What would the right of return do to Israel’s population?

An inflow of about 5.633 million people would bring Israel’s Arab population level with its Jews and Others, on the Central Bureau of Statistics’ count of 10.244 million residents in April 2026, holding everything else fixed. That figure is the Institute’s subtraction from the Bureau’s two group totals. It is the base behind a warning usually stated in one sentence, that return would end the Jewish state, and the question is whether the arithmetic matches the alarm. The only computed scenario on record is a 2008 study by Youssef Courbage, summarized by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies in 2024. It admitted 2 million returnees in stages and still projected 8 million Jews against 4.4 million Palestinians in 2058, while the count of who could claim return sits with UNRWA, the agency the Knesset voted 92 to 10 in 2024 to bar from Israel’s sovereign territory.

Key Findings

• Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2026) counted 10.244 million residents in its preliminary estimate for 22 April 2026: 7.790 million Jews and Others (76%) and 2.157 million Arabs (21.1%). The 5.633 million gap between the two groups is the Institute’s subtraction from those figures.
• Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), a party to the conflict, wrote that “the influx of millions of Palestinians into the State of Israel would threaten the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.” The document gives no projected Jewish share under return.
• The Knesset (2024) passed the law barring UNRWA operations in Israel’s sovereign territory by 92 votes to 10, and the law barring official contact with the agency by 87 to 9, at the sitting of 28 October 2024.
• Hillel Cohen (2002), in a signed article that was not peer-reviewed, put the 1948 refugees who remained inside Israel at “some 25,000 internal refugees … about one sixth of the total Arab population.”
• Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2026) recorded about 21,000 immigrants and about 177,000 births in the 11.75 months to 22 April 2026.

Would return end Israel’s Jewish majority, on today’s count?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics’ preliminary count for 22 April 2026 puts Jews and Others ahead of Arabs by 5.633 million people, on the Institute’s subtraction from the Bureau’s two group totals. That is the inflow at which the two groups would be level if births, deaths, emigration and immigration all stood still. The Bureau’s release models no return scenario, so the figure is a threshold, not a forecast.

The two totals are 7.790 million Jews and Others (76%) and 2.157 million Arabs (21.1%) in a population of 10.244 million. Another 296,000 foreigners (2.9%) make up the remainder. The Bureau defines Arabs as Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze. Others covers non-Arab Christians, members of other religions and those registered as not classified by religion. The estimates are preliminary and rest on the 2022 census. Since 2023 they also include foreigners, so the series is not continuous with earlier years.

A second threshold sits slightly lower. For Jews and Others to fall below half of all residents, the inflow would need to exceed about 5.336 million. That is also the Institute’s arithmetic: twice 7.790 million, less 10.244 million. Both thresholds assume every arrival is counted as Arab and that nothing else changes.

The size of the population that could claim return is a separate number held by a separate body. UNRWA reports nearly 6 million registered Palestine refugees in 2025. That is the agency’s own administrative registration. It includes descendants and people living in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and it is not a count of people who would move.

The one computed scenario on record comes from outside Israel’s official statistics. Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in 2024 summarized a 2008 study by Youssef Courbage of France’s National Institute for Demographic Studies, which admitted refugees in stages rather than at once. In a scenario of 2 million returnees, the study projected 4.4 million Palestinians against 8 million Jews in 2058. In a scenario of 600,000 returnees, admitted at 41,000 a year for 15 years, it projected 2.9 million against 8 million. On the Institute’s arithmetic, those are shares of about 35% and 27% of the two groups combined. Both are outputs of assumptions about fertility, migration and timing, not observations.

Who says return would end the Jewish state, and since when?

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party to the conflict, wrote on 30 December 2009 that “the influx of millions of Palestinians into the State of Israel would threaten the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.” The Bureau’s count supports the direction of that statement. An inflow of millions, set against a 5.633 million gap, would narrow that gap sharply or close it.

It is often said that a full return would turn Israel into an Arab-majority state, and the Ministry’s document states that view in its strongest form: “the demand to ‘return’ to Israel is nothing more than a euphemism for the demographic destruction of the Jewish state.” The statement appears in the Ministry’s question-and-answer paper “Israel, the Conflict and Peace,” under the question of whether Palestinian refugees have a justifiable right of return.

The Ministry’s base was its own round figure for 2009: “the present population of Israel is approximately 7 million (of whom about one-fifth are Arab-Israelis).” The Bureau’s 2026 count of 10.244 million is more than 3 million larger. The Arab share in that count is 21.1%, still close to the Ministry’s one-fifth. The base the warning was set against has grown since 2009, while its composition has stayed close to the 2009 description.

The document asserts the consequence and does not compute it. It names no number of returnees, no period of arrival and no projected Jewish share. Those three variables decide the outcome in the scenario work summarized by INSS (2024). That work separates a 600,000 intake spread over 15 years from a 2 million intake, and in both cases projects more Jews than Palestinians in 2058.

The difference between the Ministry’s statement and the scenario study is a difference of inputs. “Millions” arriving at once, set against the Bureau’s threshold, reaches parity. Staged intakes of 600,000 or 2 million, run through Courbage’s assumptions, do not. The Ministry’s 2009 paper and the 2008 scenario are the two dated, named positions on what return would do to the balance. Only one of them carries numbers for the inflow.

Who registers the refugees, and what did the Knesset enact?

The Knesset voted 92 to 10 on 28 October 2024 to bar UNRWA, the United Nations agency that registers Palestine refugees, from providing “any services” or carrying out “any activities, directly or indirectly, within the sovereign territory of the State of Israel.” The register that fixes how many people a right of return could reach is therefore kept by an agency Israel’s legislature has voted to exclude.

At the same sitting the Knesset passed a second law by 87 votes to 9. It bars any “government authority” from “any contact with UNRWA or anyone acting on its behalf.” The same law ends the invitation to UNRWA based on the exchange of letters of 14 June 1967. Both laws “shall come into force three months from the date of its publication.” As translated, neither law names Gaza or the West Bank. The operations ban is scoped to Israel’s sovereign territory. The two Knesset laws on UNRWA are read in full in a separate report.

The Knesset’s own release carries the sponsors’ stated reasons, which are their positions, not findings. MK Dan Illouz said UNRWA “perpetuates the refugee status of the Palestinians.” Committee chairman Yuli Edelstein cited “reports in the press according to which UNRWA’s activity serves as a cover for terror operations.” Illouz’s statement goes to the demographic question directly. It concerns how refugee status passes across generations, and that rule is what sets the size of the register.

UNRWA’s own figures show how far a register can sit from a residence count. The agency reports 487,869 registered Palestine refugees in Lebanon at 30 June 2025. Its Lebanon field office estimated that about 222,000 Palestinians actually resided there in February 2025. Both figures are UNRWA’s own and are not independently verified. Taken together, they show that a registration total and a count of people present in a place measure different things.

How many 1948 refugees already live in Israel as citizens?

Hillel Cohen, writing in the Palestine-Israel Journal in 2002 from Israeli state records, gives a historical figure for the 1948 refugees who stayed inside Israel: “According to official estimates some 25,000 internal refugees remained, mainly in Galilee, constituting about one sixth of the total Arab population.” The article is signed scholarship in a policy quarterly and was not peer-reviewed.

Cohen’s sources are a Ministry of Labor document of 29 June 1952 and a Jewish National Fund census for 1949 to 1950. His figure “is only for urban and rural refugees and does not include Bedouin in the Negev, forced to leave their places of residence for areas determined by the IDF.” The 25,000 is therefore a floor. It is also a share of Israel’s Arab population around 1950, not a present-day figure.

The legal category these refugees entered was wider than the refugees themselves. Under the 1950 Absentees’ Property Law, people who had fled to places not yet conquered were defined as absentees even though they were present and were citizens. Cohen writes that this “granted them (along with additional population groups) the title of ‘present absentees’.” The share of internal refugees is therefore not the share of present absentees, and Cohen does not equate the two.

The record also shows what happened to the villages. Citing a western Galilee Ministry of Agriculture report from September 1949, Cohen writes that in most abandoned villages “there remained between five and ten percent of the original residents” before their total evacuation.

For this group, return is a question of residence inside Israel rather than of entry across a border. A move from a Galilee town back to a home village would leave the Bureau’s national totals unchanged, because the people concerned are already citizens and already counted. The part of the 1948 refugee population that Cohen documents has been inside Israel’s population count since the state’s first years. In demographic terms, its return to its villages would change where people live, not how many live in Israel.

How steady has the Arab share stayed without any return?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics put Arabs at 21.1% of the population in its April 2026 estimate. It reported the same share in May 2024 and 20.9% in its 2025 release. Across the 17 years since 2009, with no return of any kind, the share has held near the “about one-fifth” cited by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party to the conflict, in 2009.

The absolute counts rose while the share held steady. The Bureau counted 2.089 million Arabs in May 2024, 2.114 million in 2025 and 2.157 million in April 2026. Over the same releases the total population rose from 9.900 million to 10.094 million and then to 10.244 million. The Arab population grew at roughly the pace of the whole.

The three readings are not one continuous series. The 2024 release rests on the 2008 census, does not yet incorporate the 2022 census, and excludes foreign workers, which the Bureau estimated at 222,500 at the end of 2022. The 2025 and 2026 releases rest on the 2022 census. From 2023 they include foreigners recorded as entering from 2008 with no record of exiting. A change of denominator of that kind can move a share by a fraction of a point without any change in the population being measured.

This stable baseline matters for reading any scenario. If the share has stayed near 21% across these readings without return, then a projected change in the share under a return scenario reflects the scenario’s inflow and its fertility assumptions, not a drift already under way in the official count. The three readings span only two years of direct Bureau measurement. The 2009 reference point is the Ministry’s round figure, not a Bureau statistic.

Could Jewish immigration offset a large inflow of returnees?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded about 21,000 immigrants in the 11.75 months to 22 April 2026, against about 177,000 births in the same period.

The smaller staged scenario summarized by INSS (2024) admitted 41,000 refugees a year. At the latest recorded pace, immigration to Israel would offset about half of that annual intake.

The immigrant count has fallen across the last three releases: about 37,000 in the period ending May 2024, about 28,000 in the period ending in 2025, and about 21,000 in the period ending April 2026. Over the same latest period, the Bureau recorded a negative balance of 45,000 Israelis staying abroad. On the Bureau’s own components, more Israelis left than immigrants arrived.

The long-run total is larger. The Bureau counts over 3.5 million immigrants since 1948, about 1.68 million (47.8%) of them since 1990.

The legal basis is the Law of Return. In the English text published by the Knesset, section 1 reads in full: “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.” The 1970 amendment inserted section 4A. It extends the same rights to “a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew,” with an exclusion for a person who has voluntarily changed religion. Section 4B separately defines who is a Jew “for the purposes of this Law.” The two sections do different work, and the Law of Return and its 1970 amendment are read together in a separate report.

The statute carries no numbers. Every count of immigration belongs to the Bureau. The Bureau’s components show that births, at about 177,000, outweigh immigration more than eightfold in the latest period. Natural increase, not immigration, is the larger term in Israel’s current growth.

What age structure would an inflow from Gaza carry?

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, a party to the events, projected that 47% of the Gaza Strip’s 2,226,544 residents were under 18 at mid-2023, before the war, against 41% in the West Bank. The figure describes Gaza’s whole projected population. It does not separate refugees from non-refugees, so it is not a profile of the refugee population.

A second PCBS release puts the share under 15 in Gaza at 40%, with 3% aged 65 and over, at mid-2023. The two shares use different age cut-offs and reconcile on PCBS’s own counts: 898,707 residents under 15 and 1,046,400 under 18, leaving 147,693 aged 15 to 17. For Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics (2025) gives about 27% aged 0 to 14 and about 13% aged 65 or over at the end of 2023.

Every Gaza figure here is a projection from the 1 December 2017 census, not a count. PCBS’s own footnote states that its estimates “were prepared before the Israeli aggression against Gaza Strip on October 7th, 2023.” The same footnote revises Gaza’s population down to 2,129,724 and then to 2,114,301. PCBS describes the first revision as a decrease of 6%. Against its own table, the second computes to 10%. PCBS attributes the change to deaths, missing persons, out-migration and reduced births together.

These figures bear on how a balance moves after any inflow. A population in which 40% are under 15 has a larger share of its members still ahead of their childbearing years than one in which 27% are. A one-time head count of arrivals therefore understates how the two groups would compare a generation later, in either direction, depending on the fertility those children go on to have.

Would birth rates widen or narrow the gap after an inflow?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded Druze total fertility at 1.85 children per woman in 2022, down from a peak of 7.92 in 1964. That six-decade fall within one Arab community in Israel shows that fertility is the variable most likely to change over a long horizon. That variable decides whether an inflow’s effect compounds or fades.

Other Arab subgroups show the same direction. The Bureau put total fertility among Christian women at 1.68 in 2022, and among Arab Christian women at 1.62. At the end of 2022, Arab Christian families with children up to age 17 averaged 1.98 such children, against 2.44 in Jewish families. The Druze rate itself fell from 2.00 in 2021 to 1.85 in 2022.

The age structures differ across communities. At the end of 2022, the Bureau counted children aged 0 to 14 as 32.3% of the Moslem population, 27.5% of the Jewish population, 23.8% of the Druze population and 20.6% of the Arab Christian population. Two Arab communities now carry a smaller child share than the Jewish population. The Moslem population, the largest Arab group, carries a larger one.

These are subgroup figures for Israel’s current citizens and residents. They are not a measure of any returning population. The scenario summarized by INSS (2024) rests on its own assumptions about Palestinian fertility, and its 2058 endpoints depend on them. The longer path of the gap between Israeli and Palestinian birth rates is traced in a separate report. On the Bureau’s series, the timeframe matters because fertility within Israel’s Arab communities has not stayed at the level of any single decade.

Where does Israel’s government say refugees should settle instead?

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party to the conflict, set out in Principle 2 of its 2009 paper that “Palestinian refugees should be free to settle in the Palestinian homeland,” while “Israel cannot allow itself to be demographically engulfed by a flood of refugees.” On that reading, return to a Palestinian state leaves the Bureau’s count of 10.244 million residents in Israel unchanged.

The same paper states that “under present conditions, the influx of a large number of descendents of refugees into Israel is not a viable option.” Its legal position is that “No such right exists under international law, not has one been created by the relevant UN resolutions or the agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors.” The spellings are the document’s own.

The opposing position is also dated and named. Amnesty International, in a May 2019 press release, stated that Israel’s refusal to grant Palestinian refugees the right to return had fuelled seven decades of suffering. The instruments each side reads differently, including General Assembly resolution 194 of 1948, are set out in a separate report on the international legal basis for the right of return.

The destination changes which statistical office’s count moves. Entry into Israel adds to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ Arab total, the 2.157 million in April 2026, and moves the threshold arithmetic of the first section. Settlement in the West Bank or Gaza adds to the populations the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counts and leaves Israel’s totals where they are.

Between those two poles sit intakes of a defined size, which is what the scenarios summarized by INSS (2024) model: 600,000 or 2 million admitted into Israel in stages. Read against the Ministry’s Principle 2, the demographic consequence for Israel ranges from none, under resettlement in a Palestinian state, to the 5.633 million threshold, under entry of a number that size. The answer depends on which meaning of return a settlement would adopt.

Has any Israeli official body computed what return would do?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, in its 2024 release, cites a national projection of 15.2 million residents in 2048, from the medium variant of its 2015 to 2065 projection. No return scenario appears among the figures it reports. The 2009 statement by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party to the conflict, asserts the consequence of return without giving a projected Jewish share.

The same projection gives 11.1 million for 2030 and 13.2 million for 2040. These are projections, not observations. They model natural increase and migration under the Bureau’s assumptions and contain no term for a refugee inflow. Neither the Bureau’s releases nor the Ministry’s statement contains a projection of Israel’s population under return.

The computed scenario in the record sits with INSS, a research institute, which summarized Courbage’s 2008 study in 2024. Its baselines can be checked against later counts. The scenario projected 7 million Jews in 2028. The Bureau counted 7.427 million Jews in May 2024, four years earlier. A scenario’s endpoints inherit its baseline assumptions, and this baseline has since been overtaken by a measured count.

That comparison bears on how the 2058 endpoints should be read. The 8 million Jews and 4.4 million Palestinians projected under the 2 million scenario are outputs of 2008 inputs. Courbage’s fertility, migration and baseline figures are the place a recalculation would start. On the Bureau’s current figures, the 2048 projection of 15.2 million, set against the threshold arithmetic, places any return scenario against a larger base than the one Courbage used.

Methodology and limitations

The evidence comes from four source types. The first is official statistics: Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics releases for Independence Day 2024, 2025 and 2026, its Druze release of 2024 and its Christian release of 2023, and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics’ 2023 population, labour and national accounts products. The second is enacted instruments and recorded votes: the Law of Return of 1950 with its 1970 amendment, and the two UNRWA laws passed on 28 October 2024. The third is a party’s own stated position: Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper of 30 December 2009. The fourth is scholarship and research institute work: Hillel Cohen’s 2002 article, which is signed but not peer-reviewed, and the Institute for National Security Studies’ 2024 summary of Youssef Courbage’s 2008 scenarios. The 2008 study was read through that summary.

Figures marked as the Institute’s arithmetic are subtractions or divisions on the Bureau’s published numbers: the 5.633 million and 5.336 million thresholds, and the 35% and 27% combined shares derived from the scenario endpoints. Bureau estimates for 2025 and 2026 are preliminary. The 2024 release rests on the 2008 census, and later releases rest on the 2022 census with foreigners included, so readings across that break are not one series. PCBS figures for 2018 onward are projections from the 2017 census, published by a party to the events, and PCBS has revised its own Gaza totals downward since October 2023. UNRWA registration figures are named as the agency’s own administrative counts and serve here only to locate the register. Scenario outputs depend on assumed fertility, migration and timing. Cohen’s 25,000 excludes displaced Negev Bedouin and is a floor.

Conclusion

So does the arithmetic match the alarm? On the Bureau’s count it does only at a specific size. The gap stands at 5.633 million in 2026. Any inflow of that order closes it, and smaller staged intakes, run through the one computed scenario, leave 8 million Jews against 4.4 million Palestinians in 2058.

The record around that threshold is consistent. The Arab share has held at 21.1% without any return. Immigration ran at about 21,000 in the latest period, against 177,000 births. Druze fertility fell from 7.92 to 1.85 over six decades. PCBS, a party to the events, projected 47% of Gaza’s residents under 18 before the war. Some 25,000 refugees of 1948 have been inside Israel’s count since its first years. Israel’s Foreign Ministry, a party to the conflict, asserted the end of the Jewish state in 2009 and gave no number. It named a Palestinian homeland as the place refugees could settle.

The variable that decides the outcome is the number of people who would enter Israel, and that number sits on a register kept by an agency Israel’s legislature voted 92 to 10 to bar. When the warning carries no figure and the register sits with the excluded agency, which number is a society’s argument over return actually about?

Frequently Asked Questions

How large was Israel’s population when the state was founded?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2026) puts the population at the establishment of the State at 806,000. The present population is more than 12.5 times that figure. The 1948 figure is the Bureau’s own baseline for every later growth comparison.

What share of the world’s Jews already live in Israel?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2025) puts about 45% of the world’s Jewish population in Israel at the end of 2023. About 80% of Jews in Israel were born there. Both figures bear on the size of the pool from which future immigration under the Law of Return could come.

Who counts as an “immigrating citizen” in Israel’s statistics?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2026) defines an immigrating citizen as a person born to an Israeli citizen abroad who enters Israel intending to settle. The Bureau counts about 158,000 such people since 1970. They are tallied separately from the over 3.5 million immigrants recorded since 1948.

How fast was Gaza’s population growing before the war?

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, a party to the events, projected Gaza’s population at 1,876,666 in 2017 and 2,226,544 at mid-2023. Every figure after the 2017 census is a projection. The Bureau’s own post-war footnote revises its later years downward.

Does the Law of Return define who is Jewish for every purpose?

The 1970 amendment’s section 4B defines a Jew “for the purposes of this Law” (Knesset, 1950, amended 1970). The same amendment inserted section 3A(b) into the Population Registry Law, importing “the same meaning as in section 4B” into the Registry. Together the two provisions carry the definition beyond the Law of Return itself.

How many Druze live in Israel today?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2024) estimated about 152,000 Druze in February 2024, a preliminary figure. At the founding of the state there were 14,500, so the current estimate is more than a tenfold increase. The Druze are counted within the Bureau’s Arab category.

Sources

• Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. Christmas 2023 - Christians in Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2023/411/11_23_411e.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Israel’s Independence Day 2024. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/doclib/2024/141/11_24_141e.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. The Druze Population of Israel On the Occasion of the Nabi Shu’ayb Festival 2024. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2024/124/11_24_124e.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Israel’s Independence Day 2025. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. https://www.cbs.gov.il/He/mediarelease/DocLib/2025/134/11_25_134e.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Central Bureau of Statistics, 2026. Israel’s Independence Day 2026. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2026/117/11_26_117e.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Cohen, Hillel, 2002. The Internal Refugees in the State of Israel: Israeli Citizens, Palestinian Refugees. Palestine-Israel Journal, volume 9, number 2. https://pij.org/articles/159. Signed scholarly article, not peer-reviewed.
• Institute for National Security Studies, 2024. Strategic Assessment article on the Palestinian refugee question, summarizing Youssef Courbage’s 2008 return scenarios. Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv. https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/palestinian-refugee/. Research institute publication, secondary summary of a 2008 study.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009. Israel, the Conflict and Peace: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as posted by ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/opt-israel-conflict-and-peace-answers-frequently-asked. Official or primary record (a party’s own stated position).
• Knesset, 1950, amended 1970. Law of Return, 5710-1950, and Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970. The Knesset, Laws of the State of Israel series. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/about/history/documents/kns1_return_eng.pdf and https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/about/history/documents/kns7_return_eng.pdf. Official or primary record.
• Knesset, 2024. Law to Cease UNRWA Operations, 5785-2024, and Law to Cease UNRWA Operations in the Territory of the State of Israel, 5785-2024. The Knesset. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/committees/Documents/LawUNRWA.docx. Official or primary record (statute text and recorded votes).
• Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. The pre-October-2023 Gaza baseline: unemployment, GDP and age structure. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/en/post-details/?postId=20415 and https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_IntPopulationDy2023E.pdf. Official or primary record (a party’s own count and projections).