Four separate Palestinian population categories appear in the official statistical records, each counted by a different body under a different definition, and Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2.130 million Arab citizens of Israel in September 2025, 21.5% of the 9.888 million in the Bureau’s two population groups, as one of them. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza in its 2017 census, a separate record system; Israel’s Jerusalem series counts the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967 inside the city’s municipal total; and the refugee population registered abroad appears in none of the three. The categories overlap at exactly one point, East Jerusalem, where the Palestinian census could not directly enumerate and used administrative estimates while Israel’s Bureau counted the same residents in Jerusalem’s total.
Key Findings
- Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2.130 million Arabs in September 2025, 21.5% of the 9.888 million in the Bureau’s two population groups, and publishes Moslem, Christian and Druze citizens in three separate media releases rather than one Arab-citizen series.
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza in the 2017 census, 2,881,687 in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza, and states that East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated.
- Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported Jerusalem passing one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, counting the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967 within the single municipal figure.
- Labour force participation among Moslem citizens aged 15 and over was 39.3% in 2021 on the Bureau’s own count, against 67.7% among Christians in 2024 and 56.9% among Christian Arabs in the same office’s releases.
- Among the antisemitic comments Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded on leading British media Facebook pages, 5.2% used the apartheid analogy and 7.7% denied Jewish self-determination.
Are Palestinians excluded in more than one way at once?
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2.130 million Arab citizens of Israel in September 2025, 21.5% of the 9.888 million in the Bureau’s two population groups, and that is one of four Palestinian categories the official records keep apart. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counts West Bank and Gaza residents separately, Israel’s Jerusalem series counts the annexed neighbourhoods inside the city total, and refugees registered abroad appear in none of the three.
The categories are not an interpretation laid over the data. They are the scope statements the statistical offices themselves publish. Israel’s Bureau reported a total resident population of about 10.148 million in September 2025, roughly 7.758 million Jews and others and 2.130 million Arabs, a single national series in which Arab citizens are counted alongside every other resident. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, established after the Oslo Accords, has conducted three censuses, in 1997, 2007 and 2017, and its 2017 round counted 4,780,978 residents present in the West Bank and Gaza on 1 December of that year.
The refugee category originates outside both series. Benny Morris’s archival history of the 1948 war (2004, Cambridge University Press) carries roughly 700,000 Palestinians displaced during that war as its own estimate, and attributes the exodus to causes varying by locality and phase, rejecting both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. That population is administered through a separate structure: Hababeh and colleagues (2018), reporting in a Lancet supplement abstract, surveyed Palestine refugee mothers at clinics run by the UN Relief and Works Agency across five fields at once, the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Al-Qudsi (2000, peer-reviewed) compared refugee and non-refugee Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza and found refugees somewhat better educated with only slightly higher fertility, a distinction the records inside the territory also preserve.
So the descriptive core of the question holds on the official record: a person counted as Palestinian falls into one of several administratively separate populations, and no statistical body publishes a figure covering all of them.
Who says Palestinians face a layered exclusion?
Two monitoring organizations state the layered claim in its strongest form, and both label it apartheid: Human Rights Watch in April 2021, in A Threshold Crossed, and Amnesty International in February 2022, in Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians. Each describes Palestinians as sorted into separate and inferior categories of rights across Israel, the occupied territory and refugee status. Both are organizations with advocacy missions, reporting on their own definitions.
It is often said that Israeli policy fragments Palestinians across different legal statuses, territories and levels of rights, and that this is what makes the exclusion layered rather than singular. The organizational sources named above are where that formulation is stated at length and where it is dated. The European Parliament’s research publication on the Palestinian minority in Israel and the Minority Rights Group country profile describe the citizens category in similar terms. None of these documents publishes a measured share called double exclusion; each is a characterisation drawn from a body of documentary and legal material, and each labels itself as such.
The directional point they describe is visible in the statistical record without needing their framing. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports Jerusalem, including the post-1967 neighbourhoods, as one municipal population, while the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports the West Bank and Gaza as a separate national population, and the two do not reconcile. That much is arithmetic on published scope notes.
The base rate is the part the framing does not carry. In the same September 2025 release, Arab residents were 21.5% of the 9.888 million in the Bureau’s two population groups and were enumerated in the identical national series as the other 78.5%, with the Bureau publishing their fertility, life expectancy, education, employment and household data in the same statistical architecture it uses for the majority. Whether the categories a state’s own statistics keep separate amount to a single system of domination is the contested question the two reports answer and the statistical offices do not address. The documentary basis of those organizational findings is a separate matter of record.
How many separate legal statuses do the records keep?
Four, on the records’ own scope statements. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem inside Jerusalem’s municipal total, which passed one million residents at the end of 2023 with 39.5% Arabs, while the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics could not directly enumerate East Jerusalem in its 2017 census and used administrative estimates for it instead.
Israel’s Bureau counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s national total, a scope choice distinct from the convention international monitors use. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), reviewing the CBS Yearbook from 1967 onward, date the change precisely: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as Israeli residents in the administered territories, by 1983 settlement localities were counted in the total number of Israeli localities, and in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. The authors call this trend normalization, which is their own analytic term.
The same population can therefore be reported by territory rather than by state. DellaPergola’s 2019 world Jewish population chapter, an academic reference work, disaggregates it: of 6,665,600 core Jews at the start of 2019, 6,001,700 lived within Israel’s pre-1967 borders, 221,800 in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods incorporated after 1967, 23,200 on the Golan Heights and 418,900 in the West Bank. The categories exist in the demographic literature because the statistical conventions differ, not because any one of them is definitive. The longer dispute over how these populations are counted and projected sits underneath every figure in this report.
Israel’s Bureau also disaggregates its own Arab citizens rather than reporting them as one group. It counted 1.707 million Moslems at the end of 2021, 18.1% of all residents; approximately 184,200 Christians in December 2025, of whom 78.7% were Arab Christians at the end of 2024; and approximately 152,000 Druze in February 2024. Those are three separate media releases with three separate reference dates, and the Bureau publishes no combined Arab-citizen socioeconomic series alongside them.
What do Israel’s own statistics record about Arab citizens?
Labour force participation among Moslem citizens aged 15 and over was 39.3% in 2021, on Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics’ own count, one of the socioeconomic series the Bureau publishes for each population group separately. The comparable Christian figure in the Bureau’s 2025 release was 67.7% for 2024, and 56.9% among Christian Arabs.
The Bureau’s Moslem population release for 2022 records the group’s size and its concentration: 1.707 million people, 18.1% of all residents, growing 2.1% in 2021, with 362,000 living in Jerusalem, 21.2% of all Moslems in Israel and 37.5% of the city’s residents. In the same release, 395,348 Moslem students were enrolled in primary and secondary education in the 2020/21 school year, 39,703 infants were born to Moslem women in 2021, 21.5% of all infants born that year, and about 277,000 Moslems were registered with the Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs, a figure the Bureau states is approximate and draws from ministry registration files.
The Christian and Druze releases carry the same structure with different results. Of Christian 12th-grade students, 87.7% were eligible for a matriculation certificate in the 2024/25 school year, and 6,700 Christians were studying in higher education that year, 2.2% of all students. Among Druze households in 2023, 83.8% contained employed persons, higher than the 79.3% the Bureau reports for Moslem households and the 77.7% for Christian households, and Druze enrolment in higher education stood at 5,859 in the 2022/23 academic year against 1,600 in 1999/2000.
Every one of those figures is Israel’s own statistical office reporting on its own population, not an independently verified count, and the Bureau attaches its own caveats: the population data in the Moslem release are preliminary, and the education figures note a lack of available data for many educational institutions in East Jerusalem.
A second official record covers the same ground from outside. The US Department of State’s 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices treats Israel, the West Bank and Gaza within one country report, an assessment produced by another government rather than by a monitoring organization.
What does peer-reviewed research measure on housing and health gaps?
Moslem men in Israel had a life expectancy of 75.8 years in 2021 on the Central Bureau of Statistics’ own count, against 80.7 years for all men in 2022 in the same office’s national compilation, a gap of about 4.9 years read across two adjacent release years.
For women the figures are 80.7 years and 84.8 years, a gap of about 4.1 years.
Two peer-reviewed studies published in 2025 measure related gaps directly rather than by comparing releases. Spatial and Ethno-national Health Inequalities examines health outcome differences by locality and by ethno-national group in Israel, and Housing and Social Exclusion among Minority Groups in Israel, published by Taylor and Francis, examines differentials in housing access. Both are observational, so their findings are associations between group membership, place and outcome, not measurements of cause, and both report at the level of populations rather than individuals.
The official series carry gaps of their own that bear on any such comparison. The Bureau’s Jerusalem Day release for 2024 puts labour force participation in Jerusalem at 52.2% in 2023 against a national 63.5%, a city-level rather than group-level figure, and the same release estimates that about 29.2% of Jerusalem’s residents were ultra-Orthodox Jews using a machine-learning model built on 2022 data, so the city’s composition is itself partly modelled. The Moslem population release states that data were unavailable for many educational institutions in East Jerusalem, which means the school series for the largest Arab urban population in the country is incomplete in the state’s own publication.
The distinction matters for what can be concluded. A life expectancy difference is a measured outcome. It is not, on its own, a measure of legal status, of access to a right, or of the mechanism producing it, and neither statistical office publishes a series that connects the two.
What does the residency-revocation record contain?
About 140,000 residencies were cancelled by the Israeli military between 1967 and 1994, with about 10,000 re-registered after 1995, on Human Rights Watch’s own 2021 count on its own definitions. No official statistical series among the records read here publishes a residency-cancellation figure against which to set it.
The second figure that circulates with it comes from a survey conducted in 2005 on behalf of B’Tselem, relayed in the same 2021 report: 17.2% of Palestinians registered in the West Bank and Gaza, about 640,000 people, had a close family member whom Israeli authorities had not registered as a resident. The measuring instrument was the 2005 survey, and the count is an organizational one, not an official statistic and not a rate published by either statistical office.
What the official records do contain is the counting convention on either side of the same population. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported Jerusalem’s population at over one million at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, growing by 13,400 during that year, of which approximately 20,500 came from natural increase and 4,000 from the international migration balance, the two components exceeding the net because of departures. That total includes the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, enumerating the same territory in 2017, states that East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated and administrative estimates were used there instead.
The result is a documented double appearance rather than a documented double exclusion: the same residents are inside Israel’s municipal series and inside the Palestinian national series, and neither series reports them under a distinct status label. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) date the Israeli side of that convention to the 1968 yearbook. The registration and cancellation record itself, as of the sources read here, exists in organizational reporting and not in a published official statistic.
Are Palestinian citizens also peripheral within Palestinian politics?
The narrower academic use of the phrase rests on qualitative work rather than a measured share. A 2025 peer-reviewed article held in the Ben-Gurion University research repository, on public policy under conditions of exclusionary ethno-nationalism, records that Arab citizens of Israel often describe themselves as a double minority, excluded at both the national and the municipal level, and publishes no single figure for how many hold that description.
The companion piece in the literature is The Two-Pronged Palestinian Response to Exclusion, published in the Scholarly Publishing Collective, which describes an orientation running in two directions at once, toward the Israeli state in which the population holds citizenship and toward the Palestinian national movement outside it. Neither article quantifies the condition. Both identify it as a documented pattern in the scholarship, and that is the form the evidence takes: interview and policy analysis, not a survey share.
The municipal half of the claim does have a statistical shape in the Bureau’s own releases, which report these populations as locally concentrated rather than nationally distributed. At the end of 2024, 68.3% of Arab Christians lived in the Northern District and 14.7% in the Haifa District, with the four largest Arab Christian populations in Nazareth (18,900), Haifa (18,800), Jerusalem (13,400) and Nof HaGalil (10,800). At the end of 2022, the two largest Druze localities were Daliyat al-Karmel with 17,600 residents and Yirka with 17,500. Local concentration is not itself a measure of political marginality, and the Bureau makes no claim of that kind; it establishes only that the populations in question are municipally distinct in the state’s own geography.
What the academic literature adds to the layered-exclusion question is a category the organizational reports do not use: a position described as peripheral in two political communities at once, evidenced qualitatively, with no published share attached to it in either article.
Where does the evidence for the framing run thin?
The 2017 Palestinian census counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza and states that East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated, so the two record systems overlap at exactly the point the layered claim turns on. No body publishes a combined count across the four categories, and none of the sources read here measures the categories against each other.
The disagreement over the framing is between named parties. Human Rights Watch (April 2021) and Amnesty International (February 2022) apply a single-system frame across Israel, the occupied territory and refugee status. NGO Monitor, whose 2024 annual report was published in 2025, reviews and contests reporting of that kind and publishes its own network counts, 157 groups in the United States and 111 in Canada, which are its own tallies with inclusion criteria the report does not state and no independent verification. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, in a 2025 essay, contests published counts from the Gaza war and states on its own page that neither of the two headline totals it discusses has been independently confirmed. Each of those is a party’s own account, and each is labelled here as such.
The evidence separates cleanly by type. The population and socioeconomic figures are official statistics compiled by each side’s own statistical office, which makes them authoritative for what each office counted and silent on what it did not. The layered characterisation is an organizational judgment about a legal and political system. The 2025 peer-reviewed studies on health and housing measure outcome gaps and do not measure legal status. The residency-cancellation figures are organizational counts with no official counterpart in these records. The related question of what the enacted statutory texts themselves say is a documentary record separate from all of these.
One arithmetic caution follows from the overlap. Israel’s Arab-citizen count and the Palestinian census count are not additive, because the East Jerusalem population sits inside both, and any figure that sums them has counted several hundred thousand people twice.
How does exclusion language appear in measured antisemitic content?
Among the antisemitic comments Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded on the Facebook pages of leading British media outlets during the May 2021 escalation, 5.2% used the apartheid analogy and 7.7% denied Jewish self-determination.
The study coded 4,500 comments in total, 1,500 per language, against a scheme derived from the IHRA working definition.
Of the 1,504 UK comments analysed, 26.9% were coded antisemitic, against 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments. Within the UK antisemitic set, the most frequent categories were the evil stereotype at 39.8% and Israel’s sole guilt at 27.9%, with child murder or blood libel at 8.1% and the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. The authors report that thread context was required to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of UK antisemitic comments, so the coding depends on surrounding conversation and not on the comment alone.
Jikeli and colleagues (2022, peer-reviewed), working on an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets from January 2019 to August 2020, found that 15% of antisemitic tweets containing the word Jews fit the IHRA paragraph on denial of Jewish self-determination, against about 62% fitting the paragraph on allegations of Jewish collective power. Their shares are of samples drawn within keyword queries, not of the whole platform.
Two survey-based studies measure associations rather than content. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced) report across three preregistered studies that a model in which conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediate the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes accounted for over 55% of the variance in those attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel not mediating. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced), in two British experiments with 354 and 490 participants, report two distinct pathways to anti-Jewish hostility, one running through social dominance orientation and one through identity fusion with the Palestinian people. All of these are correlational, as their authors state.
Methodology and limitations
This report reads what each statistical body publishes about the populations it counts, and what peer-reviewed research measures about outcome gaps and about discourse. It addresses the measurable questions behind the framing, which categories the records keep, who counts which population, what each series measures, and how the associated language appears in coded content, rather than the legal characterisation itself.
Four source types appear. Official statistics come from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (releases dated 2022, 2024 and 2025), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2017 census, published 2018, and the 2025 year-end brief), the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects 2024, and the US Department of State’s 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Each is a party’s or an intergovernmental body’s own compilation, not an independent audit. Peer-reviewed research includes Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), Jikeli and colleagues (2022), Harber and colleagues (2026), Ozer and colleagues (2025), Al-Qudsi (2000), and the two 2025 studies on health and housing inequalities; the Harber and Ozer entries are sourced from published abstracts. Scholarly books and reference works include Morris (2004) and DellaPergola (2019). Organizational reporting from Human Rights Watch (2021), Amnesty International (2022), NGO Monitor (2025) and the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (2025) is named and dated in the body as each organization’s own account on its own definitions.
Four limitations bound the figures. Reference years differ across releases, so the life expectancy comparison sets a 2021 Moslem figure against a 2022 national figure and the labour force figures span 2021 to 2024. Israel’s Independence Day and Christmas releases are preliminary estimates built on the 2022 census, and the Christian totals exclude people absent from the Population Register, so they undercount foreign nationals. Palestinian totals after 2017 are projections off the census base rather than counts, and the 2025 brief’s Gaza figures are estimates adjusted for war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and out-migration, not an enumeration. Finally, no series among these sources publishes a residency-cancellation count, and no series covers all four population categories together.
Model-free throughout: every figure here is a count or share as its named source published it, with the sampling and coverage caveats that source states.
Conclusion
So does the question’s premise survive contact with the records? In substance, the descriptive part does. A person counted as Palestinian appears in one of four administratively separate populations, held by three different statistical authorities plus a refugee registration structure, and the boundaries between them are published in the offices’ own scope notes rather than inferred by anyone reading them.
The rest of the picture is more particular than the phrase suggests. Israel’s Bureau counts 2.130 million Arab residents inside the same national series as everyone else and then splits them again into three group releases with three reference dates. It reports a 39.3% Moslem labour force participation rate for 2021 and a 67.7% Christian rate for 2024 without publishing a combined figure. It reports Jerusalem at over a million residents, 39.5% of them Arab, in one municipal total, while the Palestinian census reports it could not enumerate the same neighbourhoods and used estimates. Two 2025 peer-reviewed studies measure health and housing gaps; neither measures legal status. The residency-cancellation figures that circulate belong to a monitoring organization’s own count, and the official series offers nothing to set beside them. Where the exclusion claim is measured, it is measured one outcome at a time, by different bodies, on different populations, and never as a single quantity.
The vocabulary built on that record then travels somewhere the record does not. In the comments Becker, Ascone and Troschke coded on British media pages, 5.2% of the antisemitic set used the apartheid analogy and 7.7% denied Jewish self-determination outright, and Jikeli and colleagues found self-determination denial in 15% of antisemitic tweets mentioning Jews. A statistical claim about administrative categories and a statement that a people has no right to a state are not the same proposition, but they share a lexicon and they move through the same threads. Whether a framing built from the counting conventions of two statistical offices is, in circulation, one of the inputs that carries the second claim along with the first is a question these numbers put in front of anyone who uses the phrase.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which body counts Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, which has run three censuses, in 1997, 2007 and 2017. Its 2017 round counted 4,780,978 residents, 2,881,687 in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza. The UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects 2024 carries a projection of about 5.6 million for the State of Palestine, a model output rather than a count.
How many Arab citizens does Israel count, and are they treated as one group in the statistics?
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2.130 million Arabs in September 2025, 21.5% of the 9.888 million in the Bureau’s two population groups, and defines the term as Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze. In practice the Bureau publishes each group in its own media release, 1.707 million Moslems at the end of 2021, about 184,200 Christians in December 2025, and about 152,000 Druze in February 2024.
Why does East Jerusalem appear in two different population records?
Israel’s Bureau has counted East Jerusalem inside Israel’s general population since the 1968 CBS Yearbook, as documented by Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), and reports Jerusalem as a single municipal total. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics states that its 2017 census could not directly enumerate East Jerusalem and used administrative estimates there instead.
What happened to Gaza’s population after 2023 in the official brief?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics put Gaza at about 2.13 million at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which it states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates. The brief attributes the change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration, and it is a demographic net decline, not a casualty count.
Do the official statistics publish a direct measure of discrimination?
No such series appears in these releases. The Bureau publishes group-level outcomes, such as 39.3% labour force participation among Moslems aged 15 and over in 2021, and leaves the interpretation of the gap unaddressed. The 2025 peer-reviewed studies on health inequalities and on housing and social exclusion measure outcome differences directly and, being observational, report associations rather than causes.
Where does the refugee category come from in the historical record?
Benny Morris’s 2004 archival history estimates roughly 700,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1948 war and attributes the exodus to causes varying by locality and phase. That population has since been administered separately: Hababeh and colleagues (2018) surveyed refugee mothers at UN Relief and Works Agency clinics across five fields at once, the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
Sources
- Al-Qudsi, S., 2000. Profiles of Refugee and Non-Refugee Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. International Migration, 38(4), pp. 79 to 107. DOI 10.1111/1468-2435.00121. Peer-reviewed.
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- DellaPergola, S., 2019. World Jewish Population, 2019. American Jewish Year Book 2019, vol. 119, Springer (Berman Jewish DataBank reprint). Academic reference.
- Hababeh, M., Zeidan, W., Abu El-Kader, M., Abu Thaher, A., Kassim, N., Habash, E., and colleagues, 2018. Contraceptive Use by Palestine Refugee Mothers of Young Children Attending UNRWA Clinics. The Lancet, 391(Supplement 2), p. S26. DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(18)30392-1. Peer-reviewed conference abstract.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., and Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., and Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, How Many Settlements Are There? Counting, Tracking, and Normalizing Jewish Settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the Present. POMEPS. Organizational report.
- Housing and Social Exclusion among Minority Groups in Israel, 2025. Taylor and Francis. DOI 10.1080/13602004.2025.2472600. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022. The Moslem Population in Israel: Data on the Occasion of Eid al-Adha. Media Release 217/2022. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Israel in Figures 2023: Selected Data From the Statistical Abstract of Israel. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. The Druze Population of Israel on the Occasion of the Nabi Shu’ayb Festival 2024. Media Release 124/2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Christmas 2025: Christians in Israel. Media Release 413/2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. Media Release 304/2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. jcfa.org. Research institute.
- Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., and Soemer, K., 2022. Differences Between Antisemitic and Non-Antisemitic English Language Tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- Morris, B., 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521009676. Scholarly book.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., and Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017: Final Results. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Public Policy Under Conditions of Exclusionary Ethno-Nationalism, 2025. Ben-Gurion University research repository, cris.bgu.ac.il. Peer-reviewed.
- Spatial and Ethno-national Health Inequalities, 2025. PMC12125490. Peer-reviewed.
- The Two-Pronged Palestinian Response to Exclusion, vol. 1, issue 2, p. 421. Scholarly Publishing Collective. Peer-reviewed.
- UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. population.un.org/wpp. Official record.
- US Department of State, 2023. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. state.gov. Official record.