Israel’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened into alleged misconduct by Israeli forces in Gaza as of 3 August 2024, alongside more than 1,000 incidents its General Staff had referred for factual assessment, each handled as a suspected deviation from orders rather than as an order carried out. Findings describing the conduct in Gaza and the West Bank as systematic, widespread or deliberate have been published by four named bodies between 2023 and 2026, three of them monitoring organizations and one an official governmental report. The word doing the work in the question is systematic: in the treaty texts that give the term its legal content, it is a claim about a State policy, not a tally of incidents.
Key Findings
- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in force since 1 July 2002, defines an attack directed against a civilian population as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of listed acts “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”, and Article 7(1) requires that the attack be widespread or systematic (official record, treaty text).
- Israel’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as of 3 August 2024, 44 of them concerning the death of detainees held by the IDF, drawn from more than 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment; these are the corps’ own counts of its own processes.
- The same corps states the standard those counts rest on: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”
- The United States Department of State’s 2023 country report records 509 Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during 2023, at least 121 of them children (official governmental record).
- Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded 26.9% of 1,504 comments on leading British media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation as antisemitic, and 27.9% of those antisemitic comments assigned Israel sole guilt for the conflict.
Which bodies have found a systematic pattern of attacks?
Four bodies have published findings of this kind between 2023 and 2026: the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the United States Department of State. One is an official governmental record. The other three are monitoring bodies reporting incidents they gathered themselves, against definitions they set themselves.
The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry stated in its 2024 report on Gaza that Israeli forces’ use of heavy weapons in densely populated areas amounted to an intentional and direct attack on the civilian population, and described the resulting civilian casualties and destruction as the inevitable result of the strategy pursued. In 2025 the same commission reported that more than half of Gaza’s religious and cultural sites had been destroyed or damaged and that the education system had been obliterated.
Amnesty International’s 2025 report on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory stated that it had documented a “pattern of unlawful attacks” by Israeli forces against civilians and civilian objects, including direct and indiscriminate attacks and “wanton destruction of civilian property not justified by military necessity”. Human Rights Watch, in its World Report 2024, reported repeated indiscriminate airstrikes in Gaza and, in the West Bank, unlawful killings it linked to excessive lethal force.
The United States Department of State’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering Israel, the West Bank and Gaza documents killings by Israeli security forces and by Israeli settlers, use of excessive force, and destruction of property. It is the only one of the four issued by a government.
The three monitoring findings are the bodies’ own determinations on their own criteria, published without external adjudication, and Israel disputes them. The distinction between the four is not a matter of degree of confidence but of instrument: a commission of inquiry and a rights organization each publish findings, while a foreign ministry publishes a country report that credits its casualty figures to another compiler.
Is it said the attacks are widespread and deliberate?
Yes, and the characterization is datable to specific documents. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry used the language of intentional attack in its 2024 report; Amnesty International in its 2025 report; Human Rights Watch in World Report 2024; the United States Department of State in its 2023 country report. What the premise omits is that each is a finding issued by its author, not a determination entered by a court.
It is often said that these findings are settled across the bodies that examined the question. On the record of publication, they do converge: three of the four use the vocabulary of deliberate or indiscriminate attack on civilians, and the fourth records the same categories of conduct without applying that vocabulary. A reader who holds that impression is holding something traceable.
The base rate the premise leaves out is the instrument. None of the four documents is a judicial finding of fact. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are advocacy-mission organizations counting on definitions they publish themselves. The commission of inquiry is a body established to report, and its findings carry no adjudicative effect. The State Department report attributes its counts externally. Whether the conduct these documents describe meets the elements of a war crime is a separate question from whether the conduct was recorded.
Israel disputes the findings, and the machinery through which it does so is a party record with counts of its own, set out below.
What makes conduct systematic rather than isolated?
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in force since 1 July 2002, sets the threshold. Article 7(2)(a) defines an “attack directed against any civilian population” as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of the listed acts “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”, and Article 7(1) requires that the attack be widespread or systematic.
Two elements sit inside that definition and they do different work. Widespread concerns scale. Systematic concerns organization, and the policy clause is what carries it: a course of conduct pursued in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. A high volume of unlawful incidents does not by itself establish the policy element, and the policy element is what separates a crime against humanity from a large number of individual crimes.
Article 8 of the same Statute lists war crimes and attaches no policy element at all. A single unlawful attack on a civilian or a civilian object can constitute one. This is why the two claims in circulation are not versions of the same claim at different strengths: an allegation of individual war crimes and an allegation of a systematic attack rest on different findings, and evidence sufficient for the first is not evidence for the second.
Two other instruments set higher thresholds again. The 1948 Genocide Convention requires acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. The 1973 Apartheid Convention requires inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group. Both turn on purpose, which is why the argument in each case runs through what a pattern of conduct is said to indicate about intent rather than through the incident count alone.
The practical consequence for reading the four findings above: none of them is a determination on the policy element, and the treaty texts are where the word systematic acquires the meaning the question is using.
How many Palestinians have Israeli forces killed in the West Bank?
The United States Department of State’s 2023 country report records 509 Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during 2023, a count it credits to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs rather than to a measurement of its own. The report states that at least 121 of them were children.
Three further counts circulate, and they measure different periods. Human Rights Watch, in World Report 2024, relayed 464 Palestinians killed in the West Bank between the start of 2023 and 12 December 2023, including 109 children. A UN report published in 2024 gave 1,096 Palestinians killed in the West Bank since 7 October 2023. Amnesty International, in a 2026 publication, relayed at least 1,231 Palestinians killed in the West Bank including East Jerusalem between 1 January 2023 and 30 April 2026.
These four figures are not four independent measurements. Each traces to the same recording office, the UN humanitarian coordination office, which the State Department, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International all name as the source of the count they carry. The differences between the numbers are differences of window, not of method: 464 stops in mid-December 2023, 509 covers calendar 2023, 1,096 begins on 7 October 2023, and 1,231 spans more than three years and encloses all of them.
They therefore cannot be summed, and the largest is not evidence of a faster rate than the smallest. A report that sets 509 beside 1,231 without the dates has produced an apparent trend out of two overlapping periods measured by one office.
What the set does establish is a recorded volume: on the count the official US record adopts, Israeli security forces killed more than 500 Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in a single calendar year before the Gaza war’s second year began. No Israeli official series covering the same population and period appears in the records cited here.
How much Palestinian property damage is recorded, and by whom?
Amnesty International’s 2026 publication records 4,575 settler attacks on Palestinian communities between January 2023 and December 2025 that resulted in casualties, property damage or both, the organization’s own count of recorded incidents on its own inclusion criteria. The same publication records roughly 69,000 trees or saplings destroyed or damaged and at least 2,200 Palestinian cars damaged.
Those counts concern actions by Israeli settlers, not by Israeli forces, and the distinction is load-bearing for the question. A count of settler attacks is evidence about settler conduct and about whatever role state forces are documented as playing in it; it is not a count of attacks by the military, and merging the two produces a total that describes no single actor. The role settler violence plays in the land record is documented separately from the record of military operations.
For property damage attributed to military operations, the figures published are areal and categorical rather than itemized. The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry reported in 2025 that more than half of Gaza’s religious and cultural sites had been destroyed or damaged and that the education system had been obliterated. That is the commission’s own finding, and it is expressed as a share of a category of sites, not as a count of structures with a stated denominator on the page.
On the other side of the ledger, the Israel Defense Forces publishes no figures for the precautions it states it takes. Its published materials describe telephone calls, text messages, leaflets, the use of a loud non-lethal munition on a roof before a strike, aborted strikes when civilians are present, and a numbered evacuation-area map. Those descriptions carry no count of warnings issued, roof-knocks performed or strikes aborted, so the record supports a description of the stated measures and no statement of their frequency.
The result is an asymmetry in the property record: itemized counts of settler-attributed damage from an advocacy-mission organization, share-of-category findings from a commission, and no published Israeli figure for either destruction or mitigation.
What does the US government’s own report record?
At least 121 of the Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during 2023 were children, per the United States Department of State’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, which documents killings by Israeli security forces and by Israeli settlers, use of excessive force, and destruction of property in one document covering Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.
Two features of that record matter for how much weight it carries. The first is that it keeps its actors apart. Killings attributed to security forces and killings attributed to settlers appear as separate categories, which is the distinction that the aggregate figures circulating on property damage tend to lose.
The second is that the official label attaches to the reporting, not to the measurement. The report credits its West Bank casualty figures to the UN humanitarian coordination office. A government publishing another body’s count is a governmental record of that count, and it does not convert the count into a national statistic produced by US collection.
The report documents conduct by category. It does not enter the treaty terms at issue in this question, and no US governmental finding on the policy element of Article 7 appears in the documents cited here.
For the scope of operations and the American policy response, the standing congressional reference is the Congressional Research Service report Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief, prepared for members of Congress as an official nonpartisan record. It sets out the operational and policy frame within which the country report’s figures were compiled.
Read together, the two US documents supply what the monitoring findings cannot: an official-tier record that carries the same categories of documented conduct, with its sourcing chain stated on the page, and without a characterization of policy attached.
How does Israel’s own record classify these incidents?
Israel’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened into alleged misconduct by Israeli forces in Gaza as of 3 August 2024, published by the corps as its own count of its own processes rather than as an independently verified tally.
The corps reported that over 1,000 incidents had been identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, with hundreds still undergoing material collection at the time of writing. That mechanism was created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission and now operates, in the corps’ words, as “a permanent body which conducts factual assessments”.
The standard that produces those counts is stated in the same document: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The investigation count is a function of that threshold, so the ratio of 74 investigations to more than 1,000 referrals is not interpretable without it. The 74 are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions.
On independence, the corps states that “the MAG is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence”, and that its decisions are subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged before Israel’s Attorney General and before the Israeli Supreme Court.
The doctrine the machinery is measured against is published. The Spirit of the IDF states that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property”, and that a soldier will ensure they are “only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders”. That is a record of the stated requirement, not evidence about conduct against it.
The classification itself is the crux. The corps handles each referred incident as a suspected deviation from orders, examined case by case. The IDF separately states that Hamas sites military infrastructure in residential buildings, hospitals, mosques and schools, and that Hamas broadcast messages telling residents to ignore evacuation warnings. Its spokesperson stated on 29 February 2024 that Israeli forces had eliminated over 13,000 people it described as terrorists in Gaza, the IDF’s own characterization of those counted and its own count, published by a party to the events.
Which analyses reject the systematic characterization?
The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs put a ceiling of at most 41,000 on civilians in Gaza who have died of war-related causes through October 2025, deriving it by subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s estimate of Hamas fighters killed from the Gaza Ministry of Health total. The Center states on the same page that neither input has been independently confirmed.
Its published wording is explicit about that: “Neither the Hamas claim of 67,000 total Gazan deaths nor the Israel estimate of 21,000 Hamas fighters killed has been independently confirmed, and the Hamas claim has been challenged.” The 41,000 is therefore the publisher’s own arithmetic on two unverified inputs, and it is a stated ceiling rather than a count. What it puts on the page is the absent variable in most published totals: a combatant and civilian split that no body has verified.
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, in a situation report covering 1 August to 5 September 2024, carried cumulative Israeli casualty totals counted from 7 October 2023: 1,664 Israelis confirmed killed and 17,809 wounded, with 1,184 killed on 7 October itself. The report credits no official body for the killed and wounded figures, so they are the institute’s own running totals.
NGO Monitor, in its 2024 annual report, states that it identified 157 groups in the United States and 111 in Canada linked to what it describes as an anti-Israel network, with over 3,000 and over 1,800 connections respectively. The report does not state the mapping’s method or inclusion criteria, and the counts are the organization’s own on its own advocacy mission. They address the organizations that publish incident findings, not the incident record.
None of these three is peer-reviewed, and none measures the underlying incidents. Their contribution to the question is narrower and specific: they contest the counting, not the occurrence. Where the monitoring findings rest on incidents selected and coded by the finding body, and on casualty totals relayed from a single recording office or a party health ministry, these publications name that dependence as the weak joint.
How does this framing appear in measured antisemitic discourse?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) found that 26.9% of comments on leading British media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation were coded as antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme.
The same peer-reviewed study coded 1,504 British comments in total, alongside 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments flagged as antisemitic under the same IHRA-based scheme.
Within the UK antisemitic comments, 27.9% assigned Israel sole guilt for the conflict, 8.1% invoked child murder or blood libel, 5.2% used the apartheid analogy and 4.2% the Nazi analogy. The authors also report that thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, so a share of what was coded is not visible in the comment text alone.
Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, peer-reviewed, reported from the abstract) ran two experiments with British samples of 354 and 490 participants, priming war-in-Gaza material and measuring hostility toward Jews. They report two distinct pathways: political orientation associated positively with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation, and conservative orientation associated negatively with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people, an identity-based route the authors describe as conflating attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward Jews. These are measured associations in experimental samples, not causal findings about any population.
Huesmann and colleagues (2012, peer-reviewed) surveyed 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students and found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes. The association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed in the media, and both groups held more negative stereotypes about the out-group than the in-group, with ethnic identity correlating with implicit out-group stereotyping at r = -0.70.
Read together, the three measure a conversation rather than a conflict: how a framing of state conduct travels through comment threads and attitude scales, at what coded share, and by which route.
Methodology and limitations
This report measures the documentary record on the question and the discourse around it. It does not assess the underlying legal question of whether the conduct described meets any treaty threshold, and where a finding is a body’s own determination it is reported as that body’s determination.
Source types are labelled where they are cited. The treaty texts (the Rome Statute, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1973 Apartheid Convention) are official records quoted from the instruments. The United States Department of State country report and the Congressional Research Service report are official governmental records. The Military Advocate General’s Corps publication, The Spirit of the IDF, the IDF’s stated precautions and the 29 February 2024 spokesperson briefing are the party’s own published counts and doctrine, produced by a party to the events they describe and not independently verified; each is attributed as such. Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) and Huesmann and colleagues (2012) are peer-reviewed, with the Ozer figures reported from the abstract only. The Jerusalem Center, Begin-Sadat Center and NGO Monitor publications are research-institute and advocacy-mission reports, not peer-reviewed.
Findings published by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are carried in the body as those bodies’ own determinations on their own definitions and inclusion criteria, dated to the document that states them.
Four limitations bear on the numbers. First, the West Bank casualty counts trace to one recording office and cover overlapping windows, so they are one series read at four cut-offs and cannot be summed or compared as independent measurements. Second, Israel’s investigation counts are a function of the threshold the corps states, and are counts of investigations opened, not of findings or convictions. Third, no Israeli published figure exists for warnings issued, strikes aborted or civilian structures destroyed, and none is estimated here. Fourth, the Gaza casualty totals in circulation carry no verified combatant and civilian split, which is the specific gap the Jerusalem Center’s arithmetic names.
Conclusion
The question turns on one word. Systematic, in the instruments that give it legal content, asserts a policy; in ordinary use it asserts a pattern. The records answer the second and stop short of the first. Four named bodies have published findings of widespread, deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on Palestinian civilians and civilian objects, dated between 2023 and 2026, and one of the four is an official governmental report. Israel’s own prosecutorial record classifies more than 1,000 referred incidents and 74 opened investigations as suspected deviations from orders, under a stated threshold holding that civilian death in armed conflict in most cases does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
Both accounts are documented and both are partial. The official US record carries 509 Palestinians killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 2023, at least 121 of them children, on a count it credits to another office. Amnesty International’s own tally holds 4,575 settler attacks over three years, with roughly 69,000 trees and at least 2,200 cars damaged. The UN commission’s 2025 finding holds more than half of Gaza’s religious and cultural sites destroyed or damaged. Against that, the Israel Defense Forces publishes doctrine forbidding harm to uninvolved civilians and a description of precautions with no count attached to any of them, and the Jerusalem Center’s ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths rests, by its own statement, on two figures neither side has independently confirmed. Every number in that paragraph belongs to the body that produced it, and no court has entered a determination on the policy element.
Which leaves the second life these findings have. Becker, Ascone and Troschke coded 26.9% of 1,504 British comments on the May 2021 escalation as antisemitic, and inside that share the sole-guilt framing ran at 27.9%, the apartheid analogy at 5.2% and blood libel at 8.1%, with thread context required to see the meaning in 38.7% of cases. The vocabulary of an ordered, purposeful campaign is precisely the vocabulary those comments reach for, and Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh found hostility toward Jews rising along a route that runs through identification rather than through the argument itself. So the sharper question sits one layer below the legal one: when a claim about policy moves from a commission report into a comment thread, what does it become on the way, and who ends up standing in for the state it was written about?
Frequently Asked Questions
Can the published West Bank counts be added together?
No. The 464, 509, 1,096 and at least 1,231 figures cover overlapping and unequal windows, and each traces to the same UN humanitarian coordination office. The 1,231 spans 1 January 2023 to 30 April 2026 and encloses the other three, so summing them would count the same deaths several times.
Which records exist in Israel’s own legal system on these questions?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps states that its decisions are subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged before Israel’s Attorney General and the Israeli Supreme Court. The nearest domestic constitutional ruling on a related subject is HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided 8 July 2021, which upheld Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People while holding that the Knesset cannot deny the state’s core democratic identity.
Where did Israel’s fact-finding mechanism come from?
The General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism was created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission and now operates, per the Military Advocate General’s Corps, as a permanent body conducting factual assessments. The corps reported over 1,000 incidents referred to it in the Gaza war, hundreds still in assessment as of August 2024.
Do the published Gaza death counts separate combatants from civilians?
No published total carries a verified split. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs states that neither the 67,000 total it cites from the Gaza health authorities nor Israel’s estimate of 21,000 Hamas fighters killed has been independently confirmed. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports 70,942 deaths in Gaza to the end of December 2025, attributed to the Palestinian Ministry of Health and not measured by the Bureau.
Does the Palestinian statistical office report a population decline in Gaza?
Yes. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports about 2.13 million people in Gaza at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000, which it states is 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates. It separately reports roughly 2.2 million residents on the eve of the war and attributes the change to deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. It is a demographic net decline, not a casualty count.
How do researchers decide whether a comment is antisemitic?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded 4,500 comments, 1,500 per language, against a scheme built on the IHRA working definition. They report that thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the British antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, so coding a comment in isolation would have missed a substantial share.
Is conspiracy belief about Israel measured alongside antisemitism?
Yes. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026, peer-reviewed) report that their Conspiracies Mediated Model of New Antisemitism accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023, peer-reviewed) found coronavirus conspiracy suspicion correlated with all measured forms of antisemitism in a survey of 1,790 UK adults.
Sources
- Allington, D., Hirsh, D., and Katz, L., 2023. Correlation Between Coronavirus Conspiracism and Antisemitism: A Cross-Sectional Study in the United Kingdom. Scientific Reports. DOI 10.1038/s41598-023-41794-y. Peer-reviewed.
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2025. The Gaza Terror Offensive, 1 August to 5 September 2024. besacenter.org. Research institute report.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., and Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed.
- Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E., Boxer, P., Souweidane, V., and Ginges, J., 2012. Foreign Wars and Domestic Prejudice: How Media Exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Predicts Ethnic Stereotyping by Jewish and Arab American Adolescents. Journal of Research on Adolescence. DOI 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. idf.il, published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Defense Forces, no date. The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces. idf.il. Official record, party’s own published doctrine.
- Israel Defense Forces, no date. Hamas Use of Human Shields in Gaza, and evacuation-area publications. idf.il. Official record, party’s own stated position.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, 29 February 2024. idf.il. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, judgment of 8 July 2021. versa.cardozo.yu.edu. Official record, court judgment.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. jcfa.org. Research institute report.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., and Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record, national statistical office.
- United Nations, 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. United Nations Treaty Series. Official record, treaty text.
- United Nations, 1973. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. United Nations Treaty Series. Official record, treaty text.
- United Nations, 1998. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in force 1 July 2002. United Nations Treaty Series. Official record, treaty text.
- US Congressional Research Service, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress, report R47828. congress.gov/crs-product/R47828. Official record.
- US Department of State, 2024. 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza. state.gov. Official record.