its first phase. Israel’s own records also document what sits beside the two aims: a renewed offensive in March 2025 justified by the hostage aim, an eleven-week halt to aid entry by political directive, strike campaigns in Iran and Lebanon, and a Knesset declaration against a Palestinian state adopted 68 to 9, as CNN reported in 2024. Does the list a government publishes describe everything its own records show it pursuing?
Key Findings
- 48 hostages remained in Gaza and 207 had returned or been recovered (148 alive, 59 deceased) as of 14 September 2025, on the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s own reported counts, published by a party to the conflict and not independently verified (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission of Israel to the Multilateral Organizations in France, 2025).
- “Over 13,000” people the IDF describes as terrorists had been eliminated in Gaza by 29 February 2024, day 146 of the war, on the IDF’s own self-reported count, a floor and a contested classification (Israel Defense Forces, 2024).
- No aid entered Gaza between 2 March and 19 May 2025 “According to the directive from the political echelon,” in the words of COGAT’s own Aid Data dashboard, a party’s own record (COGAT, 2026).
- Approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran and more than 1,100 across Lebanon had been carried out by 13 March 2026, on the IDF’s own reported count, not independently verified (Israel Defense Forces, 2026).
- The Knesset voted 68 to 9 on the night of 17 to 18 July 2024 for a non-binding declaration opposing “the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan (river)” (CNN, 2024).
Which objectives does Israel’s government name for the Gaza war?
The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s mission in France publishes a statement titled “Israel’s Objectives and Current Operation,” last updated 17 September 2025, that counts 48 hostages still held in Gaza as of 14 September 2025, on Israel’s own reported count. The Foreign Ministry’s FAQ, updated to 8 December 2023, names the second aim: “It is impossible to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities without operating in southern Gaza.”
The FAQ was published by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and republished by the IDF on 15 December 2023. It gives four reasons the military aim requires operating in the south: rocket launches, senior commanders, military assets and hostages. The two aims therefore appear in one passage, with the hostages listed among the reasons for the military operation. The same passage addresses the population of the south directly: “The IDF is well aware of the increased number of civilians in southern Gaza, and utilizes the entirety of the measures described above in order to mitigate harm to civilians in these areas.”
The 2025 mission statement quantifies its content in two ways only: hostages and aid trucks. It states that 48 hostages, living and deceased, remained in captivity 712 days after the abduction, and it refers readers to COGAT’s aid data site for humanitarian detail. Neither document attaches a number to the military aim. The hostage aim is expressed as a count that can reach zero; the Hamas aim is expressed as a capability to be dismantled.
Both documents are a party’s own statement of its position, issued by the government of a party to the conflict, and their counts are Israel’s own. The Foreign Ministry’s descriptions of Hamas and of its critics are its own characterisations and are not carried here.
Who frames the aims as hostages and Hamas, and since when?
Israel’s Foreign Ministry and the IDF frame the war’s aims around the hostages and Hamas’s military capacity in dated documents spanning 2023 to 2026, so the pairing is Israel’s own and it holds across that period. The Foreign Ministry FAQ of 8 December 2023 uses “dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities”; an IDF page dated 19 February 2026 records a plan requiring Hamas to “return all 48 of the remaining hostages in Gaza, and fully disarm.”
Between those two points sit three further government documents. The Foreign Ministry paper “Key Legal Aspects,” updated to 2 November 2023, sets the targeting rule that accompanies the military aim. The IDF Spokesperson’s briefing of 29 February 2024 counted progress against that aim in people. The Foreign Ministry mission statement of 17 September 2025 is titled as an objectives statement and counts the hostages still held.
The wording of the Hamas aim shifts across the series while its object stays fixed. In 2023 the Foreign Ministry writes of “military capabilities”; in 2026 the IDF describes the plan’s demand that Hamas “fully disarm.” The hostage aim keeps the same unit throughout: a number of people still held. The 48 in the September 2025 mission statement and the 48 in the IDF’s description of the October 2025 plan are the same count, a month apart, both reported by Israel.
Each document is the statement of a party to the conflict. Their consistency establishes what Israel’s government says its aims are; it is not an external assessment of whether those aims describe its conduct.
How many hostages had returned by September 2025, on Israel’s count?
The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s mission in France recorded 207 hostages returned or recovered as of 14 September 2025, on Israel’s own reported count, published by a party to the conflict and not independently verified. The same statement counts 48 hostages, living and deceased, still held in Gaza on that date.
The 207 divides into 148 returned alive and 59 deceased, which sum to the stated total. The mission statement dates the remaining 48 to 712 days after the abduction. All three figures are point-in-time counts from September 2025 and describe the position one month before the ceasefire of 10 October 2025.
The hostage aim is the only one of the two named aims for which Israel’s government publishes a running tally of progress. Earlier releases appear in the record with their own counts: the operational pause that began on 24 November 2023 saw 105 hostages freed, CBS News reported on 1 December 2023, alongside some 240 Palestinian prisoners, a figure CBS attributed to the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club. The IDF said at the pause’s end that “Hamas violated the operational pause and in addition, fired toward Israeli territory,” in its own words as reported by CBS News (2023).
The counts measure people returned, recovered and still held. They do not measure how each return was achieved, whether by negotiated exchange or military operation, and the mission statement does not divide them that way. Nor does it date the individual returns, so the 105 freed during the November 2023 pause cannot be traced inside the 207 from this document alone.
What does the IDF count against the aim of dismantling Hamas?
The IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, stated on 29 February 2024, day 146 of the war, that over 13,000 people the IDF describes as terrorists had been eliminated in Gaza. The figure is the IDF’s own count, self-reported by a party to the conflict, not independently verified, and written as a floor rather than an exact total.
The classification of those counted as “terrorists” is the IDF’s own characterisation, and the division of Gaza’s dead into combatants and civilians is contested. The briefing does not publish the method by which a person entered the count. The same briefing gave a second figure for a different place and a different action: about 3,400 people apprehended in Judea and Samaria by IDF forces together with the Israel Security Agency, of whom 1,500 the IDF describes as Hamas.
| Measure | IDF figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Described as terrorists, eliminated in Gaza | over 13,000 | Israel Defense Forces, 2024 |
| Apprehended in Judea and Samaria, with the ISA | about 3,400 | Israel Defense Forces, 2024 |
| Of those apprehended, described as Hamas | 1,500 | Israel Defense Forces, 2024 |
The Foreign Ministry’s FAQ of December 2023 lists the components of the capability it seeks to dismantle: rocket launches, senior commanders and military assets. The February 2024 briefing counts one kind of thing against that list, people, and publishes no count of rockets, launchers or infrastructure destroyed. The apprehension figure covers the West Bank only and is a joint result, so it is neither an IDF-only nor a war-wide total.
Why did Israel resume fighting in March 2025, in its words?
On 18 March 2025, CBS News reported, Israel’s prime minister’s office cited Hamas’s “repeated refusals to release its hostages and its rejection of all offers it received from the U.S. presidential envoy Steve Witkoff and mediators” as its reason for renewed operations in Gaza. The first phase of the January 2025 ceasefire had ended on 1 March. The statement is a party’s own account of its reasons.
Hamas gave its own account in the same report: the Israeli government had “decided to overturn the ceasefire agreement.” Each statement is the claim of one party, and the record contains both. The CBS report does not set out the offers the prime minister’s office referred to, so their terms cannot be read beside the statement.
The government’s statement invokes the hostage aim as the reason for renewed military pressure, so the two named aims appear here as one instrument serving the other rather than as parallel goals. The statement does not rank the two aims; it presents military action as the route to the hostage aim.
The dated record around the statement places it in sequence. The first ceasefire phase ended on 1 March 2025. COGAT’s own Aid Data dashboard records that no aid entered Gaza from 2 March, “According to the directive from the political echelon.” Fighting resumed on 18 March, sixteen days into that halt. Six months later the Foreign Ministry’s mission in France counted 48 hostages, living and deceased, still held on 14 September 2025, on Israel’s own reported count.
The resumption therefore sits between the end of one negotiated phase and the next arrangement, which took effect at 12:00 on 10 October 2025 in the IDF’s own account. Across that interval the hostage aim is the one the government named as its reason to fight, and the hostage count is the measure its September 2025 objectives statement published.
What did Israel record about aid entry during spring 2025?
COGAT, the Israeli Defense Ministry unit that coordinates entry into Gaza, states on its own Aid Data dashboard: “According to the directive from the political echelon, no aid entered the Gaza Strip between March 2 to May 19 2025.” The halt ran from 2 March to 19 May 2025, about eleven weeks, on a party’s own record of its own crossings.
The halt began the day after the first ceasefire phase ended on 1 March 2025 and continued through the resumption of fighting on 18 March, the date CBS News (2025) reported. The dashboard attributes the halt to a directive from the political echelon and gives no reason for it. No document read for this report connects the directive to either named objective in its own words.
The Foreign Ministry mission statement gives Israel’s war-long totals: more than 106,000 aid trucks from 7 October 2023 to 14 September 2025, and more than 12,000 since May 2025, 80% of them carrying food. Those are Israel’s own stated totals, not an audited tally. COGAT’s own method note of 9 July 2026 separates the two units it publishes: trucks and pallets are counted at inspection, while tonnage “is based on the self-declaration of humanitarian organizations and private sector providers.” The dashboard’s own qualifications travel with its truck counts: trucks classed as food “carry food items exclusively,” while “mixed aid” and “shelter equipment” trucks “may also contain food items,” and “Totals do not include fuel.” Any cumulative or average figure that spans 2025 crosses the eleven weeks of nil, which is the context for the counts of aid entry set against the stated aims.
Where does Israel place Gaza’s civilians relative to its objectives?
Israel’s Foreign Ministry counted over 15 million text messages sent by the IDF urging Gaza residents to leave areas of hostilities, cumulative to 8 December 2023, on its own reported count. Its legal paper updated to 2 November 2023 states that “the IDF only targets persons who are members of organized armed groups or civilians directly participating in the hostilities.”
The FAQ of 8 December 2023 lists three further channels: over 12 million pre-recorded phone calls, over 4.5 million leaflets and over 45,000 individual phone calls. Every count is a floor and Israel’s own. The channels reach overlapping audiences, so they cannot be added into a number of warnings or of people warned.
| Channel | Israel’s own count, to 8 December 2023 | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Text messages | over 15 million | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023 |
| Pre-recorded phone calls | over 12 million | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023 |
| Leaflets airdropped | over 4.5 million | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023 |
| Individual phone calls | over 45,000 | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023 |
Each row is a floor in a different unit, a message, a call or a leaflet, and the rows are not summed.
The legal paper sets out how Israel’s government says civilians enter its targeting calculations. “Estimating expected civilian harm can be very challenging, especially when operating in a complex and dense urban environment where civilian presence is dynamic and often hard to ascertain,” it states, and: “If the attack results in more collateral damage than expected, this does not necessarily indicate a violation: compliance is conduct-oriented, not result-oriented.” It adds that “the IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given.”
The FAQ describes a “Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit” of commanders, intelligence officers, Arabic speakers and legal advisers that “constantly monitors in real time the implementation of these evacuation recommendations.” These passages are a party’s statement of its own legal position and procedures, not a finding of compliance by any court or reviewer.
Does the October 2025 ceasefire plan restate Israel’s objectives?
The IDF describes the ceasefire as a 20-point plan.
In a page dated 19 February 2026, the IDF says the ceasefire took effect at 12:00 on 10 October 2025, and that the first phase of the plan “stated that Hamas would return all 48 of the remaining hostages in Gaza, and fully disarm.”
The description is the IDF’s own, published by a party to the agreement.
Both named aims sit in that one clause: the hostage count, matching the Foreign Ministry’s September 2025 figure of 48, and disarmament, the 2026 form of the 2023 aim to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities. In the IDF’s account, the objectives Israel stated in wartime became the first-phase terms of the plan that ended major operations.
The end-state the plan sets for Israeli forces is less specific in the instrument than in the IDF’s account. United Nations Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) and the Comprehensive Plan annexed to it state that “Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line,” without defining or mapping that line; the “yellow line” that governs the IDF’s later incident reports appears nowhere in the resolution or its annex. The annexed Plan does not use the word “ceasefire” at all; it says the war “will immediately end” and that military operations “will be suspended,” so the phase language belongs to the IDF’s description rather than to the Plan’s text. The plan’s provisions on Palestinian governance are read in detail in the report on point 19 of the ceasefire plan.
The same IDF page is a chronological list of incidents it attributes to Hamas and Palestinian armed groups from 19 October 2025 to 14 February 2026, each judged against the IDF’s own test that the activities “constitute a clear violation of the understandings of the ceasefire.” It publishes no total, no rate and no casualty figure, and it records no incidents attributed to Israel. Several of its November 2025 entries carry the printed year 2026.
What has Israel struck beyond Gaza, in Lebanon and Iran?
The IDF reported approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran during Operation Roaring Lion, to 13 March 2026, in its live update of that date, a party’s self-reported count that is not independently verified. The page gives the total two ways, “More than 7,600” in its headline and “approximately 7,600” in its body.
More than 2,000 of the Iran strikes, on the IDF’s count, hit what it describes as headquarters and assets of the Iranian regime; that characterisation is the IDF’s own and is contested. The same update reports more than 1,100 strikes across Lebanon, including about 190 targets the IDF identifies as Radwan Force and over 200 it identifies as missile and launcher targets. The Lebanon total counts strikes across the country; the Hezbollah-related figures are subsets reported inside it, on the IDF’s own target identifications.
The counts place Israel’s military activity in 2026 on fronts the Gaza objectives documents do not name. The Foreign Ministry’s 2023 FAQ and its 2025 objectives statement address Gaza and the hostages; the March 2026 update counts operations against Iran and in Lebanon. The update’s figures are operational tallies: they record what was struck, by the IDF’s own classification, and not the objective each strike was meant to serve.
The update also mixes units that are not interchangeable. Its totals for Iran and Lebanon count strikes, while its Lebanon breakdown is given in targets, about 190 identified as Radwan Force and over 200 as missile and launcher targets, so the subsets cannot be read as a share of strikes. The Iran total is carried here in the approximate form the page uses in its body, not the “More than 7,600” of its headline.
What has the Knesset recorded about a Palestinian state after the war?
The Knesset voted 68 to 9 on the night of 17 to 18 July 2024 for a declaration that it “firmly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan (river),” CNN reported on 18 July 2024. The declaration is non-binding and is not a statute.
The text, as CNN quoted it, continues: “The establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel would pose an existential danger to the State of Israel and its citizens, perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and destabilize the region.” The vote is the Israeli legislature’s recorded position on one possible end-state for the territory, adopted nine months into the war.
The October 2025 arrangement treats the same end-state in conditional terms. Point 19 of the Comprehensive Plan annexed to United Nations Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) ties the pathway to self-determination to the moment “While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out,” and closes on the clause “which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.” The resolution’s operative paragraph 2 restates the pathway as opening “After the PA reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza redevelopment has advanced,” a different sequencing, and drops that closing clause. The 2024 Knesset declaration and the 2025 instrument therefore address the same question in different words.
None of the government documents read here, from the 2023 FAQ to the 2025 objectives statement, sets out a governance end-state for Gaza in its own words. The recorded vote is the most specific dated statement in this record on what the end-state should exclude.
Methodology and limitations
The evidence is drawn from three source types. Primary and official records of a party to the conflict form the core: two Foreign Ministry documents of 2 November and 8 December 2023, read on 22 September 2026; the Foreign Ministry mission statement last updated 17 September 2025; an IDF briefing of 29 February 2024; IDF pages of 19 February and 13 March 2026, the first read on 10 September 2026; and COGAT’s Aid Data portal and truck-level workbook, read and parsed on 10 September 2026. Every figure from these sources is the party’s own count, published by a party to the events it describes, and is labelled as such in each section that carries it.
Several counts carry fixed limits. The warning-channel counts are floors cumulative to 8 December 2023 and are never summed. The “over 13,000” figure is a floor on the IDF’s own classification, and the combatant count in this conflict is contested. The Iran strike total appears two ways on its source page. COGAT counts trucks at inspection and takes tonnage from shippers’ declarations, and no tonnage figure is used here. The IDF ceasefire page is a list without a total, and nineteen of its November entries carry the wrong year.
Press reports supply dated statements and one tally: CBS News for the November 2023 pause and the March 2025 resumption, and CNN for the Knesset vote, whose tally is carried from the press report because the Knesset’s own record was not read. The third type is an intergovernmental instrument: United Nations Security Council resolution 2803 (2025), cited for its own text and that of its annexed Plan. No body publishes a count of ceasefire violations since October 2025 against a stated threshold.
Conclusion
Does the list Israel’s government publishes describe everything its own records show it pursuing? On the two aims it names, the record is consistent and specific: from 2023 to 2026 the Foreign Ministry and the IDF state the same pair, and the IDF, describing the October 2025 arrangement in its own words, says the plan’s first phase required both. That phasing is the IDF’s characterisation; the annexed Plan itself speaks of the war ending and operations being “suspended,” and never uses the word “ceasefire.”
The two aims are measured differently. The hostage aim is counted to the person, 48 still held and 207 returned on the Foreign Ministry’s own September 2025 count; the Hamas aim is counted in people eliminated, “over 13,000” on the IDF’s own February 2024 figure, with no published tally of the capability itself. In March 2025 the government cited the hostage aim as the reason to resume fighting. Israel’s own records then add what the objectives documents leave unnamed: a political-echelon directive under which no aid entered from 2 March to 19 May 2025, on COGAT’s own record; approximately 7,600 strikes in Iran by March 2026, on the IDF’s own count; and a 68 to 9 Knesset declaration against a Palestinian state.
A war’s objectives can be read in two places: the lists its ministries publish, and the full set of records the same government counts, directs and votes. Here the two overlap on the hostages and on Hamas and diverge on aid, on Iran and Lebanon, and on Gaza’s future. When a public comes to judge whether the war achieved what was intended, which of those two records is it measuring against: the two aims the ministries list, or everything the same government counted, directed and voted?
Frequently Asked Questions
Who reviews IDF strikes for legality, on Israel’s own account?
The Foreign Ministry’s “Key Legal Aspects” paper of November 2023 states that “IDF legal advisers are not subject to the IDF chain of command on professional matters, but report directly to the Military Advocate General.” This is a party’s description of its own procedures, not an external finding.
How does Israel’s government apply proportionality to individual strikes?
The Foreign Ministry’s FAQ of December 2023 states that proportionality is “to be applied to each and every attack independently,” and gives an illustration comparing one attack causing 500 casualties with 500 separate attacks. The illustration is the ministry’s own statement of its legal position.
How does COGAT count aid entering Gaza?
COGAT counts trucks and pallets at inspection, while its tonnage “is based on the self-declaration of humanitarian organizations and private sector providers,” according to its method note of 9 July 2026. COGAT, a party to the events, reports “negligible divergence (around 5%)” between declarations and inspection.
What does COGAT’s truck-level file record by crossing?
COGAT’s own workbook carries 32,946 truck rows from 21 October 2023 to 31 May 2024, of which 18,371 are labelled Kerem Shalom, by the Institute’s count of the published rows. The file stops in May 2024, and its “Nitzana\Rafah” label fuses an inspection point with an entry crossing.
What share of medical evacuation requests does COGAT say it approves?
COGAT’s June 2026 FAQ states it approves “over 98% of all submitted medical evacuation requests,” a party’s own figure. The share is of requests that reached COGAT, not a count of patients who left, and exits also depend on a receiving country.
How many sorties did Israel’s Air Force report in Operation Roaring Lion?
The IDF reported more than 4,700 operational sorties to 13 March 2026, including over 380 missions in Iranian airspace, on its own self-reported count. The sortie and strike figures count different units and are not interchangeable.
Does any body publish a count of violations of the October 2025 ceasefire?
No body publishes a violation count against a stated threshold. Resolution 2803 (2025) and its annexed plan contain the word “violation” zero times, and the IDF’s own page is a dated list of incidents it attributes to Hamas, with no total. The record of what the instrument defines sets out the gap.
Sources
- CBS News, 2023. Report on the end of the November 2023 operational pause in Gaza, 1 December 2023. CBS News. International press.
- CBS News, 2025. Report on the resumption of Israeli operations in Gaza, 18 March 2025. CBS News. International press.
- CNN, 2024. Israeli lawmakers vote overwhelmingly against Palestinian statehood, challenging US policy. CNN, 18 July 2024. International press.
- COGAT, 2026. Gaza Aid Data portal: the truck-level entry record and the Aid Data dashboard, with Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire, October 2025 to June 2026 (9 July 2026) and FAQ: Humanitarian efforts into Gaza (June 2026). Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel Ministry of Defense. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/mainhome/. Official or primary record (a party’s own count).
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, February 29th, 2024. idf.il. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-at-war/briefings-by-idf-spokesperson-bg-effie-defrin/february-24-press-briefings/press-briefing-by-idf-spokesperson-rear-admiral-daniel-hagari-february-29th-2024/. Official or primary record (a party’s own count).
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations. idf.il, dated 19 February 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/a-broken-record-on-repeat-major-ceasefire-violations/. Official or primary record (a party’s own characterisation).
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. Iran-Israel War 2026 Live Updates (March 13, 2026). idf.il. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/iran-israel-war-2026/live-updates-iran-israel-war-2026/march-13-2026-iran-israel-war-2026-live-updates/. Official or primary record (a party’s own count).
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions, updated to 8 December 2023. gov.il. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023. Official or primary record (a party’s own position and counts).
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects, updated to 2 November 2023. gov.il. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023/en/English_Documents_Hamas-Israel%20Conflict%202023%20-%20Some%20Factual%20and%20Legal%20Aspects%20-%20Israel%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20(2%20NOV%202023).pdf. Official or primary record (a party’s own legal position).
- Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission of Israel to the Multilateral Organizations in France, 2025. Israel’s Objectives and Current Operation, last updated 17 September 2025. https://embassies.gov.il/multilateral-organizations-france/en/news/israels-objectives-and-current-operation. Official or primary record (a party’s own counts).
- United Nations Security Council, 2025. Resolution 2803 (2025), with the annexed Comprehensive Plan. S/RES/2803 (2025). Official or primary record (instrument).