Is Congress divided on Israel? Check the roll calls.

Dissent on Israel security assistance is on the congressional record: on 20 April 2024, 58 of the 424 House members voting cast a no against H.R. 8034, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, which passed with 366 yeas (US Congress, 2021 to 2024). Each of the four recent recorded votes in which that assistance was the measure or its principal component passed. Yet the House yea count on essentially the same assistance moved by 140 votes between November 2023 and April 2024, as its legislative packaging changed. Whether “unconditional” describes the support depends on which record is read. The Congressional Research Service puts cumulative US aid to Israel at $174 billion. Enacted statute permits US defense articles to be used “solely” for listed purposes and bars assistance to security-force units credibly linked to gross violations of human rights.

Key Findings

• The House passed H.R. 8034 on 20 April 2024 by 366 to 58. The 58 nays were 13.7% of the 424 members voting, with Republicans voting 193 to 21 and Democrats 173 to 37 (US Congress, 2021 to 2024).
• The same Israel assistance drew 226 yeas on 2 November 2023, when it was paired with a rescission of IRS funding, and 366 yeas on 20 April 2024 without that offset, a difference of 140 votes (US Congress, 2021 to 2024).
• Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since the Second World War, at $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding in current dollars (US Congressional Research Service, ongoing).
• Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act permits sales or leases of US defense articles “solely” for six enumerated purposes (United States Congress, 1968, as amended). Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act bars assistance to any security-force unit where the Secretary of State has “credible information” of a gross violation of human rights (United States Congress, 1961, section added 2007, renumbered 2011).
• In Quinnipiac’s 21 to 25 August 2025 poll of 1,220 self-identified registered voters, 60% opposed sending more military aid to Israel. That is the highest opposition since the item was first asked on 2 November 2023 (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2025).

How many members voted against recent Israel aid bills?

The House recorded 58 nays against H.R. 8034 on 20 April 2024, out of 424 members voting, while 366 voted yes (US Congress, 2021 to 2024). A recorded no is the checkable form of floor dissent, and on this roll call it came from 13.7% of those voting.

The four recorded votes in which Israel security assistance was the measure or its principal component run as follows.

Every measure passed. As a share of members recording a position, the nays ranged widely:

• 2.1% on the 2021 Iron Dome bill (9 of 431, counting the 2 present).
• 46.4% on the November 2023 bill (196 of 422).
• 13.7% in April 2024 (58 of 424).
• 18.6% in the Senate (18 of 97).

H.R. 815 also carried Ukraine and Indo-Pacific assistance, so its 18 Senate nays were cast on a three-part package.

The widest dissent came on the bill that carried something besides aid. H.R. 6126 paired the assistance with a rescission of IRS funding and passed 226 to 196, near party lines. H.R. 8034 carried essentially the same assistance without the offset and drew 140 more yeas. On these two roll calls the margin tracked the packaging. The 196 nays of November 2023 therefore record opposition to a bill, not a headcount of members opposed to the assistance.

The April 2024 nays came from both parties. Republicans voted 193 to 21 and Democrats 173 to 37, so Democrats supplied 37 of the 58 nays and Republicans 21.

The 2021 roll call sets a ceiling on how much any bloc could have dissented. With only 9 members voting no on Roll 275, any group of 100 members casting a yea or nay voted at least 91% yes. Any group of 300 voted at least 97% yes, however the group is defined. That bound applies to any analysis of whether AIPAC-backed members vote differently on Israel aid. On the 2021 bill, every sizeable subgroup of the House voted the way the whole chamber did.

Why is US support for Israel described as unconditional?

The Congressional Research Service records $174 billion in US bilateral assistance and missile defense funding to Israel, in current dollars. That makes Israel the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since the Second World War. The phrase “unconditional support” rests on that scale; an Al Jazeera opinion piece of 8 November 2026, for example, asked whether such support was becoming “a liability for Republicans.”

The current framework is the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Washington on 14 September 2016 by Under Secretary Thomas A. Shannon, Jr. and Acting National Security Adviser Jacob Nagel (US Department of State, 2016). It covers FY2019 to FY2028.

The Congressional Research Service records the pledge as $38 billion over that decade:

• $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing, requested at $3.3 billion a year.
• $5 billion in missile defense appropriations, requested at $500 million a year.

Together the two requests come to $3.8 billion a year.

Appropriations have run above the MOU’s annual level in conflict years. The Congressional Research Service records $8.7 billion in combined Foreign Military Financing and missile defense funding for FY2024. That is more than twice the $3.8 billion annual request. It also records $1 billion in additional missile defense funding in FY2022, the same sum as the Iron Dome supplemental the House passed 420 to 9 in 2021. CRS revises its cumulative total with each edition of RL33222, so the $174 billion figure is dated to the edition that states it.

The memorandum itself contains a condition. It states that the funding levels “are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds” (US Department of State, 2016). It therefore sets a level and a schedule rather than obligating money, and each year’s dollars still pass through Congress.

The accompanying letter from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Secretary of State John Kerry records Israel’s own commitments, as a party to the agreement:

• Israel will not seek Foreign Military Financing above the agreed levels for the duration of the framework.
• Israel will return any additional 2017 or 2018 financing granted outside it.

The record supports two readings at once. On dollars and continuity, support has been large and sustained across administrations. In the text of the governing instrument, it is a pledge that depends on congressional appropriation.

Which conditions does the arms export statute attach to transfers?

Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2754, permits US defense articles to be sold or leased to friendly countries “solely” for six enumerated purposes (United States Congress, 1968, as amended). Internal security and legitimate self-defense come first on the list. Because the list is exhaustive, every buyer, Israel included, holds US-origin arms under a use condition written into statute.

The operative clause says defense articles and services “shall be sold or leased by the United States Government under this chapter to friendly countries solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” The remaining purposes are:

• Participation in regional or collective arrangements “consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”
• Collective measures requested by the United Nations.
• Public works and economic development by the forces of less developed friendly countries.

The word “solely” makes this a list of permitted purposes. A dispute under it therefore turns on whether a given use falls inside the list.

Section 3 supplies the enforcement machinery:

• Recipient agreement. Section 3(a)(2) requires the recipient to have agreed “not to use or permit the use of such article… for purposes other than those for which furnished” without the President’s consent.
• Ineligibility. Section 3(c)(1)(A) makes a country ineligible for credits and guaranties if it uses articles “in substantial violation (either in terms of quantities or in terms of the gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantities involved)” of such an agreement.
• Reporting. Section 3(c)(2) states that the President “shall report to the Congress promptly upon the receipt of information that a violation… may have occurred.”

The text contains no automatic cutoff. Under section 3(c)(3)(A), a country becomes ineligible “if the President so determines and so reports in writing to the Congress, or if the Congress so determines by joint resolution.” A joint resolution goes to the President for signature, so both routes pass through the President. Under section 3(c)(4), ineligibility lasts until the President determines that the violation has ceased and that the country has given “assurances satisfactory to the President that such violation will not recur.”

The phrase “consistent with the Charter of the United Nations” applies only to the regional and collective arrangements clause. Section 4 mentions neither international humanitarian law nor civilian harm. The text quoted here is from the Office of the Law Revision Counsel’s prelim edition, which states that it contains “those laws in effect on August 18, 2026.” A fuller reading of the transfer statutes sets these sections beside the other export provisions.

What can Congress demand under section 502B?

Under section 502B(c)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2304, either House by resolution, or the Senate Foreign Relations or House Foreign Affairs Committee, can require the Secretary of State to send a country human rights statement within 30 days (United States Congress, 1961, as amended). This is the congressional instrument for tying security assistance to a recipient’s human rights record.

The prohibition behind the request is in section 502B(a)(2): “Except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”

Section 502B(d)(1) defines the term to include “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.”

The requested statement must cover three things:

• The country’s human rights record.
• The steps the United States has taken.
• Whether “extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation of security assistance.”

Two consequences follow, and they differ in kind. Section 502B(c)(3) is the only one in the section that takes effect on its own. If the statement is not sent within thirty days, “no security assistance shall be delivered to such country except as may thereafter be specifically authorized by law… unless and until such statement is transmitted.” Once a statement arrives, section 502B(c)(4)(A) provides that “the Congress may at any time thereafter adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such country.”

The text sets three limits on its own reach:

• Channel. It conditions “security assistance,” which is a different channel from direct commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. Whether 502B reaches a given transfer depends on which channel carried it.
• Threshold. The trigger is a “consistent pattern,” not a single incident. The statute supplies no threshold, no counting rule and no decision-maker for that finding other than the President.
• Bar for action. A committee request under (c)(1) is a much lower bar than a termination under (c)(4). The first needs one committee; the second needs a joint resolution.

The section still refers to “the Export Administration Act of 1979,” which has been superseded, and the Code carries a footnote at that point.

What must be shown before aid reaches a foreign unit?

Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2378d, first enacted in 2007 as section 620J, bars US assistance to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces “if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights” (United States Congress, 1961, section added 2007, renumbered 2011). The bar covers assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.

Section 620M(b) sets the conditions under which assistance may resume. The prohibition “shall not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.” The standard in the current text, as amended through 2022, is “credible information,” not “credible evidence.” The two phrases carry different burdens.

Section 620M(c)(1) covers cases where the recipient unit cannot be identified before transfer. The Secretary must then “regularly provide a list of units prohibited from receiving assistance” to the recipient government and to Congress. From 31 December 2022, such assistance “shall only be made available subject to a written agreement that the recipient government will comply with such prohibition.”

Section 620M(d) sets out seven vetting procedures. They include facilitating information “from individuals and organizations outside the United States Government.” They also require the Department to seek to identify the unit involved when credible information exists but the unit’s identity is lacking. Under section 620M(d)(7), the Department must “make publicly available, to the maximum extent practicable, the identity of those units for which no assistance shall be furnished.”

Section 620M(e)(1) allows withholding a unit’s identity where the Secretary reports that disclosure “is not in the national security interest of the United States.” That justification “may be submitted in classified form.” Because the exception is self-certifying and may be classified, the absence of a published list does not indicate whether any unit has been barred.

Three further features of the text limit what it can establish:

• Two Leahy laws. The United States has two Leahy laws. This one governs State Department assistance and arms transfers. The Defense Department version, 10 U.S.C. 362, governs training and equipping, and its exception is worded differently.
• Unit, not country. The bar applies to a unit, never to a country. It produces an ineligibility determination about a named unit, not a finding about a state’s conduct.
• Undefined term. “Gross violation of human rights” is not defined in this section. The definition in section 502B(d)(1) is not incorporated here by its terms.

What did the 2024 memorandum require recipients to assure?

National Security Memorandum 20, issued by the White House on 8 February 2024, directed the Secretary of State to obtain “credible and reliable written assurances” from recipients of US defense articles (The White House, 2024). Recipients were to assure that they “will use any such defense articles in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, other international law.”

A second assurance, in section 1(a)(ii), ties the memorandum to statute. It is required “in furtherance of supporting section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378-1).” The recipient was to “facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict, or otherwise impede, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” The preamble names the statutes the memorandum builds on, including “the applicable ‘Leahy Law’ (22 U.S.C. 2378d, 10 U.S.C. 362).” It also sets the legal frame: “As a matter of international law, the United States looks to the law of state responsibility and United States partners’ compliance with international humanitarian law.”

The memorandum created a reporting duty to Congress. Section 2(a) required a written report to six named congressional committees “Not later than 90 days after the date of this memorandum, and once every fiscal year thereafter.” Under section 2(a)(ii), the report had to include “an assessment of any credible reports or allegations” that defense articles “have been used in a manner not consistent with international law.” That assessment was to include “any determinations, if they can reasonably be made,” and whether the recipient “has pursued appropriate accountability.”

The memorandum is presidential policy, not statute, and that shapes what it can do:

• No enforceable rights. It creates no cause of action, and its general provisions disclaim any enforceable right.
• Revocable. A later President can rescind or supersede it without Congress, so what it required is dated to 8 February 2024.
• Location of the IHL condition. This is where the international humanitarian law condition on US transfers sits. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act contains no such condition.
• Party statements. The assurances are the recipient’s own written statements about its own future conduct. They are a party’s own representations, not findings.

Where is the report that the memorandum promised Congress?

Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent the first report required by Section 2 of NSM-20 to Congress on 10 May 2024. As of 19 August 2026, its full text did not appear on state.gov or on the archived 2021-2025.state.gov site (US Department of State, 2024).

The search covered every likely location on 19 August 2026, with these results:

• Site search. State.gov’s own search endpoint returned an HTTP 404 error.
• Restricted searches. Searches limited to state.gov and to the archived Biden-era site found press briefings discussing the report but no copy of it.
• Report pages. No report page or PDF appeared under the department’s document directory.
• Bureau listings. No entry appeared in the report listings of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

The unclassified text in general circulation was obtained and posted by Just Security, an academic law-and-policy publication. Just Security is not the issuing body. Organizational reports, news articles and commentary that quote the report’s language are relaying that posting rather than a government copy.

NSM-20 itself explains part of this absence. Section 2 requires delivery to six congressional committees and does not require publication. The missing government copy is therefore consistent with the instrument’s terms. It is not, on the record, evidence of improper withholding.

The result is a specific gap in the public record. The central executive-branch assessment of whether US-transferred defense articles were used consistently with international law went to Congress through a channel Congress and the President set up. The public can read it only through a third party. The Congressional Research Service discusses the report in its Israel products, including RL33222 and the insight IN12444.

NSM-20 also required a report “once every fiscal year thereafter,” so later editions exist or were due. None was located on a government host.

How do voters answer the question Congress keeps voting on?

Quinnipiac University’s national poll of 1,220 self-identified registered voters, fielded 21 to 25 August 2025, found 60% opposed to “the United States sending more military aid to Israel for their efforts in the war with Hamas” (Quinnipiac University Poll, 2025). The margin of error was plus or minus 3.4 points. Quinnipiac called this the highest opposition since it first asked the item on 2 November 2023.

The same item recorded 32% in support. The release calls this “the lowest level of support” since the item was first asked. The figures describe registered voters, and self-identified ones, not the general adult population.

The item’s position in the questionnaire is part of the instrument. Question 23 came after question 21 on sympathies and question 22 on US support for Israel, so respondents reached the aid question after two framing items. Nothing in the release measures how large any order effect was. The plus or minus 3.4 points applies to the whole sample and includes the design effect. The release publishes no subgroup base sizes, so differences between parties or sexes cannot be tested from the printed document.

The poll and the roll calls measure different things:

• Timing. The latest vote in the series, the Senate’s 79 to 18 on H.R. 815 on 23 April 2024, came 16 months before Quinnipiac’s field period.
• Scope. H.R. 815 bundled Israel assistance with Ukraine and Indo-Pacific funding. Quinnipiac asked about “more military aid” to Israel alone.
• Population. A senator’s yea and a voter’s answer do not share a population, a question wording or a date.

The record supports a narrower statement than a comparison of percentages. Within 16 months of a Senate vote in which 81.4% of senators voting supported a package carrying Israel assistance, a national sample of registered voters recorded majority opposition to sending more military aid. Quinnipiac’s own trend line for the item began in November 2023.

Have American sympathies shifted while the votes held?

Gallup’s February 2025 reading found 46% of US adults sympathized more with the Israelis in the Middle East situation (Gallup, 2010 to 2025). That is the lowest in 25 years of its trend, against 63% in February 2010. Over the same years, the recorded votes on Israel security assistance kept passing.

The 2025 reading had 1,004 respondents, fielded 3 to 16 February, with a margin of plus or minus 4 points. Sympathy with the Palestinians stood at 33%, the highest in the trend by two points. The 2010 reading of 63% for the Israelis, from 1,025 respondents, was then the highest since 1991.

The partisan pattern changed along with the totals:

• 2023. Democrats sympathized more with the Palestinians (49%) than with the Israelis (38%), the first such reading in the trend.
• 2024. Fourteen months later, House Democrats voted 173 to 37 for H.R. 8034.
• 2025. Gallup recorded 75% of Republicans sympathizing more with the Israelis and 59% of Democrats more with the Palestinians.

These figures show that the two records coincided in time. They do not show a measured relationship between them.

A second polling organization recorded a similar reading on a different population. Quinnipiac’s August 2025 sympathies item, asked of registered voters, recorded 37% for the Palestinians, 36% for the Israelis and 27% offering no answer. Quinnipiac called this an all-time high for the Palestinians since it began asking in December 2001. The two series differ in population, wording and placement, so they are reported side by side and never joined into one line.

Gallup’s own 2018 methodology work documents that the question’s placement within a survey changes the shares it produces, so readings taken in different questionnaires are compared with that caveat attached. Across the same fifteen years, the House recorded 420 yeas in 2021 and 366 in 2024 on Israel security assistance. On these records, opinion moved while the recorded votes on Israel security assistance kept carrying.

Methodology and limitations

The report draws on four kinds of record.

• Recorded votes. The vote series is the four roll calls in which Israel security assistance was the measure or its principal component: House Roll 275 of the 117th Congress, House Rolls 577 and 152 of the 118th, and Senate Record Vote 154 of the 118th. US assistance to Israel is ordinarily carried inside the annual State, Foreign Operations appropriations act. A vote on that act is a vote on a whole package, not on one line, so annual appropriations votes are not part of the series. Every share of nays in the report is computed against members recording a position on that roll call, with the denominator stated.
• Statutes. The statutory sections are quoted from the Office of the Law Revision Counsel’s prelim edition of the United States Code, which states it contains the laws in effect on 18 August 2026. Section numbers of the Acts are paired with their Code sections, because the two numbering systems differ.
• Executive records. National Security Memorandum 20 is quoted from the Government Publishing Office’s Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, DCPD-202400098. Whether a later directive has rescinded or superseded it was not checked against a later instrument, so its requirements are dated to 8 February 2024. The search for the May 2024 report to Congress covered state.gov, its search endpoint, the archived 2021-2025.state.gov site and the relevant bureau report listings, on 19 August 2026.
• Surveys. The poll figures come from two survey organizations with different populations. Quinnipiac sampled 1,220 self-identified registered voters. Gallup samples US adults by national telephone survey. Quinnipiac’s margin of plus or minus 3.4 points applies to its whole sample, and no subgroup bases are published. Gallup’s sympathies item is a forced choice between two named parties, so it measures relative sympathy and carries no view on assistance or conditions. No survey figure here measures any member of Congress.

One quantity that circulates in this debate has no located source. No published source states, with a denominator, a vote set or a method, a rate at which AIPAC-supported members of Congress vote for unconditioned aid.

Conclusion

Is support for Israel undebated in Congress? The roll calls answer that it is debated and that the debate has so far lost every recorded vote in this series. Nays ran from 9 on the 2021 Iron Dome bill to 196 on the November 2023 package. The 58 nays of April 2024 came from both parties. The 140-vote swing between two bills carrying the same assistance shows how far the margin depended on what else rode with the aid.

“Unconditional” also has a checkable form. In dollars, the Congressional Research Service records $174 billion in cumulative aid, more than any other recipient since the Second World War, and FY2024 appropriations more than twice the memorandum’s annual level. In the statute book, the support is conditioned. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act limits use to six listed purposes. Section 502B lets one committee demand a human rights statement on a thirty-day clock. Section 620M bars any unit credibly linked to a gross violation. The 2024 memorandum asked recipients to put their compliance with international humanitarian law in writing.

Every one of those conditions reaches its consequence through a presidential determination or a joint resolution, and the one report built to assess compliance is not readable on a government host. Over the same span, sympathy with Israelis fell to 46% on Gallup’s reading, and 60% of Quinnipiac’s registered voters opposed more military aid. A democracy that writes conditions into law but routes every finding through the officials who grant the aid has made a choice about who decides. Whether the record of the last five years reflects that choice working as designed, or a debate that has yet to reach the votes where it would register, is what these figures put in front of the public.

Frequently Asked Questions

Has the Senate voted on blocking arms transfers to Israel?

Yes. In its 2026 edition of report RL33222, the Congressional Research Service records that in April 2025 the Senate rejected motions to discharge two joint resolutions of disapproval of arms transfers to Israel, by 83 to 15 and 82 to 15. Those were procedural votes on whether to bring the resolutions to the floor, not votes on the assistance itself.

Where does opposition to Israel aid appear in the official record?

The Congressional Record for 17 July 2025, volume 171, number 123, carries a House floor statement titled “No More Military Aid to Israel” (US Congress, 2025). Floor statements are printed in the Congressional Record whether or not a recorded vote follows.

Why are there so few standalone votes on Israel aid?

The Congressional Research Service records that assistance under the 2016 memorandum is requested year by year and ordinarily appropriated inside the annual State, Foreign Operations act. A recorded vote on that act covers the whole foreign-operations budget. Standalone Israel measures, such as the 2021 Iron Dome bill, are the exception.

Does US arms export law treat Israel differently from other recipients?

Section 3(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act names Israel, with NATO members, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, among the governments to which US-origin components in foreign defense articles may be retransferred without prior presidential consent. Section 3(d)(2)(B) gives that group a 15-day congressional review window instead of the general 30 days (United States Congress, 1968, as amended). Section 4’s use limits and section 620M’s unit bar name no country and apply to all recipients.

Do Americans approve of Israel’s military action in Gaza?

Gallup’s poll of 7 to 21 July 2025 found 32% of US adults approving of Israel’s military action in Gaza and 60% disapproving, which Gallup reported as a new low in approval (Gallup, 2025). That item asks about military action, not about US aid. It measures a different proposition from Quinnipiac’s aid question and a different population.

Do US adults support a Palestinian state?

Gallup’s 2025 reading found 55% of US adults in favor of establishing an independent Palestinian state, in line with its readings since 2020 (Gallup, 2010 to 2025). Unlike the sympathies item, this measure has held roughly steady over the same period.

Sources

• Gallup, 2010 to 2025. Middle East sympathies trend series, readings from the 2010, 2023 and 2025 World Affairs surveys. Gallup. news.gallup.com/poll/1639. Named survey organization.
• Gallup, 2025. 32% in U.S. Back Israel’s Military Action in Gaza, a New Low. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/692948/u.s.-back-israel-military-action-gaza-new-low.aspx. Named survey organization.
• Quinnipiac University Poll, 2025. Majority Of Voters Oppose Deploying National Guard To D.C., Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Support Drops For U.S. Military Aid To Israel As 50% Think Israel Is Committing Genocide In Gaza. Quinnipiac University. https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3929. Named survey organization.
• The White House, 2024. National Security Memorandum on Safeguards and Accountability With Respect to Transferred Defense Articles and Defense Services (NSM-20). Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, DCPD-202400098, US Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202400098/html/DCPD-202400098.htm. Official record.
• United States Congress, 1961, as amended. Foreign Assistance Act, section 502B (22 U.S.C. 2304). Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2304&num=0&edition=prelim. Official record.
• United States Congress, 1961, section added 2007, renumbered 2011. Foreign Assistance Act, section 620M (22 U.S.C. 2378d). Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2378d&num=0&edition=prelim. Official record.
• United States Congress, 1968, as amended. Arms Export Control Act, sections 3 and 4 (22 U.S.C. 2753 and 2754). Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2754&num=0&edition=prelim. Official record.
• US Congress, 2021 to 2024. Recorded votes on Israel security assistance: House Roll Call 275, 117th Congress; House Roll Calls 577 and 152, 118th Congress; Senate Record Vote 154, 118th Congress. congress.gov. Official record.
• US Congress, 2025. Congressional Record, Vol. 171, No. 123, House, 17 July 2025, “No More Military Aid to Israel.” congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-171/issue-123/house-section/article/H3469-5. Official record.
• US Congressional Research Service, ongoing. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments (RL33222). congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33222. Official record.
• US Congressional Research Service, 2026. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments (RL33222), 2026 edition. congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33222/RL33222.51.pdf. Official record.
• US Department of State, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Israel on Security Assistance, signed 14 September 2016. 2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/265160.pdf. Official record.
• US Department of State, 2024. Report to Congress under Section 2 of National Security Memorandum 20, transmitted 10 May 2024; full text not located on state.gov or 2021-2025.state.gov as of 19 August 2026. Official record (publication absence).