What Evidence Suggests Zionism Is a Settler-Colonial Ideology? Reading the Named Scholarship, the Framework’s Criteria and the Enacted Texts

Four classes of evidence carry the settler-colonial reading of Zionism across the published literature: the movement’s own vocabulary of colonization, its organized settlement institutions, its programme of land purchase and capital transfer, and the demographic outcome of the 1948 war. The dated peer-reviewed anchors are Ilan Pappé's 2008 essay in South Atlantic Quarterly, published by Duke University Press, and Amir Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 article covering 1920 to 1956. The same journals publish the dissent, and the classification appears in no Israeli statute and in no domestic court ruling.

Key Findings

• Four distinct classes of evidence recur across the settler-colonial literature: self-described colonization, organized settlement institutions, land purchase and capital transfer, and demographic replacement or separation (Pappé, 2008, Duke University Press; Locker-Biletzki, 2025, peer-reviewed).
• The strongest period-bounded peer-reviewed item covers 36 years, 1920 to 1956, and argues that land purchase, capital transfer and settlement building were internal to Zionist ideological and economic practice rather than incidental to it (Locker-Biletzki, 2025).
• On the 1948 outcome, the Israel Law Review records that about 400 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed and about 80% of the residents of the regions on which Israel was established were expelled or fled; Benny Morris’s archival reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, 2004) puts displacement at roughly 700,000 and attributes it to causes varying by locality and phase.
• Israel’s Basic Law of 2018 states in clause 1(c) that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People,” and in clause 7 that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value”; the Supreme Court of Israel upheld the law on 8 July 2021 in HCJ 5555/18.
• 7.7% of the UK comments coded as antisemitic in Becker, Ascone and Troschke’s 2022 peer-reviewed study turned on denial of Jewish self-determination, the coded category nearest the colonizer framing.

What evidence do the settler-colonial analyses actually cite?

Four classes of evidence recur. Ilan Pappé's 2008 essay in South Atlantic Quarterly, published by Duke University Press, sets out the comparative case; Amir Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 peer-reviewed article argues that two of the four classes, land transfer and settlement building, were internal to Zionist practice between 1920 and 1956 rather than incidental to it.

The first class is vocabulary. Pappé's 2008 essay places the movement inside the comparative history of European colonial projects in Asia and Africa and reads the movement’s own colonization language as evidence of that lineage.

The second and third classes are institutional and economic. Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 article, covering 1920 to 1956, argues that capital transfer, land purchase and the building of settlements were structural features of Zionist ideology and economic practice, not by-products of migration. That is a claim about organization: about bodies constituted to buy land and place people on it.

The fourth class is the demographic outcome. The Israel Law Review, a peer-reviewed law journal published by Cambridge University Press, records that in the course of the Zionist and Israeli military operations of 1948 about 400 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed, and that about 80% of the residents of the Palestinian regions on which the State of Israel was established were expelled or fled. Benny Morris’s archival reconstruction (Cambridge University Press, 2004) carries the displacement figure of roughly 700,000 and attributes it to multiple causes that varied by locality and phase, including military attack, fear of attack, expulsions in certain sectors and flight; Morris rejects both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. Ilan Pappé's 2006 book, published by Oneworld, argues the displacement was planned ethnic cleansing. The 400 localities, the 80% share and the 700,000 count are three different quantities from three different reconstructions and do not derive from one another; what caused the 1948 displacement is the point on which Morris and Pappé are furthest apart.

Is it often said that scholars have settled this question?

It is often said that scholarship has settled the classification. The directional part holds: five dated peer-reviewed or university-press items cited in this report, published between 2008 and 2026, advance or engage the settler-colonial reading, and they can be named rather than gestured at. What the same record shows is that the classification lives in journals, where the dissent is published too.

The five are Pappé's 2008 South Atlantic Quarterly essay (Duke University Press), Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 article, two 2024 Taylor and Francis articles, “Zionism, Settler Colonialism, and Nationalism: On Motivations and Violence” and “Intent to Harm: Settler Colonial Outposts in Psychoanalysis,” and a 2026 Taylor and Francis article in the Israel studies literature. A further peer-reviewed article, “Zionism, Imperialism, and Indigeneity in Israel/Palestine: A Critical Analysis,” appears in Peace and Conflict Studies, published by Nova Southeastern University. Lorenzo Veracini’s article in the Journal of Palestine Studies is the item most often relied on for the periodization of the claim.

Two features of that set are worth stating plainly. First, it is an analytic literature: the items argue that a framework developed comparatively fits a case, and they differ among themselves on which evidence is decisive. The 2024 Taylor and Francis article on motivations and violence sits inside the same literature and treats the motivation criterion as unresolved.

Second, the classification has no legal counterpart in the records this report examines. It appears in no Israeli statute. Israel’s Basic Law of 2018 and the Supreme Court’s 2021 judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset both address the state’s constitutional self-definition, and neither uses the term. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel of 14 May 1948, published in Official Gazette Number 1, recites the movement’s own historical chain, the First Zionist Congress of 1897, the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, the League of Nations Mandate and the UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, in the vocabulary of national restoration.

What must a project show to count as settler colonial?

One criterion is definitional in the framework and the rest are indicators. Patrick Wolfe’s 2006 formulation, published in the Journal of Genocide Research, holds that settler colonialism is a structure rather than an event, organized around a logic of elimination: the replacement of a native population rather than the exploitation of its labour. That single test, replacement over exploitation, is what the literature applies.

Lorenzo Veracini’s contribution is the distinction between settlers and migrants: settlers arrive carrying a claim to sovereignty over the place they enter, while migrants arrive into a sovereignty already held by someone else. On that reading, the question is not how many people moved but what institutional form the movement took on arrival.

The indicators that follow from the definitional test are the ones the analyses then look for: organized settlement institutions, systematic land transfer, separation of labour markets, and demographic engineering toward a majority. None of them is definitional on its own. A movement can build settlements without meeting the replacement test, and the framework’s own logic requires the indicators to be read together.

Two consequences follow for a reader weighing the evidence. The framework is comparative, not statutory: it is applied by measuring one case against others, from Australia and North America to Algeria and South Africa, which is the exercise Pappé's 2008 essay performs, and its conclusions are arguments about fit rather than findings of fact under a defined legal element. And because the test is structural, it is indifferent by design to what participants believed they were doing, which is precisely the point the dissenting literature contests. The peer-reviewed article “Zionism, Imperialism, and Indigeneity in Israel/Palestine: A Critical Analysis,” in Peace and Conflict Studies, works a second criterion, indigeneity, which the framework treats as a status of the displaced population rather than of the arriving one.

Which periods does each study actually examine?

Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 refereed meeting report examines 36 years, 1920 to 1956, and its conclusions are bounded by that window. The other items in the literature examine different spans, and the periods do not stack into one continuous evidentiary claim without being stated.

Source: publication records of the items named; period as stated by each.

Veracini’s Journal of Palestine Studies article is the item that states the widest span, holding that settler-colonial objectives informed actions before 1948, after 1948 and after 1967. That is a claim about continuity across three regimes of territorial control, and it is the claim doing the most work when the framework is applied to the present.

The administrative record after 1967 is separately documented. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Lihi Ben Shitrit, in a 2020 review published by POMEPS and not peer-reviewed, trace how Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics has counted settlements since 1967: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” settlement localities were counted within Israel’s total number of localities by 1983, and the separate territories chapter was removed in 1997. The authors’ term for that trend, normalization, is their own analytic framing.

A reader can hold both facts at once: the strongest period-bounded peer-reviewed finding covers 1920 to 1956, and the territorial record after 1967 is documented in a different tier of source, chiefly official statistical practice and think-tank review.

Does the label rest on outcomes or on stated motivation?

Two criteria compete, and the literature splits on which is decisive. The structural reading, following Patrick Wolfe’s 2006 formulation, holds that institutional form and outcome settle the classification whatever participants intended. The 2024 Taylor and Francis article “Zionism, Settler Colonialism, and Nationalism: On Motivations and Violence” argues the opposite: that motivation is analytically load-bearing and cannot be set aside.

The dispute matters because the two criteria point at different records. On the outcome side sit the figures already given: about 400 localities destroyed and about 80% of residents displaced in the regions on which the state was established (Israel Law Review, peer-reviewed), and roughly 700,000 displaced on Morris’s 2004 archival count.

On the stated-purpose side sit texts a reader can check directly. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 14 May 1948, declares “THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL,” pledges “complete equality of social and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex” in the Knesset’s published English translation, and appeals to “the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel” to participate “on the basis of full and equal citizenship.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes the same sentence with “all its inhabitants”; both are Israeli government translations of the Hebrew original.

Seventy years later, Israel’s Basic Law of 2018 states in clause 1(c) that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People,” and in clause 7 that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” The Knesset labels its English text unofficial. The enacted text contains no equality clause; that is a fact about the document, not a finding about treatment.

The structural reading does not need the 2018 text to make its case, and the motivation reading does not dispute the 1948 counts. What divides them is which record is treated as decisive, and neither side’s evidence is unavailable to the other.

Which of these findings come from advocacy submissions?

Three tiers of source carry the claim, and they support different things. Peer-reviewed journal articles and a university-press volume carry method and review; advocacy and legal submissions carry a stated position; web commentary carries argument without either.

The peer-reviewed tier is the one that can be checked against a method: Pappé's 2008 South Atlantic Quarterly essay, Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 article on 1920 to 1956, the two 2024 Taylor and Francis articles, and the Peace and Conflict Studies article on indigeneity. Each states what it examines and over what period.

The submission tier is different in kind. Al-Haq’s annex to the United Nations process on the legacy of colonialism, published as “A Century of Settler Colonialism in Palestine,” is that organization’s own submission on its own definitions, filed as advocacy in a legal and diplomatic process. It states a position and a periodization; it is not a study, it carries no sample, and its century-long framing is an assertion of continuity rather than a measured finding.

The third tier is web commentary, which circulates the argument furthest and documents it least. The Al-Shabaka commentary “The Continuation of Zionist Settler Colonialism,” the page “Zionism is not colonialism, just Jewish self-determination” published by decolonizepalestine among claims it disputes, and the 2016 post “Yes, Zionism is Settler Colonialism” on the Shalom Rav blog all state the case; none reports a sample, a period or a method.

The practical consequence is narrow and worth stating. A reader who encounters the classification most often meets it in the third tier, where the wording is strongest and the evidentiary base is thinnest, while the bounded finding underneath it, Locker-Biletzki’s 36 years, is the item least often named. The tiers are not interchangeable, and a claim’s reach across them is not evidence about its content.

Which named organizations reject the characterization?

Three named publishers reject the classification in print, and each contests a different element. The Anti-Defamation League, a monitoring organization with an advocacy mission, publishes a standing backgrounder titled “Allegation: Israel is a Settler Colonialist Enterprise.” The University of Washington’s Stroum Center for Jewish Studies publishes an essay titled “Why Israel Isn’t a Settler Colonial State.” The Third Narrative publishes “Does Zionism = Settler Colonialism?”

The ADL backgrounder contests the definitional fit, arguing that a movement it describes as the national movement for Jewish self-determination in an ancestral homeland does not map onto a framework built for European powers projecting settlers abroad on behalf of a metropole. The University of Washington essay contests the historical premises, working from the record of Jewish migration and its sponsorship rather than from the framework’s criteria. The Third Narrative contests the analytic mapping itself, asking whether the framework’s elements attach to this case.

None of the three disputes that settlement occurred or that displacement occurred. The disagreement is about what those facts classify as, which is the same axis the peer-reviewed dispute over motivation runs along.

On the domestic legal record, Israel’s own highest court has ruled on the constitutional question nearest to this one, though not on the label. On 8 July 2021, an eleven-justice panel of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, dismissed fifteen petitions against Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset. The Court upheld the law. It also held that the Knesset, acting as constituent authority, is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the state’s core character as a Jewish and democratic state, deriving that limit from the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law. Both halves of that judgment are part of the record: the statute stands, and the Court set a constitutional ceiling it could have breached.

Where does colonizer language appear in measured online discourse?

7.7% of the UK comments coded as antisemitic by Becker, Ascone and Troschke in their 2022 peer-reviewed study turned on denial of Jewish self-determination, the coded category closest to the colonizer framing. The study analysed 1,504 UK comments on the Facebook pages of leading British media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation, of which 26.9% were coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme.

The comparable measure on Twitter runs higher. Jikeli and colleagues, in a 2022 peer-reviewed study of an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets, found that 15% of the antisemitic tweets containing “Jews” fit the IHRA paragraph on denial of Jewish self-determination, while about 62% fit the paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power. Both shares are of samples drawn within keyword queries, not of all of the platform.

Two further peer-reviewed findings bear on how such framings travel. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026, American Psychologist, abstract-sourced) report across three preregistered studies that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, with their model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate it and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, abstract-sourced) report from two British experiments, with 354 and 490 participants, two separate pathways to anti-Jewish hostility: one running through social dominance orientation and one through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people.

These are measured associations, reported by their authors in correlational terms. None of the four studies measures the settler-colonial framing itself. Each codes comments or attitudes against categories defined by other criteria, so the figures describe how adjacent categories appear in these corpora, not how often the framework is invoked or by whom.

Methodology and limitations

This report examines what the published literature argues, what the enacted texts and court records state, and what the measured corpora record. It draws on four source types, each labelled where cited: peer-reviewed journal articles and a university-press essay; primary and official records, comprising Israel’s Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948), Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018) and the Supreme Court judgment in HCJ 5555/18 (2021); a monitoring organization with an advocacy mission (the Anti-Defamation League); and, named in body prose only, advocacy submissions and web commentary that state positions without reporting a method.

Scope limits carry into the findings. Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 article covers 1920 to 1956, so it is evidence about that window. Harber and colleagues (2026) and Ozer and colleagues (2025) are cited from their abstracts; no full-text detail is implied. Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) coded 1,504 UK comments on a single escalation, and Jikeli and colleagues (2022) coded tweets drawn within keyword queries, so neither share generalizes to a platform.

Where the literature disagrees, both sides are named. On the cause of the 1948 displacement, Morris (2004) and Pappé (2006) are the opposing poles, and the Israel Law Review’s locality and share figures measure quantities different from Morris’s 700,000 count. On the criterion, the structural reading following Wolfe (2006) and the motivation reading in the 2024 Taylor and Francis article are the two published positions.

The Knesset labels its English translation of the 2018 Basic Law unofficial, and the Declaration exists in two divergent Israeli government translations, the Knesset’s reading “all its citizens” and the Foreign Ministry’s “all its inhabitants.” No statute, domestic court ruling or recorded vote examined here classifies Zionism under the settler-colonial framework; the classification appears in scholarship, in submissions and in commentary.

Conclusion

So what does the evidence suggest? It suggests a framework, applied by named scholars to a case, with the strongest bounded finding covering 36 years. The four classes the literature advances are vocabulary, institutions, land transfer and demographic outcome; the outcome class rests on the firmest ground, with about 400 localities destroyed and about 80% of the residents of the affected regions displaced on the Israel Law Review’s peer-reviewed account, and roughly 700,000 people displaced on Morris’s archival count.

Nothing in that record is contested by the organizations that reject the label. The Anti-Defamation League, the University of Washington’s Stroum Center and the Third Narrative dispute the classification, not the settlement or the displacement, and the peer-reviewed dispute runs on the same axis: whether structure and outcome settle the question, as Wolfe’s formulation holds, or whether motivation is load-bearing, as the 2024 Taylor and Francis article argues. Israel’s own texts speak to purpose on both sides of that line, the 1948 Declaration in the language of equal citizenship, the 2018 Basic Law in clauses reserving national self-determination to one people and naming Jewish settlement a national value, with the Supreme Court upholding the second in 2021 while setting a limit on what a Basic Law may deny.

Between the journal and the feed, the framework loses its criteria and keeps its charge. In the measured corpora, denial of Jewish self-determination is a coded category appearing in 7.7% of the UK antisemitic comments Becker and colleagues analysed and 15% of the antisemitic tweets Jikeli and colleagues annotated. Whether an analytic vocabulary, stripped of the 36-year window and the definitional test that gave it meaning, becomes something else on the way to a comment thread is the question the numbers put in front of anyone who reads them.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does settler colonialism differ from colonialism generally?

Patrick Wolfe’s 2006 formulation in the Journal of Genocide Research draws the line at what the arriving power wants from the existing population: classical colonialism exploits native labour, while settler colonialism runs on a logic of elimination, seeking replacement. Wolfe’s other central claim is that it is a structure rather than an event.

Which period does the strongest peer-reviewed evidence cover?

Amir Locker-Biletzki’s 2025 refereed meeting report covers 1920 to 1956, arguing that land purchase, capital transfer and settlement building were internal to Zionist ideological and economic practice in that period. Lorenzo Veracini’s Journal of Palestine Studies article states the widest span, holding that settler-colonial objectives informed actions before 1948, after 1948 and after 1967.

Does the framework require evidence of intent?

That is the live dispute. The structural reading following Wolfe (2006) treats institutional form and outcome as decisive whatever participants intended; the 2024 Taylor and Francis article “Zionism, Settler Colonialism, and Nationalism: On Motivations and Violence” argues motivation is analytically load-bearing and cannot be set aside.

Where does the figure of 700,000 displaced Palestinians come from?

From Benny Morris’s “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited” (Cambridge University Press, 2004), an archival history built from Israeli military and state records. Morris attributes the exodus to causes varying by locality and phase and rejects both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary.

What does Israeli law say about settlement?

Clause 7 of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018) states that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation,” in the Knesset’s published English translation, which the Knesset labels unofficial.

Has any Israeli court ruled on the Nation-State Law?

Yes. On 8 July 2021 an eleven-justice panel of the Supreme Court of Israel dismissed fifteen petitions in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset and upheld the law, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority may not deny the state’s core character as a Jewish and democratic state.

Do the discourse studies measure use of the settler-colonial framing itself?

No. Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) and Jikeli and colleagues (2022) code comments and tweets against IHRA-based categories, including denial of Jewish self-determination; neither counts invocations of the settler-colonial framework, and neither reports a measured link between using that framework and holding antisemitic attitudes.

Why does the source tier matter for this question?

Because the tiers support different claims. A peer-reviewed article states a period, a sample and a method a reader can check; an advocacy submission such as Al-Haq’s annex to the United Nations process states a position on its own definitions; web commentary states an argument with neither.

Sources

• Anti-Defamation League, no date. Allegation: Israel is a Settler Colonialist Enterprise. adl.org. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
• Becker, M., Ascone, L., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic comments on Facebook pages of leading British, French and German media outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
• Harber, R., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
• Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, how many settlements are there? Counting, tracking, and normalizing Jewish settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the present. POMEPS. Organizational report, not peer-reviewed.
• Israel Law Review, no date. 1948 Refugees. Cambridge University Press. Peer-reviewed journal.
• Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., Soemer, K., 2022. Differences Between Antisemitic and Non-Antisemitic English Language Tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
• Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Official English translation, labelled unofficial. Official record.
• Locker-Biletzki, 2025. Settler-Colonialism and Empire-Building in Palestine/Israel, 1920 to 1956. Review of Radical Political Economics, SAGE for the Union for Radical Political Economics, online 18 April 2025. DOI 10.1177/04866134251322919. Refereed meeting report in a themed symposium, not a research article.
• Morris, B., 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521009676. Scholarly book.
• Ukashi, 2018. Zionism, Imperialism, and Indigeneity in Israel/Palestine: A Critical Analysis. Peace and Conflict Studies, Nova Southeastern University, volume 25, number 1, article 7, May 2018. Peer-reviewed journal; an argumentative essay, not a research study.
• Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
• Pappé, I., 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. Scholarly book.
• Pappé, I., 2008. Zionism as Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa. South Atlantic Quarterly, 107(4), pp. 611 to 633. Duke University Press. Peer-reviewed.
• Provisional Government of Israel, 1948. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Official Gazette Number 1, 14 May 1948. Official record.
• Supreme Court of Israel, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record (court judgment).
• Taylor and Francis, 2024. Zionism, Settler Colonialism, and Nationalism: On Motivations and Violence. DOI 10.1080/19436149.2024.2335770. Peer-reviewed journal article.
• Taylor and Francis, 2024. Intent to Harm: Settler Colonial Outposts in Psychoanalysis. DOI 10.1080/19436149.2024.2348373. Peer-reviewed journal article.
• Taylor and Francis, 2026. Peer-reviewed article in the Israel studies literature on Zionism and the settler-colonial framework. DOI 10.1080/13531042.2026.2624932. Peer-reviewed journal article.
• Dowty, 2022. Is Israel a settler colonial state? Stroum Center for Jewish Studies, University of Washington, 10 November 2022. jewishstudies.washington.edu. Academic centre essay, not peer-reviewed.
• Wolfe, P., 2006. Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. Journal of Genocide Research, 8(4), pp. 387 to 409. Peer-reviewed.