Data Reportby The Hanover InstituteNovember 16, 2026

Who prosecutes settler violence? Police files, closure rates and the jurisdiction rules

Israel Police investigations of West Bank nationalist crime rose from 139 in 2019 to 779 in 2025. What indictment rates, reviews and court orders show.

Who prosecutes settler violence? Police files, closure rates and the jurisdiction rules

Of the investigations Israel Police opened into Jewish nationalist crime against Palestinians in the West Bank, 6.6% produced an indictment, by the Israel Police’s own count as reported by Haaretz in July 2026, over a period in which the cases opened each year rose from 139 in 2019 to 779 in 2025. The phrase “plausible deniability” asks a plain question about that gap: where does the state’s name appear on the record, and where does it not? It appears, signed and dated, on the land route. A review summarised at the request of the Prime Minister’s bureau and published in English in March 2005 counted 105 unauthorized outposts and found that state ministries had financed building at them with no government decision behind it, and Israel’s Supreme Court has twice ordered the evacuation of outposts standing on privately owned Palestinian land.

Key Findings

  • 6.6% of investigations into nationalist crime against Palestinians in the West Bank ended in an indictment, by the Israel Police’s own count as reported by Haaretz in July 2026, as cases opened rose from 139 in 2019 to 779 in 2025.
  • The summary opinion prepared at the request of the Prime Minister’s bureau and published in March 2005 recorded NIS 71,870,000 spent by the Ministry of Construction and Housing on unauthorized outposts between 2000 and 2004, and found that “State and public authorities took part in breaking the law.”
  • Under Article XVII(2)(c) of the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinian Council’s personal jurisdiction applies “to all persons, except for Israelis.”
  • In 2020, 7 of about 1,500 appeal files handled by the State Attorney’s Appeals Unit ended in an instruction to indict, and the Israel Police keep no data at all on files closed for “lack of guilt,” per the State Comptroller of Israel’s May 2022 audit.
  • On 2 August 2011 the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the State to evacuate Migron, a site the State itself described as the largest outpost in the territories, holding that its erection and expansion “constitute blatant and defiant violations of the law and of the Palestinian landowners’ property rights.”

What share of settler-violence cases ends in a formal charge?

6.6% of investigations into Jewish nationalist crime against Palestinians in the West Bank produced an indictment, according to Israel Police data reported by Haaretz on 8 July 2026.

The same data put the investigations opened at 139 in 2019 and 779 in 2025, a change Haaretz’s headline gives as a rise of more than 560%, though the two counts give about 460%. Both figures are the police force’s own count, on the police force’s own classification. The 6.6% is a share of investigations the police opened under the heading of nationalist crime, not a share of all incidents that occurred, and the openly published text does not state which years it covers. A rise in registered cases can reflect more conduct, more reporting, or a wider classification, and the report distinguishes none of those.

A second count, built on a different denominator, runs in the same direction. Yesh Din, an Israeli monitoring organization, published a data sheet dated December 2023 reporting that of 1,664 police investigation files it tracked from 2005 to September 2023 into suspected Israeli violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, 3% ended in a full or partial conviction, and that of the 1,615 files concluded, 93.7% closed without an indictment. That is the organization’s own documentation on its own case criteria, not an official statistic, and its file set is the set it followed rather than the full police register.

The two counts measure different objects across different spans. One is the police force’s share of its own recorded cases in the most recent period; the other is a monitoring body’s share of the files it tracked across eighteen years. Neither publisher reconciles its figure with the other’s, and no Israeli official release read here sets them side by side. What both describe is a two-stage process in which the first stage, registration, is far wider than the second.

Is it said the state never formally authorizes settler actions?

It is often said that the state avoids owning settler conduct by never formally authorizing it. 105 unauthorized outposts were known to the author of the opinion summarised at the request of the Prime Minister’s bureau and published in English on the Foreign Ministry’s pages in March 2005, a figure the summary immediately qualifies as one that “probably does not reflect the true number of outposts in the area.”

Its first characteristic of an unauthorized outpost is that “there was no government decision to establish it, and in any case no authorized political echelon approved its establishment.” Its central finding is the state’s own: “The problem is State and public authorities took part in breaking the law. They are the ones who financed construction without a resolution by the political echelon, in contrary to government resolutions, with no legal planning status, sometimes not on State owned land, sometimes on private Palestinian property or on survey land.”

The money is itemised. The Ministry of Construction and Housing reported spending NIS 71,870,000 on unauthorized outposts between 2000 and 2004, a figure the summary says does not settle with the Ministry’s own working schemes, so it is a floor. Of 140 caravans already placed in the territories when a 2003 tender was published, 90 were in unauthorized outposts, and a further 64 were conveyed to them between August and December 2004.

Source: Prime Minister's Office of Israel, 2005, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts. Official record.

The commission appointed on 13 February 2012 by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, which signed its report on 21 June 2012, concluded that “the establishment of settlements cannot in and of itself be considered to be illegal,” and that settlements defined as “unauthorized” or “illegal” had been established “with the knowledge, encouragement and tacit agreement of the most senior political level,” naming “government ministers and the Prime Minister,” and that “consequently such conduct is to be seen as implied agreement.” The Prime Minister’s Office published the full report in Hebrew, with only its conclusions and recommendations officially translated; the complete English text in circulation was produced by an organization that had itself made submissions to the commission and is named in the report.

Which authority may prosecute a settler in the West Bank?

12,865 cases were opened in 2020 by the Israel Police district that covers the West Bank, for offences of disturbing public order, security violations and damage to property, on the district’s own count as reported in the State Comptroller of Israel’s follow-up audit of that district, published in May 2022. The audit measures the district’s policing capability and publishes no count of complaints, investigations or indictments for offences by Israeli civilians against Palestinians.

The Interim Agreement signed by Israel and the PLO at Washington on 28 September 1995 provides at Article XVII(2)(c) that the Council’s personal jurisdiction applies “to all persons, except for Israelis,” lists “settlements” and “Israelis” among the matters carved out of its jurisdiction entirely at Article XVII(1), and provides at Article XVII(4)(a) that “Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.” Article XIII gives Israel “the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis” in Area B. The agreement set that division for an interim period, with three further redeployments to be completed within 18 months of the Council’s inauguration and permanent-status negotiations to begin no later than 4 May 1996.

Who is prosecuted By which authority Named in
Israeli civilians in the West Bank Israeli criminal law applied personally, investigated by the Israel Police Samaria and Judea District Interim Agreement, Articles XVII(1), XVII(2)(c) and XVII(4)(a), 1995
Persons in areas outside the Council’s territorial jurisdiction Israel, through its military government Interim Agreement, Article XVII(4)(a), 1995
Border Police officers under IDF command whose gunfire injured or killed Palestinians The IDF and the Military Police, following a January 2018 decision of the Prime Minister State Comptroller of Israel, 2022

The same audit records which deficiencies from an earlier examination had not been rectified by June 2021: bulletproof vehicles unsuited to the district’s missions and unchanged in kind and number, most ceramic vests past their plate expiry date, the transfer of Palestinian vehicle and driver licensing information from the Civil Administration to the police, and the investigation of falsified real-estate transactions. Sections of that chapter were published under confidentiality, so every count in it is a floor.

How much settler violence never enters an official file?

The only quantified figure published for non-reporting comes from a monitoring body rather than a register. Yesh Din, in its data sheet dated December 2023, documented 160 cases of violence against Palestinians or their property between January and September 2023 and reported that 92 of the victims in those cases, 57.5%, did not file a complaint with the police. That is the organization’s own documentation on its own case criteria, and it is not an official count.

The 6.6% indictment rate is a share of investigations the Israel Police opened. The State Comptroller’s 2022 audit of file-closing practice examines files that were opened. Neither instrument is built to detect an incident that generated no file, and no Israeli official publication read here states a rate of non-reporting for offences of this kind.

The state auditor does record one adjacent quantity, and it concerns people who never learned what happened to a file that named them. Across 2015 to 2020, about 130,000 complainees had investigation files opened without ever being questioned under caution, of whom about 126,000 were closed on the “circumstances” ground and 675 on “lack of evidence,” in both cases without the police notifying them, at an annual average the audit puts at approximately 21,000 files.

A figure describing what the state registered is a lower bound on what occurred, by the ordinary logic of a complaint-driven register, and the size of the gap is not measured by the register itself. A share computed on registered cases, such as the 6.6%, is a share of a base that the non-reporting figure above suggests is narrower than the phenomenon, so the two cannot be multiplied together or read as shares of the same thing.

What happens to the cases that do reach an indictment?

Charging and sanction are two separate stages with separate rates, and the second is not published by the police. Of the indictments with known outcomes in the file set Yesh Din tracked, 54%, 50 cases, ended in full or partial conviction, and 46%, 43 cases, ended without a conviction, either because the court found the defendants guilty but decided not to convict or because the indictment was vacated or withdrawn.

Those shares are of 93 indictments with known outcomes, not of the 1,664 files.

The arithmetic across the two stages reconciles on the organization’s own figures. Fifty convictions out of 1,664 investigation files is 3%, which is the conviction rate the same data sheet reports for the full set covering 2005 to September 2023.

A rate at which charges are brought describes prosecutorial decision-making on the evidence gathered. A rate at which charges result in a sanction describes what happens once a court is seized of the matter. They are produced by different bodies, they can move in opposite directions, and a report that collapses them cannot say which stage a change occurred at.

The Israel Police release reported in 2026 gives the first stage, at 6.6%, and gives no conviction share. The Yesh Din data sheet gives both, on its own case criteria and its own denominators, and is a monitoring organization’s documentation rather than an official statistic. No Israeli official publication read here reports a conviction rate for this class of case, which means the second stage of the process reaches the public, at present, only through the count of a non-governmental body.

What does Israel’s own state auditor record about these files?

7 of about 1,500 appeal files in 2020 ended in an instruction to indict, per the State Comptroller of Israel’s May 2022 chapter on closing criminal files by the Israel Police and the Office of the State Attorney.

Across 2018 to 2020, the Appeals Unit decided to close approximately 2,000 files annually following complainants’ appeals, with indictments in about 0.5% of appeals and approximately 94% dismissed.

The same audit records that the police keep no data at all on one of the three main closure grounds. In the auditor’s words, “there is no data on closing of suspects’ files on the ground of ‘lack of guilt’ in the computerized systems of the Police’s Research and Statistics Department,” so implementation of the governing State Attorney’s directive by the police cannot be examined. It also found that no notice of closing was sent to the complainant or the suspect in 30% to 40% of closed files, and that notices which were sent went by regular post with no record of delivery, leaving the start of the complainant’s 60-day appeal window unfixed. Of 34 decisions examined on appeals and requests to change a closing ground, 13 lacked reasoning.

Which ground a file is closed on varies by prosecution district. In 2020 the chance that a suspect’s file was closed for “lack of guilt” was approximately 33% at the Northern District Attorney’s Office and approximately 15% at Haifa.

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2022, Closing Criminal Files by the Israel Police and the Office of the State Attorney. Official record.

Its one table counting closures by ground excludes, by its own footnote, the ground of “offender unknown,” because the table presents data for suspects’ files only, which removes exactly the class of case in which no suspect was identified. And the chapter contains no disaggregation whatever by police district, by offence category or by the identity of complainants: the terms for the West Bank and its districts do not appear in it.

Which land transfers does the state claim in its own name?

418,900 core Jews lived in the West Bank at the beginning of 2019, with a further 221,800 in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods incorporated after 1967, on the estimates Sergio DellaPergola published in the American Jewish Year Book 2019. The population is counted, published annually and broken out by territory. The route by which land becomes available for it is likewise signed, numbered and dated at every step.

That route begins with a military order. Order 59, signed on 23 Tammuz 5727, 31 July 1967, by the GOC Central Command as Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, defines government property by who owned it on 7 June 1967 and creates a Custodian, appointed by the military commander, empowered to take possession of it. It was published in Hebrew and Arabic in the Collection of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments, booklet 5 at page 162, has been amended nine times, and has no official English text of any kind.

The criteria for declaring land available run back further. The 1858 Ottoman Land Code sets five classes of land at Article 1, defines dead land at Article 6 by distance from habitation, and provides at Article 68 that arable land left fallow for three successive years without a valid excuse “becomes the right of Tapu,” in Ongley’s 1892 English translation, with the former owner able to recover it for its equivalent value and only otherwise going to auction. That text does not say the land reverts to the state, and it is not official.

How the resulting population is reported has itself changed. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Lihi Ben Shitrit, in a 2020 review for POMEPS which is not peer-reviewed, document that East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 Central Bureau of Statistics yearbook, that a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” that by 1983 settlement localities were counted in the total number of Israeli localities, and that in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. The same review records that the Bureau excludes unrecognized outposts from its count.

So the administrative route carries a signature, a date and a serial number at each stage, and the registration record is public. The conduct counted in the first section of this report carries none of those.

Have courts ever attributed settler conduct to the state?

On 2 August 2011 the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice in HCJ 8887/06, issued a final order requiring the State to evacuate the outpost of Migron, a site the State itself described as the largest outpost in the territories, with some 45 families and about 250 residents as of February 2009. The petition had been filed on 30 June 2006 by Palestinian landowners, later joined by the Peace Now movement.

The State conceded the facts. In the Court’s summary, it “did not dispute that the lands which constitute the object of the Petition are registered lands under private Palestinian ownership, within the confines of the Palestinian villages of Burqa and Dir Dabwan, and that the Outpost, Migron, is illegal.” The Court held that “the erection of the Outpost and its continued expansion constitute blatant and defiant violations of the law and of the Palestinian landowners’ property rights,” and set a deadline of 31 March 2012. A second case followed the same shape: in HCJ 9949/08, decided on 25 December 2014, the Court ordered removal of the entire Amona outpost within two years on the ground that it stood on privately owned Palestinian land without authorisation, and on 14 November 2016 it rejected the government’s request to delay implementation further.

An earlier judgment set the test those cases apply. In HCJ 390/79, decided 22 October 1979, the Court annulled an order of possession as to the petitioners’ registered plots after finding that the initiative for the settlement had come from the political echelons, which then approached the Chief of the General Staff for a professional opinion, so that the military consideration “was subordinate to the primary, political decision.” The same judgment held that possession of privately owned land for the purposes of a civilian settlement “is potentially justified under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations,” and expressly declined to decide the treaty question under Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

An international body has addressed the settlement enterprise as such. The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 requested by the General Assembly, held by eleven votes to four that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful, and by fourteen votes to one that Israel is obliged to cease immediately all new settlement activities and to evacuate all settlers. An advisory opinion is not a judgment and binds no party. What the domestic record holds is a run of orders attaching illegality to named sites and duties to the State, alongside no judgment read here attributing any individual act of violence to it.

Where do the accounts of settler violence disagree?

Two Israeli official registers report different movements over different periods. The Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet recorded a 27% rise in attacks by settlers on Palestinians and Israeli security forces in 2025 against 2024, on figures reported by The Times of Israel on 19 January 2026.

That rise is 867 incidents against 682, with severe incidents up from 83 to 128. The Israel Police recorded investigations into nationalist crime rising from 139 in 2019 to 779 in 2025. The two are each body’s own count, on separate classifications across separate spans, and neither body publishes a reconciliation with the other.

The monitoring counts add a third category again. Yesh Din’s file set counts police investigation files it tracked; the police count investigations their own system classifies as nationalist crime; the army and the Shin Bet count incidents they logged. A case can appear in one, two or none of them, and no shared denominator exists.

The category itself is contested in Israeli research. The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security published an analysis in April 2026, “The ‘Settler Violence’ Influence Warfare Campaign,” arguing that the term and its counts function as an influence warfare campaign rather than a neutral description, while stating that violence by Jews against Palestinians does occur and warrants full enforcement. It is a research institute’s argument, not peer-reviewed and carrying no measurement this report relies on, and it is the clearest statement of the position that the disagreement is about what the category counts, not only about how it is enforced.

The methods dispute reaches the monitors as well. NGO Monitor, an Israeli organization whose subject is other organizations’ output, reported in its Annual Report 2024 that its network mapping identified 157 groups in the United States with over 3,000 connections and 111 in Canada with over 1,800; the report does not state the mapping’s inclusion criteria.

Methodology

This report examines the record of attribution: which body registers an act, which body may charge it, and where each figure was produced.

The sources sit in four tiers. Primary and official records: the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995 in the English text published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Military Order 59 of 31 July 1967, published in Hebrew and Arabic only, with no official English text, so its provisions are described rather than quoted; the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in Ongley’s unofficial English translation of 1892; the judgments in HCJ 390/79, HCJ 8887/06 and HCJ 9949/08, the first two read in the Israeli judiciary’s English translations, the third having no official English text. Government-commissioned reviews: the March 2005 opinion on unauthorized outposts, read in the official English summary, the full opinion being Hebrew-only and considerably longer; and the 2012 commission report on the legal status of building in Judea and Samaria, published in Hebrew by the Prime Minister’s Office with only its conclusions officially translated, whose complete English translation in circulation was produced by an organization that made submissions to the commission. Official audits: the State Comptroller of Israel’s May 2022 report, chapters on the Samaria and Judea District and on closing criminal files, read in the Comptroller’s own English abstracts, with sections of the district chapter published under confidentiality.

Party counts reported through news outlets are labelled as such: the Israel Police figures of 6.6% and of 139 and 779 investigations were reported by Haaretz on 8 July 2026, and the 27% figure for 2025 recorded by the army and the Shin Bet was reported by The Times of Israel on 19 January 2026. The publishing body in each case is the police force or the security services, not the outlet.

Two categories of source are named in the body and carry no figure the report stands on. Yesh Din is an Israeli monitoring organization whose December 2023 data sheet counts files and cases it tracked on its own criteria, not an official register. The International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 is a legal conclusion on a contested question; its recorded votes are reported as votes.

Three limits bear on any reading. The State Comptroller’s chapter on closing criminal files carries no breakdown by police district, by offence category or by complainant identity, and the one table counting closures by ground excludes files where the offender is unknown. No Israeli official publication read here reports a non-reporting rate or a conviction rate for this class of case. And the police, army and monitoring counts use different classifications over different periods, so none of their figures may be summed, divided into one another, or plotted as one series.

Conclusion

So where does the state’s name appear? On the land route, everywhere and by design: a military order of 31 July 1967 with a serial number and a signature, a Custodian appointed by the commander, criteria drawn from named articles of an 1858 code, a population series that folded East Jerusalem into Israel’s general count in the 1968 yearbook and settlement localities into the national total by 1983, and 418,900 core Jews recorded in the West Bank at the beginning of 2019.

On the conduct, the record thins at each stage and thins for reasons the state itself has documented. Its police opened 139 such investigations in 2019 and 779 in 2025, and charged in 6.6% of cases. Its own commissioned review counted 105 outposts established with no government decision, recorded NIS 71,870,000 spent at them by one ministry between 2000 and 2004, and concluded that public authorities took part in breaking the law. Its later commission described the same building as carrying the tacit agreement of the most senior political level. Its state auditor found that the police keep no data on one of the three main closure grounds, that 30% to 40% of closed files generated no notice at all, and that 7 of about 1,500 appeals in 2020 ended in an instruction to indict. Its courts ordered two named outposts evacuated on land the State conceded was privately owned, and in 1979 annulled an order of possession after finding the political echelon had initiated it and the military had endorsed it afterwards. And the jurisdiction clause its negotiators signed in 1995 places Israeli civilians outside the reach of the one other authority in the territory.

None of that is concealed. It is published, numbered, translated in part, and audited by the state’s own institutions. The distinction the record actually draws is not between what is known and what is hidden, but between an act the state signs and an act it registers. A signature creates a duty that a court can enforce against a named body; a registration creates a case that may or may not be charged, in a system whose own auditor cannot say how many of its closures rest on which ground.

Which leaves the question the arithmetic sharpens rather than settles. When a state counts the conduct, funds the places where it occurs, adjudicates the property it affects, and attaches formal responsibility in 6.6% of the cases it counted, who is left in a position to attribute the remaining 93.4%, and on whose record would that attribution be made?

Frequently Asked Questions

Who appoints the Custodian of Government Property in the West Bank?

The military commander. Order 59 of 31 July 1967, signed by the GOC Central Command as Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, defines the Custodian as the person appointed by the military commander for the purposes of that order, and defines government property by who owned it on 7 June 1967.

Why do Israeli and Palestinian residents of the same territory answer to different courts?

Because the 1995 Interim Agreement drew personal jurisdiction, not only territorial jurisdiction. Article XVII(2)(c) provides that the Palestinian Council’s personal jurisdiction applies “to all persons, except for Israelis,” and Article XVII(4)(a) leaves authority over Israelis with Israel through its military government. The West Bank was declared a closed area by a 1967 order of the military commander.

What counts as an unauthorized outpost in the state’s own definition?

The March 2005 opinion summary prepared for the Prime Minister’s bureau defines one by the absence of a decision: “There was no government decision to establish it, and in any case no authorized political echelon approved its establishment.” It also requires the site to sit at least a few hundred metres from an existing settlement, so unauthorized building inside or adjoining a recognised settlement falls outside the count of 105.

Which body investigates Border Police gunfire in the West Bank?

The IDF and the Military Police, since October 2019. The State Comptroller’s May 2022 follow-up audit records that authority to examine and investigate gunfire by Border Police officers operating under IDF command that injured or killed Palestinians was transferred to those bodies following a January 2018 decision of the Prime Minister, and lists this among the deficiencies from an earlier audit that had been rectified.

Does the 1858 Ottoman Land Code still govern anything?

Its articles remain the criteria the declaration process works from. Article 1 sets the five classes of land, Article 6 defines dead land by an audible-voice distance test of about a mile and a half, and Article 68 sets the three-year non-cultivation rule, which Ongley’s 1892 English translation renders as the land becoming the right of Tapu rather than reverting to the state, with the former owner able to recover it for its equivalent value.

What did the 1979 Elon Moreh judgment actually decide?

It annulled one order of possession as to the petitioners’ registered plots, on a dominant-purpose test, after finding that the initiative came from the political echelons and the military opinion followed. It did not hold settlement unlawful in principle: the Court wrote that possession of privately owned land for the purposes of a civilian settlement “is potentially justified under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations,” and it expressly declined to decide the question under Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

They count different objects over different periods. The police figures, 139 investigations in 2019 and 779 in 2025, cover cases opened as nationalist crime; the 27% figure recorded by the army and the Shin Bet covers incidents logged during 2025 against 2024, with severe incidents up from 83 to 128. Each is that body’s own count on its own classification, and neither body publishes a reconciliation with the other.

Sources

  • Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, 1967. Order Concerning Government Property (West Bank Area) (No. 59), 5727-1967. Collection of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments, booklet 5, p. 162. idf.il. Official record (security legislation as enacted; no official English text).
  • DellaPergola, S., 2019. World Jewish Population, 2019. American Jewish Year Book 2019, vol. 119, Springer; reprinted by the Berman Jewish DataBank. Academic reference.
  • Hirsch-Hoefler, S. and Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, how many settlements are there? Counting, tracking, and normalizing Jewish settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the present. POMEPS. Think-tank report, not peer-reviewed.
  • Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet, 2026. Figures on settler attacks during 2025, reported in The Times of Israel, 19 January 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-settler-violence-rose-by-27-in-2025-severe-attacks-spiked-by-over-50/. A party’s own count reported through a news outlet.
  • Israel Police, 2026. Data on investigations into Jewish nationalist crime against Palestinians in the West Bank, reported in Haaretz, 8 July 2026. Official register reported through a news outlet.
  • Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, 1995. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington DC, 28 September 1995, English text published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. gov.il. Official record (treaty text).
  • Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, 1979. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat and others v. The State of Israel and others, judgment of 22 October 1979. Official record (court judgment; unofficial English translation).
  • Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, 2011. HCJ 8887/06 al-Nabut and others v. Minister of Defense, judgment of 2 August 2011, English translation published by the Judicial Authority. Official record (court judgment).
  • Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, 2014. HCJ 9949/08 Hamad and others v. Minister of Defense, judgment of 25 December 2014, and the refusal of further delay of 14 November 2016. Official record (court judgment; Hebrew only).
  • International Court of Justice, 2024. Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, ICJ Reports 2024, p. 753. Advisory opinion (recorded votes reported as votes).
  • Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 2026. The “Settler Violence” Influence Warfare Campaign, by Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner, 15 April 2026. jiss.org.il. Research-institute analysis, not peer-reviewed.
  • Levy, E. E., Shapira, T. and Baker, A., 2012. Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria. Commission appointed 13 February 2012, report signed 21 June 2012, published in Hebrew by the Prime Minister’s Office; complete English translation by Regavim, which made submissions to the commission. Government-commissioned review.
  • NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
  • Ottoman Empire, 1858. The Ottoman Land Code of 7 Ramazan 1274, quoted from the English translation of F. Ongley, revised by H. E. Miller, London: William Clowes and Sons, 1892. Official record (enacted legislation, in unofficial translation).
  • Prime Minister’s Office of Israel, 2005. Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts (Talya Sason), prepared at the request of the Prime Minister’s bureau, published 10 March 2005 on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs pages. gov.il. Official record (government-commissioned review of the government’s own conduct).
  • State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Interdisciplinary Audit: Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police, Follow-up Audit. State Comptroller Report, May 2022 (English abstract pp. 323 to 329). mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution).
  • State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Closing Criminal Files by the Israel Police and the Office of the State Attorney. State Comptroller Report, May 2022, Chapter One, pp. 111 to 120 (English abstract), full Hebrew chapter pp. 767 to 846. mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution).

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