NAZA Says Civilian Deaths Were Built Into Strike Approvals. What Do the IDF’s Targeting Records Show?

Two IDF records provided to the Hanover Institute describe a strike process that asks whether civilians are present at more than one point: a presentation setting out 9 stages for every target, and 18 clips of targeting footage in which operators divert the munition or call the strike off after people appear near the target. The documentary NAZA, built on testimony from 24 anonymous insiders, alleges that civilian deaths were built into strike approvals, including one its interviewee calls “an approval for 500.” The IDF states that no such strike was ever planned, approved or carried out. Neither record shows how often the process stopped a strike across the war.

Key Findings

• The IDF, a party to the conflict, said on 14 September 2026 that it “has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed,” answering a NAZA interviewee who says “there was once an approval for 500.”
• The IDF’s targeting presentation sets out 9 stages for a target, with a legal review at the seventh and commanders’ approval at the eighth, and a strike chart that asks “Civilians in Target?” before “Permission to Strike.”
• In 18 clips of IDF targeting footage provided to the Hanover Institute, dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026, the munition is diverted in 10, the strike is aborted or cancelled in 7 and held in 1.
• 8 of the 18 IDF clips name a child or minors near the target before the strike is diverted or called off.
• None of the IDF records examined counts the strikes stopped because civilians were present; the IDF presentation says only that “Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians.”

What does the documentary NAZA allege about how Israel approved strikes in Gaza?

NAZA, a documentary directed by Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor and produced by The Guardian, rests on testimony from 24 anonymous Israeli military and intelligence insiders. Reporting its Venice premiere on 10 September 2026, The Guardian reports that they describe “AI-based systems built to identify large numbers of potential low-ranking Hamas targets, who were then bombed in their homes at night, in the knowledge attacks would also kill their families.”

The title carries the argument. The Guardian reports that it “comes from an Israeli military acronym used euphemistically to refer to civilians expected to be killed in a military attack,” and its interview with the directors the next day calls NAZA “an acronym used by the intelligence service to indicate how many civilians it expects to die in an airstrike on Gaza.” Israel Hayom describes the title as a homonym of the Hebrew acronym for collateral damage. The directors, quoted by The Guardian, say the film’s focus is not “sporadic war crimes committed by rogue soldiers” but “the orders themselves, the policies, the accepted practices, the language and logic that make those practices possible, and the people who operate within them.”

The interviews were filmed at night on Tel Aviv rooftops, and the participants’ appearance and voices were digitally altered, according to The Guardian. Beyond the targeting systems, The Guardian reports first-person accounts of “the destruction of neighbourhoods where the Israeli military estimated that up to 25% of residents were still sheltering in their homes,” of the burning of homes, and of killings at a food distribution site.

The Institute has not viewed the film. Its content enters this report through its producer’s reporting and through a promotional clip quoted by The Times of Israel, and each claim below is attributed to the outlet that carried it. The records set against it are the IDF’s own: two statements, a published account of its intelligence tools, a targeting presentation and 18 clips of strike footage. Each is a party’s own account of its own conduct, and each is labelled that way where it is used.

Did the IDF approve a strike expecting 500 civilian deaths?

The IDF states that it did not. In a statement posted on 14 September 2026 it said it “has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed.” The statement answered a promotional clip in which a NAZA interviewee says “there was once an approval for 500.”

In the clip, as The Times of Israel reported it, the interviewee is asked for the largest number of expected civilian deaths ever approved for a strike and answers: “I don’t know how many were killed, because they never check this, but there was once an approval for 500.” His figure describes an approval, a number set before a strike, and he says the toll was never checked. The IDF’s statement goes beyond the approval. “Nor was any credible claim raised throughout the war suggesting that an IDF strike had caused anything near that number of fatalities,” it said, adding that “nothing about the interviewee, not his service nor his role can be independently checked and verified,” as The Times of Israel and Israel Hayom reported the post. Both statements are the IDF’s own account of its own conduct, and neither the denial nor the testimony it answers has been independently verified.

The IDF’s first response, on 11 September, set the terms of that objection. The film, it said, “relies on anonymous testimonies from individuals whose identity cannot be verified, including whether they served in the IDF, in what capacity, or whether they were involved in the matters about which the allegations are being made.” It also said a soldier who witnesses a violation “is required under military orders to report it,” and that “This also applies to individuals who were interviewed for the film.”

The two accounts agree that such an estimate exists. The IDF’s published description of its targeting procedure requires, “In each attack,” “an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects,” made “in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.” The dispute is about the size of one estimate, which the interviewee says was approved and the IDF says no strike ever carried, for a strike that none of the public reporting identifies by date or place.

Does artificial intelligence choose the IDF’s targets in Gaza?

The IDF names 2 data tools in its published answer to the claim, Habsora and Lavender, and says neither chooses targets. The IDF states, in its response to NAZA of 11 September 2026, that decisions on “the selection and approval of strikes in the IDF are made by human personnel only, in accordance with IDF guidelines, and not by artificial intelligence.”

In the film’s account, as The Guardian reports it, the tools identified and recommended targets: interviewees “helped develop an AI mapping tool that trawled for phone signals and recommended apartment buildings in Gaza to bomb,” and describe systems “built to identify large numbers of potential low-ranking Hamas targets.” The question both accounts turn on is what happened between a recommendation and an approval.

The IDF’s page on the two tools, first published on 18 June 2024 and updated on 14 September 2026, describes Habsora as a system, first used operationally in 2021, that “suggests to the intelligence analyst to focus his or her research on certain physical objects with greater potential of a military affiliation with a terror group.” It says a suggestion “cannot be solely relied upon to identify a target without being thoroughly explored by the intelligence analyst, and approved by an authorized intelligence officer.” It calls Lavender “a general-purpose database” and states that “this is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack.”

The same page separates the people involved. The IDF states that “intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets,” and that “operational commanders are those who approve strikes.” The presentation examined below draws the same line: “Validation,” “Legal review” and “Commanders’ Approval” are separate stages that follow the identification of a target. Both documents are the IDF’s own descriptions of its procedure. Neither shows how much time or scrutiny an individual approval received, and that is the point the film contests.

Where does the IDF say military targets were located in Khan Younis?

The IDF presentation records 3 categories of military objective on its opening map of the Khan Younis Brigade area, “Surface-Surface Rockets,” “Tunnel Shafts” and “Command and Control sites,” across the city and the towns around it, from the coast to Khuza’a on the eastern edge, with the markers densest in central Khan Younis.

The presentation builds the map over its first four slides, adding markers to the same satellite base, and the final version is reproduced here. It gives no count of sites, no date for the intelligence and no identification of any individual marker. It is the IDF’s own intelligence picture of one brigade area, and nothing in the records examined here can check it.

The map illustrates, for one area, the claim the IDF made in its response to NAZA: that “Hamas continues to systematically operate from within the civilian environment, embedding its operatives and military infrastructure among the population and exploiting civilian areas for terrorist purposes.” The film’s interviewees describe the same kind of setting from the other side: homes struck at night with families inside.

The two claims meet in the presentation’s definition of a target. A military target, its eighth slide says, includes “Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action.” Under that definition a building on a residential street can be a lawful target, and every strike on one then carries the civilian estimate at the center of the dispute over the figure of 500. The one worked legal review in the presentation is such a case, from the 2014 war: a residential building in Abasan al-Kabir, a town east of Khan Younis.

What steps does the IDF say a target must pass before a strike is approved?

The IDF presentation sets out 9 stages for every target: intelligence collection, analysis, identifying military objectives, link to mission, validation, planning, legal review, commanders’ approval, and a last stage of execution, battle damage assessment and lessons learned. The sequence frames the deck, appearing four times across its 18 slides.

The IDF presentation records what may be targeted in two parts. The first, objects which “by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action” and whose destruction “offers a definite military advantage,” reproduces word for word the definition in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Israel is not a party to Additional Protocols I or II; its May 2015 report on the 2014 war states that it “abides by their provisions inasmuch as they reflect rules of customary international law.” The second is people: “A Member of an enemy armed force, a member of an organize [sic] armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities (for such time that he does so).” The qualification in parentheses matters, because it limits the last category to the period of participation.

The eighth stage has its own slide, and the IDF presentation states there that “The approving commander is an officer who has been professionally and operationally qualified for this role and possesses the authority to authorize strikes against designated targets.” The IDF states what that officer weighs in its published account of the procedure: “The decision whether to strike is made by the commander after considering this information and input, as well as operational, policy, humanitarian, and legal considerations.”

What the sequence establishes is the stated order of checks and the office that signs the last one. It does not record how long a target spent at each stage, how often one failed a stage, or whether stages were compressed when the pace of the war rose. The film’s allegations concern the practice inside these boxes, and the presentation describes the boxes themselves.

What does an IDF legal review of a target in a residential building look like?

The State of Israel published the presentation’s one worked example in May 2015: the same target card appears on page 144 of its report on the 2014 Gaza conflict, as the legal review for a strike on 8 July 2014. It describes an “Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building,” marks the review “Conditional” on “the provision of an effective advance warning,” and recommends real-time visual surveillance.

The presentation covers much of the card with an enlarged legal-review panel. The 2015 report, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prints it whole, translated and redacted, under the same “Top Secret” heading. Its intelligence panel records the target as an arms cache in the house of a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander in Abasan al-Kabir, a town east of Khan Younis, and lists as present at the target “The military commander, his family, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives.” Its operational directives call for a strike by fighter jet to destroy the weapons store “whilst avoiding harm to civilians,” with one bomb.

The ticked conditions, identical in both versions, are “Real-time visual surv.,” “Nighttime,” “Indiv. warning to civilians in target” and “Legal conditions.” The box for “Indiv. warning to civil. in surrounding structures” is not ticked. The 2015 report states that the legal advisers conditioned approval on an effective advance warning, that the commander added “that the attack be conducted at night,” and that “Such steps could be taken due to the fact that the objective was the structure (and the weaponry therein) and not any persons inside.” It states that “the IDF is unaware of any claim of fatality or harm as a result of the attack.”

The example shows the legal-review stage producing a conditional approval rather than a plain yes, and what the conditions are made of: a warning, surveillance and the time of day. The warning condition tracks Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I: “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.” It is a case from the 2014 war, published by Israel in 2015, not a record of a strike in the current war, and the statement that it caused no harm is the IDF’s own account. It is one target Israel chose to publish, out of a total neither document gives.

How does the IDF check for civilians before it strikes a target?

The presentation’s strike chart runs 8 steps from an intelligence-based target to “Permission to Strike,” and four of them are yes-or-no gates: “Area Evacuated?”, “Proximity to Sensitive Sites?”, “Target Coherent RoE?” and “Civilians in Target?”. The other steps are defining the exact location, “Warning Considerations” and choosing “The Right Munition.”

The check does not end at approval. “The IDF routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians,” the IDF presentation states on its seventeenth slide. The IDF’s published procedure makes the same point about proportionality, which it says must be assessed “in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.”

Two of the clips provided to the Institute show that last check in progress. In footage dated 5 July 2024, the exchange asks for a search of “the route below to make sure people aren’t approaching”; seconds later the report is that “Two people are on the route, they could be kids,” and the instruction is “Abort, abort. Abort.” In footage dated 14 August 2024 the concern is a single passenger: “We suspect that there is a woman in the car with him,” followed by “Stand by while we confirm.”

The chart is a procedure and the two clips show it applied in two instances. Neither records what happened when the answer at the civilian gate was no, which is the case the film’s interviewees describe.

How does the IDF warn civilians in Gaza before strikes?

The IDF presentation documents a map dividing Gaza into 630 sectors, with a continuing estimate of the civilians present in each, kept by a Southern Command team led by a brigadier general and used to tell residents “precisely where the IDF intends to operate and where are the safer regions.”

The IDF presentation states that the team was “made up of intelligence experts, Arabists, legal advisers, OSINT specialists and more,” and maintained “contact with key communal leaders in those sectors.” The map was used internally, “so that forces are aware of civilian presence in each sector,” and externally as a “common language” with the population, carried “through the millions of leaflets, phone calls, and text messages which have been disseminated by the IDF since the start of the war.” The millions are the IDF’s own figure, and the presentation gives no count.

The IDF presentation documents one such notice in Arabic with an English translation. Addressed to residents of numbered blocks in named neighborhoods, it reads: “The area you are in is considered a dangerous combat zone!” and “For your safety, the IDF appeals to you immediately evacuate from this area and go to the known shelter in Deir al-Balah.”

The same instrument appears in the film’s account. The Guardian reports interviewees describing neighborhoods “where the Israeli military estimated that up to 25% of residents were still sheltering in their homes,” which is an estimate of exactly the kind the sector map records. The two accounts share the measurement and differ on what followed it: the presentation presents the estimate as the basis for warnings and evacuation, and the film’s interviewees describe strikes that went ahead regardless.

What does IDF strike footage show about how the IDF decides whether to strike?

In 18 clips of IDF targeting footage provided to the Hanover Institute, dated on screen across more than two years, each exchange ends in an instruction to divert the munition, abort the strike or hold, most often after people are seen near the target.

Ten end with the munition diverted, 7 with the strike aborted or cancelled and 1 with a hold to confirm who is present. In 15 of the 18 the stated reason is a person; one concerns a truck, and two state no clear reason on screen, “This is an active area” and “Cancel [the attack].” The exchanges report “Four people approaching,” “We detect a lot of people,” “We detected many people there,” “A certain cyclist is arriving in a proximity to the building” and, for the truck, “Stay away from the truck,” then “Divert, don’t harm the trucks.” In five clips the subtitles render the instruction as “divert [ammunition],” with the bracketed word supplied in the subtitles.

Each clip runs 3 to 21 seconds, 2 minutes 15 seconds in all, and each begins mid-exchange and ends on the decision. Two are dated after the ceasefire of 10 October 2025, which the IDF recorded as taking effect at noon that day: 29 May 2026 and 12 July 2026. The rest fall between April 2024 and September 2025.

The clips show the moment of a decision and nothing either side of it. They do not identify the target, show what a diverted munition struck instead, or record whether the target was struck later. They are the IDF’s own record of its own strikes, a selection made before the files reached the Institute, and they are published here exactly as received, each with the SHA-256 checksum of its file. The treaty rule closest to what they show is Article 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I, under which an attack “shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent” that it may be expected to cause excessive incidental harm to civilians.

Does IDF footage show strikes called off because children were present?

In 8 of the 18 IDF clips the exchange names a child or minors near the target before the strike is diverted or called off, as in “Watch out, a child is coming, we are going to divert,” dated 29 May 2026. Two of the eight are hedged on screen: “they could be kids” and “possibly children.”

The other cases run across the two years. On 22 May 2024 the exchange reports “a group of five people now, even more, possibly children” and recommends that “it’s an appropriate time to abort.” On 8 August 2024 a strike is aborted for a cyclist, the operators wait for him to leave, and two more people arrive: “Currently not clear, there are two kids in the south.” On 10 December 2024 the question is “Isn’t that a child near him?” and the answer is “Divert, divert, divert. I diverted.” On 27 June 2025 a woman and then “two children” are seen; on 7 July 2025 “There is a child here”; on 12 July 2026, “Four minors, currently not very close.” Of the eight, five end with the munition diverted and three with the strike called off.

The IDF’s ethical code states the standard these exchanges illustrate. Under its value of Purity of Arms, a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” The code is the IDF’s own statement of what it requires; the footage shows eight moments in which a child was seen and the strike stopped.

What the footage does not show is a strike in which no child was seen, or one in which a child was seen and the strike went ahead. The film’s interviewees describe the second kind, homes struck at night “in the knowledge attacks would also kill their families.” The broader question of whether children are being targeted in Gaza rests on registers of the dead, which count outcomes, not decisions.

How often does the IDF call off strikes because civilians are present?

The IDF records examined here give no count. The IDF presentation states that “Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians” and illustrates the point with 3 examples, only one of them dated: Monday, 14 July 2014, during the Gaza war of that summer, more than nine years before the current war began.

The three examples pair screenshots with the exchanges: “we identified civilian on the roof...” and “copy that, let’s move to the next target”; “There is civilian walking in the yard” and “we will not strike this target now”; and “there are probably children here.. We are stopping everything.” The two undated examples cannot be placed in either war.

The 18 clips are a selection too, and the IDF has released footage of this kind before: The Times of Israel reported on 18 December 2023 that the IDF had published videos of airstrikes aborted because civilians were present. None of the IDF publications read for this report, its two statements on the film, its page on its intelligence tools and the presentation, carries a count of strikes stopped. The IDF does publish counts elsewhere in its accountability record: its Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened in connection with the war as of 3 August 2024, its own count of its own processes.

Measuring the rate would take three numbers the records do not supply: how many targets were approved, how many were struck, and how many were stopped at each gate of the strike chart. With them, the 18 clips and the film’s cases could each be placed against the whole. Without them, both remain examples, chosen by the people presenting them, of a process whose ordinary behavior neither publishes. The IDF’s wider record on claims of deliberate targeting has the same gap.

Methodology and limitations

This report sets the published account of the documentary NAZA against the IDF’s own record: its two statements on the film, its page on its intelligence tools, a targeting presentation and 18 clips of footage, with other IDF publications where they bear on a point. The film’s claims come from The Guardian, which produced it, and from a promotional clip quoted by The Times of Israel; the film itself was not available to the Institute and was not viewed. The IDF’s statement of 11 September 2026 and its page on its intelligence tools were read on idf.il. Its statement of 14 September 2026 was posted on social media and is cited as The Times of Israel and Israel Hayom quote it.

The 18 clips were provided to the Hanover Institute by a source on 17 September 2026. They appear here exactly as received: the Institute has not cut, altered, re-encoded or subtitled them, and the dates and English subtitles on screen are part of the files as supplied. Each file’s SHA-256 checksum is listed beneath it so any copy can be checked against what the Institute received. Some frames carry grey masking patches that were present on receipt. The audio is carried as received and was not reviewed. The Institute has not independently verified when or where the footage was recorded.

The subtitles were read from frames sampled every half second and checked against enlarged frames; they are quoted as displayed, including one misspelling marked [sic]. Each clip is classified by its last instruction on screen: “divert” as diverted, “abort,” “cancel” or “We will not attack” as aborted or cancelled, and “stand by” as held. A clip counts toward the child figure when a child, kids or minors are named in the exchange, including the two hedged cases.

The targeting presentation, 18 slides, was provided to the Institute and is published in full at the link in the sources. Before publishing, the Institute removed the file’s document metadata, an author field and a document-management label; every page is unchanged. The slides reproduced as figures link to the page they show. Two of the presentation’s examples date from the 2014 war: the legal review on slide 15 is the target card the State of Israel published in its May 2015 report on that conflict, for a strike on 8 July 2014, and one of the three cancelled-strike examples on slide 17 is dated 14 July 2014.

Every record here is a party’s own account, and the clips and the presentation are selections, so none supports a rate, a share of all strikes or a finding about any incident the film describes. Neither the records nor the film identify a single strike by date and place on which the two accounts can be compared.

Conclusion

The IDF’s own targeting records answer the question in the title on their own terms: they show a process that asks about civilians repeatedly, and a set of moments in which it stopped because of them. A target passes nine stages, including a legal review and a commander’s signature. A review of a residential building, from the 2014 war, comes back conditional on a warning to the people inside. A sector map estimates who is still present in each part of Gaza, and the strike chart asks whether civilians are in the target before it grants permission to strike. In 18 recorded exchanges the instruction is to divert, abort or hold, and in eight of them the people seen are children.

They also show where the film’s allegation sits. The interviewee’s “approval for 500” and the IDF’s denial concern an estimate the IDF says every strike requires, made at a stage no clip shows and recorded in files that have not been published. The footage begins after that estimate was made and ends before anyone could count against it.

The argument now turns on documents that neither the military nor the film has put in public view. If one strike’s file were published in full, with its estimate, its gates and its outcome, which of the two accounts of the system would it describe?

Sources

• Israel Defense Forces, 2024, updated 2026. The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Published 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idfs-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing-published-june-18-2024/. Official record, a party’s own account of its procedures.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. A broken record on repeat: Major Ceasefire Violations. 19 February 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/a-broken-record-on-repeat-major-ceasefire-violations/. Official record, a party’s own account.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. Statement on the “500” claim in NAZA. 14 September 2026, as quoted by The Times of Israel and Israel Hayom. Official statement, a party’s own.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2026. The IDF Spokesperson’s Response Following the Publication of the Movie “NAZA.” 11 September 2026. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-hamas-war-gaza/articles-israel-hamas-war-gaza/distributions-swords-of-iron-war-gaza/the-idf-spokesperson-s-response-following-the-publication-of-the-movie-naza/. Official statement, a party’s own.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Targeting footage of strikes diverted or called off, 18 clips. Provided to the Hanover Institute, 17 September 2026, and published as received. Official record, a party’s own footage.
• Israel Defense Forces, undated. Addressing Challenges Through LOAC | IHL, targeting process presentation, 18 slides. Provided to the Hanover Institute. /hanover/media/naza/idf-targeting-process-presentation.pdf. Official record, a party’s own presentation.
• Israel Defense Forces, undated. The Spirit of the IDF: the ethical code and its values. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/spirit-of-the-idf/. Official record, a party’s own doctrine.
• Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/military-advocate-generals-corps/addressing-alleged-misconduct-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-gaza-published-february-24-2024/. Official record, a party’s own count.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/idf-conduct-of-operations-during-the-2014-gaza-conflict. Official record, a party’s own account.
• Israel Hayom, 2026. IDF takes on NAZA directors over ‘completely false’ Gaza allegations. 14 September 2026. https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/09/14/idf-denies-naza-documentary-claims/. Israeli press.
• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Articles 52 and 57. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977. Treaty text.
• The Guardian, 2026. Secret systems used by Israel in mass killings of Gaza civilians revealed in new film. 10 September 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/10/secret-systems-used-by-israel-in-mass-killings-of-gaza-civilians-revealed-in-new-film. International press, the film’s producer.
• The Guardian, 2026. ‘They know the house they are bombing is full of children’: NAZA’s directors on their devastating film about Israeli intelligence. 11 September 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/film/2026/sep/11/naza-directors-film-israeli-intelligence-rachel-szor-yuval-abraham-. International press, the film’s producer.
• The Times of Israel, 2023. IDF releases videos of airstrikes aborted due to presence of civilians. 18 December 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-releases-videos-of-airstrikes-aborted-due-to-presence-of-civilians/. Israeli press.
• The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF denies claim in new ‘NAZA’ documentary that it planned Gaza strike with 500 civilian deaths. 14 September 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-denies-claim-in-new-naza-documentary-that-it-planned-gaza-strike-with-500-civilian-deaths/. Israeli press.