The IDF states that a soldier who witnesses a violation “is required under military orders to report it,” and that this “also applies to individuals who were interviewed for the film,” the documentary NAZA. The IDF’s own ethical code adds a duty not to follow illegal orders, and an Israeli military court set the test for a manifestly illegal order in 1958: over such an order “should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: ‘Prohibited!’” The Military Advocate General’s Corps, where reports go, counted 74 criminal investigations opened in the Gaza war by August 2024, its own count. None of the records examined here shows whether any of the film’s interviewees reported what they describe.
Key Findings
- The IDF’s statement on NAZA, a party’s own, states that a soldier who witnesses a violation “is required under military orders to report it,” and that “This also applies to individuals who were interviewed for the film.”
- The IDF’s ethical code, its own doctrine, requires that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners” and “do not follow illegal orders.”
- The Military Advocate General’s Corps, a party’s own count, opened 74 criminal investigations in the Gaza war by 3 August 2024, 44 of them concerning the deaths of detainees, and referred over 1,000 incidents for factual assessment.
- The military court judgment of October 1958 in the Kafr Qasim trial set the test for a manifestly illegal order in Israeli law, and every sentence it imposed was reduced on appeal.
What does the IDF say NAZA’s interviewees were required to do?
The IDF’s statement of 11 September 2026, its own account, answers the film’s testimony with a duty: a soldier who witnesses a violation “is required under military orders to report it,” and “This also applies to individuals who were interviewed for the film.”
The statement pairs that duty with a challenge to the testimony. It states that the film “relies on anonymous testimonies from individuals whose identity cannot be verified, including whether they served in the IDF, in what capacity, or whether they were involved in the matters about which the allegations are being made.” Of one interviewee, the IDF said on 14 September 2026 that “nothing about the interviewee, not his service nor his role can be independently checked and verified.”
The film rests on those people. The Guardian, which produced it, reports testimony from 24 Israeli military insiders, and quotes the directors saying their subject is “the orders themselves, the policies, the accepted practices, the language and logic that make those practices possible.”
The two positions meet on a single question the records can partly answer: what the IDF’s rules require of a soldier who sees something unlawful, and where that report goes. The IDF’s code states the duty; Israeli case law states the test for an order a soldier must refuse; the Military Advocate General’s Corps states what happens to a report and publishes counts of what it opened.
What the records cannot answer is whether any interviewee used that route. The film’s insiders are anonymous, the IDF says it cannot identify them, and no record examined here shows a report from any of them. The Institute has not viewed the film; its content enters here through its producer’s reporting.
What does the IDF’s ethical code require of a soldier near civilians?
The IDF’s ethical code, its own doctrine, addresses civilians directly under the value it calls Purity of Arms: “The soldier will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.”
The value opens with a limit on force itself: “An IDF soldier will only exercise their power or use their weapon in order to fulfill their mission and only when necessary. They will maintain their humanity during combat and routine times.” Its other stated values include Human Life, Discipline, Professionalism, Camaraderie and a Sense of Mission.
Under Human Life, the soldier “will recognize the critical importance of human life,” and in combat “will put themselves and their fellow soldiers at risk only to the extent required to fulfill their mission.” The code states that it, “together with the practical rules derived from it, constitutes the ethical code.”
The code is a statement of the standard, and it is evidence of nothing more. It records what the IDF requires of itself. It cannot show whether any particular strike complied with it, and it carries no figure.
The IDF’s own footage offers something closer to practice. In the 18 clips of targeting footage provided to the Hanover Institute, the IDF’s own record, every strike shown is stopped, diverted or held, and in 15 of the 18 the stated reason is people near the target. The clips are a selection, examined in the Institute’s report on the question of targeting civilians, and they show the moment the code describes in its most favorable form: a weapon withheld because uninvolved people were close.
The film’s account is of the opposite case, where harm to uninvolved people was accepted in advance. The code and the clips describe the rule and its observance; the film describes its breach. None of the three measures how often each occurred.
When must an IDF soldier refuse an order?
The IDF’s ethical code, its own doctrine, states under Discipline that the soldier “will ensure they are only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders.” The sentence binds the officer who gives an order as well as the soldier who receives it.
The code does not say how a soldier is to tell an illegal order from a legal one. Israeli law supplies that test, and it comes from a military court’s judgment in 1958: “The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order is that above such an order should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: ‘Prohibited!’”
The test sets a high bar and a clear one. An order that is merely questionable, or unlawful in a way a soldier could not be expected to see, does not meet it. An order whose illegality is plain on its face does.
The film’s subject sits on that line. Its directors, as The Guardian quotes them, describe “the orders themselves, the policies, the accepted practices.” Whether any order the insiders describe was manifestly illegal, in the black-flag sense, or lawful but contested, is the question the test would decide, and deciding it needs the order itself.
No order the film describes appears in any record examined here. The IDF’s presentation provided to the Institute sets out its process, its strike chart and one worked legal review from 2014, but it contains no operational order from the current war. The black-flag test can be stated from the record; it cannot be applied to the film’s account without the orders the film describes.
Where does the black-flag test come from?
The black-flag test comes from the military court’s judgment of October 1958 in the trial of eleven defendants for the killing of civilians at Kafr Qasim on 29 October 1956. The trial, according to the document library of the Akevot Institute, “spanned 100 different sessions between March 1957 and January 1958.”
The Akevot record states the outcome: “Eight of the defendants were convicted and three were acquitted.” The longest sentence, imposed on the battalion commander, was 17 years. On 3 April 1959 the appeal court reduced all eight sentences, and the longest were further commuted by the Chief of Staff and the President.
The Akevot record ends the sequence on 4 March 1960: “Less than eighteen months after the sentencing in the trial of the eleven, all convicted prisoners are free.”
The case therefore stands in Israeli law for two things at once. The ruling established that an order to kill civilians carries the black flag and must be refused, and it convicted eight of the eleven men tried. The sentences it imposed were cut on appeal and by commutation until every convicted man was free within eighteen months.
The Akevot Institute, an Israeli research and archive institute that publishes primary records of the conflict, obtained the release of hundreds of sealed transcript pages through the Military Court of Appeals. The record it publishes is the Israeli military court’s own. The Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project, which documents Israeli jurisprudence, records the black-flag passage in its profile of the judge who wrote it.
The case is nearly seventy years older than the war the film describes, and it concerns a different kind of act. It is cited here for the standard it set, and for the record of what followed a conviction under it.
What does international law require of commanders who learn of a breach?
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to which Israel is a party, states in Article 146 that each party “shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,” and to “bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.”
The same article requires each party to “take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches.” The duty to investigate is the state’s; the duty to report, in the IDF’s statement, is placed on the soldier.
Additional Protocol I places the link in the chain of command. Article 87(1) requires parties to “require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.” Israel is not a party to Additional Protocols I or II; its May 2015 report states that it “abides by their provisions inasmuch as they reflect rules of customary international law.”
Read together, the instruments and the IDF’s statement describe three duties: the soldier reports, the commander prevents, suppresses and reports, and the state searches for and prosecutes. The IDF’s code adds a fourth at the level of the order: an order that is manifestly illegal is not to be obeyed.
Each duty presupposes that the person who saw the breach can be identified and that the report reaches a body able to act on it. The film’s testimony comes from people the IDF says it cannot identify, which is where the IDF’s statement and the film’s account part.
Where does a report of misconduct go in the IDF?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps states, its own account, that it “is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence,” and that its decisions are “subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged on appeal in front of Israel’s Attorney General, as well as before the Israeli Supreme Court.” It publishes its process on a page first dated 24 February 2024.
Incidents requiring factual assessment go first to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism. The Corps states that the mechanism was created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission, and now operates as “a permanent body which conducts factual assessments.”
Israel’s May 2015 report, its own account, describes the Corps’ standing. Its lawyers “are not subordinate to the commanders they advise,” and the Military Advocate General “is appointed by the Minister of Defence (a civilian authority), not by the IDF Chief of General Staff.” The Foreign Ministry paper of November 2023 states that “IDF legal advisers are not subject to the IDF chain of command on professional matters, but report directly to the Military Advocate General.”
The route runs, then, from a soldier or a report to a factual assessment, to a decision by the Corps whether to open a criminal investigation, and from that decision to appeal before the Attorney General and the Supreme Court. Each stage is the Israeli state’s own, and the independence the Corps claims is its own description of itself.
The mechanism the Corps describes assesses incidents. Anonymous testimony about policies and practices, as the film’s is described, is a different kind of account from an incident, and the records examined here do not say how the Corps treats one.
How many criminal investigations has the Military Advocate General opened?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps, a party’s own count, had opened 74 criminal investigations in the Gaza war as at 3 August 2024. The Corps states that it referred over 1,000 further incidents to the Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, hundreds of them still under assessment.
The breakdown is the Corps’ own: 44 concerning the deaths of detainees held by the IDF, 13 alleged pillaging or stealing, 8 alleged mistreatment of detainees, 6 alleged illegal use of force, and 3 alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity.
The largest share concerns detainees in IDF custody. Six concern the illegal use of force, the category nearest to the film’s subject, and none in the Corps’ list is framed as concerning the selection or approval of targets.
The counts are of investigations opened, not of findings, indictments or convictions, and the page gives none of those. The over 1,000 referrals are incidents sent for factual assessment, not cases in which any wrongdoing was found. Both figures are the IDF’s own, unaudited, and dated August 2024.
The records examined here give no later count. They do not show how many of the 74 closed, how many led to charges, or how many of the over 1,000 referrals became investigations after August 2024. The records examined here give no breakdown of the over 1,000 referrals by subject, so the share concerning strikes cannot be read from them. The count is the only published measure of what the reporting route produced, and it stops two years before the film.
What decides whether a civilian death is investigated?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps states, its own account on its 2024 page, that in armed conflict “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.”
That sentence is the threshold that produces the counts above. A civilian death alone does not open a criminal investigation; a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct does. The number of investigations is therefore a function of the threshold applied as much as of the number of incidents.
The threshold helps explain the shape of the Corps’ list. Its largest category concerns deaths of detainees in custody, outside combat, and a count of investigations cannot be read as a count of civilian deaths in strikes.
It also explains why the film’s account and the Corps’ counts do not meet. NAZA’s insiders, as The Guardian reports them, describe civilian harm accepted within the approval process itself. A strike carried out inside that process, and within the approved expectation of harm, could on the Corps’ stated threshold be explained as “reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity” unless something else raised a suspicion.
What would raise one is the kind of evidence the film’s testimony describes: an order, a policy or a practice that made the harm unlawful in advance. That evidence would need to reach the Corps in a form it could assess. The IDF’s statement invites exactly that, and says the interviewees were obliged to provide it.
What do the records not show about reports from NAZA’s interviewees?
The IDF’s statement of 11 September 2026, its own account, says the interviewees were required to report what they witnessed, but no record examined here shows whether any of them did, what was reported, or what became of a report.
The Corps publishes counts of investigations opened by subject, not by source, so its figures cannot show whether any came from people who later spoke to the film. Its counts stop in August 2024. The film’s interviewees are anonymous, and the IDF states that it cannot verify their service, their role or their involvement.
That leaves each side’s claim unanswerable from the other’s record. The IDF cannot show that the insiders failed to report, because it cannot identify them. The film cannot show that reports were made and ignored without identifying the people who made them. Neither record reaches the other.
The black-flag test, the code’s duty to refuse and the treaty duties to report all assume an identified witness and an identifiable order. The film’s testimony, by its design, has neither in public. The IDF’s answer, by its design, points to a route the testimony did not take in public.
The IDF’s statement of 11 September names the duty and the route, and the records examined here show no inquiry opened into the matters the film describes. A measure that would test both accounts is simple to state: how many reports reached the Corps about target selection or approval, from whom in the chain of command, and what was decided about each. None of the records examined here supplies it.
Methodology and limitations
This report sets the IDF’s answer to the documentary NAZA against the rules and records that govern reporting and refusal in the IDF: the IDF’s statements of 11 and 14 September 2026, its ethical code, the Military Advocate General’s Corps page on alleged misconduct, the Foreign Ministry’s May 2015 report and November 2023 legal paper, the Kafr Qasim trial record published by the Akevot Institute, and the treaty text of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. The film’s claims come from The Guardian, which produced it; the film was not viewed.
The Corps’ counts are its own and are not audited; they count investigations opened, not findings. The Kafr Qasim record is cited for its dates, outcome and the standard it set; no death toll is given here, and no defendant is named. The 18 clips are a selection published as received.
Conclusion
The IDF’s answer to NAZA turns the film’s testimony back on its witnesses. What must an IDF soldier do who sees a violation? On the IDF’s own rules, report it, refuse any order that flies the black flag, and withhold force from uninvolved civilians, and the IDF states that those duties bound the film’s interviewees. An Israeli military court set the black-flag test in 1958, the Military Advocate General’s Corps describes an independent route for reports, and it counted 74 investigations opened by August 2024.
The records stop where the film begins. They show the duties and the route, and counts of what the route opened. They do not show a single report from anyone who later spoke to the film, and the film does not show one either.
A duty to report is only as visible as the reports it produces. If the Corps published how many reports it received about how targets were chosen and approved, and what it decided about each, would the film’s insiders turn out to have been silent, or unheard?
Frequently Asked Questions
Are IDF soldiers required to report violations?
The IDF states that a soldier who witnesses a violation “is required under military orders to report it.” It said on 11 September 2026 that the duty also applied to the people interviewed for NAZA.
Can an IDF soldier refuse an order?
The IDF’s ethical code states that soldiers “do not follow illegal orders.” Israeli law requires refusal of a manifestly illegal order, one over which “should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: ‘Prohibited!’”
What is the black flag test?
It is the standard, set by an Israeli military court in 1958, for an order so plainly unlawful that a soldier must refuse it. It comes from the judgment in the Kafr Qasim trial.
Who investigates alleged IDF misconduct?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps decides whether to open criminal investigations, after incidents are assessed by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism. Its decisions can be appealed to Israel’s Attorney General and Supreme Court.
How many criminal investigations has the IDF opened in the Gaza war?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, its own count. They are investigations opened, not findings or convictions.
Does a civilian death automatically lead to an IDF investigation?
No. The Military Advocate General’s Corps states that civilian harm “in most cases” does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, which is the threshold for a criminal investigation.
Did NAZA’s interviewees report what they saw to the IDF?
No record examined here says. The interviewees are anonymous, and the IDF states that it cannot verify their service or role.
Sources
- Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research, 2019. Kafr Qasim Massacre: Document Library. https://kafr-qasim-massacre.akevot.org.il/index-en.php. Research and archive institute publishing the Israeli military court’s trial record.
- Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project, undated. Binyamin Halevy. https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/justices/halevy-binyamin. Academic legal database, recording the black-flag passage.
- Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949. Article 146. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-146. Treaty text.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. The IDF Spokesperson’s Response Following the Publication of the Movie “NAZA.” 11 September 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/distributions-swords-of-iron-war-gaza/the-idf-spokesperson-s-response-following-the-publication-of-the-movie-naza/. Official statement, a party’s own.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Targeting footage of strikes diverted or called off, 18 clips. Provided to the Hanover Institute, 17 September 2026, and published as received. Official record, a party’s own footage.
- Israel Defense Forces, undated. The Spirit of the IDF: the ethical code and its values. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/spirit-of-the-idf/. Official record, a party’s own doctrine.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/idf-conduct-of-operations-during-the-2014-gaza-conflict. Official record, a party’s own account.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023/en/English_Documents_Hamas-Israel%20Conflict%202023%20-%20Some%20Factual%20and%20Legal%20Aspects%20-%20Israel%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20(2%20NOV%202023).pdf. Official record, a party’s own position.
- Military Advocate General’s Corps, Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/military-advocate-generals-corps/addressing-alleged-misconduct-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-gaza-published-february-24-2024/. Official record, a party’s own account and counts.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Article 87. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-87. Treaty text.
- The Guardian, 2026. Secret systems used by Israel in mass killings of Gaza civilians revealed in new film. 10 September 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/10/secret-systems-used-by-israel-in-mass-killings-of-gaza-civilians-revealed-in-new-film. International press, the film’s producer.
- The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF denies claim in new ‘NAZA’ documentary that it planned Gaza strike with 500 civilian deaths. 14 September 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-denies-claim-in-new-naza-documentary-that-it-planned-gaza-strike-with-500-civilian-deaths/. Israeli press, carrying the IDF’s statement.