How Did Israel’s Intelligence Services Fail to Recognize Hamas’s Attack Plans? Reading the Agencies’ Own Reviews, the State Audit and the Scholarship

Israeli intelligence detected Hamas’s invasion plans in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022, according to the Shin Bet’s own 2025 investigation into itself, which says the plans “were never fully processed as an imminent threat.” The day is remembered as a surprise. The IDF’s own expert review, presented on 10 November 2025, found that the surprise “did not emerge from a vacuum of information; quite the opposite,” and listed six explanatory factors, from a conceptual failure about Hamas to flawed decisions on the night itself. The accounts differ on where the plans stalled. Baram and Ben Israel (2025, peer-reviewed) place the critical failure in analysis rather than collection, while Jones and Pinfold (2025, peer-reviewed) trace it to assumptions set by the Prime Minister’s Office, a frame that office contests.

Key Findings

• Hamas invasion plans were detected in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022. That is the Shin Bet’s own account of itself, which says the plans “were never fully processed as an imminent threat” (Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), 2025, a party’s own findings).
• The IDF’s own expert review, presented on 10 November 2025, names six explanatory factors. The first two are a conceptual failure about Gaza and Hamas and an intelligence failure “in not providing warning” (Israel Defense Forces, 2025, the IDF’s own review, Institute translation).
• Baram and Ben Israel (2025, peer-reviewed) conclude that the critical failure lay in analysing the intelligence received, “not a lack of intelligence collection capabilities.” Relaying press reporting, they report that Unit 8200 acquired the attack plan in 2022.
• Jones and Pinfold (2025, peer-reviewed) relay press reporting that 32 IDF battalions were deployed in the West Bank and two around Gaza, on an assessment that the most pertinent threats came from the West Bank.
• The State Comptroller of Israel recorded on 11 November 2025 that no fewer than six attempts to formulate a national security concept had been made. None was approved by the State Security Cabinet or the government.

What did the IDF’s own review name as the failure’s causes?

The IDF’s own expert review names six explanatory factors for the failure of 7 October 2023. Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman led the team, which presented its findings to Chief of the General Staff LTG Eyal Zamir on 10 November 2025. It is a party’s review of its own investigations. Its first two factors are a conceptual failure about Gaza and Hamas and an intelligence failure “in not providing warning.”

Zamir appointed the team on 22 March 2025. Its task was to assess the IDF investigations conducted from 7 March 2024 onward under his predecessor, LTG Herzi Halevi. The English renderings here are the Institute’s translation of the IDF’s Hebrew summary. The full report has not been published. The six factors, in the team’s order:

Source: Israel Defense Forces, 2025, the IDF’s own review of its own investigations.

The team’s description of the surprise is the IDF’s own. In its words, the surprise “did not emerge from a vacuum of information; quite the opposite.” In the team’s account, varied information accumulated on the night of 7 October. Had it been analysed professionally, “it was possible and even required” to raise a warning for significant action. That information arrived against a background of high-quality, unusual information held by several IDF bodies.

The review is bounded by its own terms. It examined IDF investigations only, “without examining the space between the political and military echelons or between the IDF and parallel security bodies.” It therefore carries no finding on the Shin Bet’s conduct or on decisions above the General Staff. It is also a review of the quality of earlier probes, not a fresh investigation of the attack. It is distinct from the IDF investigation summaries released to the press in February 2025.

Who says Israel held Hamas’s plans and dismissed them, and since when?

The Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) says Israeli intelligence detected Hamas invasion plans in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022. The dates come from the agency’s own 2025 investigation into its own conduct, relayed by Ynetnews and The Times of Israel. The agency states that “these plans were never fully processed as an imminent threat, which led to a lack of preparation.”

Wagner (2024), in a book chapter written before any official inquiry, put the point directly: “there was clearly specific, tactical and actionable warning which was disregarded.” It is often said that the information existed and Israeli intelligence did not believe Hamas would act on it. The agency responsible for human intelligence on Hamas gives substantially that account of itself. The plans were held more than once and were not treated as imminent. The agency adds that the attack could have been prevented had it acted differently.

The Times of Israel relayed the agency’s findings on 4 March 2025. That relay carries two further points, each the agency’s own account of itself:

• The agency issued no warning of the attack, and the signs on the night of 6 to 7 October did not lead to significant action.
• The agency says it was not underestimating Hamas and had a deep understanding of the threat.

The term “held” needs care in this record. Wagner states that his evidence is “fresh and incomplete” and that he relies “almost exclusively on media reports.” His account of who warned whom is relayed from Haaretz, The New York Times, Maariv, Channel 12 and N12. The Shin Bet’s findings reach the public through the press, so the outlet is the relay and the agency is the source. The Times of Israel relay does not link the agency’s document. On the handling of the plan document, it does not quote the agency’s exact words.

The two records agree on the central fact, from different positions. The agency is assessing its own processes, a party investigating itself. Wagner is assembling a picture from reporting before any agency had published a finding. Neither is a verified external account. On the narrower question of whether the plans were in Israeli hands, they converge: they were, from 2018.

Why was a captured attack plan read as aspirational?

Baram and Ben Israel (2025, peer-reviewed, Intelligence and National Security) report that Unit 8200 acquired Hamas’s attack plan, the “Walls of Jericho,” in a 2022 operation, “a year and a half earlier.” Yet, they write, “the significance of this intelligence was not fully grasped.” They relay the acquisition date from press reporting and an unpublished report. It is not a finding of their own.

Their account adds that Hamas practised the plan in May 2023 “in the same manner it executed it on October 7.” By this reporting, the plan existed in Israeli hands as a document and also as a rehearsed sequence, months before the attack. The Times of Israel’s 2025 report on the IDF’s own investigation summaries ran the finding under the line that the intelligence on the plan was there but the IDF “simply refused to believe it.”

The Shin Bet’s findings, as relayed by The Times of Israel on 4 March 2025, describe the Jericho Wall document as mishandled over years. The document never became a training scenario. The relay gives this in summary rather than in the agency’s own words.

The IDF’s own review left the decisive question open: why the plan read as aspiration rather than operation. Its expert team found that “the handling of the information that arrived over the years and the systemic and operational aspects of the ‘Jericho Wall’ plan” had not been investigated. It recommended that the Chief of Staff complete that work. Its third factor, the absence of engagement with the plan, names the gap. The review does not establish what happened to the document inside the IDF, and its summary makes no claim to have done so.

Which assumption about Hamas shaped how analysts read the evidence?

Wagner (2024) identifies a new Israeli “conception.” It was the assumption “that Hamas preferred to avoid direct confrontation, and instead wished to deal with economic problems and its own administrative interests rather than risk its destruction.” The IDF’s own expert review, presented on 10 November 2025, lists a conceptual failure about Gaza and Hamas first among its factors. That factor is the party’s own counterpart to Wagner’s reading.

Jones and Pinfold (2025, peer-reviewed, The RUSI Journal) carry the argument a level higher. Their central claim is that “Israel’s intelligence agencies deferred to the prevailing, but incorrect, assumptions and short-sighted policy priorities set by the Prime Minister’s Office.” That attribution is their position on a disputed question of political responsibility. The office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contests the frame. The two scholarly accounts agree on what the assumption was and differ on where it was set.

The Shin Bet’s own account cuts across the word “underestimating.” As The Times of Israel relayed its findings on 4 March 2025, the agency says it was not underestimating Hamas and had a deep understanding of the threat. Its assessment was that Hamas sought to inflame the West Bank rather than launch an attack from Gaza. On that account, the error lay in the expected direction of the threat, not in judging how serious it was.

Hamas’s own conduct also figures in the record. The Washington Post reported on 6 December 2023 that, as Hamas planned the attack, it lulled Israel into a false sense of security. That reported pattern of conduct fits the assumption Wagner describes. The Post’s account is reporting, not an official finding.

The timing of these accounts matters. Wagner’s chapter was written before every official 7 October investigation and has not been updated. Jones and Pinfold wrote before the IDF’s February 2025 investigation summaries and the Shin Bet’s March 2025 findings were public. Both describe the assumption from press reporting rather than from the internal record. The IDF’s first factor is the only one of these three descriptions written with access to that internal record.

Why did lower-ranking warnings not change the senior assessment?

Jones and Pinfold (2025) write that analysts “did identify a clear shift in the modus operandi of Hamas that pointed to a potential game-changing attack.” Yet “such assessments never carried sufficient weight to shift prevailing assumptions,” in a hierarchy where the Prime Minister’s Office’s priorities “remained fixed.” Their account rests on published press reporting. They call their findings partial until a formal state inquiry reports.

Further down the chain, they write that the IDF’s Southern Command “had no active intelligence assessments on known Hamas commanders, nor did it undertake a proper investigation of the scale and calibre of training exercises.” Those exercises had been “repeatedly flagged up by low-level intelligence personnel.” That claim is relayed from Haaretz, The New York Times and the Financial Times.

The most senior challenge in the record came a week before the attack. Wagner (2024) relays N12’s report of 7 January 2024. According to that report, the heads of military intelligence’s “devil’s advocate” department and research division put an assessment to the chief of military intelligence that contradicted his premise that Hamas wanted quiet. It warned of shooting and kidnapping attempts, “not an operation on the scale of 7 October,” and was disseminated “to no effect.” On this relayed account, even the internal dissent did not foresee the scale of the attack.

Wagner lists “sexism and rank bias” among the intelligence failures, alongside tradecraft, organisational structure, briefing practice and “a failure to disseminate.” The IDF’s own review describes the end of the chain. On the night before the attack, no one among the commanders or the intelligence community assembled a thorough, professional picture of the enemy situation. No professional discussion was held on the warning level. The specific warnings from Israeli signals intelligence are traced separately.

Was the failure in collecting intelligence or in analysing it?

Baram and Ben Israel (2025) state that their “main conclusion is that a critical aspect of the failure was in the analysis of the intelligence received about Hamas’ intentions and capabilities, not a lack of intelligence collection capabilities.” The authors are based at Bar-Ilan University and Tel Aviv University. They wrote without access to classified material, and their account of the attack draws on press and published reporting.

They describe a warning system facing Gaza with three layers:

Source: Baram and Ben Israel, 2025, peer-reviewed.

They name a second factor: “an over reliance on technology in intelligence collection on the expense of intelligence assessment and estimation.” In their account, this “led to a false sense of security and diminished the value of human analysis and estimate.” On their reading, investment in collection came at the cost of the judgement needed to read what was collected.

The IDF’s own review points the same way from inside the institution. Its expert team found that surveillance soldiers had gathered information over time that indicated unusual enemy activity in the months before the attack. It also found that quality intelligence analysis could have highlighted the change in the sector. This is the party’s own retrospective analysis. Like the review as a whole, it is published only in summary.

The two records reach the same point from different directions. Baram and Ben Israel argue from the public account that the material was collected and misread. The IDF’s reviewers state from the internal record that the surveillance information existed and was not analysed into a warning. The Shin Bet’s own findings add a third angle. The agency describes itself as holding a deep understanding of the threat while assessing its direction differently. None of the three describes a collection gap as the decisive failure.

Why did Israel’s early-warning doctrine not fit a border assault?

Baram and Ben Israel (2025) argue that the doctrine’s 48 to 72 hour notice for calling up reserves “became obsolete when facing an enemy positioned just meters away from Israeli settlements.” They trace that notice period to David Ben-Gurion’s 1953 concept. In their reading, the attack “highlights a fundamental breakdown in the concept of ‘early warning’,” a doctrine designed for invading state armies.

Their argument recasts the warning failure as a mismatch of design rather than a single act of dismissal. A system built to give days of notice before state armies crossed a frontier faced a non-state force already at the fence. On their account, the margin the doctrine assumed did not exist on the Gaza border.

Jones and Pinfold (2025) add a second doctrinal shift. In their account, reforms that prioritised real-time targeting intelligence came “at the expense of strategic early warning.” On that reading, the system was tuned toward finding targets rather than judging an adversary’s intent to go to war.

The deployment on the eve of the attack is consistent with that frame. Jones and Pinfold relay press reporting that “in total, 32 IDF battalions were deployed in the West Bank, leaving only two around Gaza.” That deployment followed an assessment that the most pertinent threats came from the West Bank. The figure is relayed, not measured by the authors. It aligns with the Shin Bet’s own stated assessment, relayed by The Times of Israel, that Hamas sought to inflame the West Bank.

The IDF’s own fifth factor states the same gap in the army’s terms. It describes a substantial and persistent gap, at every level of command and professional body, between the reference threat and the operational response. That finding is the party’s own assessment of its readiness. Its summary does not tie the gap to the early-warning doctrine by name.

Did any body fuse the agencies’ pieces into one assessment?

Israel “lacks an all-source intelligence analysis body comprised of its own professional analytic staff,” Wagner (2024) writes. He sets this against the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee and the US National Intelligence Council. On his account, no standing body existed in 2023 to join the pieces held by military intelligence, the Shin Bet and the IDF’s commands into one national assessment.

Jones and Pinfold (2025) describe the imbalance among the agencies. Military intelligence, Agaf Modi’n, consumes “the bulk of Israel’s intelligence budget,” they write. The Meridor committee had recommended an inter-agency intelligence fusion centre working with the cabinet, akin to the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee. In their words, that recommendation “has yet to be implemented.” On their reading, the largest collector was also the dominant assessor.

The Shin Bet’s own findings describe the seam from the other side. As The Times of Israel relayed on 4 March 2025, the agency states that responsibility for issuing a warning of war was not clearly defined between the IDF and the Shin Bet. That is a party’s own account of a gap between itself and another body. The Times of Israel relay does not quote the agency’s exact wording on the point.

The IDF’s own review stops at the same seam. Its remit excluded “the space between the political and military echelons or between the IDF and parallel security bodies,” in the Institute’s translation of its Hebrew summary. The party’s most detailed published review of the failure therefore carries no finding on how the agencies’ pieces were, or were not, combined. The Shin Bet’s findings, published separately, cover its own processes.

The record on this question is a set of separate accounts. Each agency has reviewed its own conduct; the scholars have described the structure from outside. No published official record in this report’s sources examines the combined picture across agencies on the night or in the years before.

What strategic direction did the services receive from the government?

The State Comptroller of Israel recorded on 11 November 2025 that no fewer than six attempts had been made to formulate and ratify a national security concept. None was approved by the State Security Cabinet or the government. The Comptroller, Israel’s state audit institution reporting to the Knesset, calls it “a long-standing failure in which the political echelon has not fulfilled its obligation.”

Without an updated concept, the Comptroller finds, the political echelon’s ability to direct the IDF and other agencies by long-term strategy is “markedly deficient, if not entirely lacking.” The release names two holders of responsibility:

• Prime Minister Netanyahu began drafting a concept in 2017 to 2018 but did not complete it or secure its approval, and the Comptroller finds he “did not fulfill his responsibilities.” Netanyahu’s office disputes the Comptroller’s authority and findings.
• Heads of the National Security Council since 2008 did not submit an updated concept for a State Security Cabinet decision, so the Council “did not execute its role in this context.”

The audit’s reach is narrow. It covers the strategic frame within which the services worked, and its release carries no finding on intelligence collection, analysis or warning. The Comptroller states that the report is “not a substitute for a comprehensive audit.” It neither identifies every deficiency nor assigns accountability for 7 October. The findings come from the Comptroller’s published release; the full report was not linked from it.

One further point reaches the political echelon from the scholarship. Jones and Pinfold (2025) write, relaying press reporting, that “no evidence has emerged to date that the political echelon was informed of Jericho Walls.” Their wider argument places the prevailing assumptions in the Prime Minister’s Office. Set beside the Comptroller’s record, the two accounts describe services working without an approved national strategy and under priorities that, on the scholars’ reading, “remained fixed.” The Prime Minister’s office contests both frames.

How long had the failure been building, by the IDF’s account?

The IDF’s own expert review examined 25 IDF investigations in depth and reads most of its six factors as extending over several years and across many formations. In the team’s words, in the Institute’s translation, it was “a systemic, organisation-wide, multi-year failure.” This is the party’s own finding about itself, presented to the Chief of the General Staff on 10 November 2025.

The team interviewed about 80 officials with roles relevant to 7 October and the preceding years. It found the quality of the 25 investigations varied: “some professional and comprehensive,” some laying a good factual foundation without identifying the failure points, “some lacking; and some unsatisfactory.” On the IDF’s own account, then, the earlier probes were themselves uneven.

The review records a warning from inside the system during 2023. Senior military officials warned that Israel’s enemies perceived an internal weakening that harmed deterrence and raised the likelihood of escalation. The team found that, despite the warning, “the required military actions to improve readiness and adjust force deployment were not taken.”

Its fourth factor describes how the failure persisted: an organisational and operational culture of flawed patterns and norms entrenched over years. Read with the others, the review places the night of 7 October at the end of a long sequence rather than as a single lapse. The conceptual failure, the gap between threat and response, and the unexamined Jericho Wall plan all predate the attack by years in its account.

The review also records what remained unexamined. The handling of the information that arrived over the years, and the systemic and operational aspects of the Jericho Wall plan, had not been investigated. The team recommended that the Chief of Staff complete that work. By the IDF’s own account, the multi-year question the review identifies is the one its earlier investigations left least explored.

Methodology and limitations

This report draws on three tiers of evidence. The first is official or primary records: the IDF’s published summary of its expert team’s review (10 November 2025), the Israel Security Agency’s published findings on its own conduct (2025), and the State Comptroller of Israel’s release on the absence of a national security concept (11 November 2025). The second is peer-reviewed research: Baram and Ben Israel (2025) in Intelligence and National Security, and Jones and Pinfold (2025) in The RUSI Journal. The third is a scholarly book chapter, Wagner (2024), together with press reporting from The Times of Israel and The Washington Post.

Each official record is a party’s account of itself. The IDF and the Shin Bet reviewed their own conduct, and neither review is an independent or external inquiry. The IDF review’s remit excluded the political echelon and the Shin Bet by its own terms. Only its summary is published, in Hebrew; the English renderings quoted here are the Institute’s translation. The Shin Bet’s findings reach the public through press reporting by Ynetnews and The Times of Israel, and the relay does not link the agency’s document. The Comptroller’s release is the source for its findings; the full report was not read. Netanyahu’s office disputes the Comptroller’s authority and findings.

The scholarship is interpretive rather than measured, and none of it carries a rate or count of its own. Wagner states that his evidence is “fresh and incomplete” and that he relies “almost exclusively on media reports.” Baram and Ben Israel had no access to classified material. Their article was corrected after first publication, and the corrected version is cited. Jones and Pinfold describe their findings as “only partial” until a formal state inquiry reports. Figures they relay, including the 2022 acquisition date, the May 2023 exercise and the 32-battalion deployment, are cited as press reporting relayed by them. The 2018 and 2022 detection dates are the Shin Bet’s own; intervals derived from them are not used.

No body in these sources publishes a quantified count of warnings received and dismissed. The record of what was held, and when, consists of dated events and the agencies’ own descriptions.

Conclusion

The attack is remembered as a surprise. The agencies’ own accounts describe the surprise as one of reading rather than knowing. On the Shin Bet’s own findings, Hamas’s invasion plans were in Israeli hands from 2018 and in greater detail from 2022. On the IDF’s own review, the surprise came out of no vacuum of information.

The record draws a consistent portrait across every axis it covers. The plan was held, and, in press reporting relayed by Baram and Ben Israel, rehearsed in May 2023 in the manner it was carried out. The critical failure, on their peer-reviewed reading, lay in analysis rather than collection. Lower-ranking warnings, as Jones and Pinfold and Wagner relay them, lacked the weight to move a fixed assessment, and the boldest internal dissent still did not foresee the attack’s scale. A doctrine built for days of notice faced a force at the fence, with 32 battalions in the West Bank and two around Gaza, as Jones and Pinfold relay the deployment. No standing body fused the agencies’ pieces. Above them, the State Comptroller recorded six unapproved attempts at a national security concept. By the IDF’s own account, the result was a multi-year failure across the organisation.

A plan in a drawer is information; a plan acted upon is a warning; between the two sits a chain of people, assumptions and institutions that the published reviews examine one link at a time. Each agency has now described its own link. What is a society to make of an intelligence system whose most detailed accounts of failure stop at the borders of the bodies that wrote them, and who, then, is in a position to read the whole?

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was responsible for issuing a warning of war?

Responsibility for issuing a warning of war was not clearly defined between the IDF and the Shin Bet, according to the Shin Bet’s own findings as relayed by The Times of Israel on 4 March 2025. The agency also states it issued no warning of the attack. Both points are a party’s account of its own processes.

What signals appeared on the night of 6 to 7 October?

The Shin Bet’s own findings, relayed by The Times of Israel on 4 March 2025, confirm that Hamas activated 45 Israeli SIM cards overnight, and that the night’s signs did not lead to significant action. The Times of Israel reported in 2025 that the IDF’s own probe identified five warning signs on the eve of the attack, which were not acted upon. Both counts are the parties’ own.

When did Hamas decide to attack, according to the IDF?

The IDF’s February 2025 investigation summaries, as reported by The Times of Israel, found that Hamas decided in April 2022 to launch a large-scale attack and in May 2023 to carry it out on 7 October. These dates are the IDF’s own findings, not independently verified. The summaries were released to the press rather than published in full.

How does the November 2025 IDF review differ from the February 2025 summaries?

The IDF expert team led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman assessed the quality of the earlier investigations rather than investigating the attack afresh. It examined 25 investigations and found topics still uninvestigated. The February 2025 summaries were the investigations’ own findings, released to the press.

Has a formal state inquiry examined the failure?

Jones and Pinfold (2025) wrote that “unless or until a formal state inquiry into those failures is conducted,” their findings are “only partial.” The State Comptroller stated on 11 November 2025 that its special report is “not a substitute for a comprehensive audit.” Neither body’s publication is a state commission of inquiry.

Why does the scholarly record rely on press reporting?

Wagner (2024) states he relies “almost exclusively on media reports,” and Baram and Ben Israel (2025) had no access to classified material. The IDF published only a summary of its expert report, and the Shin Bet’s findings reached the public through the press. Scholars writing before those releases worked from Haaretz, The New York Times, the Financial Times, Maariv, Channel 12 and N12.

Sources

• Baram, G., and Ben Israel, I., 2025. Redefining vigilance: reevaluating the meaning of early warning in Israel’s security doctrine and the October 7 attack. Intelligence and National Security, 40(3), 470 to 485. DOI 10.1080/02684527.2025.2466267 (correction DOI 10.1080/02684527.2025.2473202). Peer-reviewed.
• Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Chief of the General Staff’s Summary of the Expert Team Report on the Quality of the October 7 Investigations (Hebrew). IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, 10 November 2025. https://www.idf.il/315803. Official or primary record (the IDF’s own review, self-reported).
• Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), 2025. Findings of its own investigation into 7 October. Reported by Ynetnews and The Times of Israel, 4 March 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-probe-oct-7-would-have-been-prevented-if-wed-acted-differently/. Official or primary record (a party’s own findings, self-reported).
• Jones, C., and Pinfold, R. G., 2025. Israel and the Politics of Intelligence Failure on 7 October. The RUSI Journal, 170(3), 40 to 50. DOI 10.1080/03071847.2025.2487510. Peer-reviewed.
• State Comptroller of Israel, 2025. Special Report on the Absence of a National Security Concept. Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, newsroom release, 11 November 2025. https://www.mevaker.gov.il/en/newsroom/2025-11-11-special-report. Official or primary record.
• The Times of Israel, 2025. The intel on Hamas attack plan was there, but IDF simply refused to believe it, probe finds. https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-intel-on-hamas-attack-plan-was-there-but-idf-simply-refused-to-believe-it-probe-finds/. Press reporting.
• The Times of Israel, 2025. IDF identified but ignored 5 warning signs of Hamas attack on eve of Oct. 7, its probe shows. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-identified-but-ignored-5-warning-signs-of-hamas-attack-on-eve-of-oct-7-its-probe-shows/. Press reporting.
• The Times of Israel, 2025. IDF’s Oct. 7 probes show it misread Hamas for years, left southern Israel utterly vulnerable. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idfs-oct-7-probes-show-it-misread-hamas-for-years-left-southern-israel-utterly-vulnerable/. Press reporting.
• The Washington Post, 2023. As it planned for Oct. 7, Hamas lulled Israel into a false sense of security. 6 December 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/06/israel-knew-hamas-attack-oct-7/. Press reporting.
• Wagner, S., 2024. Israel’s intelligence failure prior to 7 October 2023. In M. Hefler (ed.), Intelligence and Contemporary Conflict: Communication in Diplomacy, Statecraft and War. Bokförlaget Stolpe, Stockholm and London. ISBN 978-91-89882-15-7. Deposited at bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30042. Scholarly book chapter (relaying Haaretz, The New York Times, Maariv, Channel 12 and N12).