On 26 January 2024 the International Court of Justice indicated 6 provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel. Every one opens with the words “The State of Israel shall”, and the first requires Israel to “take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II” of the Genocide Convention.
The Court added 2 measures on humanitarian access on 28 March 2024 and 3 on Rafah, the Rafah crossing and investigators on 24 May 2024, reaffirming the earlier measures each time. The same January order states that the Court “is not required to ascertain whether any violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred” at this stage. A March paragraph explains why no measure reaches anyone but Israel: the Court can bind only the parties before it.
Key Findings
- The International Court of Justice’s order of 26 January 2024 indicated 6 measures addressed to the State of Israel. 4 were adopted by 15 votes to 2 and 2 by 16 votes to 1, on a 17-judge bench (International Court of Justice, 2024, paragraph 86).
- The same order states that a finding of any violation of the Genocide Convention “could be made by the Court only at the stage of the examination of the merits” (International Court of Justice, 2024, paragraph 30).
- On 28 March 2024 the 16-judge bench indicated, unanimously, that Israel ensure “the unhindered provision at scale” of food, water, fuel, shelter and medical care, “including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points” (International Court of Justice, 2024, paragraph 51).
- On 24 May 2024 the Court indicated, by 13 votes to 2 on a 15-judge bench, that Israel “Immediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (International Court of Justice, 2024, paragraph 57).
- South Africa’s Application of 29 December 2023, a party’s own pleading, requested 9 provisional measures under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The Court indicated 6 in January (Republic of South Africa, 2023).
What did the Court order Israel to do in January 2024?
The International Court of Justice indicated 6 provisional measures in its order of 26 January 2024, and every one opens with the words “The State of Israel shall”. Paragraph 83 of the same order states that such orders “have binding effect and thus create international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed.”
The dispositif at paragraph 86 records the six measures below. Each vote is counted against a bench of 17 judges: 15 Members of the Court and 2 judges ad hoc.
| Measure | Operative words, paragraph 86 | Vote | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Prevention | “take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II” | 15 to 2 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
| 2. Military | “ensure with immediate effect that its military does not commit any acts described in point 1 above” | 15 to 2 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
| 3. Incitement | “prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide in relation to members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip” | 16 to 1 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
| 4. Humanitarian | “take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance” | 16 to 1 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
| 5. Evidence | “take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence” | 15 to 2 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
| 6. Reporting | “submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this Order within one month” | 15 to 2 | ICJ order, 26 January 2024 |
Measure 1 enumerates the acts it covers, in the Convention’s own words: “(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”. Measure 2 then applies the same list to Israel’s armed forces specifically and “with immediate effect”.
Measure 4 states its purpose: to “address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip”. The order sets no tonnage, truck count or crossing number.
The 2 measures carried 16 to 1, incitement and humanitarian assistance, drew one more vote than the other 4. The section below on the benches identifies whose vote that was.
Who asked the Court to order measures, and on what treaty?
The Republic of South Africa, in an Application filed on 29 December 2023, asked the Court for 9 provisional measures. At paragraph 17 it grounded jurisdiction in “Article 36 (1) of the Court’s Statute and Article IX of the Genocide Convention”. The Application is a party’s own pleading. It records what one state alleged and on which treaty, not what is established.
The Court did order measures in response. Paragraph 86 of the 26 January 2024 order indicates 6, each binding on Israel.
The comparison is between 9 measures requested and 6 indicated, and the indicated measures did not always take the requested form. South Africa’s list included a measure addressed to both states: “The Republic of South Africa and the State of Israel shall each... take all reasonable measures within their power to prevent genocide”. The Court did not indicate it in that mutual form. Every measure it indicated in January is addressed to the State of Israel alone, for the jurisdictional reason the March order gives at paragraph 44, set out below.
The treaty route rests on 3 facts the Application sets out. Paragraph 10 quotes Article IX, the Convention’s dispute clause, in full. Paragraph 11 records that “Neither South Africa nor Israel has entered any reservation to Article IX”. Paragraph 9 dates Israel’s ratification of the Convention to 9 March 1950 and South Africa’s accession to 10 December 1998.
The Application was signed at The Hague on 28 December 2023 by South Africa’s Agent, Vusimuzi Philemon Madonsela. It was entered as General List No. 192. Paragraph 148 reserves “the right to revise, supplement or amend the terms of this Application, as well as the grounds invoked”.
Did the January order decide whether genocide was occurring?
No. Paragraph 30 of the International Court of Justice’s order of 26 January 2024 states that “the Court is not required to ascertain whether any violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred”. It adds that “Such a finding could be made by the Court only at the stage of the examination of the merits of the present case.”
What the Court did decide was narrower and procedural. Paragraph 35 sets the threshold: the Court “may exercise this power only if it is satisfied that the rights asserted by the party requesting such measures are at least plausible”. Paragraph 36 adds that it “is not called upon to determine definitively whether the rights which South Africa wishes to see protected exist”.
Paragraph 54 then records what the Court found plausible, and it is rights, not conduct: “In the Court’s view, the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible. This is the case with respect to the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention.”
Paragraph 30 also states the test the Court applied to the facts at this stage. That test is whether the alleged acts and omissions “appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Genocide Convention”. The Court held that “at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable” of doing so.
Read together, the paragraphs separate two things. The order binds Israel to measures now. It leaves the question of whether any violation occurred to the merits. The Genocide Convention’s connection to the Gaza question sets out the treaty text behind that plausibility threshold.
What did the March 2024 order add on food and crossings?
The International Court of Justice’s order of 28 March 2024 added 2 measures, and the first was adopted unanimously by a 16-judge bench. It requires Israel to ensure “the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned” of urgently needed services and assistance, “including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and maintaining them open for as long as necessary”.
The dispositif at paragraph 51 states the reason in its opening words: “in view of the worsening conditions of life faced by Palestinians in Gaza, in particular the spread of famine and starvation”. Measure 2(a) then lists what is to be provided: “food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza”. It also requires this be done “without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations”.
Measure 2(b), adopted by 15 votes to 1, directs Israel to “Ensure with immediate effect that its military does not commit acts which constitute a violation of any of the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group under the Convention... including by preventing, through any action, the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance”. The order also reaffirmed all 6 January measures, by 14 votes to 2, and required a further one-month report, by 15 votes to 1.
The phrase “by all concerned” describes who provides the aid. It does not name a second party under the order. The addressee of measure 2(a), like every other measure, is the State of Israel.
One textual fact governs any close reading. The March order’s attestation reads “Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative”. The English of paragraph 51 is therefore a translation of the governing text. The January and May orders are authoritative in English.
What did the Court order about Rafah in May 2024?
The International Court of Justice’s order of 24 May 2024 indicated further measures on Rafah, each by 13 votes to 2.
The order set out three measures, and the bench that voted on them had 15 judges. The first requires Israel to “Immediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.
The other 2 measures in the dispositif at paragraph 57 require Israel to “Maintain open the Rafah crossing for unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance”. They also require it to “Take effective measures to ensure the unimpeded access to the Gaza Strip of any commission of inquiry, fact-finding mission or other investigative body mandated by competent organs of the United Nations to investigate allegations of genocide”. All 3 open with the phrase “in view of the worsening conditions of life faced by civilians in the Rafah Governorate”.
The scope of the halt measure is disputed, and the dispute turns on its relative clause, “which may inflict”. One reading requires a halt to the offensive. The other requires a halt only to action of the described character. Five members of the bench appended separate texts to the order. Vice-President Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Barak each appended a dissenting opinion, and Judges Nolte, Aurescu and Tladi each appended a declaration.
The May measures add to the earlier ones. They do not replace them. The order’s first operative point “Reaffirms the provisional measures indicated in its Orders of 26 January 2024 and 28 March 2024, which should be immediately and effectively implemented”, also by 13 votes to 2. The 6 January measures and the 2 March measures therefore remain in force alongside the 3 Rafah measures.
The May order formally modifies the March order, not the January one. Its official title is “Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024”.
Why do the majorities fall from fifteen to thirteen?
The dissenting vote held at 2 on the first operative point of each order, the International Court of Justice’s own record shows.
Over the same period the bench shrank from 17 judges in January 2024 to 16 in March and 15 in May, so the majority fell by exactly the 2 seats the bench lost.
Expressed as shares of the bench, the majorities are nearly flat: 15 of 17 is 88.2%, 14 of 16 is 87.5% and 13 of 15 is 86.7%. The change in the raw count comes from who was sitting, not from votes changing sides.
The bench changed for 2 recorded reasons. Judge ad hoc Dikgang Moseneke, chosen by South Africa, ceased to sit when Judge Tladi, a South African national, became a Member of the Court with effect from 6 February 2024. Judge Tomka did not sit on 24 May.
The individual votes do not form a fixed bloc. Judge ad hoc Aharon Barak, chosen by Israel, voted in favour of the January incitement and humanitarian-assistance measures, both carried 16 to 1. He also joined the unanimous March measure on humanitarian provision at scale.
Judge Julia Sebutinde, listed as Vice-President Sebutinde in the March and May orders, dissented from all 6 January measures. In March she voted in favour of both new measures and the reporting decision while voting against the reaffirmation. In May she dissented throughout. Each order lists her votes under her title at the time, and “Judge Sebutinde” and “Vice-President Sebutinde” are the same person.
Which requested measures did the Court decline to order, and why?
Paragraph 44 of the International Court of Justice’s order of 28 March 2024 declined 3 measures South Africa had requested. The Court stated that it “may... indicate provisional measures to be taken by the parties, but not by third States or other entities”, citing Article 59 of its Statute, under which a judgment has “no binding force except between the parties”.
Paragraph 11 of the same order quotes the 3 declined requests. The first read: “All participants in the conflict must ensure that all fighting and hostilities come to an immediate halt, and that all hostages and detainees are released immediately.” The second and third were addressed to “All Parties to the Convention”. They asked those states to comply with their own obligations and to “refrain from any action, and in particular any armed action or support thereof, which might prejudice the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide.”
The Court’s reason is jurisdictional. Israel and South Africa are the only parties to General List No. 192. No Palestinian party is before the Court, so none could be bound. All the measures across the 3 orders are addressed to the State of Israel, and the Court gives Article 59 as the reason. The record of who brought the case and who answered it sets out the parties.
The Court did address the armed groups in Gaza, in its reasoning rather than its dispositifs. Paragraph 85 of the 26 January 2024 order reads: “The Court deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties to the conflict in the Gaza Strip are bound by international humanitarian law. It is gravely concerned about the fate of the hostages abducted during the attack in Israel on 7 October 2023 and held since then by Hamas and other armed groups, and calls for their immediate and unconditional release.”
The March order at paragraph 50 and the May order at paragraph 56 each “reiterates its call for their immediate and unconditional release”. So no measure was directed to any Palestinian party, and the Court referred to the hostages held by Hamas and other armed groups in all 3 orders.
What standard does the Israeli army set itself on civilians?
The Israel Defense Forces’ published ethical code, The Spirit of the IDF, states under the value of Purity of Arms that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” This is the army’s own doctrine and records its stated standard.
The same value opens with a limit on force: “An IDF soldier will only exercise their power or use their weapon in order to fulfill their mission and only when necessary. They will maintain their humanity during combat and routine times.” Under Human Life, the code says the soldier “will recognize the critical importance of human life”. Under Discipline, it says the soldier “will ensure they are only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders.”
The IDF states that the code, “together with the practical rules derived from it, constitutes the ethical code”. Its other stated values include Professionalism, Camaraderie and a Sense of Mission.
The code’s text sits beside the January measure addressed to the same institution. Measure 2 of the International Court of Justice’s order of 26 January 2024 required Israel to “ensure with immediate effect that its military does not commit” the Article II acts listed in measure 1. The Court’s paragraph 85 adds that “all parties to the conflict in the Gaza Strip are bound by international humanitarian law”.
The comparison has a firm limit. The code shows what the IDF requires of its own soldiers. It is not evidence that any particular action complied with that standard or departed from it, and no figure can be derived from it. The Court’s orders also make no finding on conduct. The March order at paragraph 49 and the May order at paragraph 55 are each “without prejudice to any findings concerning the Respondent’s compliance”.
What does Israel’s own crossing record show after the orders?
COGAT, the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit that coordinates goods entering Gaza, published a truck-level record of 32,946 aid trucks between 21 October 2023 and 31 May 2024. That is a party’s own operational count at its own inspection points, not independently verified, and it spans all 3 orders.
The record’s crossing column shows dated windows that line up with the orders’ timing. Rows labelled Erez first appear on 17 April 2024, 20 days after the 28 March order called for “increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points”, and run for 23 operating days. Kerem Shalom rows run from 12 December 2023 to 31 May 2024. Rows under the fused label “Nitzana\Rafah” end on 5 May 2024. These dates coincide with the orders. The record does not show that any order produced them.
The labels need care. “Nitzana\Rafah” fuses an Israeli inspection point with the Egypt-Gaza crossing, so it cannot show where a given truck entered Gaza. JLOTS is the temporary United States pier, not an Israeli crossing. In the same series, daily totals range from 467 trucks on 9 April 2024 to 9 trucks on 8 May 2024.
COGAT’s live dashboard, also its own record, contains one dated line about the period after this series: “According to the directive from the political echelon, no aid entered the Gaza Strip between March 2 to May 19 2025.”
None of these figures establishes compliance or non-compliance. Israel filed reports under the reporting measures on 26 February 2024 and 29 April 2024, and South Africa filed observations on each. The later orders record the filings but do not publish their contents. The entry counts and the enacted standard are set out in detail elsewhere.
Where do legal scholars disagree about what the orders imply?
Nimer Sultany of SOAS University of London argued on 9 May 2024, in the peer-reviewed Journal of Genocide Research, that on a reading of intent he sets out “the conclusion should be that the threshold of intent is met, and Israel violated the Genocide Convention”. Paragraph 30 of the Court’s 26 January 2024 order reserves that question for the merits.
Sultany’s argument, in “A Threshold Crossed”, depends on the standard of proof. He calls the requirement that genocidal intent be the “only reasonable inference” from the evidence a “high legal requirement”, and he argues for lowering it rather than defending it. His support is the Joint Declaration of Intervention filed on 15 November 2023 in The Gambia v. Myanmar by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. He describes it as asking the Court to “assess genocidal acts and intentions in a more holistic way.” He concludes that if the six states’ reading is “applied consistently, without double standards”, the threshold is met.
Sultany also addresses what the orders mean for other states. He writes that “States are under a positive obligation to prevent when there is a ‘serious danger’ of genocide, whereas complicity consists in assisting the perpetrator with the knowledge that the perpetrator is engaged in genocide.” His article discusses paragraph 44 of the March order, the same paragraph in which the Court states it cannot address third states.
Marko Milanovic takes a different route on the same standard in “Proving Genocide”, a commentary posted on EJIL:Talk! on 18 September 2025. EJIL:Talk! is the blog of the European Journal of International Law, and the commentary is not peer-reviewed. Milanovic writes that “The notion of an ‘only reasonable inference’ comes to international law from the jurisprudence of the first modern ad hoc criminal tribunals”. He argues that the test follows from the criminal standard of proof.
On that basis, he writes, “Other fact-finders are not bound to apply a high standard of proof or ORI”, including “governments, NGOs, academics, or ordinary people”. Sultany asks the Court to apply a lower bar, while Milanovic limits the high bar to bodies applying the criminal standard. The Court has not stated which standard it will apply at the merits.
Methodology and limitations
This report draws on 5 types of source. The primary records are the full texts of the International Court of Justice’s 3 orders indicating measures in General List No. 192 (26 January, 28 March and 24 May 2024), read from the Court’s own files on 10 September 2026. Measures, votes and quotations come from the dispositifs at paragraphs 86, 51 and 57 and the reasoning paragraphs cited by number. Bench sizes are counted from each order’s Present line.
South Africa’s Application of 28 and 29 December 2023 is cited as a party’s own pleading. The Genocide Convention and the Court’s Statute are cited as treaty texts.
The Israel Defense Forces’ code is cited as a party’s own doctrine. COGAT’s truck figures are row counts of its published “Humanitarian Aid” workbook, a party’s own operational record. The crossing and content columns each partition the 32,946 rows exactly, and the totals are tallies of those published rows rather than figures COGAT states.
Tonnage from the same workbook is excluded. COGAT’s own method statement of 9 July 2026 says it rests on “the self-declaration of humanitarian organizations and private sector providers”, and the weight column takes only 8 banded values.
The 2 scholarly sources differ in status. Sultany (2024) is peer-reviewed. Milanovic (2025) is named-author blog commentary. Both are cited as named positions, not findings.
Several limits apply. The orders state that they are without prejudice to compliance, and Israel’s 2 reports of February and April 2024 are not published in them. The March and May orders quote figures from other bodies, which are not carried here. The halt measure of 24 May 2024 has a disputed scope. The merits of the case remain undecided.
Conclusion
So what did the Court order Israel to do? In January 2024 it ordered Israel to prevent the 4 Article II acts its order lists, keep its military from committing them, prevent and punish incitement, enable aid and basic services, preserve evidence and report back. In March it ordered aid at scale through more land crossings. In May it ordered a halt in the Rafah Governorate, in words whose scope is disputed, an open Rafah crossing and access for UN-mandated investigators.
Each order adds to the ones before it. Each binds Israel, and none decides the merits, which paragraph 30 reserves. The dissent stayed at 2 while the bench went from 17 judges to 15. Every measure is addressed to Israel for the jurisdictional reason paragraph 44 gives, and the Court’s call for the hostages’ release appears in its reasoning in all 3 orders. Israel’s own count of 32,946 trucks, a party’s own record, places those dates on a timeline but does not show compliance either way.
That leaves the halt measure. A reader who remembers only that the Court told Israel to stop in Rafah carries one reading of a clause whose scope remains disputed. As the case moves toward a judgment on genocide itself, how much of what the public believes the Court ordered rests on the measures, and how much on the relative clause that was left out?
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a judge ad hoc, and who sat in this case?
Article 31 of the Court’s Statute allows a party with no national among the Court’s Members to choose a judge to sit for that case. The 26 January 2024 bench included 2 such judges, Aharon Barak for Israel and Dikgang Moseneke for South Africa, alongside 15 Members. A judge ad hoc votes on the same footing as a Member.
Why does the January measure list four acts when Article II lists five?
Article II of the Genocide Convention defines 5 acts, the fifth being “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. The enumeration in paragraph 86 of the 26 January 2024 order stops at (d), “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”.
Are all three documents provisional measures orders?
Strictly, only the first is. The Court’s official titles are “Provisional Measures, Order of 26 January 2024”, a “Request for the Modification of the Order Indicating Provisional Measures” for 28 March, and a “Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024” for 24 May. Each later order modifies the one immediately before it.
Do the orders contain casualty or famine figures?
The March and May orders quote or summarise figures from the IPC Global Initiative, UNICEF, OCHA, WHO, WFP, UNRWA and the UN human rights office, and they recite each party’s own claims. The Court measured none of these figures itself. They remain the counts of the bodies that produced them.
Did the March order already require the Rafah crossing to stay open?
The May order says it did. Paragraph 52 of the 24 May 2024 order holds that the March measure on provision “at scale by all concerned” already “necessitates that the Respondent maintain open land crossing points, and in particular the Rafah crossing”.
Where are the orders published?
The 3 orders appear in I.C.J. Reports 2024 at pages 3, 513 and 649. They are cited by paragraph number because all 3 are paginated within one volume. The cross-references inside the later orders use the form “I.C.J. Reports 2024 (I)”, which is also the Court’s own.
Sources
- COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), Israel Ministry of Defense, 2026. Gaza Aid Data portal: “Humanitarian Aid” truck-level workbook, the Aid Data dashboard, and “Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire, October 2025 to June 2026” (9 July 2026). https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/d15pw0ii/humanitarian-aid.xlsx and https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/mainhome/. Official record, a party’s own operational count.
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 260 A (III), 9 December 1948; 78 UNTS 277. Articles II and IX. Treaty text.
- International Court of Justice, 2024. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Provisional Measures, Order of 26 January 2024. I.C.J. Reports 2024, p. 3. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf. Official record, court order.
- International Court of Justice, 2024. Request for the Modification of the Order Indicating Provisional Measures of 26 January 2024, Order of 28 March 2024. I.C.J. Reports 2024, p. 513. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf. Official record, court order.
- International Court of Justice, 2024. Request for the Modification of the Order of 28 March 2024, Order of 24 May 2024. I.C.J. Reports 2024, p. 649. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf. Official record, court order.
- Israel Defense Forces, n.d. The Spirit of the IDF; Our Mission, Our Values. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/spirit-of-the-idf/ and https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/our-mission-our-values/. Official record, a party’s own doctrine.
- Milanovic, Marko, 2025. Proving Genocide. EJIL:Talk!, Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 18 September 2025. https://www.ejiltalk.org/proving-genocide. Academic blog commentary, not peer-reviewed.
- Republic of South Africa, 2023. Application instituting proceedings and Request for the indication of provisional measures, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), signed 28 December 2023, filed 29 December 2023, General List No. 192. Primary record, a state party’s own pleading.
- Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. Annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945. Articles 31, 41 and 59. Treaty text.
- Sultany, Nimer, 2024. A Threshold Crossed: On Genocidal Intent and the Duty to Prevent Genocide in Palestine. Journal of Genocide Research, published online 9 May 2024. DOI 10.1080/14623528.2024.2351261. Peer-reviewed.
