What Is Breaking the Silence, and What Do Its Testimonies Record About the Occupation?

Breaking the Silence is an Israeli organization of former soldiers, founded in 2004, that collects anonymous first-person accounts of military service in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the organization states in its own published FAQ that it has gathered testimonies from over 1,000 soldiers since its founding. What those accounts describe, in the organization’s own framing, is the daily administration of a civilian population by military authority. The archive is a documentary genre with no sampling frame, which is why published counts of it differ by unit rather than by disagreement, and why Israel’s own registers, the permit quotas, the investigation counts, the court records, answer a different and narrower set of questions than the testimonies pose.

Key Findings

• Breaking the Silence states in its own published FAQ that it has collected testimonies from over 1,000 soldiers since its founding in 2004; that is the organization’s own count of its own archive, not a verified or independently audited total.
• Four differently sized counts of the same archive circulate because they measure three different units: 900 published testimonies (Christian Science Monitor, 2014), nearly a thousand former soldiers interviewed (a founder of the organization, writing on the Open Society Foundations site, 2014), over 1,000 soldiers (Breaking the Silence FAQ, 2026), and over 60 soldiers in a single Gaza publication (the organization’s own 2015 report); three of the four are the organization’s own counts.
• Israel’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported that as of 3 August 2024 it had opened 74 criminal investigations arising from the Gaza war and referred over 1,000 incidents to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, and it publishes the threshold that produces those counts.
• The State Comptroller of Israel reported that in 2020 the Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police opened 12,865 cases for offenses of disturbing public order, security violations and damage to property, and issued 48,371 traffic tickets, of which 36,074 went to Palestinians, about 75% on the Comptroller’s own rounding.
• No peer-reviewed study in the record samples Israeli soldier testimony against a defined service population, so no prevalence rate for any described practice can be derived from the archive; none of the published counts carries a denominator of soldiers who served.

What is Breaking the Silence, and what does it publish?

Breaking the Silence states in its own published FAQ that it was founded in 2004 by Israeli veterans and has collected testimonies from over 1,000 soldiers who served in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That figure is the organization’s own count of its own archive, not an audited one, and it counts soldiers who gave accounts rather than incidents described or years covered.

The organization publishes in three forms: individual written testimonies, video testimonies, and thematic reports that group accounts around a single operation or practice. Its 2015 booklet on the 2014 Gaza operation, “This is How We Fought in Gaza,” is the best-documented example of the third form, and its own introduction describes it as “a collection of testimonies from over 60 soldiers in mandatory and reserve service.”

NGO Monitor, a monitoring organization with an explicit critical mission toward Israeli human-rights groups, maintains a standing organizational profile of Breaking the Silence and, in its Annual Report 2024, describes its own work mapping the funding and activity of such organizations. Its profile is the fullest critical account of the group’s legal form and funding sources available from a named body; its objections are set out in a later section, and it is labelled here by type rather than treated as a neutral register.

Two things follow from the publication format and matter for every figure below. The testimonies are anonymous by design, with the organization stating that identifying details are withheld to protect people who served from professional and legal consequence. And the archive is cumulative rather than periodic: it grows as people come forward, which means its size at any date is a function of who volunteered, not of what occurred.

That is the distinction the rest of this report turns on. A register that records what a body did with an allegation, the Military Advocate General’s investigation counts, the State Comptroller’s case-opening figures, publishes a denominator. A testimony archive does not, and was not built to.

Is it often said the testimonies expose the occupation’s reality?

It is often said that the archive exposes the reality of military rule, and the checkable part of that claim holds: one of the organization’s founders wrote on the Open Society Foundations site in November 2014 that “to this day we have interviewed nearly a thousand former soldiers,” an archive sustained across a decade at that date and now more than two.

The premise has named holders and dates. The Christian Science Monitor reported in June 2014 that the group had 900 published testimonies. The founder’s piece of the same year put the interviews at nearly a thousand former soldiers. The New York Times reported in December 2015 on the furor over the group’s West Bank criticism. Only the Monitor’s figure comes from outside the organization; the others are its own counts of its own archive, published under its own name or a founder’s.

What the archive is, and what it is not, follows from its construction. A testimony is a documentary artifact: it records what one person states about what they saw or did, at a date, in a place. An archive of such artifacts has no sampling frame. Nobody drew the participants from a list of everyone who served, nobody recorded who declined, and nobody published a refusal rate. So the count measures how many people came forward, which is a fact about the organization’s reach and about soldiers’ willingness to speak, and not a fact about how often any described practice occurred.

That is not a defect in the archive; it is the genre. Court testimony, oral history and clinical case series all work the same way, and each is useful for the thing it does. What it cannot do is supply a rate. A rate requires a denominator, and the denominator here would be the number of people who served in the relevant units over the relevant years, a figure no published count of the testimonies carries.

The permit instrument and the investigation registers below do carry denominators, which is why they enter the report alongside the archive rather than behind it.

Why do published counts of the testimonies differ?

Four counts of the same archive circulate, and the largest and smallest differ by a factor of roughly seventeen: over 1,000 soldiers in the organization’s own FAQ against over 60 soldiers in the 2014 Gaza report, as the organization’s own 2015 booklet describes it. The gap is a unit gap, not a discrepancy.

The four figures measure three different objects. Soldiers interviewed is one unit: a founder of the organization put it at nearly a thousand former soldiers in 2014, and Breaking the Silence’s own FAQ reports over 1,000 soldiers. Testimonies published is a second: the Christian Science Monitor reported 900 published testimonies in June 2014. Testimonies in a single publication is a third: over 60 soldiers in the 2014 Gaza booklet, per its own introduction.

Soldiers and testimonies are not interchangeable in either direction. One soldier may give several testimonies about different postings; an interview may yield no publishable testimony at all, if the organization cannot corroborate it or the account carries identifying detail it declines to publish. So 900 published testimonies and nearly a thousand soldiers interviewed, both reported in 2014, are consistent with each other and with each other’s publisher, and neither is evidence that the other is wrong.

Two of the four are floors rather than totals, written by their publishers as “over” and “nearly,” and the organization’s own is current to its FAQ rather than to any stated cut-off date. A sentence setting a 2014 figure against a 2026 figure is measuring twelve years of accumulation as well as a change of unit.

What does the daily control the testimonies describe consist of?

The permit regime the testimonies describe is a written instrument with published quotas. According to the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, updated to 8 February 2022, it authorized itself to administer 74,300 permits for home construction employment in Israel.

The same update also set quotas of 8,550 permits for industry and services, 6,650 for agriculture and 12,500 for seasonal agriculture.

That document opens on the legal frame, in its own words: “Under the Order Concerning Closed Areas (West Bank Area) (Amendment) (No. 34), 1967, the area of Judea and Samaria is a closed military area and not to be entered or exited without a permit issued on behalf of the military commander.” Every quota below it is a ceiling the military commander’s coordination body set for itself, not a count of permits issued and not a count of people who crossed. The Civil Administration’s Employment Unit reports the issued quantity separately, stating that as of 1 March 2020 the number of valid work permits for Palestinian employees working in Israel stood at 87,000.

The jurisdictional split that puts civil administration in the military’s hands is in the signed Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995. Article XVII(2) gives the Palestinian Council territorial jurisdiction over West Bank territory “except for Area C,” and Article XI(2) provides that in Area C, “Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory.” Article XVII(4)(a) states that “Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.”

The permit document’s own detail is where the daily texture sits. Employment quotas in the standing categories carry the criterion “Age 22, married.” Senior Palestinian businesspeople fall under a BMC permit with an overall quota of 4,600 and 1,267 vehicular permits inside it. Employment in industrial zones and in Israeli communities outside the Seam Zone is approved “from age 18 and up, with no quota and with no restriction regarding personal status.” The instrument is dated 8 February 2022 and predates the suspension of Palestinian work permits after 7 October 2023; no later edition is on the record.

What happens to a misconduct allegation inside Israel’s own system?

Israel’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported that, as of 3 August 2024, it had opened 74 criminal investigations arising from the Gaza war.

Of these, 44 concerned the death of detainees held by the IDF, 8 concerned alleged detainee mistreatment, 13 concerned alleged pillaging or stealing, 6 concerned alleged illegal use of force and 3 concerned alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity.

The same publication reports that over 1,000 incidents were identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, with hundreds still undergoing material collection at the time of writing. The Mechanism was created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission and now operates, in the Corps’ words, as “a permanent body which conducts factual assessments.” Every one of these figures is the IDF’s own count of its own processes, and they are counts of investigations opened rather than findings, indictments or convictions.

The Corps publishes the threshold that produces the numbers, and it must travel with them. In its own words: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The investigation count is a function of that standard, so 74 against over 1,000 referrals is a ratio a reader can only interpret with the threshold stated.

For the West Bank the comparable register is the State Comptroller of Israel’s May 2022 follow-up audit of the Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police. It reports that in 2020 the district opened 12,865 cases for offenses of disturbing public order, security violations and damage to property, and issued 48,371 traffic tickets, of which 36,074 went to Palestinians, which the Comptroller writes as about 75%. That audit measures policing capability rather than settler violence: it publishes no complaint, investigation or conviction count for offenses by Israeli civilians against Palestinians, and sections of it were published under confidentiality.

The Comptroller’s companion audit of file closures, in the same May 2022 volume, found that the ground on which a file is closed varies by about 20% between prosecution districts, and that the Police keep no data at all on closures for “lack of guilt.”

Which described practices rest on a written order rather than an aberration?

Some conduct the testimonies describe is aberration and some is standing authority, and the second category is documented in enacted text: Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, as Israel’s High Court reproduced it in December 2014, empowers a military commander to direct the forfeiture and destruction of a house from which he has reason to suspect a weapon was illegally discharged.

The Court quoted the regulation in its current Israeli wording and dismissed the petition against its use, holding at paragraph 23 that “the disproportionate use of said authority by the military commander, which amounts to collective punishment that is prohibited under international law, is precluded,” while stating at paragraph 27 that “the principle of proportionality does not allow us to continue to assume forever that choosing the drastic option of house demolition, or even of house sealing, achieves the desired purpose of deterrence, unless all of the data that properly confirms that hypothesis is presented to us for our review.” One justice described the authority as “draconian” while observing that “The Regulation, as written, does not reflect the actual situation on the ground.” On the State’s own account in that case, the commander had exercised the authority “only several times” in the decade since 2005.

The property regime rests on a military order of the first weeks of the occupation. Order 59 of 31 July 1967, on Government Property, defines Government Property by who owned it on 7 June 1967, creates a Custodian, and provides in one sentence that the Custodian may take possession of government property and take any step he considers necessary to do so. It has been amended nine times.

The limit on that authority is judicial and is dated. In October 1979, in the Elon Moreh case, the Supreme Court declared invalid an order of possession over private Palestinian land at Rujeib, holding that while requisition for a civilian settlement is “potentially justified under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations,” the record showed “the process was inverted: the initiative came from the political echelons, which then reached out to the Chief of the General Staff for his professional opinion.” The Chief of the General Staff answered the Court’s questionnaire: “There was no preexisting plan to build a civilian settlement on the relevant site approved by a competent military authority.”

That ruling annulled one order over the petitioners’ plots. It did not hold settlement unlawful, and the Court expressly declined to decide the question under Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

What does peer-reviewed research measure about detention practices?

Peer-reviewed work on detention practices in this context argues structure rather than counting incidence: Jabr and Helbich, writing in the Torture Journal in October 2025, read recurring patterns in testimonies of Palestinian detainees and argue that torture functions as a strategic mechanism of domination rather than as aggregated individual misconduct.

Their paper is peer-reviewed, on the journal’s stated double-blind process with two reviewers, and it measures nothing. There is no sample, no rate, no victim total and no incidence estimate in it; it reads testimonies for patterns and neither samples nor enumerates them. It is also openly normative, its own abstract advocating a critical human-rights-based approach, and it is published by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, a rehabilitation body. It is cited here as one named pole in a live methodological dispute.

The opposite pole is Israel’s own accountability machinery, and the disagreement between them is precisely about the inference from pattern to policy. The Military Advocate General’s published threshold, quoted above, declines exactly that inference: it treats civilian harm as in most cases explicable as the aftermath of lawful operational activity absent something further, which means a pattern across accounts does not, on that standard, establish a criminal suspicion in any particular case. Jabr and Helbich read the pattern as the finding. The Corps reads the individual case as the unit. Neither position is settled by the other’s evidence.

The gap this leaves is the one that matters for the question. A structural argument built on testimonies and an incident-by-incident investigation standard are two ways of handling the same accounts, and neither produces a prevalence figure. The peer-reviewed layer that would produce one, a study sampling detainees or soldiers against a defined population and reporting a rate with a confidence interval, does not appear in this record for either side of the dispute.

The Israeli military’s own published ethical code sits at the doctrinal end of the same question. Its Purity of Arms value states that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” That records the stated standard, and is evidence of the standard rather than of conduct against it.

Who disputes the organization’s methods, and on what grounds?

NGO Monitor, a monitoring organization with a stated advocacy mission toward the groups it maps, maintains a standing critical profile of Breaking the Silence and objects to its methods on three grounds: the anonymity of the testimonies, the absence of verifiable identifying detail, and foreign government funding.

Those objections are that organization’s own, and it states its critical mission openly; it is labelled as such here rather than treated as a neutral register. Its Annual Report 2024 describes its wider work mapping the funding and activity of human-rights groups, but it does not set out the inclusion criteria or the method behind that mapping, so its network figures are not carried into this report.

The organization’s own answer to the anonymity objection is published on its site: it states that testimonies are collected on condition of anonymity, that identifying details are withheld to protect people who served from professional and legal consequence, and that accounts are checked before publication. That is the party’s own account of its own procedure, and the reader has, on this record, no third-party audit of either the procedure or the objection to it.

The two positions are not symmetrical in what they would require to resolve. The anonymity objection is a claim about verifiability: a reader cannot follow a testimony to a named person, a unit, a date and a place, and so cannot check it the way a court record or a permit quota can be checked. The organization’s answer is that the alternative is no archive, because named testimony from serving and former soldiers carries consequences the organization states it will not expose contributors to. Both propositions can hold at once, and the disagreement is about which cost to bear.

The funding objection is a question about provenance rather than content, and it is answerable from disclosure records rather than from testimony. Which governments fund a publisher bears on how a reader weighs its selection of material; it does not by itself establish whether any single account is accurate, which is the question the anonymity objection raises.

What can a testimony archive not measure?

No prevalence rate for any practice described in the testimonies can be derived from the archive, because none of the published counts carries a denominator: over 1,000 soldiers is a numerator with no stated number of soldiers who served over the same period, and the same holds for 900, for nearly a thousand and for over 60.

That absence is a property of the genre and not a gap in the search. A rate requires a defined population, a sample drawn from it and a recorded non-response, and no study in this record samples Israeli soldier testimony against a defined service population. The organization does not claim otherwise; its FAQ describes collection from people who approach it or whom it approaches, which is a recruitment process rather than a sampling frame.

Set that against the registers that do publish denominators, and the contrast is the finding. The State Comptroller reported 36,074 of 48,371 traffic tickets issued to Palestinians in the Samaria and Judea District in 2020, which is a numerator over a stated total. The Military Advocate General reported 74 criminal investigations against over 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment, and published the threshold that produces the ratio. The permit instrument of 8 February 2022 publishes a quota of 74,300 for home construction employment, and the Civil Administration’s Employment Unit separately reported 87,000 valid permits as of 1 March 2020, one a ceiling and one a count.

Those registers answer narrower questions than the testimonies pose. A ticket count measures enforcement activity, not what an encounter at a checkpoint was like. An investigation count measures what a legal system did with an allegation under a stated standard, not what happened. A permit quota measures what a coordination body authorized itself to issue, not who crossed or who was refused.

So the two bodies of evidence do not compete and cannot substitute. The archive records what people who served state about what they saw, in detail no register carries. The registers record quantities with bases, in a form the archive cannot produce. A reader who wants a rate has the registers; a reader who wants the described conduct has the testimonies; and no document in this record supplies both.

Methodology

This report draws on four source types, each labelled where it appears.

Israeli official and primary records. The Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, “Status of Authorizations for entry of Palestinians into Israel; for their passage from Judea and Samaria into the Gaza Strip; and for their departure abroad,” updated to 8 February 2022, is the restricting authority’s own published instrument; its quotas are ceilings the body set for itself, never counts of permits issued or people who crossed, and the edition predates 7 October 2023 with no later edition located. The Military Advocate General’s Corps publication of 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024, and the two State Comptroller audits of May 2022 are Israeli bodies counting their own processes, not audited or independently verified tallies; sections of the Samaria and Judea District audit were published under confidentiality, so its counts are floors. The Israeli Supreme Court judgments in HCJ 8091/14 (31 December 2014) and HCJ 390/79 (22 October 1979) are court records; the English texts used are the Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project’s translations, not the Judicial Authority’s, and the Hebrew governs. Military Order 59 of 31 July 1967 has no official English text and has been amended nine times, so the 1967 wording is not the text in force.

The signed Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995 is quoted from the English text published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party to it. It contains no percentage for the area of any zone: Areas A and B are defined by shading on an attached map and Area C residually, so any share of the West Bank attributed to Area C was measured by some other body.

The organization’s own account. Breaking the Silence’s published FAQ supplies the over-1,000 figure and the description of its collection and anonymity procedure. Both are the party’s own statements about itself.

Outside reporting and monitoring. The Christian Science Monitor (June 2014) supplies the one outside count; a founder’s 2014 piece on the Open Society Foundations site and the organization’s 2015 Gaza booklet supply two more of its own; The New York Times (December 2015) reports the public controversy. NGO Monitor’s Annual Report 2024 supplies the critical profile and the network-mapping figures, which are that organization’s own counts on unstated inclusion criteria; it states an advocacy mission toward the groups it maps.

Peer-reviewed research. Jabr and Helbich (2025) is peer-reviewed and interpretive: it samples nothing, enumerates nothing, and reports no rate.

Two limits bear on every figure. The four counts of the archive measure three different units across twelve years, so no two of them are a like-for-like comparison. And no study in this record samples soldier testimony against a defined service population, so no prevalence rate for any described practice appears here.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does an anonymous testimony get checked before publication?

Breaking the Silence states in its own published FAQ that testimonies are collected on condition of anonymity and are checked before publication, with identifying details withheld to protect contributors from professional and legal consequence. That is the organization’s own account of its own procedure, and no third-party audit of it appears in this record.

Which Israeli body records what happens to a misconduct allegation?

The Military Advocate General’s Corps for the military system, and the Israel Police and State Attorney’s Office for criminal files, audited by the State Comptroller. The Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as of 3 August 2024 against over 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment; the Comptroller’s May 2022 audit found the Police keep no data on files closed for “lack of guilt.”

Why do the permit quotas not add up to a published total?

Because the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories publishes none. Its 8 February 2022 document lists category quotas without a total anywhere in its 68 pages, and two rows defeat addition: the 9,500 and 3,000 seasonal sub-quotas sit inside the 12,500 seasonal figure, and a 200 hi-tech figure sits inside an allotment of 500.

Which practices in the West Bank rest on standing legal authority?

Punitive demolition under Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which Israel’s High Court upheld in December 2014 while making continued deference conditional on effectiveness data the State had not produced; and the property regime under Military Order 59 of 31 July 1967, which created a Custodian of Government Property and has since been amended nine times.

How many work permits were actually valid, as opposed to authorized?

The Civil Administration’s Employment Unit reported that as of 1 March 2020, valid work permits for Palestinian employees working in Israel stood at 87,000, and for those working in Judea and Samaria at 35,000. Those are permits held; the quotas in the 2022 authorizations document are ceilings and a different quantity.

What would a study need in order to report how often a described practice occurred?

A defined service population, a sample drawn from it, a recorded non-response rate and a reported confidence interval. No study in this record does that for Israeli soldier testimony, which is why the archive’s counts are numerators without denominators.

Conclusion

So what does the archive record about the occupation? It records what over a thousand people who served state they saw and did, in a form no register reproduces, and it records nothing about how often any of it happened.

The two bodies of evidence in this report were built to answer different questions and they answer them cleanly. The registers publish bases: 36,074 of 48,371 traffic tickets in one police district in one year, 74 criminal investigations against over 1,000 incidents referred, a quota of 74,300 against 87,000 permits actually valid, one order of possession annulled over one set of plots in 1979. The archive publishes accounts: over 1,000 soldiers since 2004, 900 testimonies published by mid-2014, over 60 soldiers in one report on one operation. The four counts of the archive differ because they count soldiers, testimonies and testimonies-in-one-publication, and because twelve years separate the earliest from the latest. The Military Advocate General’s threshold, that civilian harm in armed conflict in most cases does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and the structural reading in Jabr and Helbich, that a pattern across accounts is itself the finding, are the two poles of one methodological disagreement about what accounts can establish. Neither pole produces a rate.

What the record does hold, in enacted text rather than in testimony, is that the West Bank is a closed military area under a 1967 order, that entry and exit run on permits issued on behalf of the military commander with published quotas by occupation and marital status, that a 1945 regulation empowering a commander to destroy a house on suspicion was upheld by Israel’s own High Court in 2014 and described from the bench as draconian, and that a 1967 order lets a Custodian take possession of property by defining it as governmental.

Those instruments were written to administer a population, and each of them is checkable. The archive adds what they cannot: the view from behind the counter, given by people who stood there and unwilling to give their names. When the only people able to describe a system from the inside will do so only anonymously, is their account evidence a society can act on, or evidence it can set aside?

Sources

• Breaking the Silence, accessed 2026. Frequently Asked Questions. breakingthesilence.org.il. Organization’s own published account.
• Christian Science Monitor, 2014. Breaking the silence about Israeli occupation. csmonitor.com. International press.
• Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, 2022. Status of Authorizations for entry of Palestinians into Israel; for their passage from Judea and Samaria into the Gaza Strip; and for their departure abroad, updated 8 February 2022. gov.il. Official record (Israeli Ministry of Defense unit).
• Israel and the P.L.O., 1995. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington DC, 28 September 1995. Text published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gov.il. Primary and official record (treaty text).
• Israel Defense Forces. The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces: the ethical code and its values. idf.il. Official record (the party’s own published doctrine).
• Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza, published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. idf.il. Official record (the party’s own reported counts).
• Israeli Supreme Court, 1979. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat and others v. The State of Israel and others (the Elon Moreh case), judgment of 22 October 1979. English text published by the Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project. Official record (court judgment, unofficial translation).
• Israeli Supreme Court, 2014. HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual v. Minister of Defense, judgment of 31 December 2014. English text published by the Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project. Official record (court judgment, unofficial translation).
• Jabr, S., and Helbich, M., 2025. Torture as a tool of domination: The logic behind the use of torture against Palestinians. A human rights approach. Torture Journal, 35(2-3), pp. 101 to 111. DOI 10.7146/torture.v35i2.156977. Peer-reviewed journal.
• Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, 1967. Military Order 59, Order Concerning Government Property, signed 31 July 1967, Collection of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments, booklet 5, p. 162. idf.il. Official record (security legislation as enacted).
• NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
• Open Society Foundations, 2014. Israeli Veterans Break Their Silence on Life in the Occupied Territories, 26 November 2014, written by a founder of Breaking the Silence. opensocietyfoundations.org. Organization’s own account, hosted by a funder.
• Breaking the Silence, 2015. This is How We Fought in Gaza: Soldiers’ testimonies and photographs from Operation “Protective Edge” (2014). breakingthesilence.org.il. Organization’s own publication.
• State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Interdisciplinary Audit: Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police, Follow-up Audit, in State Comptroller Report, May 2022, Chapter Four. mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution).
• State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Closing Criminal Files by the Israel Police and the Office of the State Attorney, in State Comptroller Report, May 2022, Chapter One. mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution).
• The New York Times, 2015. Israeli Veterans’ Criticism of West Bank Occupation Incites Furor, December 2015. nytimes.com. International press.