What Records Would Settle NAZA’s Claims? The Counts Neither Side Has Published

Of 8 claims at the center of the documentary NAZA and the IDF’s answer to it, the IDF’s own records describe the rules for every one and publish a count that would settle none. Each claim could be tested by a record the IDF says it keeps: the expected civilian harm on each target card, the population estimate for each of 630 sectors, the suggestions its systems produced, the strikes it stopped, what its investigations found. Israel published some of those counts for the 2014 war, including a total of over 6,000 aerial strikes. For the war NAZA describes, the records examined here hold rules, examples and a few floors.

Key Findings

• Israel’s May 2015 report, its own account, published a total of over 6,000 aerial strikes and more than a thousand specific warnings for the 2014 war; the records examined here give no equivalent totals for the current war.
• The IDF presentation, a party’s own document, describes population estimates for 630 sectors of Gaza and publishes none of them, the figures against which NAZA’s claim of neighborhoods a quarter full could be checked.
• The IDF presentation states that “Many strikes were cancelled” and Israel’s Foreign Ministry that “countless attacks have been aborted,” and neither gives a number.
• The Military Advocate General’s Corps, a party’s own count, reports 74 criminal investigations opened by August 2024 and publishes no findings from them.
• The Guardian reports that NAZA rests on testimony from 24 Israeli military insiders whom the IDF says it cannot identify, and no document from the film is in the records examined.

Which records would test NAZA’s claims?

The IDF’s own procedures, as it describes them, generate a record for each of the 8 claims set out below. The table pairs each claim with that record and with what has been published from it.

Each row is taken up below, with a link to the Institute’s fuller report on it. The pattern across the rows is the finding. The records describe rules precisely and give examples willingly; they almost never give the count that would show how often a rule held.

That is not unique to the current war. Israel’s report on the 2014 war published some totals, and they are the benchmark for what a party has chosen to publish before. The records examined here, all of them the IDF’s or the Israeli government’s own, are set against that benchmark rather than against any outside standard.

Every figure below is a party’s own count unless stated. The Institute has not viewed the film; its content enters here through its producer’s reporting.

What would test the claim that civilian deaths were built into approvals?

The record that would test it is the expected-harm estimate on each target card, and Israel has published one card, a 2014 legal review for a strike on 8 July 2014. It lists the people present at the target and approves the strike on condition of a warning. The dispute over approvals in the current war is examined in the Institute’s report on the IDF’s targeting record.

NAZA’s insiders, as The Guardian reports them, describe civilian deaths accepted as part of approval, and one interviewee speaks of “an approval for 500.” The IDF stated on 14 September 2026 that it “has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed.”

Both statements are about the same kind of number: the civilian harm expected when a strike was approved. The IDF’s procedures, in its own account, require that number for every strike. Its page on its data systems states that each attack requires “an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects.” Israel’s May 2015 report states that excessiveness “is not measured using absolute numbers. It is assessed on a case-by-case basis.”

The estimate therefore exists, on the IDF’s description, for each approved strike. Neither side has published one for the current war. A single target card with its expected-harm figure, from any strike the film describes, would test both the interviewee’s 500 and the IDF’s denial at once.

What would test the claim about populated neighborhoods?

The record is the population estimate the IDF says it kept for each of 630 sectors of Gaza, and none has been published. The IDF presentation describes “continuous assessments of the population presence” in each sector, passed to the forces that strike. It names the team that kept them, a Southern Command unit “led by a Brigadier General” that included “legal advisers,” so the record has an owner inside the IDF.

NAZA’s insiders, as The Guardian reports them, describe “the destruction of neighbourhoods where the Israeli military estimated that up to 25% of residents were still sheltering in their homes.” The claim names the kind of figure the sector map was built to hold. If the estimates for the neighborhoods the film describes were published beside the dates of the strikes there, the 25% could be checked.

What Israel has published instead are counts of what it sent. Its Foreign Ministry counted over 15 million text messages and over 4.5 million leaflets by 8 December 2023, its own figures, and states that “communications in Gaza is intermittent.” Those count messages, not the people who received them or the people who stayed.

The Foreign Ministry also states that the IDF “does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given.” On that stated position, the number of people who stayed is exactly what entered each strike’s assessment. The Institute’s report on neighborhoods that stayed populated sets out the map and the warnings in full.

What would test the claim that software chose the targets?

The IDF publishes no count of what its systems suggested or of what became of each suggestion, the record that would test this claim. It states that Habsora, in operational use since 2021, “suggests” objects to an analyst, and that a suggestion “cannot be solely relied upon to identify a target.”

The film’s insiders, as The Guardian reports them, describe “AI-based systems built to identify large numbers of potential low-ranking Hamas targets.” The IDF states that strike decisions “are made by human personnel only.” Its account names the stages a suggestion passes through: an analyst’s research, an authorized intelligence officer’s approval, a legal review, and a commander’s approval.

Each of those stages is a point at which a count could be kept: suggestions produced, suggestions researched, targets approved, strikes approved, targets rejected at each stage. The film’s claim is a claim about scale, and scale is the one thing the IDF’s description of its systems does not give.

The IDF’s answer to a New York Times investigation, as The Times of Israel reported it in December 2024, was that “officers always verified the information provided” by AI systems. A rate of verification, or of rejection, would turn that statement into a measure. The IDF’s page on the two systems, first published in June 2024 and updated in September 2026, answers the question “Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?” with “No,” and gives no figure for either system. The Institute’s report on the approval chain sets out the stages the IDF describes.

What would test the claim about homes and families?

The record is the set of target cards and warning logs for strikes on homes, and the one card Israel has published is from 2014. It concerns a weapons store in a commander’s home, lists the commander and his family at the target, and approves the strike on condition of a warning.

For 2014, Israel’s May 2015 report published a count: specific warnings “prior to more than a thousand attacks against individual targets.” It also stated that when the IDF attacked individual militants, “the attack was conducted without giving advance warning.” For the current war, the Foreign Ministry counted over 45,000 individual phone calls to 8 December 2023, “urging people to temporarily leave areas of hostilities and individual targets,” its own count, which does not separate homes from other targets.

The film’s insiders, as The Guardian reports them, describe targets “bombed in their homes at night, in the knowledge attacks would also kill their families.” Two counts would test that: how many strikes on homes were aimed at a person rather than a structure, the kind Israel’s own account says are made without warning, and how many were preceded by a warning to the household.

The published card shows what such a record holds: the object, the people present, the conditions attached, and the “Number of bombs: One.” Israel’s 2015 report adds that target cards “may take different forms in different IDF units, their subject matter and purpose remain the same.” Neither count appears in the records examined here. The Institute’s report on the one target card Israel has published sets out the card and Israel’s rules on warnings.

How often did the IDF stop a strike?

The IDF presentation states that “Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians,” and Israel’s Foreign Ministry states that “countless attacks have been aborted or avoided completely in order to prevent harm to civilians.” Neither record gives a number, and the presentation’s 3 examples of cancelled strikes include one dated to 2014. That dated example, from 14 July 2014, predates the current war.

The 18 clips of IDF targeting footage provided to the Hanover Institute are the IDF’s own record of stopped strikes, dated from April 2024 to July 2026. The IDF has released such footage before: The Times of Israel reported in December 2023 that it published videos of airstrikes aborted because civilians were present.

The clips and the statements show that stopping happened. They cannot show how often, because they are selected and the totals behind them are not published. For 2014, Israel’s May 2015 report stated that “individual pilots exercised their discretion to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians,” and gave no count either.

A rate is what would matter to the film’s claim. Two numbers would supply it: strikes approved, and strikes stopped after approval. With both, the 18 clips could be placed against the whole; without them, they remain examples chosen by the party presenting them. The Institute’s report on the question of targeting civilians sets out what the clips show and what the IDF’s rules say about civilians near a target.

What have the investigations found?

The Military Advocate General’s Corps, its own count, had opened 74 criminal investigations in the Gaza war by 3 August 2024, and referred over 1,000 further incidents for factual assessment. It publishes no findings, charges or convictions from either.

The Corps states that civilian harm “in most cases” does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, which is the threshold for an investigation. The count therefore reflects the threshold as much as the incidents. Of the 74, the largest group concerns deaths of detainees in custody, and none is framed as concerning the selection or approval of targets.

The IDF states that its soldiers are required to report violations, and that the duty applied to the people interviewed for NAZA. The Corps’ counts are broken down by subject and give no source for any referral, so they cannot show whether any report came from anyone who later spoke to the film.

The Corps states that its decisions are “subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged on appeal in front of Israel’s Attorney General, as well as before the Israeli Supreme Court.” A published list of closed files and appeals would show how often that oversight was used. The outcome of each investigation is the record that would show what the reporting route produced: how many closed without charges, how many led to indictments, and on what grounds. The Institute’s report on the duty to report and refuse sets out the duties, the route and the counts in full.

Where did Hamas place its military assets, by count?

The record that would test Israel’s own central claim is the share of targets that were civilian buildings used for military purposes, and the IDF presentation maps 3 categories of such sites around Khan Younis without counting them. Israel’s May 2015 report gives named cases from 2014 and no total.

The IDF’s answer to NAZA states that “Hamas continues to systematically operate from within the civilian environment.” Israel’s Foreign Ministry counts over 1,000 Hamas rockets that landed inside Gaza by December 2023, its own count and a floor, with no method. It states that Hamas conceals military assets “in and underneath hospitals, including the Al-Shifa hospital, which is the largest hospital in Gaza,” and gives no count of such sites.

This claim is Israel’s, not the film’s, and the same gap applies to it. A count of strikes on buildings the IDF classed as military objectives by use, with the use it recorded for each, would test it. Israel’s 2015 report states that forensic evidence of military use “is rarely available after an attack,” so such a count would rest on the IDF’s own intelligence records, which is where the target card already sits.

The claim and the film’s allegations are not alternatives. A strike on a home used as a command post can be lawful in its target and disputed in its expected harm. The Institute’s report on civilian sites in Israel’s record sets out the map, the cases and the law.

How often was the ceasefire breached?

The Board of Peace, in the only report Security Council resolution 2803 requires, states that violations of the Gaza ceasefire “continue to occur on a near daily basis, some of which are serious,” and gives no total. The plan the resolution endorses defines no violation and names no body to count one.

The IDF publishes a dated list of what it calls Hamas violations, its own account, with no total and no entry for any violation by Israel. Gaza’s Ministry of Health counts deaths since the ceasefire without linking them to incidents. Two of the IDF clips provided to the Institute are dated after the ceasefire began and show strikes diverted because children came near. The force the resolution charges with helping monitor the ceasefire had not deployed by May 2026, on the Board of Peace’s account, and the resolution imposes no duty to count incidents. The IDF’s list also carries its own date errors: entries from November 2025 are stamped 2026 on a page dated February 2026.

A record that would settle the question needs a standard first: a statement of what the ceasefire forbids. Only then can incidents be counted against it and attributed to a party. None of the documents examined here supplies the standard, so none of the parties’ ledgers can be read as a measure of how the ceasefire held.

The Institute’s report on strikes during the ceasefire sets out the instruments, the reporting body’s account and each party’s ledger.

What would verify the film’s own testimony?

The Guardian, which produced NAZA, reports that the film rests on testimony from 24 Israeli military insiders, and the IDF states, in its own statement of 11 September 2026, that their identity “cannot be verified, including whether they served in the IDF, in what capacity, or whether they were involved in the matters about which the allegations are being made.”

The film’s claims rest on testimony, as the producer’s reporting describes them, and no document from the film appears in the records examined here. The IDF’s answer is a denial and a set of published rules. Each side’s evidence is of a kind the other cannot test directly: the IDF cannot cross-examine anonymous witnesses, and the film’s account cannot be checked against target cards the IDF has not released.

The records that would test the testimony are the same ones that would test the IDF’s denial: the target cards, estimates and approvals for the strikes the insiders describe. Released with identifying detail removed, a handful of them would show whether the approvals the film describes existed.

The Guardian quotes the directors describing their subject as “the orders themselves, the policies, the accepted practices, the language and logic that make those practices possible.” Orders and policies, where written down, are records held inside the IDF, which is where both sides’ evidence would meet. Absent those, the dispute rests on credibility rather than record, and the records examined here cannot settle it. The Institute has not viewed the film, and has not verified when or where the IDF’s clips were recorded.

Methodology and limitations

This report draws together the records examined in the Institute’s series on the documentary NAZA: an IDF targeting presentation and 18 clips of IDF footage provided to the Institute, the IDF’s statements on the film, its page on its data systems, the Military Advocate General’s Corps page on alleged misconduct, the Foreign Ministry’s May 2015 report on the 2014 war and its papers of November and December 2023, Security Council resolution 2803, and the Board of Peace’s report of May 2026. The film’s claims come from The Guardian, which produced it; the film was not viewed.

The eight claims were chosen as the ones the series examined, not as a complete list of the film’s allegations. A count is treated as published only where a record examined here states it. Every count cited is a party’s own or the Board of Peace’s own, and none is independently verified.

Conclusion

The IDF’s own records set out how every one of NAZA’s central claims could be settled. What records would settle them? Target cards with their expected-harm estimates, the sector population estimates, counts of what the IDF’s systems suggested and what was approved, a rate of strikes stopped, the outcomes of investigations, and a standard for what the ceasefire forbids. The IDF says it keeps most of these, and has published almost none for this war.

The pattern is consistent across all eight: precise rules, chosen examples, floors instead of totals. Israel published more for 2014, including a total of strikes. The film offers testimony the IDF says it cannot verify. Each side holds the evidence the other lacks, and neither has released it.

A handful of target cards from the strikes the film describes would test both accounts at once, and Israel has already shown that it can publish one. If it released the next, whose account would the figure on it support?

Frequently Asked Questions

Has the IDF published how many strikes it carried out in Gaza?

The records examined here give no total for the current war. For the 2014 war, Israel’s May 2015 report stated that the IDF “conducted over 6,000 aerial strikes against military objectives.”

Has the IDF published its civilian harm estimates for any strike?

Israel has published one target card, from a strike on 8 July 2014, which lists the people present and approves the strike on condition of a warning. The records examined here contain none from the current war.

How many strikes did the IDF abort because civilians were present?

No record examined here gives a number. The IDF presentation says “many,” Israel’s Foreign Ministry says “countless,” and the IDF has released footage of individual aborted strikes.

How many of NAZA’s interviewees are there?

The Guardian, which produced the film, reports testimony from 24 Israeli military insiders. The IDF states that their identities cannot be verified.

Have IDF investigations found wrongdoing in Gaza strikes?

The Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened by August 2024, its own count, and published no findings from them. None of the 74 is framed as concerning the approval of targets.

What would settle whether NAZA’s claims are true?

The target cards, population estimates and approval records for the specific strikes the film describes would test both the film’s claims and the IDF’s denials. None has been published.

Sources

• Board of Peace, 2026. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. S/2026/418, 15 May 2026. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2026/418&l=E&t=pdf. Official record, the reporting body’s own account.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2024. The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Published 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idfs-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing-published-june-18-2024/. Official record, a party’s own account of its procedures.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. The IDF Spokesperson’s Response Following the Publication of the Movie “NAZA.” 11 September 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/distributions-swords-of-iron-war-gaza/the-idf-spokesperson-s-response-following-the-publication-of-the-movie-naza/. Official statement, a party’s own.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations. 19 February 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/a-broken-record-on-repeat-major-ceasefire-violations/. Official record, a party’s own account.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Targeting footage of strikes diverted or called off, 18 clips. Provided to the Hanover Institute, 17 September 2026, and published as received. Official record, a party’s own footage.
• Israel Defense Forces, undated. Addressing Challenges Through LOAC | IHL, targeting process presentation, 18 slides. Provided to the Hanover Institute. /hanover/media/naza/idf-targeting-process-presentation.pdf. Official record, a party’s own presentation.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/idf-conduct-of-operations-during-the-2014-gaza-conflict. Official record, a party’s own account.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions. Updated to 8 December 2023. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023. Official record, a party’s own counts and position.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023/en/English_Documents_Hamas-Israel%20Conflict%202023%20-%20Some%20Factual%20and%20Legal%20Aspects%20-%20Israel%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20(2%20NOV%202023).pdf. Official record, a party’s own position.
• Military Advocate General’s Corps, Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/military-advocate-generals-corps/addressing-alleged-misconduct-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-gaza-published-february-24-2024/. Official record, a party’s own account and counts.
• The Guardian, 2026. Secret systems used by Israel in mass killings of Gaza civilians revealed in new film. 10 September 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/10/secret-systems-used-by-israel-in-mass-killings-of-gaza-civilians-revealed-in-new-film. International press, the film’s producer.
• The Times of Israel, 2023. IDF releases videos of airstrikes aborted due to presence of civilians. 18 December 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-releases-videos-of-airstrikes-aborted-due-to-presence-of-civilians/. Israeli press.
• The Times of Israel, 2024. IDF loosened rules of engagement after Oct. 7, allowing more civilian deaths, NY Times. 26 December 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-loosened-rules-of-engagement-after-oct-7-allowing-more-civilian-deaths-ny-times/. Israeli press, carrying the IDF’s response.
• The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF denies claim in new ‘NAZA’ documentary that it planned Gaza strike with 500 civilian deaths. 14 September 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-denies-claim-in-new-naza-documentary-that-it-planned-gaza-strike-with-500-civilian-deaths/. Israeli press, carrying the IDF’s statement.
• United Nations Security Council, 2025. Resolution 2803 (2025), with the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict as Annex 1. S/RES/2803 (2025), adopted 17 November 2025. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/RES/2803(2025)&l=E&t=pdf. Resolution text.