How Many Times Has Israel Violated the Gaza Ceasefire? Reading the Mandated Report, the Endorsed Text and Each Party’s Own Record

The Board of Peace filed the only report that Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) requires on the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire on 15 May 2026. It states that “violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious,” and publishes no total, no rate and no attribution to either party. Gaza’s Ministry of Health recorded 1,359 people killed after the ceasefire took effect, as of 10 September 2026. That is a party’s own count, not independently verified, and it counts deaths rather than breaches. The Israel Defense Forces publish a dated list of incidents that they attribute to Hamas alone, with no total. The resolution itself uses the word “violation” zero times.

Key Findings

• The Board of Peace’s report of 15 May 2026 is the only report filed under resolution 2803 (2025). It covers 17 November 2025 to 14 May 2026 and says violations occur “on a near daily basis.” It gives no number and names no party. This is the Board’s own account of its own implementation (Board of Peace, 2026).
• Resolution 2803 (2025) was adopted on 17 November 2025 by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. It uses the word “violation” zero times, defines no breach, and gives no body a duty to count one (United Nations Security Council, 2025).
• Gaza’s Ministry of Health recorded 1,359 people killed and 4,571 injured since the ceasefire in its report of 10 September 2026. It listed 831 people recovered from the rubble as a separate line. These are the ministry’s own counts as a party to the war and are not independently verified (Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2024 to 2026).
• The Israel Defense Forces page of incidents, dated 19 February 2026, carried 61 dated headings when read on 10 September 2026. Every heading concerns conduct the IDF attributes to Hamas and Palestinian armed groups, and the page states no total. It is a party’s own characterisation (Israel Defense Forces, 2026).
• COGAT recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza from 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026. This is its own reported count as a party to the events, resting on suppliers’ self-declaration (COGAT, 2026).

How many times has Israel breached the ceasefire, on the record?

The Board of Peace filed the only report that resolution 2803 (2025) requires on 15 May 2026. It wrote that “violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious.” The reporting window ran from 17 November 2025 to 14 May 2026. Across that window, the phrase is the report’s entire quantification of breaches: it gives no total, no rate, no denominator and no attribution to Israel or any other party.

Paragraph 7 of the report reads in full:

“Seven months into the ceasefire, the guns have largely fallen silent across Gaza for the first time in two years. This is a remarkable achievement that must be preserved. Nevertheless, violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious, and their human consequences, civilians killed, families living in fear, and continued impediments to humanitarian access, cannot be minimized. The Board of Peace and the guarantors have actively engaged all parties to reduce violations and ensure the protection of civilians.”

The phrase “civilians killed” carries no number either. Paragraph 5 records that “The ceasefire has held despite considerable challenges and violations during the reporting period.” Paragraph 11 states that “every violation, from whatever quarter, risks unraveling what has been painstakingly built.” “Near daily” is a frequency without a unit, a start date or a party attached. No total can be built from it.

The report’s provenance travels with it. The Board of Peace is the transitional administration the resolution created, and it is chaired by the President of the United States. The report reached the Council as the annex to a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States, which is one of the four guarantors. It is therefore the Board’s own account of its own implementation, not a neutral or verified assessment. Paragraph 3 names “Hamas’ refusal to accept verified decommissioning” as the principal obstacle. That attribution is the Board’s own, and it concerns decommissioning, not a count of breaches.

On the mandated reporter’s own words, the premise behind the question holds in its general form: the ceasefire has been breached repeatedly, and some breaches are serious. What the mandated record does not contain is a number of breaches assigned to Israel.

The totals most often quoted come from the Gaza Government Media Office. That office belongs to the authority governing Gaza, so it is a party to the war. Its running counts reach readers through Al Jazeera, Middle East Eye and The New Arab. As of 10 September 2026, no publication of those totals on any Palestinian government host had been located, and they remain that office’s own counts, not independently verified. A fuller reading of what the instrument defines sets out the terms these counts are measured against.

Who in Gaza counts the ceasefire’s toll, and since when?

Gaza’s Ministry of Health recorded 1,359 people killed since the ceasefire in its daily statistical report of 10 September 2026 (message 7607). This is the ministry’s own count as a party to the war and is not independently verified. The ministry runs the series from 11 October, the date it gives for the ceasefire, and publishes it alongside its cumulative war totals.

The same report records 4,571 injuries since the ceasefire. It lists 831 people recovered from the rubble as a separate line, and its cumulative totals for the whole war stand at 73,670 killed and 174,682 injured. The ministry’s own website has published no file since 21 October 2023, so the daily report appears only on its media office channel. The ministry’s published lists and completeness statements set out what those totals include.

The parties date the ceasefire a day apart. The Israel Defense Forces state that “On Friday, October 10th, 2025, at 12:00 PM, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas came into effect” (Israel Defense Forces, 2026). In the Security Council’s verbatim record of 17 November 2025, Denmark stated that “the ceasefire entered into force on 10 October” (United Nations Security Council, 2025). The ministry’s series therefore opens one day after the start date recorded on the Israeli side and at the Council.

On the ministry’s record, the directional claim holds. The authority in Gaza publishes a running, dated count of people killed and injured after the ceasefire took effect, and the count rises through the period. The Board of Peace’s phrase “civilians killed” points the same way and supplies no number of its own (Board of Peace, 2026).

The ministry’s scope statements travel with its figures. On 7 January 2024 (message 4739), it stated that several groups are not counted:

• the missing and bodies under rubble
• the unidentified who reached hospitals
• the unidentified whose bodies Israel handed over
• those buried by their families without passing through a hospital

That statement has never been withdrawn. The 831 recovered from the rubble appear as their own line in the 10 September 2026 report, and the report does not say whether they overlap with the 1,359.

Is a count of the dead a count of violations?

The 1,359 deaths that Gaza’s Ministry of Health records since the ceasefire are a count of people. On the ministry’s own definition of 24 July 2024, its general count is everyone who reached the hospitals. It is a party’s count, not independently verified. One strike can kill several people, and a breach of the terms can kill no one, so the figure contains no count of incidents.

The ministry also changes its cumulative total through administrative approval rather than new deaths. During August 2026 it added 160 records (message 7600), attributed to a “لجنة اعتماد الشهداء” (martyrs’ approval committee). Earlier, it added 233 records on 23 March 2025 and 280 on 30 August 2025, described as records completed and approved by a judicial committee. These additions raise the war total. The ministry does not place them inside or outside the ceasefire window.

The date attached to each death is also soft. On 29 July 2024 (message 5663), the ministry explained that the date of death was registered either on the family’s report or on the date the body reached the hospital. A committee was then formed to audit the actual date. Any line drawn between deaths before and after 11 October rests on that recording practice (Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2024 to 2026).

The other published records measure different objects again. The Board of Peace counts no incidents at all. The Israel Defense Forces list incidents but state no total.

Source: Board of Peace, 2026; Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2024 to 2026 (party’s own counts, not independently verified); Israel Defense Forces, 2026 (party’s own list).

The five rows have five different units: a frequency, deaths, recovered bodies, administrative records and page headings. None of them converts into another. Adding the 831 to the 1,359, subtracting it, or folding in the committee additions would mix objects the ministry itself keeps apart.

Why does the Security Council framework produce no violation total?

Resolution 2803 (2025) is the Security Council’s endorsement of the Gaza plan, dated 17 November 2025. It uses the word “violation” zero times, in its operative paragraphs and in the annexed Comprehensive Plan alike (United Nations Security Council, 2025). It defines no breach, names no body to find one, and attaches no consequence to one.

The Council adopted the text at its 10046th meeting by 13 votes in favour and none against, with China and the Russian Federation abstaining (S/PV.10046). A case-insensitive search of the four-page text also returns zero occurrences of “breach,” “enforce” and “sanction.” “Ceasefire” appears three times in the operative paragraphs and zero times in Annex 1. Annex 1, point 3, instead provides that “all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.”

The monitoring mandate is a single clause. Operative paragraph 7 has the International Stabilization Force “assist the BoP in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza,” with no duty to count, classify, attribute or publish. Operative paragraph 10 is the only reporting duty: it “Requests the BoP provide a written report on progress related to the above to the UN Security Council every six months.”

The instrument asked for a progress report, and the Board filed one. The absence of a violations series is the text working as drafted. The only “independent monitors” in the instrument appear at Annex 1, point 13, and they supervise weapons decommissioning, not the ceasefire.

The monitoring body was not yet deployed. Seven months in, the Board reported that for the ISF “Preparations for deployment are well advanced” and that “Deployments are anticipated in phases” (Board of Peace, 2026, paragraphs 37 and 38). A second report was due around 15 November 2026 and did not exist as of 10 September 2026. The record therefore holds one reporting period, and no trend can be drawn from it.

Does Israel publish a count of breaches by either side?

The Israel Defense Forces publish no total. Their page “A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations,” dated 19 February 2026, carried 61 dated headings when read on 10 September 2026. Each heading is a press release on an incident the IDF attributes to Hamas. The 61 are headings on one page on one date, the IDF’s own characterisation as a party, not a count of violations.

The page describes its contents as “IDF press releases addressing each ceasefire violation by Hamas since the start of the agreement.” The entries run from 19 October 2025 to 14 February 2026. The page states no total, no monthly rate and no casualty figure, and it makes no claim to be complete.

Its test of a breach is the IDF’s own, quoted verbatim: “All these activities constitute a clear violation of the understandings of the ceasefire, and the IDF has been responding in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, eliminating terrorists who pose a threat to our troops and citizens of Israel.” That threshold comes from the IDF, not from resolution 2803 (2025) or its annexed Plan, which set none. The page records no breach by Israel.

The page’s own dates do not run in order. Nineteen entries in the November block are stamped with dates from 8 to 29 November 2026. They sit between October 2025 and December 2025 entries, on a page dated 19 February 2026, so they are November 2025 entries carrying the wrong year. A timeline built from the printed dates would place nineteen incidents nine months after the page was published (Israel Defense Forces, 2026).

The one-directional format has a precedent in Israel’s own record. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015), in chapter VI of its report on the 2014 Gaza conflict, published a table it called “non-exhaustive” of eight ceasefires and suspensions in July and August 2014. It attributed each breach to Hamas and stated that Hamas “consistently rejected proposed ceasefire agreements, violated coordinated ceasefires, and exploited unilateral IDF ceasefires.”

Taken together, the published records count in opposite directions:

• Gaza’s Ministry of Health counts people killed after the ceasefire. Its counts are a party’s own and are not independently verified.
• The IDF lists incidents it attributes to Hamas.

Neither party publishes a tally covering conduct on both sides.

Where is the line most breaches are measured against?

The Israel Defense Forces’ entry of 20 October 2025 sets the pattern for the page. It describes “several terrorists who crossed the yellow line and approached IDF troops operating in the Shejaiya area, posing an immediate threat to them.” That is a party’s own wording (Israel Defense Forces, 2026). Resolution 2803 (2025) and its annexed Plan never name a yellow line.

The same entry continues: “The troops fired toward the terrorists who crossed the yellow line in order to remove the threat to them.” The entry for 22 November carries a variant on a designated route: “Another Violation of the Ceasefire Agreement: An Armed Terrorist Crossed the Yellow Line on a Humanitarian Route, Fired at IDF Soldiers, And Was Eliminated.” That entry is printed with a 2026 year that its position on the page places in 2025. The words “terrorist,” “eliminated” and “immediate threat” are the IDF’s own.

The endorsed text is less specific. Annex 1, point 3, states that “Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release,” and that “battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal” (United Nations Security Council, 2025). Point 15 adds that “A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.” Neither the resolution nor the annex gives the line a name, a map or coordinates.

The yellow line is therefore an implementation artefact of the parties. No published instrument defining or mapping it was located in the official records searched on 10 September 2026. This includes the documents issued under resolution 2803 (2025) in the United Nations Official Document System and Israel’s government and military sites.

The missing line affects both directions of the dispute:

• The IDF’s entries. Most of them turn on a person approaching or crossing the line.
• Gaza-side accounts. Accounts of people shot near the line turn on where the line runs.

Without a published line, an approach, a crossing or a shooting near it cannot be scored against a text that either party has released. The Board of Peace states that the Civil-Military Coordination Centre, established on 17 October 2025 with 50 partner nations and organizations, “has served as the principal operational mechanism” for coordination (Board of Peace, 2026, paragraph 28). Its report publishes no map of the line.

Does the counting rule change who appears to break a truce?

Kanwisher, Haushofer and Biletzki (2009) counted killings only. Their Huffington Post commentary, which contained original analysis but was not peer-reviewed, found that 79% of conflict pauses between September 2000 and October 2008 were interrupted when Israel killed a Palestinian. The finding measures order in time, not legal responsibility, and covers no arrangement after 2008.

The authors defined a conflict pause as one or more days with no killing on either side, and they drew their data from B’Tselem’s fatality records. Of the remaining pauses, 8% were interrupted by Palestinian attacks and 13% by both sides on the same day. Rocket and mortar fire that killed no one does not register in this count.

A count of projectiles orders the same events differently. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2008), an Israeli research institute publishing its own count, recorded 329 rockets and mortar shells during the six-month lull of 2008, most of them after 4 November. It recorded 2,278 in the six months before. The Center describes 4 November as the date “the IDF carried out a military action close to the border security fence on the Gazan side to prevent an abduction planned by Hamas.” Its later tally gives a different total for the same lull: 362, including 324 from 4 November to 19 December (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009).

The peer-reviewed literature finds retaliation in both directions. Haushofer, Biletzki and Kanwisher (2010, PNAS) report that “the firing of Palestinian rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians.” They also report that “the probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel.” Golan and Rosenblatt (2011) critiqued that analysis in the same journal. Jaeger and Paserman (2008, American Economic Review, figures from the abstract) found “evidence of Granger causality from Palestinian to Israeli violence, but not vice versa” and “no evidence” of “a predictable ‘tit-for-tat’ cycle of violence.” Granger causality is a test of whether one series helps predict another.

The history of earlier Gaza truces carries these episodes in full. The unit chosen, killings or projectiles, shapes which side registers first, and every current total rests on such a choice.

What does Israel count during the ceasefire instead of breaches?

COGAT is the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit for the territories. Its July 2026 ceasefire report records 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026. This is its own reported count as a party to the events and is not independently verified (COGAT, 2026). Israel’s published ceasefire record counts aid entries, not incidents.

The same report records 18,000 tons of medical supplies and medicines since 10 October 2025. It also records more than 70,000 cubic meters of water a day supplied through external lines and desalination facilities, excluding local wells.

The method behind the tonnage is stated in the report itself. The figures rest on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private suppliers, not on weighing at the crossings. COGAT reports that food entry ran “nearly threefold” the World Food Programme’s monthly requirement benchmark. In that ratio only the numerator is COGAT’s own; the benchmark belongs to the World Food Programme.

The breach claim has an access component, and the mandated report addresses it only in words. Paragraph 7 of the Board of Peace report lists “continued impediments to humanitarian access” among the human consequences of violations and gives no number for them (Board of Peace, 2026). Elsewhere, the Board reports aid distributed by United Nations agencies and partners from 17 November 2025.

The two aid records differ in three respects:

• Measuring body. COGAT is a party to the events; the Board is the transitional administration.
• Object counted. COGAT counts tonnage entering Gaza; the Board counts aid distributed by UN agencies and partners.
• Start date. COGAT counts from 10 October 2025; the Board from 17 November 2025.

The two are not summed or compared here.

On access, the record therefore holds a party’s tonnage on one side and an unquantified phrase in the mandated report on the other. COGAT’s report sets its figures against the food requirement, not against any list of incidents. Paragraph 7 names impediments without listing, dating or attributing them. Neither record contains a unit that the other could be counted against, so no breach total for access can be built from the two.

Methodology and limitations

The evidence comes from four types of source, each labelled by type in the text.

• Primary instruments. These are resolution 2803 (2025) with its annexed Plan and the recorded vote in S/PV.10046, read from the Official Document System. Word counts come from a case-insensitive search of the full four-page text.
• The mandated report. This is S/2026/418 of 15 May 2026, written by the Board of Peace and transmitted by the United States. It is a party’s account of its own implementation.
• Party records. These are the Gaza Ministry of Health’s daily statistical report and statements, the Israel Defense Forces incident page, and COGAT’s July 2026 situation report. Each is a party’s own count or characterisation, none independently verified.
  • The ministry’s figures were read from its media office channel by message number, because its website has published no file since 21 October 2023.
  • The IDF page was read on 10 September 2026, and its 61 headings are a count of that page on that date.
• Research on earlier truces. This covers peer-reviewed articles in PNAS and the American Economic Review (the latter abstract-sourced), a 2009 commentary with original analysis that was not peer-reviewed, and the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center’s own counts. All of it covers arrangements up to 2008 and measures ordering in time, not legal responsibility.

The following were searched on 10 September 2026 and carried no ceasefire-violation series:

• the Official Document System, for documents issued under resolution 2803 (2025)
• Israeli government and military sites
• the Gaza ministry’s portal

The Gaza Government Media Office’s running totals were not located on any Palestinian government host.

Several limits apply to the figures. The ministry dates the ceasefire to 11 October and Israeli and Council records to 10 October 2025. The ministry’s date of death rests on family reports or hospital arrival. The IDF page misprints nineteen dates. Only one Board report exists, so no trend across reporting periods is available.

Conclusion

So how many times has Israel violated the Gaza ceasefire? On the only record the Security Council required, the answer is “on a near daily basis.” That phrase comes from a body that is a party to the arrangement it reports on, and it assigns no breach to Israel or to anyone else.

The measured portrait is consistent across every axis this record covers:

• The instrument uses “violation” zero times and asks only for progress reports.
• Gaza’s Ministry of Health records 1,359 people killed since the ceasefire. That is its own count as a party, not independently verified, and it counts people rather than breaches.
• The Israel Defense Forces list 61 headings of incidents attributed to Hamas alone. That is a party’s own page, with no total and with dates printed in the wrong year.
• The line that most incidents turn on appears in no published text.
• Kanwisher, Haushofer and Biletzki (2009), counting killings, and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2008), counting projectiles as its own tally, show that the unit decides which side appears to move first: 79% of pauses ended with an Israeli killing on one count, against a sharp rise in rocket fire after 4 November 2008 on the other.

Each record is real, and none of them counts what the question asks for.

A ceasefire endorsed by 13 Council votes has now run for nearly a year. During that time the only bodies keeping a tally were the parties, each counting the other’s conduct in its own unit. The frozen line had no map, and the force mandated to help monitor it was still assembling. When a public argument about who broke a truce rests on counts that cannot be set against one another, what exactly is being held to account: the conduct on the ground, or the choice of what to count?

Frequently Asked Questions

Which Gaza ceasefire does this concern?

It concerns the arrangement in force from 10 October 2025, which the Security Council endorsed in resolution 2803 (2025). An earlier agreement had a first phase that ended on 1 March 2025. Fighting resumed on 18 March 2025, when Israel’s prime minister’s office cited Hamas’s “repeated refusals to release its hostages” and Hamas said the government had “decided to overturn the ceasefire agreement” (CBS News, 2025).

Who chairs the Board of Peace that files the reports?

Annex 1, point 9, of the endorsed Plan names President Trump as head of the Board. None of the operative paragraphs the Council itself wrote names the chair (United Nations Security Council, 2025). The Board’s Charter was signed by its Chairman on 16 January 2026 and launched at Davos on 22 January 2026 with 28 Heads of State as Members (Board of Peace, 2026).

Which states have committed to the stabilization force?

Five states signed the Declaration of Founding Contributors to the International Stabilization Force on 19 February 2026: Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco (Board of Peace, 2026). The Board reported that troop contributors completed a pre-deployment site survey in late April 2026.

How long does the Security Council mandate run?

Operative paragraph 8 keeps the Board and the authorized presences in place “until Dec. 31, 2027, subject to further action by the Council” (United Nations Security Council, 2025). At a six-monthly reporting rate, that span allows for a small number of further progress reports.

What happened to the hostages under the ceasefire terms?

The Board of Peace reports that 168 of the 251 people taken captive on 7 October 2023 were returned alive. The last living hostage was returned on 13 October 2025 and the last deceased hostage on 26 January 2026 (Board of Peace, 2026). In the same exchange, Israel released 250 life-sentence prisoners and some 1,700 Gazans detained after 7 October 2023.

Has the Council called for a Gaza ceasefire before?

Resolution 1860, adopted on 8 January 2009 by 14 votes to none with the United States abstaining, called for “an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire” (United Nations Security Council, 2009). Like resolution 2803 (2025), it named no body to count breaches.

Did the November 2023 pause end in competing breach claims?

The pause began on 24 November 2023. When it ended, the IDF stated that “Hamas violated the operational pause and in addition, fired toward Israeli territory” (CBS News, 2023). During the pause 105 hostages were freed, along with some 240 Palestinian prisoners on the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club’s count.

Sources

• Board of Peace, 2026. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. S/2026/418, 15 May 2026. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2026/418&l=E&t=pdf. Official record (party’s own account).
• CBS News, 2023. Report of 1 December 2023 on the end of the operational pause in Gaza. CBS News. News report.
• CBS News, 2025. Report of 18 March 2025 on the resumption of fighting after the first phase of the ceasefire. CBS News. News report.
• COGAT, 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, July 2026. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/e2gjueei/humanitarian-situation-report-during-the-ceasefire-cogat-july-2026.pdf. Official record (party’s own count).
• Golan, D., and Rosenblatt, J. D., 2011. Critique of Haushofer, Biletzki and Kanwisher. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(15). DOI 10.1073/pnas.1016378108. Peer-reviewed.
• Haushofer, J., Biletzki, A., and Kanwisher, N., 2010. Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(42), 17927 to 17932. DOI 10.1073/pnas.1012115107. Peer-reviewed.
• Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2008. The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement. 19 December 2008. terrorism-info.org.il/en/18366. Research institute (its own count).
• Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009. Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008. 1 January 2009. Research institute (its own count).
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations. Page dated 19 February 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/a-broken-record-on-repeat-major-ceasefire-violations/. Official record (party’s own characterisation).
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, chapter VI, paragraphs 394 to 396. Official record (party’s own account).
• Jaeger, D. A., and Paserman, M. D., 2008. The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. American Economic Review 98(4), 1591 to 1604. DOI 10.1257/aer.98.4.1591. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
• Kanwisher, N., Haushofer, J., and Biletzki, A., 2009. Reigniting Violence: How Do Ceasefires End? The Huffington Post, 6 February 2009. Commentary with original analysis, not peer-reviewed.
• Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2024 to 2026. Daily statistical reports, completeness statements and approval notices, ministry media office channel, messages 4739, 5663, 7600 and 7607. https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza. Official record (party’s own count, not independently verified).
• United Nations Security Council, 2009. Resolution 1860 (2009), 8 January 2009, with recorded vote in S/PV.6063. Primary instrument and recorded vote.
• United Nations Security Council, 2025. Resolution 2803 (2025), endorsing the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, with the Plan as Annex 1; recorded vote in S/PV.10046, 17 November 2025. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2803(2025). Primary instrument and recorded vote.