The human cost of the occupation is usually given as a single total, and several separate registers each publish one: the longest, a 2025 peer-reviewed analysis titled Occupation, displacement, and violence in the West Bank, records 117,014 conflict-related casualties in the West Bank between 2000 and 2023. The largest is the Gaza Ministry of Health’s own count of 73,670 people killed and 174,682 injured as of 10 September 2026, a party’s reporting on its own territory, which the ministry states excludes the missing, the bodies under rubble and the unidentified. A joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations assessment of April 2026 prices Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction at US$71.4 billion over a decade. No two of these registers count the same people over the same years, and several of the harms they are cited for carry no published number at all.
Key Findings
- A 2025 peer-reviewed analysis titled Occupation, displacement, and violence in the West Bank records 117,014 conflict-related casualties in the West Bank across 24 years, 2000 to 2023, counting deaths and injuries on one instrument.
- The Gaza Ministry of Health reports 73,670 people killed and 174,682 injured as of 10 September 2026, its own count on its own definitions, which the ministry itself says omits five named categories of the dead.
- Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025), in The Lancet, estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injury in Gaza to 30 June 2024, with a 95% confidence interval of 55,298 to 78,525, against a registry total of 37,877 for the same date.
- The Site Management Cluster counted an estimated 1,708,822 people in 1,591 verified displacement sites in Gaza, with data extracted on 16 May 2026; 38% of households in those sites reported no shelter assistance in the preceding six months.
- The joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations assessment of April 2026 puts physical infrastructure damage in Gaza at US$35.2 billion and recovery and reconstruction needs at US$71.4 billion, which measure different things.
How many West Bank casualties does the long-run record count?
A 2025 peer-reviewed analysis titled Occupation, displacement, and violence in the West Bank records 117,014 conflict-related casualties in the West Bank between 2000 and 2023, counting deaths and injuries together on a single instrument. That is a 24-year register of the occupation itself rather than of the war that began in October 2023, and it is the longest continuous series carried in this report.
Within that period the analysis itemises 69,312 Palestinian casualties, comprising 1,092 deaths and 68,220 injuries, and 4,118 Israeli casualties, comprising 198 deaths and 3,920 injuries. The two itemised subtotals account for 73,430 of the 117,014, and the balance is not broken out in the figures carried here; the register is reported by title and year because its author list is not available in the material read for this report.
The composition of those subtotals is the finding the headline total obscures. Injuries are 68,220 of the 69,312 Palestinian casualties, 98.4% of the itemised Palestinian figure, and 3,920 of the 4,118 Israeli casualties, 95.2%. On this register the occupation’s recorded cost over two decades is overwhelmingly a record of people wounded and surviving, at a ratio of roughly 62 injuries to each death on the Palestinian side and roughly 20 to one on the Israeli side.
That distinction matters for what any single number can carry. A death enters a register once and closes; an injury enters once and then continues as a medical, occupational and household cost that no casualty register is built to follow. The 117,014 counts events at the moment they were recorded. It carries no field for what followed, and neither the analysis nor any register carried here publishes a subsequent figure for the 68,220.
Is the cost larger than the deaths and injuries counted?
Yes, and the bodies that do the counting say so in their own documents. The joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of April 2026 puts physical infrastructure damage in the Gaza Strip at US$35.2 billion for October 2023 to October 2025, a quantity no casualty register counts and no casualty register was designed to count.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development states in its own assessment of the economic costs of the occupation that losses including loss of life, family life, shelter and homeland cannot be fully monetized. That is a measuring body recording the limit of its own instrument, and it is the clearest statement available of why a money figure and a casualty figure never converge on one total.
What exists instead is a set of instruments, each built to count one slice. The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment measures damage to structures and the cost of replacing them, combining remote sensing with ground-verified data across two years. The Costs of War project at Brown University, in Neta Crawford’s 2025 paper, compiles direct and indirect death and sets Gaza against Afghanistan and Ukraine on a deaths-per-month basis. Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025) estimate deaths from traumatic injury alone. The Site Management Cluster enumerates people living in displacement sites. None of the four measures the others, and none was built to.
The same assessment records that more than 50% of hospitals in Gaza were non-functional and that the economy contracted by 84%. Those are properties of institutions and of an economy rather than of persons, and they sit alongside the casualty registers rather than inside them. A reader who wants one number for the whole is asking four instruments to answer a question none of them poses. What the record supports is a list of separately measured quantities, each with a named measuring body, a stated period and a stated method, and the explicit note from one of those bodies that some of the losses were never put into the arithmetic at all.
Which territory and which years does each published count cover?
A separate West Bank count records 1,091 Palestinians killed between 7 October 2023 and 3 May 2026, including at least 239 children, as UN OCHA compiles it and as a 2026 UNRWA situation report republished it. It covers the same months as the Gaza count and a different territory, which makes it the third of three registers that share no common denominator.
The three run as follows. The West Bank register in the 2025 peer-reviewed analysis covers 2000 to 2023, the West Bank only, and counts deaths and injuries together. The Gaza register covers 7 October 2023 to 6 May 2026, the Gaza Strip only, and reports 72,619 people killed and 172,484 injured as the Gaza Ministry of Health counted them at that date. The second West Bank register covers 7 October 2023 to 3 May 2026 and counts deaths only.
Three features make them non-additive, and each is visible from the windows alone. The first is territory: the Gaza figure contains no West Bank deaths and the West Bank figures contain no Gaza deaths. The second is period: the long West Bank register stops in 2023, before the Gaza window opens, so the two do not overlap by a single day and the third register overlaps only the Gaza one. The third is unit: two registers count casualties, meaning deaths and injuries pooled, and one counts deaths alone, so the larger of the West Bank figures is not a death toll and cannot be set beside one.
The practical consequence is that no total for the occupation as a whole appears in any of them. The 2025 analysis stops where the current war begins. The Gaza count opens on 7 October 2023 and carries nothing before it. There is no published register in this report that runs continuously across both territories from 2000 to the present, so a figure presented as the occupation’s full human cost has been assembled by whoever assembled it, out of parts that were measured separately.
Who produced the Gaza figure that circulates as a UN count?
The 72,619 figure is the Gaza Ministry of Health’s own count of its own territory, collated by UN OCHA and republished in a 2026 UNRWA situation report. It is a party’s reporting relayed twice rather than an independently verified tally, and the ministry publishes the same register directly: 73,670 killed and 174,682 injured in its report of 10 September 2026.
The ministry states the limits of its register itself, in a notice of 7 January 2024 it has not withdrawn. Five categories are excluded: the missing and the bodies trapped under rubble; the unidentified who reached hospitals; the unidentified whose bodies were handed over by Israel; those buried by their families without passing through a hospital; and the victims in Gaza and North Gaza after the information system stopped functioning in November 2023. Those are the issuing body’s own scope statements, and they travel with every figure taken from it.
The ministry also runs two counts, not one. The cumulative daily figure counts everyone who reached a hospital; the name-by-name lists count only records the ministry has finished. Its published lists carry 21,323 records to 29 March 2024, 28,185 to 30 June 2024 and 34,344 to 31 August 2024. The June list splits into 22,368 records drawn from ministry records and 5,817 from notification by relatives, which are the two channels its published work on what the Gaza Health Ministry publishes about its own count sets out.
Two published numbers exist for the same day. The ministry’s own daily report for 30 June 2024 gives 37,877 killed and 86,969 injured. A 2024 UN OCHA emergency report, drawing on the same ministry data, gives 37,718 fatalities and 85,523 injuries as of 30 June 2024. Neither body reconciles the pair, and the difference of 159 deaths arises somewhere in the relay rather than in a second count of the dead. The question of whether the register runs high or low against another instrument is treated separately in the Institute’s work on whether the ministry undercounts or overcounts deaths.
How many people were displaced, and who enumerated them?
The Site Management Cluster counted an estimated 1,708,822 people living in verified displacement sites across Gaza’s five governorates when it extracted its data on 16 May 2026, after fieldwork by 165 trained enumerators between 3 February and 19 April 2026. The cluster describes the result as a social count of organised displaced communities rather than a census of discrete physical locations.
The enumeration covered 1,856 targeted sites and confirmed 1,591 active, across 116 neighbourhoods, with collection led by twelve partner organisations. Of the 1,591 sites, 83% are makeshift, meaning informal, open-air and tented; about 11% are collective centres in schools and public buildings; the remainder are scattered sites of fewer than ten households. Roughly 1.5 million residents were living in approximately 246,000 tents or tent-like shelters, an average of about six people per tent against a standard emergency tent designed for five, with about 59,000 shelters housing more than eight.
Two figures describe what was not reaching people. 7,700 households, about 38,500 individuals, were sleeping outdoors with no shelter at all, present at 19% of surveyed sites. 136,000 households, about 680,000 people and 38% of all households in sites, had received no shelter assistance in the six months preceding the survey.
The cluster’s own caveats bound each of these. Household counts are derived rather than enumerated, applying a standard household size of five where disaggregated data was unavailable. Sex-disaggregated and age-disaggregated data exist for only 253 of the 1,591 sites, so every demographic share rests on a subsample. A single interview per site means the figures for persons with disabilities and female-headed households are underestimates, which the cluster states. The earliest data were about four months old at publication, and the cluster calls the assessment a baseline rather than a point-in-time snapshot.
A separate figure of 1.9 million displaced circulates from a 2026 UNICEF update, which footnotes it as a UN estimate of 2025 vintage and describes it as cumulative, covering people displaced at any point, many of them several times. It counts a different object from the 1.7 million in sites at a stated date, and no publisher reconciles the two.
How many deaths are attributed to causes other than weapons?
Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025), in The Lancet, estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injury in the Gaza Strip between 7 October 2023 and 30 June 2024, with a 95% confidence interval of 55,298 to 78,525. That estimate covers injury deaths only, and the authors state plainly that it excludes deaths from healthcare disruption, food insecurity, water and sanitation failure and disease.
The method was capture-recapture across three lists: 22,368 identified decedents from Palestinian Ministry of Health hospital morgue records, 5,817 individual decedents from the ministry’s rolling online mortality survey, and obituary pages scraped from social media. Those first two are the same two channels the ministry’s own 30 June list reports, so the study and the registry are not independent counts of the same thing. Against the registry total of 37,877 at that date, the estimate implies 26,383 deaths absent from the registry, which is 41% of the study’s own estimate rather than a 41% uplift on the registry figure. The authors report an annualised crude death rate of 39.3 per 1,000 people, a rate ratio of 14.0 against all-cause mortality in 2022.
For deaths from causes other than injury, the picture is thinner. Neta Crawford’s 2025 Costs of War paper, the document most often cited for indirect death, makes no indirect estimate of its own; it relays a range of 4,540 to 12,500 indirect deaths for 7 October 2023 to 5 January 2025 from a preprint by Spagat and colleagues, and that range belongs to those authors with the preprint label attached.
A widely circulated figure of 62,413 starvation deaths originates in an October 2024 open letter by 99 American medical professionals who volunteered in Gaza. Its appendix derives the number by multiplying population estimates in named food-insecurity phases by the threshold crude death rates that define those phases, summing across six overlapping windows. It is arithmetic on published classifications rather than a count of anyone, and Alex de Waal of the World Peace Foundation, whom the appendix itself quotes, states that the framework’s own custodians discourage the method.
What does the occupation cost when measured in money?
The joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations assessment of April 2026 puts Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction needs at US$71.4 billion over the next decade, including US$26.3 billion required in the first eighteen months. That is a forward-looking estimate of what rebuilding would cost, not a record of money spent, pledged or lost.
The same assessment reports US$35.2 billion in physical infrastructure damages and US$22.7 billion in economic and social losses, alongside more than 371,888 housing units destroyed or damaged and an economy contracting by 84%. Damage and need measure different things and belong to different sides of the ledger; neither may be added to the other, and the needs figure is not the sum of the other two.
The pre-war baseline is the comparison that makes those figures legible, and it comes from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Gaza’s unemployment rate was 45.3% in 2022, against 13.1% in the West Bank on the same labour force survey, and the Gaza figure had run above 43% every year since 2018. Gaza’s GDP at constant 2015 prices was US$671.9 million in the third quarter of 2023, the last full quarter before the war, and its output per person that quarter was US$300.7 against US$1,129.1 in the West Bank.
The World Bank’s September 2023 report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the last before October 2023, records Gaza’s unemployment rate at 46.4% in the second quarter of 2023, with youth unemployment at 59.3% and a rate of 77.1% among young women, and Gaza’s economy contracting by 2.6% year on year in the first quarter of 2023 while the West Bank grew 4.3%. Every one of those Gaza-specific figures is sourced by the Bank to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; the Bank’s own World Development Indicators publish no Gaza entity, only a combined West Bank and Gaza economy, so its headline series for the territory buries a 33-point unemployment gap inside a single number.
The Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department publishes its own position paper on the economic costs of the occupation. It is a party’s own accounting, published by a negotiating body, and no figure from it is carried here.
What does Israel’s own record count on the same ground?
The 2025 West Bank analysis records 4,118 Israeli casualties for 2000 to 2023, 198 of them deaths, counted on the same instrument and across the same years as the Palestinian figures. It is the only register carried in this report that counts both populations on one measure, which is what makes the comparison of its two sides possible at all.
Israel’s own bodies publish counts of their own conduct. The Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as of 3 August 2024, of which 44 concern the death of detainees held by the IDF, 13 alleged pillaging or stealing, 8 alleged detainee mistreatment, 6 alleged illegal use of force and 3 alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity. The same document records over 1,000 incidents referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, and states the threshold that produces those numbers: in armed conflict, death or injury to a civilian “in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct”. The count of investigations is a function of that standard, and it counts investigations opened rather than findings, indictments or convictions.
COGAT records 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, more than 70,000 cubic meters of water per day facilitated through external lines and desalination, and 18,000 tons of medical supplies since the ceasefire began. COGAT states that its tonnages rest on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private sector providers rather than on weighing at the crossings, and it is a party to the events it describes.
The standing restrictions have their own instrument. COGAT’s status of authorizations document, current to 8 February 2022, publishes quotas rather than counts: 74,300 permits for home construction employment, 12,500 for seasonal agriculture, 4,600 under the senior businessperson permit. A quota is a ceiling on issuance, never a record of anyone who crossed, and the Institute’s work on the permit instrument and the quotas it publishes sets out the difference. The Israeli Foreign Ministry separately reported, as of 14 September 2025, 207 hostages returned or recovered, 148 alive and 59 deceased, with 48 remaining in captivity.
Which costs does no published register put a number on?
No published register puts a figure on the long-term disability carried by the 174,682 injuries the Gaza Ministry of Health records as of 10 September 2026, and none of the instruments carried here was built to. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development states in its own assessment that losses including loss of life, family life, shelter and homeland cannot be fully monetized, which is a measuring body recording where its arithmetic stops.
The ministry’s own lists show the same boundary in their columns. The four published lists carry a serial number, a name, an identity or document number, a date of birth, sex, age and a source field. There is no date of death, and the ministry has explained why: the date was registered either on the family’s report or on the day the body reached a hospital, and a committee formed later to audit actual dates found cases registered months after the fact. There is no cause field and no combatant or civilian field, so no share of either can be derived from the register that circulates most widely.
Movement restrictions inside the West Bank are counted by nobody in the official record. A search of Israeli government publication hosts located no count of physical obstacles inside the West Bank, and the counts that do exist measure different objects: an Israel Defense Forces article describes nearly 40 crossings between the West Bank and other parts of Israel and 13 checkpoints in Central Command, while a 2017 State Comptroller audit found 33 crossings operated by three separate bodies. A crossing, a checkpoint and an obstacle are three different things, which is why an official figure in the tens and a monitoring figure in the hundreds can both stand.
One absence bears directly on how much weight the headline figures carry. The claim that the ministry’s reporting in earlier conflicts differed from independent analyses by 1.5% to 3.8% rests on a single uncited sentence in a Lancet correspondence letter by Huynh, Chin and Spiegel (2024), a letter whose own measurement covers 7 October to 10 November 2023 and nothing earlier. Its arithmetic reproduces exactly from three dated number pairs printed in a news explainer, and only with the ministry’s own count as the denominator. No study comparing the ministry’s pre-2023 counts against another body’s counts was located in the biomedical, preprint or open literature.
Methodology
This report draws on five source types, each labelled where it appears. Peer-reviewed measurement supplies the West Bank casualty register and the Gaza traumatic-injury estimate. Official statistics supply the pre-war economic baseline. A party’s own counts supply the Gaza fatality register, the Israeli aid and investigation figures and the permit quotas. A humanitarian coordination body’s field enumeration supplies the displacement figures. A co-published intergovernmental assessment supplies the damage and needs estimates.
The 2025 West Bank analysis is cited by title, year and PubMed Central identifier; its author list was not available in the material read for this report, and its headline total of 117,014 does not reconcile with the sum of its itemised Palestinian and Israeli subtotals, which account for 73,430. The balance is not broken out here.
Several figures reach readers through a relay. The Gaza figure of 72,619 was collated by UN OCHA from the Gaza Ministry of Health and republished by UNRWA in 2026; it is attributed here to the ministry that produced it. The Gaza economic figures in the World Bank’s September 2023 report carry that report’s own source lines to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and are attributed accordingly.
Three arithmetic cautions apply. The 41% in Jamaluddine and colleagues (2025) is a share of that study’s own estimate of 64,260, not a multiplier on the registry total of 37,877. The recovery and reconstruction need of US$71.4 billion and the damage estimate of US$35.2 billion measure different quantities and are not summed. The Site Management Cluster’s household counts are derived by applying a standard household size of five where disaggregated data was unavailable, and its demographic shares rest on a subsample of 253 of 1,591 sites.
Two figures are carried as what they are rather than as counts. The 62,413 starvation figure is a derivation by the authors of an October 2024 advocacy open letter from published food-insecurity classifications and threshold death rates, with overlapping windows, not an enumeration. The indirect-death range of 4,540 to 12,500 is a preprint estimate that Crawford (2025) relays rather than makes.
This report constructs no total across registers, because the registers cover different territories over different periods and count different units.
Conclusion
The cost of the occupation is usually asked for as a single figure, and the honest answer is that the record produces several, none of which was built to combine with the others. A 24-year West Bank register counts 117,014 casualties and stops in 2023. A 31-month Gaza register counts 73,670 dead and 174,682 injured and begins in October 2023. A field enumeration counts 1,708,822 people in tents and school buildings in May 2026. A damage assessment prices what would be needed to rebuild at US$71.4 billion.
What survives across all of them is consistent. The long register is overwhelmingly a record of injury rather than death, at roughly 62 wounded Palestinians for each one killed, and of those 68,220 injured people no register carried here publishes a subsequent figure. The largest count is produced by a party about its own territory and excludes, on that party’s own statement, the missing, those under rubble, the unidentified and everyone buried by a family without passing through a hospital. The one independent test run against it, a capture-recapture estimate, was built from that same register’s own two channels. The money figures price replacement, not loss, and the body that priced them wrote down that loss of life, family life, shelter and homeland were never in the arithmetic.
So the registers agree on one thing about themselves: each one stops well short of the thing the question asks about. A count is an instrument built by somebody for a purpose, with fields for what that purpose required and no fields for the rest. What follows, for anyone weighing what the occupation has cost, is a choice about which of those instruments to treat as the answer, and what to do with the harms that fell outside every column.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do two published figures exist for Gaza deaths on the same day?
The Gaza Ministry of Health’s own daily report for 30 June 2024 gives 37,877 killed and 86,969 injured, while a 2024 UN OCHA emergency report drawing on the same ministry data gives 37,718 and 85,523 for the same date. Neither body reconciles the difference, which arises in the relay rather than in a second count. The ministry also adds records months later by administrative approval, which moves a cumulative total without a new death.
How many of Gaza’s injured will live with permanent disability?
No register carried here publishes a figure. The Gaza Ministry of Health’s published lists carry name, identity number, date of birth, sex, age and a source field, with no field for injury severity or outcome, and the 174,682 injuries it reports as of 10 September 2026 are counted as events at the point of recording. The joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations assessment of April 2026 prices infrastructure, not disability.
Does the Gaza Ministry of Health publish a combatant and civilian split?
No. Its Health Annual Report, Palestine 2025 publishes shares by age and sex, giving children 30%, women 16%, elderly 7% and men 47% of martyrs for 2023 to 2025 against a stated total of 71,271, and publishes no combatant classification at any point. Any civilian-to-combatant ratio in circulation was constructed by whoever constructed it, using an input from some other body.
What does the US$71.4 billion figure actually cover?
It is the joint World Bank, European Union and United Nations estimate of recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza over the next decade, including US$26.3 billion in the first eighteen months. It is forward-looking and is not a record of money spent, pledged or destroyed. The same assessment separately estimates US$35.2 billion in physical damage and US$22.7 billion in economic and social losses, and those three quantities are not additive.
How bad was Gaza’s economy before October 2023?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics recorded Gaza’s unemployment rate at 45.3% in 2022 against 13.1% in the West Bank, and output per person in the third quarter of 2023 at US$300.7 against US$1,129.1 in the West Bank at constant 2015 prices. The World Bank’s September 2023 report, relaying the same bureau’s figures, put youth unemployment in Gaza at 59.3% in the second quarter of 2023.
Who counts the aid entering Gaza, and how?
COGAT, a unit of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, publishes its own operational record and reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026. COGAT states that tonnage rests on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private sector providers rather than on weighing at the crossings, and that pallets are counted and contents compared against coordination requests during security clearance. It is a party to the events it records.
What does Israel’s own record report about hostages?
The Israeli Foreign Ministry reported, as of 14 September 2025, that 207 hostages had returned or been recovered, 148 alive and 59 deceased, with 48 remaining in captivity. Those are Israel’s own reported counts, published by a party to the conflict, and are point-in-time figures that carry that date wherever they are used.
Sources
- American Medical Professionals Who Served in Gaza, 2024. Open Letter to President Biden and Vice President Harris, and Appendix. gazahealthcareletters.org. Advocacy open letter, named estimate.
- COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), 2022. Status of Authorizations for entry of Palestinians into Israel; for their passage from Judea and Samaria into the Gaza Strip; and for their departure abroad. gov.il. Official record, a party’s own instrument.
- COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. gaza-aid-data.gov.il. Official record, a party’s own count.
- Crawford, Neta C., 2025. The Human Toll of the Gaza War: Direct and Indirect Death from 7 October 2023 to 3 October 2025. Costs of War project, Watson School of International and Public Affairs, Brown University. costsofwar.watson.brown.edu. University research project report, not peer-reviewed.
- de Waal, Alex, 2024. How Many People Have Died of Starvation in Gaza? World Peace Foundation, Tufts University, 17 December 2024. worldpeacefoundation.org. Named scholarly commentary, not peer-reviewed.
- Hamamra, Bilal, Fayez Mahamid and Asala Mayaleh, 2025. Childhood under siege: battling malnutrition, disease, and despair during genocide in Gaza. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition, 44:321. DOI 10.1186/s41043-025-00948-6. Peer-reviewed, qualitative interview study.
- Huynh, Benjamin Q., Elizabeth T. Chin and Paul B. Spiegel, 2024. No evidence of inflated mortality reporting from the Gaza Ministry of Health. The Lancet, 403(10421), pp. 23 to 24. DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(23)02713-7. Correspondence, editorially reviewed, not peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. idf.il. Official record, a party’s own count.
- Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission of Israel to the Multilateral Organizations in France, 2025. Israel’s Objectives and Current Operation. embassies.gov.il. Official record, a party’s own count.
- Jamaluddine, Zeina, Hanan Abukmail, Sarah Aly, Oona M. R. Campbell and Francesco Checchi, 2025. Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture-recapture analysis. The Lancet, 405(10477), pp. 469 to 477. DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02678-3. Peer-reviewed.
- Ministry of Health, Gaza, 2024 to 2026. Published martyr lists, daily statistical reports, and Health Annual Report, Palestine 2025. site.moh.ps and the ministry media office channel. Official record, a party’s own count, self-reported.
- Occupation, displacement, and violence in the West Bank, 2025. PMCID PMC12193732. Peer-reviewed analysis of the United Nations casualty database; cited by title and year, author list not carried here.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. Press Report, Preliminary Estimates of Quarterly National Accounts (Third Quarter 2023), and Labour Force Survey indicator tables. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record, national statistical office.
- Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department. Position Paper: The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation. nad.ps. A party’s own published position.
- Site Management Cluster in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2026. Gaza Displacement Site Verification Assessment: Baseline Findings for May 2026 Humanitarian Planning and Coordination. cccmcluster.org. Humanitarian coordination body, primary field enumeration.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2017. Activity of the crossings between Israel and the Judea and Samaria area, annual report 67b. mevaker.gov.il. Official record, state audit institution.
- World Bank, 2023. Racing Against Time: World Bank Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 2023. documents.worldbank.org. Staff report; Gaza-specific figures sourced within it to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
- World Bank, European Union and United Nations, 2026. Gaza Strip Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, April 2026. thedocs.worldbank.org. Joint intergovernmental assessment.