The document universally called the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire is United Nations Security Council resolution 2803 (2025), and a case-insensitive search of its full 4-page text returns the word “violation” zero times, along with zero occurrences of “breach,” “enforce” and “sanction,” verified 10 September 2026. A reader asking how many times the ceasefire has been violated is asking a question in three parts, and the record answers none of them the way the question expects: the instrument defines no violation, the force given its one monitoring clause had not deployed seven months in, and the Board of Peace reported in May 2026 only that violations “continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious.” Each party publishes its own count instead, on its own threshold, and the two do not date the ceasefire from the same day.
Key Findings
- The endorsed instrument uses the word “violation” zero times. A case-insensitive search of the full 4-page text of United Nations Security Council resolution 2803 (2025), covering the 11 operative paragraphs and its annex, returns zero occurrences of “violation,” zero of “breach,” zero of “enforce” and zero of “sanction,” verified 10 September 2026. The annexed Comprehensive Plan states no threshold either.
- 13 in favour, none against, 2 abstaining. The Security Council recorded that tally when it adopted resolution 2803 (2025) on 17 November 2025 at its 10046th meeting, with China and the Russian Federation abstaining, 38 days after the ceasefire entered into force.
- 4 signatories, 0 belligerents. The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, signed at Sharm el-Sheikh on 13 October 2025, carries the names of the heads of state of the United States, Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The Office of the Federal Register published it as a joint statement, and Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and every other Palestinian body are absent from the signature block.
- The one mandated report gives a phrase and no figure. The Board of Peace reported in S/2026/418 of 15 May 2026, the only report resolution 2803 (2025) requires and the only one filed, that “violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious,” with no total, no rate, no denominator and no attribution to a party. It is that body’s own account of its own implementation.
- Each party publishes its own count, and neither counts violations. The Israel Defense Forces published 61 dated entries and no total on the page read on 10 September 2026, Israel’s own characterisation of the other party’s conduct on Israel’s own test; the Gaza Ministry of Health recorded 1,359 martyrs and 4,571 injuries since the ceasefire in its daily report of the same date, that ministry’s own registry count as a party to the war and not independently verified.
What document is the Gaza ceasefire agreement?
The Security Council recorded 13 votes in favour, none against and 2 abstaining, China and the Russian Federation, when it adopted resolution 2803 (2025) on 17 November 2025, endorsing the Comprehensive Plan of 29 September 2025 in full as its annex. The ceasefire itself had entered into force 38 days earlier.
The Council put the endorsement in one sentence. Operative paragraph 1 reads, verbatim: “Endorses the Comprehensive Plan, acknowledges the parties have accepted it, and calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety, including maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay.” The Security Council recorded the tally in the verbatim record of its 10046th meeting, where the President stated that the draft “received 13 votes in favour, none against and 2 abstentions.”
Denmark stated in that same record that “the ceasefire entered into force on 10 October.” The instrument carrying the ceasefire’s only international endorsement was adopted five weeks after the ceasefire took effect, and the Plan it endorses was published seven weeks before that.
The resolution runs to 11 operative paragraphs and one annex, 4 pages in all, and the annexed Comprehensive Plan states 20 numbered points. Paragraph 2 establishes the Board of Peace “as a transitional administration with international legal personality.” Paragraph 7 authorises a temporary International Stabilization Force. Paragraph 8 decides that both “shall remain authorized until Dec. 31, 2027,” printed in that abbreviated American form.
Two texts sit inside one document and they do not read alike. Paragraph 2 restates points 9, 19 and 20 of the Plan and changes their wording, so which of the two is being quoted is a question every sentence about this instrument has to answer.
Did either side at war sign anything?
4 signatories, and not one of them a party to the war. The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, signed at Sharm el-Sheikh on 13 October 2025, carries the names of the heads of state of the United States, Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. Israel is not a signatory, and neither is Hamas, the Palestinian Authority nor any Palestinian body.
The Trump Declaration states no ceasefire term, names no monitoring body, creates no enforcement provision, defines no violation and carries no figure of any kind. It runs to 11 short paragraphs, about 480 words, and its nearest thing to an operative clause commits the signatories to “the resolution of future disputes through diplomatic engagement and negotiation rather than through force or protracted conflict.”
The Security Council recorded what the four states did, in the preamble of resolution 2803 (2025): they played “the constructive role” of “having facilitated the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.” Facilitation is what the record credits them with. A signature by the belligerents appears nowhere this report could locate.
Two official United States texts of the Declaration exist and they differ. The Office of the Federal Register published the permanent record, package DCPD-202501008 in the Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, and titles it a joint statement; the White House posting files the same text under Presidential Actions and types it a presidential memorandum. The two also print the fourth signatory’s name differently. This report quotes the Federal Register package.
The Office of the Federal Register states its own caveat beneath that text, verbatim: “NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this joint statement.” The note travels with every quotation taken from it.
What does the Plan require the parties to stop?
The word “ceasefire” appears 3 times in the operative paragraphs of resolution 2803 (2025) and 0 times in the Plan annexed to it. The Comprehensive Plan states instead, at point 3, that “all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen” once both sides accept the proposal.
The full clause is the obligation, so it is quoted rather than summarised. Point 3 reads: “If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.”
Three things follow from that wording. The obligation is a suspension of operations and a frozen line, not a defined state called a ceasefire. It is conditional on both sides agreeing to the proposal. And it runs only until a further condition is met, the complete staged withdrawal, whose conditions the point does not enumerate.
The line the clause turns on is “the agreed upon line,” and the Comprehensive Plan states neither where it lies nor who draws it. So the document that ended the fighting describes an end to operations, and the document that endorsed it describes a ceasefire. The word entered the record through the Council’s endorsement seven weeks after the Plan was published, which is why quoting the Plan for the terms and the resolution for the characterisation is a matter of accuracy rather than style.
How often does the endorsed instrument use the word violation?
Zero occurrences of “violation” appear anywhere in resolution 2803 (2025), on a case-insensitive search of its full 4-page text verified 10 September 2026, alongside zero of “breach,” zero of “enforce” and zero of “sanction,” in the 11 operative paragraphs and in the annexed Plan alike.
Four consequences follow, and each is a property of the text rather than a finding about conduct. The instrument defines no violation. It sets no threshold at which conduct becomes one. It names no body to find that one has occurred. And it attaches no consequence to one having occurred.
The words the instrument does use are hortatory. Operative paragraph 1 “calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety, including maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay.” The Comprehensive Plan states at point 14 that “a guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations,” and states at point 15 that “a deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.” A guarantee still to be provided and a mechanism still to be agreed are future undertakings, and neither is a test anyone can apply to an incident.
The only date the instrument fixes for itself is its own expiry, printed as “Dec. 31, 2027.” It sets no reporting date for compliance, no register of incidents, no format and no addressee for a complaint.
That is not the answer the question anticipates. Asking how many times an agreement has been violated is asking for a count produced by applying a rule to a set of events. The rule is the part that is not in the document.
Who is named to find a violation?
One clause in resolution 2803 (2025) names anybody to watch the ceasefire at all. Operative paragraph 7(A) provides that the International Stabilization Force shall “assist the BoP in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza,” with no duty to count, classify, attribute or publish, and that force had not deployed 7 months in.
The Board of Peace reported the force’s status itself. It records at paragraph 37 of S/2026/418 that “preparations for deployment are well advanced” and that the force “operates under the unified command of the United States,” and records at paragraph 38 that it “supports ceasefire monitoring” while “efforts are ongoing in force generation and deployment.” The Board of Peace records at paragraph 39 that the Declaration of Founding Contributors was signed on 19 February 2026 by 5 Member States, Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco, and that a pre-deployment site survey by troop contributors was completed in late April 2026.
An authority is not an activity: paragraph 7(A) creates a monitoring mandate, and the body holding it was still being assembled at the six-month mark.
The only “independent monitors” anywhere in the instrument are pointed somewhere else entirely. The Comprehensive Plan states both occurrences at point 13, and both attach to weapons decommissioning: there is to be “a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors,” with weapons placed “permanently beyond use” and the process “verified by the independent monitors.” It does not say who they are, who appoints them, what they publish or to whom, and it does not point them at the ceasefire.
So the monitoring architecture is one assisting clause for the ceasefire and a supervisory role for disarmament, and neither produces a public finding that a given incident was a violation of anything.
What did the only required report say about violations?
S/2026/418, the only report resolution 2803 (2025) requires and the only one filed, quantifies violations in a phrase with no figure in it: “violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious.” The Board of Peace published it on 15 May 2026, covering 17 November 2025 to 14 May 2026.
The sentence is quoted whole because a paraphrase invites a reader to supply arithmetic the source refuses. Paragraph 7 reads: “Seven months into the ceasefire, the guns have largely fallen silent across Gaza for the first time in two years. This is a remarkable achievement that must be preserved. Nevertheless, violations continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious, and their human consequences, civilians killed, families living in fear, and continued impediments to humanitarian access, cannot be minimized.”
There is no total in it, no rate, no denominator, no period breakdown and no attribution to a party, and “civilians killed” carries no number either. The Board of Peace states at paragraph 11 that “every violation, from whatever quarter, risks unraveling what has been painstakingly built.” From whatever quarter is as close as the document comes to naming who.
Operative paragraph 10 requests “a written report on progress” every six months, so the absence is the instrument working as drafted rather than anything withheld.
The Board of Peace is the transitional administration resolution 2803 (2025) created, chaired by the President of the United States, and the report reached the Council as the annex to a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States, one of the four guarantors. It is that body’s own account of its own implementation, not a neutral or independently verified assessment. A second report fell due around 15 November 2026 and does not yet exist, so no trend across reporting periods can be drawn from one filing.
Israel’s own violation page carries 61 entries and no total
61 dated entries and no total sit on the Israel Defense Forces page titled A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations, dated 19.02.26 and read on 10 September 2026, running from 19 October 2025 to 14 February 2026. That is a count of the headings on one page on one date, and it is Israel’s own characterisation of the other party’s conduct.
The Israel Defense Forces published it as a compilation rather than a tally. The page states that the entries below “are IDF press releases addressing each ceasefire violation by Hamas since the start of the agreement.” It states no monthly rate, no denominator and no casualty figure, and it makes no claim to be complete.
Its threshold is the publisher’s own, stated in a single sentence: “All these activities constitute a clear violation of the understandings of the ceasefire, and the IDF has been responding in accordance with the ceasefire agreement.” The understandings of the ceasefire is not a phrase in resolution 2803 (2025) or in the annexed Plan, neither of which sets any test, so the page applies a test of its own making.
The entries record incidents attributed to Hamas and Palestinian armed groups and record none by Israel. The Israel Defense Forces reported on 20 October 2025, in a representative entry, that “the IDF identified several terrorists who crossed the yellow line and approached IDF troops operating in the Shejaiya area, posing an immediate threat to them.” The words terrorists, eliminated and immediate threat are the publisher’s own, quoted here and not adopted.
One defect bears on anything built from the page. Nineteen entries in the November block are stamped 2026 while sitting between entries stamped October 2025 and December 2025, which is before November 2026 existed, so no November date here can be quoted with its printed year and no chronology should rest on it.
Does any Palestinian government host publish a violation count?
0 series located. A search run on 10 September 2026 covered moh.gov.ps, the Official Document System for every document issued under resolution 2803 (2025), centcom.mil, war.gov and defense.gov, and gov.il, mfa.gov.il and idf.il, and found no ceasefire-violation series published on any Palestinian government host.
The Gaza Government Media Office published the totals most often quoted, 1,244 violations in the first phase and roughly 2,400 over six months, and Al Jazeera, Middle East Eye and The New Arab report them onward. No publication of either figure on a Palestinian government host was located on the search date, and neither is carried here as a measured or independently verified count.
The Gaza health ministry’s own portal is the clearest case. Its media library was paged in full on 10 September 2026 and holds 2,536 documents, the newest dated 21 October 2023, and its page of cumulative statistics is an empty shell dated 10 May 2023. The Ministry of Health publishes daily, but not there.
| Publishing body | What it publishes, and on what threshold | Publishes a total? |
|---|---|---|
| Board of Peace, S/2026/418, 15 May 2026 | Violations occurring “on a near daily basis, some of which are serious,” in its own account of its own implementation | No number of any kind |
| Israel Defense Forces, page dated 19.02.26 | Dated incidents attributed to Hamas and Palestinian armed groups, on the publisher’s own test that they “constitute a clear violation of the understandings of the ceasefire” | No total; 61 entries as read |
| Ministry of Health, Gaza, daily report of 10 September 2026 | Martyrs and injuries in its own registry as a party to the war, with no threshold, classification or attribution alongside | No violation total; 1,359 martyrs since the ceasefire |
Read down the rows: three bodies counting three different objects on three thresholds, none of them the one the question assumes, and no fourth body counting what it asks for.
What does Gaza’s health ministry count during the ceasefire?
1,359 martyrs and 4,571 injuries since the ceasefire appear in the Gaza Ministry of Health’s daily statistical report of 10 September 2026. That is the ministry’s own registry count as a party to the war, self-reported and not independently verified, and it is a count of deaths and injuries rather than of violations: it publishes no threshold, no classification and no attribution alongside it.
The Gaza Ministry of Health recorded in the same report the scale the figure sits inside: 73,670 cumulative martyrs and 174,682 cumulative injuries, with 831 of the post-ceasefire deaths recovered from the rubble.
The ministry’s own exclusions travel with the number, because it published them itself and has never withdrawn them. The Ministry of Health stated five on 7 January 2024: the missing and the bodies trapped under rubble are not counted; the unidentified who reached hospitals are not counted; the unidentified whose bodies Israel handed over are not counted; those buried by their families without passing through a hospital are not counted; and the dead in Gaza and North Gaza after the information system stopped in November 2023 are not counted. What the series is not is a violation series. A death entered in a hospital register is a death. Whether it followed conduct that breached an agreement is a separate determination, and this publisher does not make it, publishes no threshold for making it, and classifies none of the deaths it records by any such cause.
Nor can the two parties’ publications be added or divided into one another: one publishes dated incidents attributed to a single party on a test of its own, the other deaths and injuries on a hospital-arrival and family-notification registry carrying the five exclusions above. The wider set of figures for the territory, and who measures each, is treated in the Institute’s report on the counts each body publishes.
Do the parties date the ceasefire from the same day?
1 day apart, in the parties’ own records. The Israel Defense Forces page states that a ceasefire agreement “came into effect” on “Friday, October 10th, 2025, at 12:00 PM,” Israel’s own dating; the Gaza Ministry of Health records its post-ceasefire series from “the ceasefire of 11 October,” its own.
Three of the four datings in the record agree. COGAT counts “from the start of the ceasefire on 10 October 2025” in its report on the humanitarian situation during the ceasefire. Denmark put entry into force on 10 October in the Security Council’s verbatim record. The Israel Defense Forces page fixes it to the hour on that same day. The Gaza Ministry of Health records its series from a day later.
A day is not a rounding difference when a rate is being computed. Any per-day figure derived from one series would carry a denominator one day different from a per-day figure derived from the other, and the numerators count different objects to begin with. Setting two such quotients side by side would produce a comparison neither publisher’s method supports.
The gap is also a reminder of who is doing the dating. Each of these is a party’s own record of when an obligation it accepted began to run, published by that party: Israel’s own dating in two Israeli publications, the health ministry’s own dating in its own daily report. Neither is wrong on its own terms, and no body reconciles them, because no instrument asked anyone to.
Where a record holds two start dates, an aggregate has to pick one, and picking one is a determination no publisher here has made, which is why every figure in this report carries the body that produced it and the date that body used.
Does the agreement set a quantity of aid?
No tonnage, no truck figure and no delivery schedule appears anywhere in resolution 2803 (2025) or in the Plan annexed to it. The only quantity in the record is 4,200 trucks a week, and it sits not in the instrument but in the Board of Peace’s own report of 15 May 2026, at paragraph 13, where it is labelled a commitment rather than a delivery count.
The Board of Peace reports that during the ceasefire, aid distributed by United Nations agencies and humanitarian partners “increased by over 70 per cent from pre-ceasefire levels, with nearly 300,000 metric tons of aid delivered to people in Gaza,” and that relief and commercial supplies “were scaled up significantly in line with the commitment for 4,200 trucks to enter Gaza on a weekly basis.” The 4,200 is what was committed to. The Board of Peace states nowhere how many entered.
Inside the instrument the humanitarian language is qualitative throughout. Operative paragraph 12, as the Board of Peace records it, “underscores the importance of the full resumption of humanitarian aid.” The one place the operative text sets any standard is paragraph 7, where the stabilization force is to act “consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law.” No tonnage, no truck count, no calorie figure, no schedule.
So a question asking whether enough aid is entering as per the ceasefire agreement has no benchmark inside the agreement to measure against. What exists is a pledge in a progress report, and separate entry counts published by a party at its own crossings, treated at length in the Institute’s report on the enacted aid standard.
A commitment is a statement of intent by the bodies that made it; a delivery count is an enumeration of what crossed. The record holds one of each, from different bodies on different dates, and the instrument the question invokes holds neither.
Methodology
This report reads a record rather than assessing conduct. The questions it answers are what the endorsed instrument defines, who it names, what the report filed under it says and what each publishing body publishes, so every finding is a property of a document rather than a determination about an event.
Three kinds of record are used and no other kind is. The first is the primary instrument and the Council’s own verbatim record of adopting it: resolution 2803 (2025), the Comprehensive Plan annexed to it, and the vote recorded at the 10046th meeting. The second is the report filed under the instrument, S/2026/418 of 15 May 2026, which is the Board of Peace’s own account of its own implementation, transmitted by one of the four guarantors, and labelled that way wherever it is cited. The third is the parties’ own publications: the Israel Defense Forces compilation of ceasefire incidents, the COGAT report on the humanitarian situation during the ceasefire, and the Gaza Ministry of Health daily statistical report, each a party to the war publishing its own count, self-reported and not independently verified, and labelled as such beside its figure.
Nothing is summed across those bodies and nothing is divided by days: they apply different thresholds to different objects over windows beginning on different dates, so any aggregate would be an artefact of the arithmetic.
Where a figure does not exist, the absence is stated with the date the search was run and the hosts it covered, and only where a search was actually run, on 10 September 2026.
Three limitations bear on the reading. The single mandated report is the only one filed, so no trend across reporting periods is available. The Israel Defense Forces page carries nineteen November entries stamped with the wrong year, so no chronology is built on it here. And the Trump Declaration exists in two official United States texts differing in the fourth signatory’s spelling and in document class; the permanent record published by the Office of the Federal Register is the one quoted.
Conclusion
So has Israel violated the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire agreement? The agreement is resolution 2803 (2025), and it does not contain the term the question turns on: no definition of a violation, no threshold, no body named to find one, no consequence attached to one, and the word itself appearing zero times across the operative paragraphs and the annexed Plan alike.
What the record holds is dense, and it points one way. A resolution adopted 13 to none with 2 abstentions, five weeks after the ceasefire took effect. A declaration signed by four heads of state, none of them a belligerent, with nothing in it to breach. A cessation clause that suspends operations and freezes a line the text never draws. A single assisting clause of monitoring, held by a force still being generated at the six-month mark. One mandated report, describing violations on a near daily basis and printing no number. And two parties publishing their own counts of two different objects, on two thresholds, from two start dates a day apart.
A war can be ended by a document that never writes down what breaking it would look like, and this one was. The question typed into a search box asks for a scoreboard; what the record keeps is an endorsement, a pledge, a list and a registry, each maintained by a body with its own reason for maintaining it. When a public question demands a number and no instrument ever created a duty to produce one, whose arithmetic ends up standing in the vacancy, and on whose threshold?
Frequently Asked Questions
Who chairs the Board of Peace, and what is it?
Operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2803 (2025) establishes the Board of Peace “as a transitional administration with international legal personality.” That the President of the United States heads and chairs it is stated in point 9 of the annexed Plan, which the Council endorsed, and in no paragraph the Council wrote. The Board of Peace records that its Charter was signed by its Chairman on 16 January 2026 and launched on 22 January 2026, with 28 Heads of State as Members.
When is the next report on the ceasefire due?
Operative paragraph 10 requires a written report on progress every six months. The Board of Peace published S/2026/418 on 15 May 2026, covering 17 November 2025 to 14 May 2026, so the next fell due around 15 November 2026, and as of 10 September 2026 no second report has been filed.
How long does the Security Council authorisation run?
Operative paragraph 8 decides that the Board of Peace and the international civil and security presences “shall remain authorized until Dec. 31, 2027, subject to further action by the Council.” It is the only date the instrument fixes for itself.
Which states have committed troops to the International Stabilization Force?
The Board of Peace records that the Declaration of Founding Contributors was signed on 19 February 2026 by 5 Member States, Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco. The same report records that a pre-deployment site survey by troop contributors was completed in late April 2026, with force generation still under way.
Why does the yellow line not appear in the agreement?
The instrument says only that “Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line.” The yellow line, which governs almost every incident in the Israel Defense Forces’ own compilation, appears nowhere in resolution 2803 (2025) or in the annexed Plan. It is an implementation artefact of the parties, and no published instrument defining or mapping it was located.
What does the mandated report say about the hostages?
The Board of Peace records that of 251 people taken captive on 7 October 2023, 168 were returned alive, that the last living hostage was returned to Israel on 13 October 2025 and the last deceased hostage on 26 January 2026, and that Israel released 250 prisoners serving life sentences and some 1,700 Gazans detained after 7 October 2023. Those are that body’s own figures in its own report.
Which body coordinates the day-to-day civil and military work?
The Board of Peace records at paragraph 28 of S/2026/418 that the Civil-Military Coordination Centre, established on 17 October 2025, “has served as the principal operational mechanism for this function during the reporting period, involving 50 partner nations and organizations.” The instrument itself does not name that centre.
Where can the text of the Plan be read?
Annex 1 of resolution 2803 (2025) carries the complete text of the 20-point Comprehensive Plan of 29 September 2025, and the machine-readable full text is served by the Official Document System at the symbol S/RES/2803(2025). It is the only address on an official host where the Plan text and the Council’s endorsement sit on the same record.
Sources
- Board of Peace, 2026. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. S/2026/418, 15 May 2026, transmitted as the annex to a letter of the same date from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2026/418&l=E&t=pdf. Official record (the report the instrument requires, filed by the body it created).
- COGAT (the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Israel Ministry of Defense), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/e2gjueei/humanitarian-situation-report-during-the-ceasefire-cogat-july-2026.pdf. Official record, self-reported by a party to the events.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations. Page dated 19.02.26. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/a-broken-record-on-repeat-major-ceasefire-violations/. Official record, a party’s own published characterisation of the other party’s conduct.
- Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2026. Daily statistical report of 10 September 2026, message 7607, and the completeness and exclusion statement of 7 January 2024, message 4739, published through the ministry’s media office channel. https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza. Official record, a party to the war reporting its own count, self-reported and not independently verified.
- United Nations Security Council, 2025. Resolution 2803 (2025), endorsing the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, with the Plan as Annex 1. S/RES/2803 (2025), 17 November 2025; recorded vote in the verbatim record of the 10046th meeting, S/PV.10046. https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2803(2025). Primary instrument and recorded vote.
- United States, Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, 2025. The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, signed at Sharm el-Sheikh, 13 October 2025. Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, DCPD-202501008, Office of the Federal Register and the National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202501008/html/DCPD-202501008.htm. Primary record (a signed joint statement).