Support for the detailed final-status package tested in the September 2024 joint Israeli-Palestinian survey stood at 25% among Israeli Jews before any added incentive was attached, per Tel Aviv University’s Peace Index and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, which conduct the survey jointly. The same survey recorded 46% total Israeli support for the two-state principle stated in the abstract, and 59% when the Palestinian side was described as committing to security cooperation. A peace plan is usually discussed as a map. For the leader who would sign it, the question is what can be shown to voters and when, and the survey record puts numbers on both halves of that trade.
Key Findings
- 25% of Israeli Jews supported the detailed final-status package before any added incentive, per the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse survey run by Tel Aviv University’s Peace Index with the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2024.
- Total Israeli support for the two-state principle rose from 46% to 59% when the Palestinian side was described as committing to security cooperation, in the same joint survey; support for the package reached 60% under some one-sided incentive packages.
- 59% of Israeli Jews supported mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the homelands of their peoples, including 40% of West Bank settlers, in the same joint survey.
- The 2016 US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding commits $38 billion over fiscal 2019 to 2028 and conditions it on one thing in its own text: the funds are “subject to the appropriation and availability of funds.”
- Clause 7 of Israel’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted in 2018, states that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value”; the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed the petitions against the law in HCJ 5555/18 on 8 July 2021.
What does the baseline domestic support for a package actually measure?
Support for the detailed final-status package stood at 25% among Israeli Jews before any added incentive was attached, per the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse survey conducted by Tel Aviv University’s Peace Index with the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in September 2024. That share is the constituency a leader could claim for a concrete deal, as distinct from a stated principle.
The same joint survey recorded 46% total Israeli support for the two-state principle. The two figures are not two readings of one quantity and cannot be subtracted from each other: they measure different objects, a package of specified final-status terms against an abstract principle, and they are reported on different bases, Israeli Jews in the first case and the total Israeli sample in the second.
What the package contains is what makes the difference legible. The Brookings Institution, in its 2018 article “How the peace process killed the two-state solution,” names the steps a two-state agreement requires of an Israeli leader as evacuating settlements, transferring territory to Palestinian sovereignty, and dividing Jerusalem. Each is specific, each is publicly attributable to whoever signs it, and each appears in the detailed package the joint survey put to respondents. The principle question carries none of them.
The 25% figure is the answer to the question of domestic payoff at its most concrete point, and it is a measured share rather than an inference from coalition arithmetic. It also sets the terms for everything below: the sections that follow ask what moves it, what a signature would cost in relocated population, and what Israel’s own enacted record says about the direction of travel.
Is it often said leaders face no reward for concessions?
It is often said that Israeli leaders face no political reward for final-status concessions, and two named institutions state that position directly. The Brookings Institution wrote in 2018 that absent meaningful pressure Israeli leaders had no incentive to take politically unpopular steps. The Center for American Progress, in “Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution,” records “little serious internal political pressure.” Against the joint survey, the package base rate is 25%.
The direction of that claim holds at package level. A quarter of Israeli Jews supporting the specified terms is a minority constituency, and the joint survey measured it before any reciprocal commitment was described.
The reframe is what the same instrument records when the question changes. At the level of the stated principle the figure is 46% of the total Israeli sample, and at the level of one component, mutual recognition, it is 59% of Israeli Jews. So the absence of a domestic constituency is measured at the package, not uniformly across every element of a settlement. A leader lacking a majority for a signed final-status agreement is not the same finding as a leader lacking a majority for each of its parts, and the joint survey separates the two.
Neither institutional statement is a measurement. Brookings states a conditional argument about pressure; the Center for American Progress states a characterization of Israeli public division. They are named here as the bodies that hold the position, dated, and quoted in their own words, which is what allows a reader to weigh them against the survey shares rather than beside them. The distinction between an argument about incentives and a measured share of respondents runs through the rest of this report, and is taken up directly in the section on where published analyses disagree.
Does US assistance to Israel carry conditions tied to negotiations?
The Memorandum of Understanding signed at Washington on 14 September 2016 commits the United States to $38 billion in security assistance over fiscal 2019 to 2028, and the text conditions that money on one stated thing: the funding levels are “subject to the appropriation and availability of funds.” No clause in the published text ties disbursement to progress in negotiations.
The Congressional Research Service, in its standing report RL33222, records the composition: $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations, requested as $3.3 billion and $500 million per year. The same report records $174 billion in cumulative bilateral assistance and missile defense funding to date in current dollars, and $8.7 billion in combined Foreign Military Financing and missile defense appropriated in fiscal 2024. The accompanying letter to the 2016 memorandum records Israel’s commitment not to seek Foreign Military Financing above the agreed levels for the duration, and to return additional 2017 or 2018 funds granted outside the framework. It is a ceiling commitment, running in the other direction from a condition.
The recorded votes show where variation actually appears. H.R. 5323, the Iron Dome supplemental, passed the House 420 to 9 on 23 September 2021. H.R. 8034, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, passed 366 to 58 on 20 April 2024, and the Senate agreed to H.R. 815 by 79 to 18 on 23 April 2024. The one near-party-line result, 226 to 196 on 2 November 2023, was on the version paired with a rescission of IRS funding as its offset. The variable between the 2023 and 2024 House votes on essentially the same assistance was the offset, not the assistance, a pattern examined further in the Institute’s report on who sets the level of US aid to Israel.
How many settlers would a territorial withdrawal have to relocate?
At the beginning of 2019, 418,900 core Jews lived in the West Bank, per Sergio DellaPergola’s demographic estimate published in the American Jewish Year Book, against 6,001,700 living within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. That is the population attached to the territorial half of the trade, measured rather than characterized.
The same estimate records 221,800 in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods incorporated after 1967 and 23,200 on the Golan Heights, each reported as its own series rather than folded into one figure. The distinction matters because the boundary between them is a counting convention, not a fact about the ground: monitoring organizations including B’Tselem publish West Bank and East Jerusalem settler populations as separate series, while Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents inside Israel’s own total.
Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), writing for POMEPS, trace how the Bureau’s yearbook arrived at that convention: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” settlement localities were counted among Israeli localities by 1983, and the separate territories chapter was removed in 1997. The authors call this a trend toward the normalization of settlements, which is their own analytic framing. They also record that the Bureau excludes unrecognized outposts, of which Peace Now documented about 121 in 2019, so the official series is a floor for the built presence.
The Bureau’s Jerusalem Day release for 2024 reports the city passing one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, counted as a single municipal population. A leader dividing that city would be dividing a population the state’s own statistics do not divide.
What does Israel’s enacted record state about settlement as policy?
The Israeli Supreme Court dismissed the 15 petitions against Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People in HCJ 5555/18, delivered on 8 July 2021 by an eleven-justice panel, leaving in force clause 7, which states that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.”
The Knesset adopted the law in 2018 and publishes an English translation it labels unofficial. Alongside clause 7, clause 1(c) states that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People,” and clause 3 states that “the complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.” A leader negotiating settlement evacuation, Palestinian sovereignty or a divided Jerusalem would be legislating against three clauses of a Basic Law rather than reversing a policy of a single government. The enacted text is examined in its own right in the Institute’s report on Israel’s nation-state law.
The Court’s reasoning cuts in two directions and both belong on the page. It upheld the law, and it held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and lacks authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the core character of the State as a Jewish and democratic state. The test it set is narrow: whether an amendment denies the core democratic identity of the state or inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core characteristics of its identity. The Court derived that limit from what it called the elements of the constitution developed since the founding, naming the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law.
For the incentive question, the operative fact is the durability of clause 7. It is enacted, it survived constitutional challenge before the state’s highest court, and its subject is the same population counted in the previous section.
Which added incentives raised Israeli support in the polling?
Support for the detailed final-status package among Israeli Jews rose from 25% to as high as 60% under some one-sided incentive packages, per the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse survey of September 2024. The incentives are added conditions attached to the deal in the survey instrument, not observed events, and the highest readings came from packages weighted toward the Israeli side.
At the level of the stated principle the same instrument recorded a smaller and more specific movement: total Israeli support rose from 46% to 59% when the Palestinian side was described as committing to security cooperation. That is 13 points produced by an assurance about conduct rather than by any change in territory, borders or refugees.
Two properties of these figures constrain what can be read from them. First, they are survey responses to described conditions, so they measure stated support under a hypothetical, not behavior at a ballot box. Second, the package shares and the principle shares run on different bases and different objects, so the 25 to 60 movement and the 46 to 59 movement are two separate findings rather than one trend line.
What they hold in common is the direction. In both pairs, the quantity that moved Israeli support upward was something the other side or an outside party supplies, not something the Israeli signatory concedes. The measured incentive that raises domestic support is reciprocal, and it is absent from the baseline the previous sections describe.
Do any elements of a deal already command majority Israeli support?
59% of Israeli Jews supported mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the homelands of their respective peoples, including 40% of West Bank settlers, per the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse survey of September 2024. That is a majority for a component of a settlement measured in the same instrument that recorded 25% for the assembled package.
The two shares are shares of the same population on the same instrument, which makes the comparison a genuine one rather than a juxtaposition across sources. What separates them is what is being asked. Mutual recognition is declaratory and reversible in political effect; the package carries evacuation, territorial transfer and Jerusalem, each of which is what Brookings in 2018 called politically unpopular and irreversible.
The settler subgroup figure is the sharper of the two. 40% support for mutual recognition among West Bank settlers is measured within the population most directly exposed to a territorial withdrawal, and it is a minority within that group, so it establishes that the component commands substantial support inside the constituency usually described as uniformly opposed, not that the group supports a withdrawal. The survey reports agreement with a formulation, not willingness to relocate.
Set against the ladder so far, the pattern is consistent rather than contradictory. The components with the highest support are the ones that cost a signatory least in enacted commitments and relocated population. Recognition asks nothing of clause 7 of the Basic Law and moves none of the 418,900 people DellaPergola counted in the West Bank at the beginning of 2019. The package asks for both. The domestic constituency thins as the specificity, and the irreversibility, rises.
What do the surveys record about trust between the two publics?
The clearest published signal about trust in the September 2024 joint survey is conditional rather than direct: total Israeli support for the two-state principle stood at 46% and reached 59% when the Palestinian side was described as committing to security cooperation. The 13-point difference was produced by an assurance about future conduct, with the terms of the settlement unchanged.
That is a measurement of how much a stated commitment is worth in support, not a measurement of how far either public trusts the other. The joint survey’s published figures carried here are package shares, principle shares and incentive shares; no trust index appears among them, and the difference between the two readings is the closest quantity the published record supplies.
The peer-reviewed literature on how conflict exposure relates to attitudes measures a different population and should be read with that bound stated. Huesmann and colleagues (2012), surveying 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students, found both groups held more negative stereotypes about the out-group than the in-group, with ethnic identity correlating with implicit out-group stereotyping at r = -0.70. Total media exposure to the conflict did not directly predict stereotypes; the association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed. The sample is American adolescents, not Israeli or Palestinian adults, so the finding speaks to the mechanism by which conflict coverage relates to attitudes and not to the two publics in the survey above.
Read together, the two records point at the same joint. What moved Israeli support in 2024 was a described commitment by the other party, and what the 2012 study found was that exposure to the conflict relates to stereotyping through identification rather than through volume of information. Neither establishes cause in either direction, and both authors state the correlational limit of their designs.
Where do published analyses disagree about what would change the calculus?
Three named sources locate the missing pressure in three different places, and only one of them reports a number: the September 2024 joint survey recorded package support at 25% at baseline, while the Brookings Institution and the Center for American Progress state arguments rather than measured quantities.
Brookings, in 2018, places the absence outside Israel: absent meaningful pressure, Israeli leaders had no incentive to take politically unpopular steps such as evacuating settlements, transferring territory to Palestinian sovereignty, or dividing Jerusalem. The Center for American Progress, in “Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution,” places it inside, recording that Israelis are divided and that there is “little serious internal political pressure.” The two are not the same claim. One implies an external actor could change the calculus; the other implies the constituency itself would have to.
The joint survey answers a third question, which neither argument asks. It measures what a described reciprocal commitment does to stated support, and it records movement of 13 points at the level of the principle and up to 35 points at the level of the package under one-sided incentive packages. That is a measurement of responsiveness to conditions, not an account of why no agreement has been reached.
The distinction between argument and measurement is the one a reader has to carry through this literature. Brookings and the Center for American Progress publish reasoned positions, dated and attributable, and their claims about incentives are not falsifiable against a survey share. The joint survey publishes shares that are falsifiable and that carry sampling limits, and it makes no claim about what any leader would do. Treating the three as interchangeable evidence collapses that difference. The wider question of what has and has not moved is examined in the Institute’s report on why the two-state solution is failing.
How does the no-partner framing appear in measured online discourse?
26.9% of UK comments beneath leading British media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation were coded antisemitic, per Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, using an IHRA-based coding scheme.
The study analyzed 1,504 UK comments in all, against 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments coded on the same IHRA-based scheme.
Within the UK antisemitic comments, the authors recorded the distribution of frames: Israel’s sole guilt at 27.9%, denial of Jewish self-determination at 7.7%, the apartheid analogy at 5.2% and the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. Thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, so the coding depended on where a comment sat, not only on what it said. These are shares of comments beneath news posts during one escalation, not shares of any national population.
Two peer-reviewed studies measure how attitudes toward Israel relate to antisemitism, both correlationally and both stating their own limits. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026), across three preregistered studies, report a model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, in which conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), in two British experiments of 354 and 490 participants, found political orientation associated with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation on one pathway, and conservative orientation negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people on another.
None of these measures the deadlock itself. They measure what circulates around it, in comment threads and in survey instruments, and they are associations rather than causes.
Methodology and limitations
This report draws on four source types, each labelled where it is used. Official and primary records: the 2016 US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding published by the US Department of State, the recorded votes at congress.gov, the Congressional Research Service reports RL33222 and R44245, the Knesset’s published text of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, the Israeli Supreme Court’s judgment in HCJ 5555/18, and releases of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Academic survey research: the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse conducted by Tel Aviv University’s Peace Index with the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2024. Peer-reviewed research: Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), Harber and colleagues (2026, abstract-sourced), Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, abstract-sourced) and Huesmann and colleagues (2012). Institutional argument, cited as argument: the Brookings Institution (2018) and the Center for American Progress.
The frame is explicit. What is measured here is the recorded incentive structure: published survey shares, enacted texts, court records and appropriations records. The merits of any settlement proposal are not a quantity these sources report.
Four limitations bear on the figures. First, the joint survey’s package shares are reported among Israeli Jews and its principle shares across the total Israeli sample; the two run on different bases and different objects and are never subtracted from one another here. Second, the incentive readings measure stated support under conditions described in a survey instrument, not behavior. Third, DellaPergola’s territorial figures are an academic demographic estimate for the beginning of 2019, not an official enumeration, and Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s own total while monitoring organizations publish them separately, so any settler total depends on the convention named alongside it. Fourth, Becker and colleagues coded comment sections during one escalation in three countries, and Huesmann and colleagues surveyed American adolescents; neither is a national attitude measure for either public in the conflict.
Where the literature disagrees, both positions are named and dated: Brookings locates the missing pressure externally and the Center for American Progress internally, and neither statement is a measurement.
Conclusion
What can a leader show for a signature, and when? On the record assembled here, very little at the moment of signing and a great deal afterward. The joint September 2024 survey put support for the specified final-status package at 25% among Israeli Jews with nothing added, and the three components Brookings named in 2018, evacuating settlements, transferring territory and dividing Jerusalem, are precisely the ones a signatory cannot later deny having done.
The rest of the record is consistent with that shape rather than with a blanket absence of support. Recognition, the cheapest element, drew 59% of Israeli Jews and 40% of West Bank settlers. A described Palestinian commitment to security cooperation moved principle support from 46% to 59%, and one-sided incentive packages moved package support as high as 60%, so the constituency is responsive to what others supply and thin on what the signatory concedes. On the concession side sit 418,900 people in the West Bank and 221,800 in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods at the beginning of 2019, a Jerusalem the state counts as one municipality of over a million, and clause 7 of a 2018 Basic Law that survived constitutional challenge in 2021. On the external side, the $38 billion framework signed in 2016 is conditioned in its own text on appropriation and availability of funds, and the recorded votes swung by 140 in the House between 2023 and 2024 on the tax offset attached to the bill rather than on the assistance itself.
Deadlock does not stay inside the negotiating file. In the comment threads Becker, Ascone and Troschke coded in 2022, 26.9% of the analyzed UK comments were antisemitic, and denial of Jewish self-determination accounted for 7.7% of them, while Harber and colleagues measured conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists carrying the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes. A stalemate that runs long enough stops being read as an arithmetic of costs and starts being read as an intention, and the language available for describing an intention is old. Whether an incentive structure this asymmetric, measured and public becomes one of the inputs that feeds that older language is the question the numbers here put in front of anyone reading them.
Frequently Asked Questions
How do settlement population counts differ between sources?
They differ by convention rather than by measurement. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s population total, a practice Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) trace to a series of yearbook changes beginning in 1968, while monitoring organizations publish the two as separate series. The Bureau also excludes unrecognized outposts, of which Peace Now documented about 121 in 2019 as reported by those authors.
What did the 2016 memorandum’s accompanying letter commit Israel to?
It records Israel’s commitment not to seek Foreign Military Financing above the agreed levels for the duration of the framework, and to return any additional 2017 or 2018 Foreign Military Financing granted outside it, per the letter published with the memorandum. It is a ceiling on requests rather than a condition on disbursement.
How much US assistance has Israel received in total?
The Congressional Research Service, in report RL33222, records $174 billion in cumulative bilateral assistance and missile defense funding in current dollars, the largest cumulative total for any recipient of US foreign assistance since the Second World War. Figures move by edition, so the edition year travels with the total.
How did the Israeli Supreme Court limit future Basic Laws?
In HCJ 5555/18, delivered 8 July 2021, the Court held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and lacks authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the state’s core character as Jewish and democratic. The test it set is narrow, asking whether an amendment inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core characteristics of that identity.
How have US public sympathies in the conflict changed?
Gallup’s forced-choice trend recorded 63% of US adults sympathizing more with the Israelis in February 2010, the highest since 1991, against 46% in February 2025, the lowest in 25 years of the trend, with 33% sympathizing more with the Palestinians. The question forces a choice between two named parties and measures relative sympathy only.
Which countries’ comment sections did the antisemitic-comment study measure?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) coded 4,500 comments in total, 1,504 analyzed in the UK, 1,500 in France and 1,520 in Germany, on the Facebook pages of leading media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation. Thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in about 62% of the French antisemitic comments and 48.3% of the German ones.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Brookings Institution, 2018. How the Peace Process Killed the Two-State Solution. brookings.edu. Research institution commentary.
- Center for American Progress, no date. Window of Opportunity for a Two-State Solution. americanprogress.org. Research and advocacy organization.
- DellaPergola, S., 2019. World Jewish Population, 2019. American Jewish Year Book 2019, vol. 119, Springer; reprinted by the Berman Jewish DataBank. Academic reference.
- Gallup, 2010 to 2025. Middle East Sympathies Trend. news.gallup.com/poll/1639. Named survey organization.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., and Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., and Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, How Many Settlements Are There? Counting, Tracking, and Normalizing Jewish Settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the Present. POMEPS. Think-tank report.
- Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E., Boxer, P., Souweidane, V., and Ginges, J., 2012. Foreign Wars and Domestic Prejudice. Journal of Research on Adolescence. DOI 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israeli Supreme Court, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset. Judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record.
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Knesset English translation, labelled unofficial. main.knesset.gov.il. Official record.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., and Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Tel Aviv University Peace Index and Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2024. The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, September 2024. en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex. Joint academic survey.
- US Congress, 2021 to 2024. Recorded votes on Israel security assistance: House Roll Calls 275 (2021), 577 (2023) and 152 (2024); Senate Record Vote 154 (2024). congress.gov. Official record.
- US Congressional Research Service, ongoing. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments, RL33222. congress.gov. Official record.
- US Congressional Research Service, ongoing. Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, R44245. congress.gov. Official record.
- US Department of State, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Israel on Security Assistance, signed 14 September 2016. Official record.