The latest United Nations report on this question is the 2026 report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, titled “The essence of childhood has been destroyed”, which states that Israeli authorities and security forces deliberately targeted Palestinian children and carries a figure of at least 20,179 Palestinian children killed between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2025. A second and separate UN mechanism reporting in the same year, the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict, verified the killing of 2,668 Palestinian children in Gaza against its own incident-by-incident standard and recorded a further 4,588 reported child deaths as still pending verification. They measure different things, over different periods, to different standards, and only the second was produced by the body that published it.
Key Findings
- The Gaza Ministry of Health, the body whose registry supplies the child figures in circulation, published 15,613 children among 50,021 recorded deaths as of 23 March 2025, which is 31.2% of that total, including 872 who had not completed their first year and 247 born and killed during the war. These are the ministry’s own counts on its own definitions.
- The ministry states five categories it does not count, among them the missing and bodies under rubble, the unidentified who reached hospitals, people buried by their families without passing through a hospital, and deaths in Gaza and North Gaza after its information system stopped in November 2023 (ministry statement of 7 January 2024).
- Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025), in a peer-reviewed capture-recapture analysis in The Lancet, estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injury (95% confidence interval 55,298 to 78,525) for 7 October 2023 to 30 June 2024, against the 37,877 the ministry had reported by that date.
- The Israel Defense Forces’ Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, across five categories, none of which is defined by the age of the person harmed, alongside more than 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment.
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics projected 1,046,400 Gaza residents under 18 at mid-2023, 47% of the projected population of 2,226,544, the pre-war base against which any wartime child count is read.
What does the latest UN commission report say about children?
At least 20,179 Palestinian children were killed between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2025, the figure carried in the 2026 report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, which states that Israeli authorities and security forces deliberately targeted Palestinian children and that the conduct amounted, in the Commission’s determination, to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Gaza.
The report, a conference room paper (A/HRC/62/CRP.2) dated 18 June 2026 and titled “The essence of childhood has been destroyed”, carries a companion figure of 44,143 Palestinian children injured over the same two years. Rounded, the pair reads “more than 20,000” killed and “more than 44,000” injured; those are the same two figures, not a separate count.
Beyond the killing and maiming, the report addresses four further categories of conduct. It describes severe physical and mental harm, orphanhood, disability, repeated displacement and the collapse of schooling and health care, which it frames as the erasure of childhood itself. It addresses the arrest, detention and treatment of Palestinian children in Israeli custody. It states that Israeli security forces used sexual violence against children. And it records the destruction of schools and of infrastructure on which children depend.
For the West Bank the Commission reaches a different characterisation. There its finding is war crimes, not genocide or crimes against humanity, and it rests on a separate body of documentation covering killings by Israeli security forces and by settlers.
The Commission is an investigative mechanism established by the UN Human Rights Council, so what it issues is a commission determination rather than a court judgment. And the casualty figures it carries are not its own enumeration: the Commission did not count the dead.
Is it often said the UN has proven deliberate targeting of children?
Yes, and the claim is directionally right: the Commission is a United Nations mechanism, and it did issue a deliberate-targeting finding in 2026. In the three provisional-measures orders the International Court of Justice issued during 2024, on 26 January, 28 March and 24 May, the Court stated plainly that the merits remained undecided.
Paragraph 30 of the January order reads: “At the present stage of the proceedings, the Court is not required to ascertain whether any violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred. Such a finding could be made by the Court only at the stage of the examination of the merits of the present case.” Paragraph 54 of the same order found plausible “the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention”. What was found plausible there is a right, not an allegation.
The forum question is settled by treaty text. South Africa’s application instituting proceedings, filed in the Registry on 29 December 2023, founds the Court’s jurisdiction on Article IX of the Genocide Convention, records that Israel deposited its ratification on 9 March 1950 and South Africa its accession on 10 December 1998, and states at paragraph 11 that “Neither South Africa nor Israel has entered any reservation to Article IX.” That clause is the route by which a dispute about a state’s responsibility for genocide reaches a court at all.
What period and territory does the report actually cover?
Two dates and two territories. The Commission’s 2026 report covers 7 October 2023 to 31 March 2026, a span of roughly 30 months, and addresses the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem, with Gaza and the West Bank producing different characterisations from different evidence.
That span is not uniform. The Security Council’s resolution 2803 (2025), adopted at its 10046th meeting on 17 November 2025 by 13 votes to none with 2 abstentions, endorsed the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict; Denmark’s representative stated at that meeting, in the verbatim record, that the ceasefire entered into force on 10 October 2025. So the Commission’s period contains roughly 24 months of active hostilities and around six months after the ceasefire took effect, while its child casualty figures stop at 7 October 2025, three days before the ceasefire.
The period matters most when the Commission’s figures are set beside those of any other UN mechanism, because the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict runs on a calendar reporting year rather than on the full period since October 2023.
The period also sits awkwardly against the registry that supplies the numbers. The Gaza Ministry of Health stated on 7 January 2024 that it does not count victims in Gaza and North Gaza after its information system stopped functioning in November 2023, and the coverage footnote on its list to 29 March 2024 records that its own records reached only to 10 November 2023 for Gaza while extending to 29 March 2024 for the south, except Nasser hospital, to 14 February 2024. The opening weeks of the Commission’s period are, on the ministry’s own account, the weeks its registry captures least well.
Where do the 20,179 and 44,143 child figures come from?
From the Gaza Ministry of Health’s registry, not from any enumeration the Commission performed; the Commission’s footnote cites an OCHA situation update and the ministry’s own channel. The ministry publishes periodic name-by-name lists of decedents whose data it has completed, the largest of them 34,344 records to 31 August 2024, alongside a daily statistical report carrying the cumulative totals, and it is a party to the war reporting its own count.
The lists carry two intake channels, labelled in the ministry’s own source column. Of the 21,323 records to 29 March 2024, 18,845 are marked as ministry records and 2,478 as notification by the martyrs’ relatives. Of the 28,185 records to 30 June 2024, 22,368 are ministry records and 5,817 family notifications. Those two strata are the material from which every child figure in circulation is built, and the hospital stratum of the June list is the same 22,368-record list the peer-reviewed analysis discussed below used as one of its three inputs.
What the March, June and August lists publish per decedent is serial number, name, identity or document number, date of birth, sex, age and source; the April list omits date of birth and source. There is no date-of-death column in any of the four published martyr lists, and the ministry clarified on 29 July 2024 that the date of death was registered either on the family’s report or on the date the body reached a hospital, with a committee later formed to audit it.
The ministry does publish child figures directly. On 23 March 2025 it reported 15,613 children among 50,021 recorded deaths, including 872 who had not completed a first year and 247 children born and killed during the war.
What does the Secretary-General’s children report verify separately?
2,668 Palestinian children killed in Gaza, verified. That is the figure the UN Secretary-General’s 2026 annual report on children and armed conflict reached through incident-by-incident verification, alongside a further 4,588 reported child deaths in Gaza that the same report recorded as still pending verification at publication.
This is a different mechanism from the Commission of Inquiry, with a different mandate and a different output. It counts categories of conduct it calls grave violations, and for the reporting year it verified 12,445 such violations against 5,663 children, of whom 5,649 were Palestinian, leaving 14 children in the count who were not. Alongside the Gaza figure it verified the killing of 57 Palestinian children in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the detention of 981 Palestinian children, 978 of them by Israeli armed and security forces and 3 by Palestinian Authority Security Forces.
The same report attributes 9,465 of the verified grave violations to Israeli armed and security forces and 326 to Israeli settlers, a breakdown Reuters reported on 17 June 2026.
Two things about this report are load-bearing for anyone comparing it with the Commission’s. First, verification here is a standard, not a synonym for counting: the mechanism corroborates incidents and publishes what it could not corroborate as a separate residual rather than folding it into the total. Second, its reporting year is a calendar period, so its figures answer the question “what was verified during this year” and not “how many children have been killed since October 2023”.
Why do the two UN child death counts differ so widely?
17,511. That is the arithmetic difference between the 20,179 the Commission carries and the 2,668 the Secretary-General’s report verified, and three structural differences account for it, none of which requires either body to be wrong about anything.
The first is period. One figure is cumulative across two years; the other covers a single calendar reporting year. The second is standard. A verified count is produced incident by incident against a corroboration threshold, and the mechanism that produces it publishes what it could not yet corroborate separately: adding the 2,668 verified to the 4,588 pending gives 7,256, which is the reader’s addition of two separately published figures and still about 36% of the Commission’s number.
The third is the registry itself. The ministry reported on 24 July 2024 that 28,185 records had complete data while a further 9,715 did not, and Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025) record 9,692 unidentified decedents in the ministry’s 30 June 2024 update, 26% of its cumulative total at that point, which their analysis excluded.
Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025), applying three-list capture-recapture to hospital morgue records, the ministry’s rolling online mortality survey and social media obituaries, estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injury for 7 October 2023 to 30 June 2024, with a 95% confidence interval of 55,298 to 78,525. Against the 37,877 the ministry reported by that date, the gap of 26,383 deaths is 41% of the 64,260 estimate. Their study reported age and sex only for the 28,257 decedents where those fields existed, of whom 16,699, or 59.1% of that subset, were women, children under 18 and people aged 65 and over.
Huynh, Chin and Spiegel published a Lancet correspondence in 2024, not a research article, whose own measurement compared 11,078 reported Gazan deaths against 101 reported UNRWA staff deaths over the 35 days to 10 November 2023. Its title is an absence claim, “No evidence of inflated mortality reporting”, and its widely quoted range for accuracy in earlier conflicts carries no citation in the published text.
What does the record show for children in the West Bank?
241 Palestinian children have been killed by Israeli security forces and settlers in the occupied West Bank since 7 October 2023, on the verified count published by the UN human rights office in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in a press release of 12 June 2026. The Secretary-General’s 2026 report separately verified 57 Palestinian children killed in the West Bank including East Jerusalem during its own reporting year.
Those two figures are consistent rather than competing, because one is cumulative across roughly 32 months to June 2026 and the other covers a single year. Both are UN counts verified case by case, the method the registers that count children in the West Bank use, rather than hospital-intake records like the Gaza figures above.
The State Comptroller of Israel conducted a follow-up audit of the Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police, published in the State Comptroller Report of May 2022 and covering examinations from February to November 2021. It reports 12,865 cases opened in the district during 2020 for disturbing public order, security violations and damage to property, and 48,371 traffic tickets issued, of which 36,074 went to Palestinians, which the audit writes as about 75%. It publishes no complaint, investigation, indictment or conviction count for offences by Israeli civilians against Palestinians, and the Comptroller imposed confidentiality on sections of the report, so its published figures are a floor over a partially released document.
At a press briefing on 29 February 2024 the IDF Spokesperson reported about 3,400 people the IDF describes as terrorists apprehended by IDF forces together with the Israel Security Agency in Judea and Samaria since the start of the war, including 1,500 it describes as Hamas. That classification is the IDF’s own, the figure is a party’s own count, and it carries no breakdown by age.
The legal frame Israel applies in the territory is contested within its own government record. The commission established at the instruction of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice on 13 February 2012, reporting on 21 June 2012, concluded that “the classical laws of ‘occupation’ as set out in the relevant international conventions cannot be considered applicable” there.
What does Israel’s own record state about targeting children?
74 criminal investigations, across five categories, none of them defined by the age of the person harmed. That is what the Israel Defense Forces’ Military Advocate General’s Corps reported ordering as at 3 August 2024, alongside more than 1,000 incidents identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism.
The Corps states the threshold it applies in its own words: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” These are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions.
The standard the army sets for itself is published separately. The Spirit of the IDF states that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” That is doctrine, evidence of the stated requirement and not evidence of conduct measured against it.
On precautions the IDF states that it warns civilians by telephone calls, text messages and leaflets, performs roof knocking before striking a building, aborts strikes when civilians are present, and published a numbered evacuation-area map. It publishes no count of warnings issued, roof knocks performed or strikes aborted, so the measures are describable and their magnitude is not.
Where Israel does publish detailed counts, they concern aid rather than casualties. COGAT reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026 and more than 18,000 tons of medicines and medical supplies since the ceasefire began, figures resting on self-declaration by suppliers rather than on weighing at the crossings.
Across the whole of that published record, no Israeli body publishes a count of Palestinian children killed.
Which forum could rule on these findings, and has one?
None has. The International Court of Justice has issued three orders on provisional measures in the case South Africa brought under the Genocide Convention, on 26 January, 28 March and 24 May 2024, and no court has entered a judgment on whether Palestinian children were deliberately targeted.
Those orders indicate measures without deciding anything. The January dispositif, at paragraph 86, directed six measures, each opening “The State of Israel shall”, including, by 15 votes to 2, that it take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of acts within the scope of Article II of the Convention, and, by 16 votes to 1, that it enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance. The March order added two further measures, one of them adopted unanimously, and the May order three more, each by 13 votes to 2. The falling majorities track a shrinking bench, 17 judges in January, 16 in March and 15 in May, while the dissenting votes held at one or two.
The orders are addressed to one state for a jurisdictional reason the Court states itself. At paragraph 44 of the March order it recalled, quoting its 1993 order in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, that under Article 59 of its Statute a judgment binds only the parties, so it “may, for the preservation of those rights, indicate provisional measures to be taken by the parties, but not by third States or other entities who would not be bound by the eventual judgment”. In the reasoning of all three orders the Court also called for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages taken on 7 October 2023 and held since by Hamas and other armed groups, a call that appears in none of the operative measures.
Two routes exist for a determination on the merits. State responsibility runs through Article IX of the Genocide Convention to the International Court of Justice, the clause South Africa invoked in its 2023 application. Individual criminal liability runs separately through the Rome Statute.
Where do scholars disagree about findings of this kind?
Six states, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, argued in a Joint Declaration of Intervention of 15 November 2023 in The Gambia v. Myanmar that the “only reasonable inference” test for genocidal intent be read narrowly, within a holistic assessment of the evidence.
Sultany describes the six states’ position as a demand “to lower the threshold required to determine intent” and states his own position on it directly: “If this interpretation is applied consistently, without double standards, the conclusion should be that the threshold of intent is met, and Israel violated the Genocide Convention by committing acts with the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’” His article is a legal argument and reports no measurement of its own.
Milanovic, writing in an editorially curated but not peer-reviewed post on the blog of the European Journal of International Law, traces the requirement to the jurisprudence of the criminal tribunals and draws the consequence: “Other fact-finders are not bound to apply a high standard of proof or ORI, for genocide or other international crimes alike. This includes formal fact-finding bodies, like a UN CoI, but also governments, NGOs, academics, or ordinary people.”
Asi and colleagues (2024), in peer-reviewed work in Conflict and Health, report those three shares for the 46-day first phase of the campaign, with 40.2% of education facilities functionally destroyed. Their clustering statistic measures the spatial distribution of detected damage and not intent, and their denominators come from humanitarian inventories rather than an official facility register. Hamamra, Mahamid and Mayaleh (2025), in a peer-reviewed qualitative study in the Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition, interviewed 30 displaced caregivers of children in the Rafah camps and coded six themes: malnutrition, disease in shelters, unsafe environments, weakened immunity and growth, inaccessible health care and daily struggle for basics. It examines no patients and reports no clinical series, and its conclusion that the crisis is “a deliberate outcome of the Israeli policies designed to undermine civilian survival” is the authors’ reading of interview themes rather than a measured attribution.
Two named Israeli research bodies reject the characterisation. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs published “The Death of Genocide” in 2025, deriving a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths by subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s own count of fighters killed from the ministry total, and stating on the same page that neither input has been independently confirmed. NGO Monitor, an advocacy-mission organisation, reported in its 2024 annual report that it identified 157 groups in the United States linked to what it calls an anti-Israel network.
Methodology
This report draws on five kinds of source, each labelled where it appears. Primary and official records: the Genocide Convention, the three 2024 orders of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures, South Africa’s 2023 application instituting proceedings, Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) with its recorded vote, the State Comptroller of Israel’s May 2022 audit chapter, and the 2012 report of the commission appointed to examine the legal status of building in Judea and Samaria. A party’s own reported counts: the Gaza Ministry of Health’s published martyr lists, daily statistical report and annual health reports; the Israel Defense Forces’ Military Advocate General’s Corps, its Spokesperson’s briefings, its ethical code and its stated precautions; and COGAT’s ceasefire reporting. Peer-reviewed research: Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025), Asi and colleagues (2024) and Hamamra, Mahamid and Mayaleh (2025). A journal forum contribution: Sultany (2024). Non-peer-reviewed academic commentary: Huynh, Chin and Spiegel (2024), which is a Lancet correspondence, and Milanovic (2025), a blog post. Named research institutes with stated missions: the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and NGO Monitor.
Four limitations bear directly on every figure here. The Gaza Ministry of Health’s registry excludes, on the ministry’s own statement of 7 January 2024, the missing and bodies under rubble, the unidentified who reached hospitals, the unidentified whose bodies were returned, people buried by families without passing through a hospital, and deaths in Gaza and North Gaza after its information system stopped in November 2023. Its lists publish date of birth rather than date of death, and its own clarification of 29 July 2024 records that the death date was registered on the family’s report or on arrival at a hospital. The ministry adds records to its cumulative total by administrative approval months after the event: 233 records on 23 March 2025, 280 on 30 August 2025, 160 during August 2026.
Denominators differ and do not travel between sources. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics projected 1,046,400 Gaza residents under 18 at mid-2023, 47% of a projected population of 2,226,544, itself a projection off the 1 December 2017 census that counted 1,899,291 residents in the Strip. The Bureau’s own footnote states that its estimates were prepared before 7 October 2023 and revises the later population downward. Any share of children among the dead is a wartime numerator read against a pre-war projected base.
No court has ruled on the conduct described in the 2026 Commission report, and the evidentiary threshold for inferring intent is disputed in the legal literature, where Sultany (2024) and Milanovic (2025) each argue against applying the criminal tribunals’ standard as it has been read.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which UN body produced the 20,179 figure, and did it count the dead itself?
The figure appears in the 2026 report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. The Commission did not perform the enumeration; the underlying record is the Gaza Ministry of Health’s registry, which is that ministry’s own count on its own definitions and is not independently verified.
How does a verified UN count differ from a reported one?
The Secretary-General’s monitoring and reporting mechanism corroborates each incident against a standard before including it, and publishes what it could not yet corroborate as a separate residual, 4,588 reported child deaths in Gaza in its 2026 report. A reported aggregate drawn from a mortality registry carries no such residual and no incident-level corroboration.
Why is the number of children detained reported separately from the number killed?
Detention is one of the categories of conduct the Secretary-General’s children and armed conflict mechanism counts as a grave violation, and it verified 978 Palestinian children detained by Israeli armed and security forces in the 2025 reporting year covered by its 2026 report. Killing, maiming, detention, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals and denial of humanitarian access are counted as distinct categories rather than summed.
Does the Gaza Ministry of Health publish the age of each person on its lists?
It publishes date of birth, sex and age per decedent on its completed-data lists, though not date of death.
Has any Israeli body investigated the deaths of children specifically?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, in five categories defined by the alleged conduct rather than by the age of the person harmed, so no subset of them is published as concerning children. The Corps also states the threshold that produces the count: civilian death or injury in armed conflict does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
Why do West Bank child figures run so much lower than Gaza figures?
Each is a separate count of separate events, produced by different machinery. Gaza figures derive largely from the ministry’s hospital-intake registry, while the West Bank figures in UN material are verified case by case: 241 children killed since 7 October 2023 on the UN human rights office’s count of 12 June 2026, and 57 in the Secretary-General’s single reporting year.
What would it take for a court to rule on a deliberate-targeting finding?
State responsibility for genocide reaches the International Court of Justice through Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the clause South Africa invoked in December 2023, and individual criminal liability runs separately through the Rome Statute. The Court’s three 2024 orders indicated provisional measures and expressly reserved the merits, so neither route has yet produced a judgment.
Conclusion
A reader who asks what the latest UN report found about Palestinian children is asking about one document, and the record answers with two. The Commission of Inquiry reported in June 2026 that Israeli authorities and security forces deliberately targeted Palestinian children, carrying 20,179 killed and 44,143 injured across the war’s first two years. The Secretary-General’s mechanism, reporting the same year against a corroboration standard, verified 2,668 Palestinian children killed in Gaza, 57 in the West Bank including East Jerusalem and 978 detained by Israeli forces, and published 4,588 further reported deaths as not yet verified. Both are United Nations documents. Neither is wrong about what it measured.
What sits beneath both is a single registry maintained by a party to the war, which publishes its own lists, its own child aggregates and its own list of what it does not count. Its 15,613 children among 50,021 deaths as of March 2025 is the ministry’s figure. Its exclusion of the missing, the unidentified and the family-buried is the ministry’s statement. The one peer-reviewed test run against it estimated 64,260 traumatic-injury deaths where the ministry had reported 37,877, a gap in the direction of undercounting. On the other side, the Israeli record publishes 74 investigations under a threshold it states plainly, a code requiring that soldiers do everything in their power to prevent harm to civilians, and no child count at all. No court has ruled, and the six states that argued in The Gambia v. Myanmar in November 2023 for reading the inference standard narrowly were arguing about how a court weighs exactly this kind of evidence.
A child killed in Gaza is counted once by a ministry, once by a commission relaying that ministry, perhaps once by a mechanism that corroborates the incident, and perhaps not at all if the body never reached a hospital. The same death yields a different number depending on which register reaches it, and the registers disagree by a factor of seven. When a society argues over whether children were deliberately targeted, and the central quantity in that argument is a figure whose producer excludes five categories of the dead by its own account, what exactly is being argued over: what happened to the children, or which register managed to record them?
Sources
- Asi, Y., Mills, D., Greenough, P. G., Kunichoff, D., Khan, S., and colleagues, 2024. “Nowhere and no one is safe”: spatial analysis of damage to critical civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip during the first phase of the Israeli military campaign, 7 October to 22 November 2023. Conflict and Health, 18(24). DOI 10.1186/s13031-024-00580-x. Peer-reviewed.
- Commission appointed by the Prime Minister of Israel to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and Samaria, 2012. Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria. Jerusalem, 21 June 2012. Official record (government-commissioned review).
- Gaza Ministry of Health, 2024 to 2026. Published martyr lists (29 March, 30 April, 30 June and 31 August 2024), daily statistical report and statements on its Telegram channel (t.me/MOHMediaGaza). A party’s own reported counts.
- Hamamra, B., Mahamid, F., and Mayaleh, A., 2025. Childhood under siege: battling malnutrition, disease, and despair during genocide in Gaza. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition, 44:321. DOI 10.1186/s41043-025-00948-6. Peer-reviewed.
- Huynh, B. Q., Chin, E. T., and Spiegel, P. B., 2024. No evidence of inflated mortality reporting from the Gaza Ministry of Health. The Lancet, 403(10421), 23 to 24. DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(23)02713-7. Correspondence, editorially reviewed, not peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. idf.il. A party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, 29 February 2024. idf.il. A party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Defense Forces, no date. The Spirit of the IDF: the ethical code and its values. idf.il. A party’s own published doctrine.
- Jamaluddine, Z., Abukmail, H., Aly, S., Campbell, O. M. R., and Checchi, F., 2025. Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture-recapture analysis. The Lancet, 405(10477), 469 to 477. DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02678-3. Peer-reviewed.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. jcfa.org. Research institute, stated mission.
- Milanovic, M., 2025. Proving Genocide. EJIL:Talk!, 18 September 2025. ejiltalk.org. Academic law blog commentary, not peer-reviewed.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017 (final results). Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. Dr. Awad highlights the Palestinian children’s situation on the occasion of Palestinian Child Day, 5 April 2023; and Conditions of the Palestinian Population on the Occasion of World Population Day, 10 July 2023. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Reuters, 2026. Brunnstrom, D. UN warns Israeli settlers could join blacklist for violations against children. 17 June 2026. reuters.com. International press.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police, Follow-up Audit. State Comptroller Report, May 2022, Chapter Four. mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution).
- Sultany, N., 2024. A Threshold Crossed: On Genocidal Intent and the Duty to Prevent Genocide in Palestine. Journal of Genocide Research (Forum: Gaza). DOI 10.1080/14623528.2024.2351261. Journal forum article; peer-review status not stated.
- The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. gaza-aid-data.gov.il. A party’s own reported counts.
- United Nations, 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Treaty text.
- United Nations Security Council, 2025. Resolution 2803 (2025), S/RES/2803, adopted 17 November 2025, with the verbatim record of the 10046th meeting, S/PV.10046. Primary instrument and recorded vote.
- Republic of South Africa, 2023. Application instituting proceedings and Request for the indication of provisional measures, South Africa v. Israel, filed 29 December 2023, General List No. 192. A state party’s own pleading.
