Israeli settlers in the West Bank numbered 503,732 at the end of 2024, with a further 233,600 in East Jerusalem, on Israeli administrative counts relayed by the European External Action Service in its 2025 settlement report. The same record moves in the other direction and does so by treaty: the Sinai Peninsula, roughly 60,000 km² and the largest territory Israel held after 1967, was returned to Egypt under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, with the final phase completed in 1982, per the US Department of State’s Office of the Historian. No treaty or statute defines a state as a “colonizer”; the operative vocabulary of the binding record is occupation, settlement, annexation and transfer of the occupying power’s civilian population, the terms UN Security Council Resolution 2334 used when it was adopted on 23 December 2016 by a recorded vote of 14 in favour, none against and 1 abstention.
Key Findings
- 503,732 settlers lived in the West Bank and 233,600 in East Jerusalem at the end of 2024, a combined 737,332 across 147 settlements and 224 outposts, on Israeli administrative counts relayed by the European External Action Service (2025).
- The same report records 28,872 settlement housing plans and tenders advanced during 2024, 18,988 of them in East Jerusalem and 9,884 in the West Bank, and 24,258 dunams declared “State Land” in 2024, which it describes as roughly half of all such declarations since the Oslo Accords.
- Two territories have been brought under Israeli domestic law by enacted statute: Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Knesset, 1980) and the Golan Heights Law (Knesset, 1981). The West Bank falls under neither and remains under military administration.
- Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in staged withdrawals completed in 1982 under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (US Department of State, Office of the Historian), and removed all 21 Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip under the Knesset’s Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law, 5765-2005.
- UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016), adopted 14 to 0 with 1 abstention, states that Israeli settlement in territory occupied since 1967 has “no legal validity” and constitutes a “flagrant violation” of international law. The resolution does not use the word colonizer.
What does the territorial record show since 1948?
Israeli settlers in the West Bank numbered 503,732 at the end of 2024, across 147 settlements and 224 outposts, on Israeli administrative counts relayed by the European External Action Service in 2025. The record of what Israel holds has moved in both directions, and each move carries a date.
The growth side is documented in the same report: 233,600 settlers in East Jerusalem at the end of 2024, a combined 737,332, alongside 28,872 settlement housing plans and tenders advanced during 2024, of which 18,988 were in East Jerusalem and 9,884 in the West Bank. B’Tselem publishes its West Bank count and its East Jerusalem count as two separate series; Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports both inside Israel’s national population total, so two sources describing the same people produce different headline figures depending on which convention they follow.
The reduction side rests on a signed treaty and an Israeli statute. The Sinai Peninsula, roughly 60,000 km² and the largest territory Israel took in 1967, was returned to Egypt in phases completed in 1982 under the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in 1979, following the 1978 Camp David Accords, per the US Department of State’s Office of the Historian. In 2005, under the Knesset’s Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law, 5765-2005, Israel removed all 21 Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip along with its permanent military presence there.
Is it often said that Israel is a settler-colonial state?
Yes, and the characterization is stated outright in named, dated scholarship: a 2024 article in Middle East Critique on the “exceptionalism” of the Israeli settler-colonial project, a 2025 article in the Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies on settler-colonialism and empire-building in Palestine/Israel, and Ilan Pappé's 2006 book The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, whose title states the thesis.
The documented core those works build on is not in dispute on the record. Settler numbers grew, settlement construction continued, and the European External Action Service recorded 28,872 settlement housing plans and tenders advanced in 2024 alone, the largest component of them in East Jerusalem. The 2024 Middle East Critique article uses both “settler-colonial” and “expansionist” of the same project.
The base rate sits alongside those counts rather than against them. The 737,332 settlers the European External Action Service reported for the end of 2024 are counted within a resident population of 10.148 million recorded by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics in September 2025, of which the Bureau counted about 7.758 million Jews and others and 2.130 million Arabs, the two groups summing to 9.888 million with the balance foreign residents. Because the Bureau counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s national total, the settler figure and the national figure are not two separate populations to be added.
Pappé's 2006 book is the strongest scholarly statement of the ethnic-cleansing characterization of 1948; Benny Morris’s archival history, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2004), carries the roughly 700,000 displacement figure from Israeli military and state archives while rejecting both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. Both are named scholarly poles on the same events.
Which territories has Israel brought under its own law?
Two, by enacted statute. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Knesset, 1980) and the Golan Heights Law (Knesset, 1981) extended Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to those areas. The West Bank is covered by neither and remains under military administration.
The distinction shows up in Israel’s own statistics. The Central Bureau of Statistics counts Jerusalem, including the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967, as a single municipal population, which passed one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% of them Jews and others and 39.5% Arabs, per its Jerusalem Day 2024 media release. Settlers in the West Bank are counted in Israel’s national total as residents while the territory itself is not incorporated by statute.
Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, enacted in 2018, contains no annexation clause. Its Clause 3 states that “The complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel,” its Clause 1(c) that “The realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People,” and its Clause 7 that “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” The Knesset labels its English text unofficial. The law names no territory beyond Jerusalem and defines no boundary.
Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld that Basic Law in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided on 8 July 2021 by an eleven-justice panel after fifteen petitions were heard on 22 December 2020. The Court dismissed the petitions and simultaneously held that the Knesset, as constituent authority, is “not all powerful” and may not, even by Basic Law, deny the core character of the state as both Jewish and democratic, a limit the Court derived from the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law. Both halves of that judgment are on the record: the statute stands, and the Court set a constitutional ceiling it could have breached.
Which occupied territories has Israel withdrawn from?
The Sinai Peninsula, roughly 60,000 km² and the largest territory Israel held after 1967, was returned to Egypt under the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed on 26 March 1979, with the staged Israeli withdrawal completed in 1982, per the US Department of State’s Office of the Historian.
The treaty followed the Camp David Accords concluded in September 1978 between Egypt, Israel and the United States. The Office of the Historian records the agreement as the first between Israel and an Arab state and the instrument under which Israel evacuated the peninsula it had held for fifteen years, including its settlements and airbases there.
The second withdrawal is domestic in form rather than bilateral. Under the Knesset’s Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law, 5765-2005, Israel removed all 21 Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip together with its permanent military presence, and removed settlements in the northern West Bank under the same statute. Both events are recorded in enacted law and in the implementation that followed, not in a characterization of intent.
Neither withdrawal reversed the growth recorded elsewhere. The two directions coexist in the same period: the treaty withdrawal from Sinai completed in 1982 sits one year after the 1981 Golan Heights Law, and the 2005 evacuation of Gaza sits inside a period during which the West Bank settler population continued to rise toward the 503,732 the European External Action Service reported for the end of 2024. A report on the direction of Israeli territorial control that names only one of those movements has described part of the record.
Does international law name any state a colonizer?
No treaty or resolution uses that category for any state. UN Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted on 23 December 2016 by a recorded vote of 14 in favour, none against and 1 abstention, states that Israeli settlement in territory occupied since 1967 has “no legal validity” and constitutes a “flagrant violation” of international law.
The vocabulary of the binding record is narrower and more specific than the labels in circulation. Resolution 2334 speaks of occupation, of settlement activity, of the demographic composition of the occupied territory and of the transfer by an occupying power of its own civilian population, and it calls on Israel to cease all settlement activities. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, works in the same categories. Neither text introduces “colonizer” or “expansionist power” as a legal designation, and no instrument supplies a threshold at which a state acquires either name.
That has a practical consequence for the question. “Occupation” and “settlement” are defined terms with recorded determinations attached and a recorded vote behind them. “Colonizer” and “expansionist power” are analytic and political terms whose content depends on the criterion the user of the term treats as decisive, which is why two writers can accept every figure in this report and still disagree on the label. The disagreement is over definition, not over the counts.
Israel’s own government-commissioned review reaches a different legal starting point from the Security Council’s. The Levy Report, delivered in 2012 by a committee appointed by the Israeli government, concluded that the West Bank is not occupied territory in the legal sense, a position no international body has adopted. It is a party’s own commissioned review, labelled as such, and it stands in the record next to Resolution 2334 rather than in place of it.
What do Israel’s own reviews and courts record about settlements?
Israeli authorities declared 24,258 dunams of land “State Land” during 2024, which the European External Action Service, relaying Israeli administrative records in its 2025 report, describes as approximately half of all land so declared since the Oslo Accords.
Those declarations are an administrative act by the party carrying them out, recorded in that party’s own files, and they are the mechanism through which most land enters the settlement system. The same report records 147 settlements alongside 224 outposts, the second category being structures built without Israeli authorisation, which is why Israel’s own enforcement record is part of the answer rather than a footnote to it.
Israel’s High Court of Justice has ordered the removal of structures built on privately owned Palestinian land, and Israel’s own reviews have described a body of construction as unauthorised under Israeli law. The Levy Report of 2012, commissioned by the Israeli government, took the position that the West Bank is not occupied territory in the legal sense and recommended regularising much of that construction; the record of what Israel’s own reviews and courts have found about outposts is where the enforcement figures sit.
Two features of this evidence bear on how it can be read. First, every figure here is a count produced by a party to the events it describes, whether by a ministry, a military administration or a commissioned committee, and none of it is independently verified. Second, an enforcement count is a function of the standard applied: a number of demolition orders issued, or of structures removed, describes the operation of a threshold as much as it describes conduct on the ground, and reads as a rate only when the threshold travels with it. Both cautions apply to the 24,258 dunams as well, a figure that records an administrative classification rather than a measured transfer of possession.
Where did Israel’s Jewish population migrate from?
More than 500,000 people migrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union from 1989 onward, per Berthomière’s 1995 peer-reviewed analysis in the Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, a wave large enough that Factor and Habib’s 1993 modelling study recorded Israel’s total population rising about 10% between 1990 and 1993.
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports the resulting composition directly. Of the 7.1 million Jews in Israel at the end of 2023, 5.7 million were born in Israel and 1.4 million abroad, of whom 1.0 million were born in Europe or the Americas and 275,000 in Africa, per its Holocaust Day 2025 release. The Bureau counts 168,800 residents of Ethiopian origin at the end of 2022, about 92,100 of them born in Ethiopia and 76,800 born in Israel to an Ethiopian-born father. Cumulatively, over 3.5 million immigrants have arrived since 1948, about 1.68 million (47.8%) of them since 1990, per the Bureau’s Independence Day 2026 release.
This is the evidence tier the definitional dispute in the literature turns on, because the settler-colonial framework as ordinarily specified requires a metropole: a sending state that dispatches a population and extracts from the territory on its own account. The migration record names origin countries from which Jewish populations departed, in numbers Berthomière (1995) and the Bureau document, rather than one sending power with an interest in the destination. DellaPergola’s 2025 estimate in the American Jewish Year Book puts world Jewry at 15,736,800 at the start of 2024, with over 85% living in Israel and the United States. Whether the absence of a metropole is decisive for the label is exactly what the scholars disagree about, and the next section names them.
Where do scholars disagree about the settler-colonial label?
The disagreement is definitional and it is held by name on both sides: the 2024 Middle East Critique article on the “exceptionalism” of the Israeli settler-colonial project and the 2025 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies article on settler-colonialism and empire-building in Palestine/Israel apply the framework; the University of Washington’s Stiroh Chair in Jewish Studies published material arguing it misdescribes Zionist migration, and the American Jewish Committee published a rebuttal titled “Why Israel is Not a Settler Colonial State.”
Three criteria do most of the work. The first is the metropole: whether a settler population must be dispatched by, and remit to, a home state, which is the criterion the University of Washington material and the American Jewish Committee treat as decisive and which the migration record in the previous section bears on. The second is replacement: whether the defining feature is the displacement of an existing population, which is where Pappé's 2006 thesis and Morris’s 2004 archival account of roughly 700,000 displaced in 1948 both live, from opposite readings of the same events. The third is the nature of the sovereignty claim, whether a movement asserting an ancestral connection to the territory falls inside or outside the category at all.
The 2024 Middle East Critique article is explicit that the case it describes is exceptional within the settler-colonial literature, which is itself a statement about how far the framework transfers. That is the shape of the dispute: not a contest over the settlement counts, which both sides largely accept, but over which criterion a classification must satisfy.
Documentation published under the label by Palestinian organisations, including BADIL and the Civic Coalition-affiliated reporting that counts “colonial units,” “colonies” and “colonial outposts,” uses categories those organisations define themselves for their own advocacy purposes. Their counts and the European External Action Service figures relaying Israeli administrative records are not measuring the same units and cannot be read as one series.
How does colonization language appear in measured antisemitic content?
Denial of Jewish self-determination appeared in 7.7% of the UK comments coded antisemitic by Becker, Ascone and Troschke in their 2022 peer-reviewed study of 4,500 comments on leading British, French and German media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation, in which 26.9% of 1,504 UK comments were coded antisemitic.
Within those UK antisemitic comments the authors coded the “evil” stereotype at 39.8%, sole guilt attributed to Israel at 27.9%, the apartheid analogy at 5.2% and the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. Thread context was required to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of them, a measurement caveat the authors state and one that bears on any use of these shares: a comment coded on its context is not a keyword match.
Jikeli and colleagues (2022), in a peer-reviewed study of an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets, found that about 15% of antisemitic tweets containing “Jews” fit the paragraph of the working definition covering denial of Jewish self-determination, against about 62% fitting the paragraph on allegations of Jewish collective power. Their measured shares are of samples drawn within keyword queries, not of all of the platform.
Two survey findings sit alongside these content measurements as associations, in the terms their authors state. Enstad (2026), in two nationally representative Norwegian surveys with a preregistered replication (N = 1,575 and N = 1,653), reports that endorsement of Holocaust inversion, the belief that Israel treats Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated during the Second World War, was associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026), across three preregistered studies, report that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, with their model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate it. These are correlational designs measuring attitudes and coded content, not the truth or falsity of any territorial characterization.
Methodology and limitations
This report assembles the record bearing on two characterizations, “colonizer” and “expansionist power,” from five source types, each labelled where it is used.
Primary and official records carry the territorial and legal spine: the enacted texts of Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Knesset, 1980), the Golan Heights Law (Knesset, 1981), the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law, 5765-2005, and Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Knesset, 2018, English text labelled unofficial by the Knesset); the judgment of Israel’s High Court of Justice in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset (8 July 2021); the recorded vote on UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016, 14 to 0 with 1 abstention); the US Department of State Office of the Historian on the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty; and the media releases of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics.
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s national population total, a scope choice distinct from the convention international monitors use, under which B’Tselem publishes its West Bank and East Jerusalem counts as separate series. Its September 2025 population figures are preliminary, rest on the 2022 census, and include foreign residents from 2023 onward, so the published group shares belong to a 9.888 million base rather than the 10.148 million total.
The settler, plan and land-declaration figures come from the European External Action Service’s 2025 report on Israeli settlements covering January to December 2024, which relays Israeli administrative counts. They are therefore the counts of the authority carrying out the activity, compiled by a third party, and are not independently measured. The Levy Report (2012) is a review commissioned by the Israeli government and its legal conclusion is that party’s own, adopted by no international body.
On the scholarship, the 2024 Middle East Critique article, the 2025 Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies article and Pappé (2006) hold the settler-colonial characterization; the University of Washington Stiroh Chair in Jewish Studies material and the American Jewish Committee’s published rebuttal hold the contrary position; Morris (2004) is the archival counter-pole to Pappé on 1948. The two sides differ on which criterion is decisive, not chiefly on the counts.
The discourse measurements carry their own bounds. Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) coded 4,500 comments across three languages in one news window, and 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments required thread context to code. Jikeli and colleagues (2022) report shares within keyword-drawn samples. Enstad (2026) and Harber and colleagues (2026) are peer-reviewed and read here from published abstracts; both are correlational and their figures are associations, not causes. Documentation published by BADIL and the Civic Coalition using the categories “colonial units” and “colonies” is named here as those organisations’ own documentation on their own definitions, and no figure is carried from it. No count of settlements, settlers or dunams in this report is an independently verified total.
Conclusion
The question offers two words, and the record answers with a map and a set of dates. Since 1948 the territory under Israeli control has grown and shrunk in the same lifetime: 503,732 settlers in the West Bank and 233,600 in East Jerusalem at the end of 2024, 28,872 housing plans and tenders advanced in a single year and 24,258 dunams declared State Land, set against roughly 60,000 km² of Sinai returned to Egypt by treaty in stages completed in 1982 and all 21 Israeli settlements in Gaza removed under a 2005 Knesset statute. Two territories, Jerusalem in 1980 and the Golan Heights in 1981, were brought inside Israeli law by enacted text. The West Bank was not, and remains under military administration while its settlers are counted in Israel’s national population.
Neither of the question’s two words appears in the binding record. Resolution 2334, adopted 14 to 0 with 1 abstention, calls the settlements a “flagrant violation” with “no legal validity” and reaches for occupation, settlement and transfer of population, not for a label about national character. The scholars who do use the labels say so under their own names and disagree about the criterion, whether a metropole is required, whether replacement is the defining act, whether a claim of ancestral connection sits inside the category, while largely accepting the same counts. Israel’s own commissioned review starts from a legal premise no international body shares, and its own High Court upheld the 2018 Basic Law while holding that the Knesset may not deny the state’s democratic core.
What travels beyond the record is the vocabulary. In Becker, Ascone and Troschke’s coded UK comments, 7.7% of the antisemitic ones turned on denying Jewish self-determination, and 5.2% used the apartheid analogy; Jikeli and colleagues put self-determination denial at about 15% of antisemitic tweets mentioning Jews; Enstad found Holocaust inversion associated with justifying aggression against Jews in two Norwegian national samples. A label built to describe a state’s conduct is also a label that can be applied to a people, and the measured comment sections are where the two uses meet. Which of those two things a reader is holding when the word arrives, and whether the distinction survives the trip from the map to the thread, is the part no count settles.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which body publishes the settler counts most often quoted?
The 503,732 West Bank and 233,600 East Jerusalem figures for the end of 2024 come from the European External Action Service’s 2025 settlement report, which relays Israeli administrative counts rather than measuring independently. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts the same residents inside Israel’s national population total.
Why do settler totals differ between sources?
Because of scope conventions rather than disagreement about people. B’Tselem publishes a West Bank count and an East Jerusalem count as two separate series, while Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports both inside Israel’s total, so a “West Bank” figure may or may not include the roughly 233,600 residents of annexed East Jerusalem neighbourhoods.
How does Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics treat East Jerusalem residents?
It counts them inside Israel’s national and municipal totals. Its Jerusalem Day 2024 release records the city passing one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and others and 39.5% Arabs, with the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967 counted as part of a single municipal population.
Did the 2018 Nation-State Law annex any territory?
No. Its enacted text names Jerusalem as the capital in Clause 3 and declares Jewish settlement a national value in Clause 7, but contains no annexation clause and defines no boundary. Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld the law in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset on 8 July 2021.
Does research measure how often antisemitic content invokes Israel rather than Jews?
Yes. Jikeli and colleagues (2022), peer-reviewed, found 13.1% of tweets containing “Israel” from January to August 2020 were antisemitic against 11.2% of conversations containing “Jews” from January 2019 to August 2020, with 23.1% of their full 4,016-tweet annotated corpus coded antisemitic. Both shares are of keyword-drawn samples.
Where does the world’s Jewish population live today?
DellaPergola’s 2025 estimate in the American Jewish Year Book puts world Jewry at 15,736,800 at the start of 2024, with 7,153,000 in Israel, his own figure of 6.3 million in the United States, and over 85% of the total in those two countries plus another 14% in the 23 other countries holding 10,000 Jews or more.
Sources
- American Jewish Committee, no date. Why Israel is Not a Settler Colonial State. ajc.org. Advocacy organization publication.
- Becker, Ascone and Troschke, 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Berthomière, 1995. The migration of Jews from the former Soviet Union: a new challenge for Israel? Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 11(3). PMID 12347243. Peer-reviewed.
- DellaPergola, 2025. World Jewish Population, 2024. In American Jewish Year Book 2024, Springer. Academic reference chapter.
- Enstad, 2026. Holocaust Inversion and Justification of Anti-Jewish Aggression: Evidence from Two National Surveys in Norway. DOI 10.1037/amp0001704. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- European External Action Service, 2025. Report on Israeli Settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem (Reporting period January to December 2024). eeas.europa.eu. Intergovernmental report relaying Israeli administrative counts.
- Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila, 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. The Population of Ethiopian Origin in Israel: Selected Data Published on the Occasion of the Sigd Festival 2023. Media release 362/2023, cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media release 165/2024, cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. On the Occasion of Holocaust Day, 2025. Media release 124/2025, cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. Media release 304/2025, cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2026. Israel’s Independence Day 2026. Media release 117/2026, cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Jikeli, Axelrod, Fischer, Forouzesh, Jeong, Miehling and Soemer, 2022. Differences Between Antisemitic and Non-Antisemitic English Language Tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- Knesset, 1980. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. main.knesset.gov.il. Enacted legislation, official record.
- Knesset, 1981. Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981. main.knesset.gov.il. Enacted legislation, official record.
- Knesset, 2005. Implementation of the Disengagement Plan Law, 5765-2005. main.knesset.gov.il. Enacted legislation, official record.
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/documents/BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawNationState.pdf. Enacted legislation, official record (English text labelled unofficial).
- Levy Committee, 2012. Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria. Government of Israel, commissioned review.
- Middle East Critique, 2024. Notes on the “Exceptionalism” of the Israeli Settler-Colonial Project. DOI 10.1080/19436149.2024.2342733. Peer-reviewed.
- Morris, 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521009676. Scholarly book.
- Pappé, 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. Scholarly book.
- Settler-Colonialism and Empire-Building in Palestine/Israel, 1920 onward, 2025. Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, SAGE. DOI 10.1177/04866134251322919. Peer-reviewed.
- Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Akram Hasson v. Knesset, judgment of 8 July 2021. Court judgment, official record.
- UN Security Council, 2016. Resolution 2334 (2016), adopted 23 December 2016 by 14 votes in favour, none against, 1 abstention. Official record.
- University of Washington, Stiroh Chair in Jewish Studies, no date. Why Israel Isn’t a Settler Colonial State. jewishstudies.washington.edu. Academic program commentary.
- US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Milestones: the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979). history.state.gov. Official record.