The House passed the most recent standalone Israel security assistance bill 366 to 58 on 20 April 2024, 86.3% of the 424 members recording a position, per the recorded vote at congress.gov. Two years later, Pew Research Center recorded 60% of Americans viewing Israel unfavorably against 37% favorably. The dollar level itself is set by neither figure: a ten‑year framework signed by the US Department of State in September 2016 fixes it at $38 billion, and the accompanying letter records Israel’s commitment to return money appropriated above that level.
Key Findings
- The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding signed at Washington on 14 September 2016 sets US security assistance to Israel at $38 billion for fiscal years 2019 to 2028, $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations, per the US Department of State text and the Congressional Research Service.
- On the four recent recorded votes where Israel security assistance was the measure, the margins were 420 to 9 (House, 2021), 226 to 196 (House, 2023), 366 to 58 (House, 2024) and 79 to 18 (Senate, 2024), per congress.gov. The 2023 and 2024 House votes on essentially the same assistance differ by 140 votes; the variable between them was an IRS‑funding rescission attached as an offset.
- The Guardian reported in January 2024 that lawmakers it coded as more supportive of Israel received an average of $125,000 from pro‑Israel donors in the first six weeks of the Gaza war, against $18,000 for lawmakers it coded as more supportive of Palestinians.
- OpenSecrets’ tabulation of Federal Election Commission filings records AIPAC’s connected PAC giving $3,037,900 to 367 federal candidates in the 2023‑2024 cycle, with a largest single‑candidate total of $20,000 under the $5,000 per‑election statutory cap, while the affiliated super PAC filed $37,860,200 in independent expenditures, which are by the statutory definition permitting them uncoordinated with any campaign.
- Pew Research Center recorded in 2026 that 80% of Democrats and Democratic leaners held unfavorable views of Israel, against 58% of Republicans and Republican leaners holding favorable views.
What actually sets the level of US support for Israel?
The level is set in a signed executive agreement, not in an annual vote. The US Department of State text signed at Washington on 14 September 2016 commits the United States, subject to appropriation, to $38 billion in security assistance across fiscal years 2019 to 2028, an agreement concluded between an Under Secretary of State and Israel’s Acting National Security Adviser.
The Congressional Research Service, in its standing report RL33222 to Congress, itemizes that total as $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations, requested as $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and $500 million in missile defense each year, $3.8 billion annually. The Memorandum of Understanding states in its own terms that the funding levels “are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds,” which is what makes it a schedule rather than an obligation: the framework fixes a number, and the annual appropriation supplies it.
That structure matters for reading the roll calls. In an ordinary year, assistance to Israel is carried inside the annual State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriations act, where a vote on the package is not a vote on any single line. The four recorded votes examined later in this report exist because Israel assistance was in those cases the measure itself or its principal component, which is unusual.
The Congressional Research Service also records the cumulative scale: Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since the Second World War, at $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding to date in current dollars. That figure moves by edition of the report, and CRS revises it as appropriations accumulate.
Two instruments therefore govern the money: an executive agreement setting the level for a decade, and an appropriations process that supplies or exceeds it. Neither is a referendum, and neither is renegotiated by the votes members actually cast in a given session.
Is it often said that campaign money explains the votes?
It is often said that campaign contributions explain congressional positions on Israel. The Guardian reported on 10 January 2024 that lawmakers it coded as more supportive of Israel received an average of $125,000 from pro‑Israel donors during the first six weeks of the Gaza war, against $18,000 for lawmakers it coded as more supportive of Palestinians. The Guardian states its analysis shows an association and does not establish direction.
The filed record behind that reporting has two channels, and they differ in size by an order of magnitude. OpenSecrets’ tabulation of Federal Election Commission filings, based on data released 6 February 2025, records AIPAC’s connected PAC (committee C00797670) giving $3,037,900 directly to federal candidates in the 2023‑2024 cycle, 36.62% to Democrats and 63.02% to Republicans, spread across 347 House candidates and 20 Senate candidates. Under 52 U.S.C. 30116, a multicandidate committee may give at most $5,000 per candidate per election, and the largest single‑candidate total in the cycle was $20,000.
The second channel is independent expenditure. OpenSecrets’ tabulation of the filings of United Democracy Project (committee C00799031) records $37,860,200 in itemized independent expenditures for the 2024 cycle: $14,067,863 supporting Democrats, $20,786,780 opposing Democrats, $3,043,662 opposing Republicans and $0 supporting Republicans. More than $14.6 million went into a single House race, New York’s 16th District. An independent expenditure is, by the statutory definition that permits it in unlimited amounts, uncoordinated with any campaign: money spent about a race rather than given to a candidate.
How far do public and congressional positions actually diverge?
Pew Research Center recorded in 2026 that 60% of Americans viewed Israel unfavorably against 37% favorably, the reading that anchors the premise of the question.
Gallup’s 2026 survey recorded 57% of US adults favoring an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, 28% opposed and 15% with no opinion.
The longer series shows when the position moved. On Gallup’s forced‑choice question asking whether sympathies in the Middle East lie more with the Israelis or the Palestinians, February 2010 returned 63% more with the Israelis (n=1,025, margin of error 4 points), the highest reading since 1991. The February 2025 reading returned 46% more with the Israelis, the lowest in 25 years of the trend, and 33% with the Palestinians, the highest by two points (n=1,004, fielded 3 to 16 February 2025, margin of error 4 points).
Gallup’s own methodology work documents that the placement of that question within a survey changes the shares it produces, so readings taken from differently structured instruments are not interchangeable. The forced choice also measures relative sympathy between two named parties; it does not measure any view on assistance levels, appropriations or conditions, and neither does the favorability item. Gallup’s 2025 reading recorded 55% of US adults favoring the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, in line with its readings since 2020, which is the same direction as its 2026 figure on a differently worded question.
Against those numbers stands a chamber that in April 2024 approved standalone assistance 366 to 58. The divergence is real and dated. What it is not, on this evidence, is uniform.
How many voters rank Israel as a top voting issue?
14% of American Jewish voters named Israel a top‑two voting issue in 2024, up from 4% in 2022, per the polling archive of J Street, conducted by GBAO Strategies and commissioned by J Street, an advocacy organization. That is a commissioned poll rather than an independent measurement, and it is reported here as the commissioning organization’s own published figure.
The scope of that series is narrow in two ways worth stating. It measures American Jewish voters, not the electorate as a whole, and it measures self‑reported ranking against other issues rather than behavior. Even at its 2024 level it places Israel outside the top two for roughly six in seven respondents in that population.
Salience of a different kind appears in the Brookings Institution’s 2024 reporting on its polling, which recorded that Democratic respondents said President Biden and members of Congress leaned toward Israel more than they themselves did. That is a measured perception of a gap between elected positioning and voter positioning, published by a named research institution and dated, and it is a different quantity from either the favorability readings above or the ranking figure here.
Between them, the two measurements describe a familiar asymmetry in intensity rather than in numbers: a majority position registered on survey instruments, and a smaller set of respondents for whom the subject ranks near the top of a ballot decision. Neither series measures how either group votes in a primary, and neither is a measurement of congressional behavior. What follows are the records that are.
Do donor-backed members vote differently on Israel aid?
On 23 September 2021 the House passed H.R. 5323, the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 420 to 9 with 2 members voting present, per Roll Call 275 of the 117th Congress.
With only 9 no votes recorded, arithmetic bounds any subgroup: any 100 members, selected on any criterion including funding, voted at least 91% yes, and any 300 members at least 97% yes.
The wide margins recur. H.R. 8034, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, passed the House 366 to 58 on 20 April 2024, with Republicans at 193 to 21 and Democrats at 173 to 37 (Roll Call 152). The Senate agreed to H.R. 815, the national security supplemental carrying Israel, Ukraine and Indo‑Pacific assistance, 79 to 18 on 23 April 2024 (Record Vote 154).
The one vote in the set that split near party lines is instructive about what moves margins. H.R. 6126, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, passed the House 226 to 196 on 2 November 2023 (Roll Call 577). It carried the same assistance as the bill that passed 366 to 58 five months later, paired with a rescission of IRS funding as its offset. The two votes differ by 140 House votes, and the variable between them is the legislative packaging rather than the assistance. The Institute’s reading of the same roll‑call record appears in a separate report on whether AIPAC-backed members vote differently on Israel aid.
What does the aid agreement say about Congress appropriating more?
Congress appropriated $8.7 billion in combined Foreign Military Financing and missile defense funding for Israel in fiscal year 2024, per the Congressional Research Service in RL33222, against the $3.8 billion annual level the 2016 framework contemplates. Supplemental appropriations sit outside the memorandum’s schedule, which is how the two figures coexist.
The framework also runs in the other direction, and this is the part of the record least often carried. The letter accompanying the 2016 memorandum, sent by Israel’s prime minister to the US secretary of state, records Israel’s commitment not to seek Foreign Military Financing above the agreed levels for the duration of the agreement, and to return any additional Foreign Military Financing granted for 2017 or 2018 outside the framework. The instrument therefore contains a ceiling mechanism as well as a floor commitment.
Both provisions are conditional in the text’s own terms. The memorandum states that funding levels are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds, and the Congressional Research Service records that Congress has appropriated above the annual level, most visibly in the fiscal 2024 supplemental and in the $1 billion of additional missile defense funding appropriated in fiscal 2022 following that year’s conflict.
Read together, the agreement and the appropriations record describe a relationship in which the executive branch negotiates a decade‑long schedule, Israel undertakes not to lobby past it, and Congress retains the constitutional appropriations power that lets it exceed it when it chooses to. Each of the three elements is documented in a primary text: the memorandum, the accompanying letter, and the enacted appropriations that CRS tabulates.
How much congressional travel to Israel is privately funded?
Since 7 October 2023, at least 26 Democratic and 52 Republican representatives have attended trips to Israel sponsored by the American Israel Education Foundation, AIPAC’s 501(c)(3) charitable affiliate, across at least 15 delegations at more than $4.2 million in total, averaging over $26,600 per member, per the Guardian’s 2 June 2026 analysis of congressional ethics filings.
The underlying documents are official records rather than reporting. Under House rules, privately sponsored travel requires pre‑travel approval from the Committee on Ethics and a post‑travel disclosure filed with the Clerk of the House, published at disclosures‑clerk.house.gov. Under the travel rules adopted in 2007, an organization that employs lobbyists may generally sponsor only single‑day travel, while a 501(c)(3) may sponsor longer trips, which is the structural reason the trips are run through the foundation rather than the lobbying committee.
The volume predates the current period. The Guardian relays a figure from the Intercept that in 2019 alone the foundation sponsored 129 trips totalling $2.32 million; that count is the Intercept’s, relayed, not the Guardian’s own tabulation. The foundation states that its missions are educational.
Nothing in the filings records an effect. They record who travelled, when, at whose expense and for how much, and the aggregate distribution across the two caucuses, which on the Guardian’s count runs roughly two Republican participants for every Democratic one.
Which party’s members have moved, and by how much?
On H.R. 8034 in April 2024, 37 of 210 voting Democrats opposed the bill against 21 of 214 voting Republicans, per Roll Call 152. The divergence from the aggregate public reading is concentrated on one side of the chamber, and the recorded no votes are concentrated on the other.
The survey record splits the same way. Pew Research Center recorded in 2026 that 80% of Democrats and Democratic leaners held unfavorable views of Israel, while 58% of Republicans and Republican leaners held favorable views. Gallup’s February 2023 reading was the first in its trend in which Democrats sympathized more with the Palestinians (49%) than the Israelis (38%); by the February 2025 reading, Republicans stood at 75% with the Israelis and Democrats at 59% with the Palestinians.
Set the two records beside each other and the pattern is asymmetric. Among Republicans, the survey majority and the roll‑call majority point the same way. Among Democrats, an 80% unfavorable share in 2026 polling sits alongside a caucus that voted 173 to 37 for standalone assistance in 2024. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs recorded in 2024 that “most political leaders on Capitol Hill have remained steadfast in their support for the US‑Israel relationship” even as public views shifted during the Gaza war.
Two caveats bound the comparison. The Pew and Gallup readings are 2025 and 2026 measurements while the votes are 2021 to 2024 events, so they are not contemporaneous. And a member’s district electorate is not the national sample: national partisan shares do not describe the constituency any individual member answers to. What the recorded votes establish is the distribution, not its cause.
Do scholars agree that donations move votes or track them?
The peer‑reviewed finding closest to the question measures sponsorship, not voting. Küçük (2025), in the Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, reports that members of Congress who sponsor pro‑Israel bills receive more campaign contributions, and that members facing stronger electoral competition attract more targeted donations. The design is correlational and cannot separate contributions that follow a position from contributions that shape one.
The distinction between sponsorship and roll‑call voting is load‑bearing. Sponsoring a bill is a voluntary individual act with a low base rate; voting on a scheduled question is near‑universal participation with margins in this policy area running above 80% yes. A finding about the first does not transfer to the second, and Küçük’s study does not claim it does.
The Guardian’s own January 2024 campaign‑finance reporting states the same limit in its own words: the analysis establishes an association between coded positions and donation totals, not the direction of the relationship. A frequently repeated figure holds that roughly nine in ten members backed by pro‑Israel donors vote for assistance without conditions; no publicly available source states a denominator, a vote set or a method behind that rate, and it appears here as an unsourced quantity rather than an established one.
The competing account in the literature is institutional. The Congressional Research Service, in RL33222, describes the US‑Israel relationship as a long‑standing and central issue in US foreign policy carried through successive administrations and appropriations cycles, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs recorded continuity among Capitol Hill leaders through the 2023 to 2024 period. Neither account has been tested against the other with a design that isolates the contribution effect on a roll‑call vote, and no such study appears in the peer‑reviewed record examined here.
What does US aid to Israel buy, and where is it spent?
Most of it buys American‑manufactured defense articles. The Congressional Research Service records in RL33222 that Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since the Second World War at $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding in current dollars, delivered overwhelmingly as Foreign Military Financing, a grant that recipients use to purchase US defense equipment and services.
Foreign Military Financing carries a standing offshore procurement restriction, and Israel has held an exception to it. Under the arrangement CRS documents, a portion of Israel’s Foreign Military Financing has historically been convertible to shekels for spending with Israeli defense industry rather than US suppliers, and the 2016 memorandum phases that allowance down across the ten‑year term, moving a larger share of the appropriation into US procurement over the life of the agreement.
The missile defense component is structured separately. The memorandum sets $5 billion across the decade for missile defense, requested at $500 million a year, and CRS records that Congress appropriated $1 billion in additional missile defense funding in fiscal 2022 outside that schedule following that year’s exchange of fire, and $8.7 billion in combined Foreign Military Financing and missile defense funding in fiscal 2024.
Those provisions are the checkable content of the strategic‑relationship claim. They describe a procurement relationship with a stated dollar level, a stated annual schedule, a stated currency restriction and a stated phase‑down, all set out in a signed text and tabulated by a nonpartisan congressional agency. What they do not describe is a mechanism by which any individual member’s vote is produced, and the appropriation record contains no such mechanism, only the enacted amounts and the years they were enacted.
How often does this question appear as a conspiracy narrative?
The same question also circulates as a claim about a people rather than about an instrument, and that version has been measured. In the expert‑annotated corpus of Jikeli and colleagues (2022), peer‑reviewed in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, about 62% of antisemitic tweets containing “Jews” fit the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power, drawn from a 4,016‑tweet gold‑standard corpus covering January 2019 to August 2020.
Adjacent corpora register the same dominant form. Weinberg and colleagues (2025), in PLoS ONE, coded sample sentences containing implicit antisemitic terms from two QAnon subreddits and found 56% invoked the hidden‑power dimension, the largest of the four dimensions they coded. Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, coded 4,500 Facebook comments on leading British, French and German media pages and found 26.9% of 1,504 UK comments antisemitic, with the “evil” stereotype the most frequent category at 39.8% of those.
On where such attitudes sit ideologically, Hersh and Royden (2022), in Political Research Quarterly, surveyed about 3,500 US adults with a young‑adult oversample and found overt antisemitic attitudes rare on the political left and more common on the right, most concentrated among young adults on the far right, contrary to horseshoe expectations.
These are measurements of corpora and survey samples, not of any speaker’s intent, and they carry no implication about anyone who asks about campaign finance or foreign policy. The Institute’s separate measurement of how the same conspiracy narrative reads in search and in the platforms where it circulates reports the comparison in the same descriptive terms.
Methodology and limitations
This report assembles four kinds of evidence and labels each by type. Primary and official records: the US Department of State text of the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding and its accompanying letter; recorded votes published at congress.gov (House Roll Call 275 of the 117th Congress; House Roll Calls 577 and 152 of the 118th; Senate Record Vote 154 of the 118th); and the Congressional Research Service report RL33222, a nonpartisan report to Congress whose totals move by edition. Peer‑reviewed research: Küçük (2025), Jikeli and colleagues (2022), Weinberg and colleagues (2025), Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), and Hersh and Royden (2022). Named survey organizations: Pew Research Center (2026), Gallup (2010 to 2026), the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2024) and the Brookings Institution (2024). Aggregated filings and press analysis of filings: OpenSecrets’ tabulations of Federal Election Commission reports, and the Guardian’s January 2024 campaign‑finance analysis and June 2026 analysis of congressional ethics filings.
Where a figure is a commissioning organization’s own poll, it is named as such: the 14% and 4% top‑two salience figures are from J Street’s polling archive, conducted by GBAO Strategies and commissioned by J Street, an advocacy organization.
Limits on the vote evidence: Israel assistance is ordinarily carried inside the annual State, Foreign Operations appropriations act, where a vote on the package is not a vote on one line, so the four measures cited here are the closest thing to a series the record allows, not a complete accounting of congressional action. Limits on the survey evidence: Gallup’s sympathies item is a forced choice between two named parties and measures relative sympathy, not any view on assistance; Gallup’s own methodology work documents that question placement changes the shares produced; the Pew and Gallup readings cited are 2025 and 2026 measurements set against 2021 to 2024 votes, so they are not contemporaneous. Limits on the finance evidence: OpenSecrets tabulates filings and does not measure effect; independent expenditures are by statutory definition uncoordinated with any campaign; Küçük (2025) measures bill sponsorship rather than roll‑call voting and states its design cannot establish direction. A widely repeated rate for the share of donor‑backed members voting for unconditioned assistance appears in circulation without a published denominator, vote set or method, and no such methodology could be located; it is recorded here as unpublished rather than assessed.
Conclusion
So why does the roll call read differently from the polling? The record answers with instruments rather than motives. The dollar level is fixed in a 2016 executive agreement at $38 billion across ten years and carries a clause obliging Israel to return appropriations above it. The margins on the votes are so wide, 420 to 9 in 2021 and 366 to 58 in 2024, that they contain nearly the whole chamber, and the one vote in the set that split near party lines split over an IRS‑funding offset attached to it, a 140‑vote swing on unchanged assistance. The money that moves in this space runs mostly through a channel that is, by the statutory definition permitting it, uncoordinated with any campaign: $37,860,200 in independent expenditures against $3,037,900 in capped direct contributions. And the divergence from the public readings is concentrated in one caucus, 37 no votes out of 210 voting Democrats, alongside an 80% unfavorable share among Democrats and Democratic leaners in 2026.
Every one of those facts is checkable in a document with a date on it: a signed agreement, a roll call, a Federal Election Commission filing, a travel disclosure filed with the Clerk of the House. And each one is more specific, and duller, than the explanation that circulates in its place.
That is where the two versions of this question part company. The measured corpora show that when antisemitic content names a mechanism at all, it names collective power: 62% of antisemitic tweets in one annotated corpus, 56% of coded implicit‑term sentences in another. The appropriations record names a procurement schedule. Both are answers to the same words. Which one arrives first, when someone looks for the reason a chamber voted 366 to 58, is a matter worth measuring in its own right, and the space between a filing and a folk explanation is where that competition is decided.
Frequently Asked Questions
How does an independent expenditure differ from a campaign contribution?
A contribution goes to a candidate’s committee and is capped: under 52 U.S.C. 30116 a multicandidate PAC may give $5,000 per candidate per election. An independent expenditure is spending about a race that is, by the statutory definition permitting unlimited amounts, uncoordinated with any campaign. In the 2024 cycle OpenSecrets recorded $3,037,900 in direct AIPAC PAC contributions against $37,860,200 in independent expenditures by the affiliated super PAC.
Does the 2016 agreement obligate the money?
No. The Memorandum of Understanding states that its funding levels “are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds,” so it sets a level and a schedule rather than obligating funds. The Congressional Research Service records that Congress has appropriated both within and above the schedule, including $1 billion in additional missile defense funding in fiscal 2022.
Where are congressional trips to Israel recorded?
In two official filings. House rules require pre‑travel approval from the Committee on Ethics and a post‑travel disclosure filed with the Clerk of the House, published at disclosures‑clerk.house.gov. Under the 2007 travel rules, an organization employing lobbyists may generally sponsor only single‑day travel, while a 501(c)(3) may sponsor longer trips.
Do Gallup and Pew measure the same thing?
They do not. Gallup’s long‑running item is a forced choice asking whether sympathies lie more with the Israelis or the Palestinians, so it measures relative sympathy between two named parties. Pew’s 2026 item measures favorable or unfavorable views of Israel. Gallup’s own methodology work notes that where the sympathies question sits within a survey changes the shares it produces.
What is Foreign Military Financing?
It is grant funding a recipient uses to purchase US defense articles and services, and it is the channel carrying $33 billion of the $38 billion in the 2016 framework, per the Congressional Research Service. The program carries an offshore procurement restriction; Israel’s historical allowance to convert part of its grant for spending with Israeli industry is phased down across the memorandum’s ten‑year term.
Is there a published rate for how donor-backed members vote on Israel aid?
Not in any source located here. A rate near nine in ten circulates without a stated denominator, vote set or method. The recorded votes themselves are public and bound the question: with 9 no votes on the 2021 Iron Dome supplemental, any subgroup of 100 members voted at least 91% yes.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic comments on Facebook pages of leading British, French, and German media outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Brookings Institution, 2024. New polls: Democrats say Biden and members of Congress lean toward Israel more than they do. brookings.edu. Research institution.
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2024. Americans grow more divided on US support for Israel. globalaffairs.org. Research organization.
- Gallup, 2010 to 2026. Middle East sympathies trend series and 2026 readings on an independent Palestinian state. news.gallup.com/poll/1639 and news.gallup.com/poll/702440. Survey organization.
- Hersh, E., and Royden, L., 2022. Antisemitic attitudes across the ideological spectrum. Political Research Quarterly. DOI 10.1177/10659129221111081. Peer-reviewed.
- Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., and Soemer, K., 2022. Differences between antisemitic and non-antisemitic English language tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- J Street, polling archive, conducted by GBAO Strategies. jstreet.org/polling. Advocacy-commissioned survey.
- Küçük, Ö. N., 2025. Funding in the shadow of conflict: AIPAC’s financial influence on US Congress post-2023 Israel-Hamas war. Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 12(1), pp. 1 to 20. DOI 10.26513/tocd.1574363. Peer-reviewed.
- OpenSecrets, 2025. AIPAC PAC contributions to federal candidates, 2023-2024 cycle (FEC committee C00797670). opensecrets.org. Campaign-finance aggregator tabulating FEC filings.
- OpenSecrets, 2025. United Democracy Project independent expenditures, 2024 cycle (FEC committee C00799031). opensecrets.org. Campaign-finance aggregator tabulating FEC filings.
- Pew Research Center, 2026. Negative views of Israel and Netanyahu continue to rise among Americans, especially young people. pewresearch.org. Survey organization.
- The Guardian, 2024. Revealed: Congress backers of Gaza war received most from pro-Israel donors, 10 January 2024. theguardian.com. Press analysis of campaign-finance records.
- The Guardian, 2026. Aipac affiliate has funded lavish trips to Israel for dozens of Congress members since 7 October, 2 June 2026. theguardian.com. Press analysis of congressional ethics filings.
- US Congress, 2021 to 2024. Recorded votes on Israel security assistance: House Roll Call 275 (117th Congress); House Roll Calls 577 and 152 (118th Congress); Senate Record Vote 154 (118th Congress). congress.gov. Official record.
- US Congressional Research Service, ongoing. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments, RL33222. congress.gov. Official record.
- US Department of State, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Israel on Security Assistance, signed 14 September 2016. 2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/265160.pdf. Official record.
- Weinberg, S., Levy, A., Edwards, M., Kopstein, J., Frey, S., and colleagues, 2025. Hidden in plain sight: antisemitic content in QAnon subreddits. PLoS ONE. DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0318988. Peer-reviewed.