Why Is Israel Seen as the Aggressor? Reading the Polls, the Party Counts and the Framing Studies

Two people can watch the same footage and reach for opposite words, and the American balance between those words has moved: 46% of US adults told Gallup in February 2025 that their sympathies lie more with the Israelis, down from 63% in February 2010 and the lowest reading in 25 years of that trend. The reasons offered for the shift are measured very unevenly. Casualty counts exist, but only as each party’s own tally; the 1967 sequence is dated in the record; headline-framing counts exist only where an advocacy monitor did the coding itself; and the steepest documented gradient is by age, with the Yale Youth Poll recording 10% of voters aged 18 to 34 agreeing with all three antisemitic statements it tested against 2% of voters 65 and over.

Key Findings

• Gallup’s forced-choice sympathies question moved 17 points between February 2010 and February 2025, from 63% to 46% of US adults sympathizing more with the Israelis, with 33% more with the Palestinians on the 2025 reading (n = 1,004, ±4 points).
• The Palestinian Ministry of Health recorded 70,942 deaths in Gaza through December 2025, as relayed in the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief of that year, against 1,664 Israelis the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies recorded as confirmed killed in the war as of 5 September 2024. Both are counts published by or for a party to the conflict.
• The IDF’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported more than 1,000 incidents from the Gaza war referred for factual assessment and 74 criminal investigations opened as of 3 August 2024, alongside its own stated threshold that civilian death or injury in armed conflict “in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”
• The Yale Youth Poll’s Fall 2025 survey of US registered voters found 10% of voters aged 18 to 34 agreeing with all three antisemitic statements tested, against 2% of voters 65 and over, and reported that younger voters were more likely both to hold those attitudes and to hold anti-Israel views.
• Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026), across three preregistered studies (N = 373, 243 and 493), report a model that accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association between antisemitism and those attitudes.

Which reasons for this perception can actually be measured?

Gallup’s forced-choice sympathies question fell 17 points, from 63% of US adults sympathizing more with the Israelis in February 2010 to 46% in February 2025, its lowest level in 25 years of the trend, with 33% more with the Palestinians on the same 2025 reading (n = 1,004, 3 to 16 February 2025, ±4 points). That movement is measured. The reasons offered for it are not measured to the same standard.

Sorting them by what the published record actually holds produces four groups. Casualty disparity has counts, but they come from the parties themselves. The 1967 sequence has a date and a list of territories. Headline framing has counts, produced by monitoring organizations that coded the headlines against their own criteria. Attitudes have dated survey and experimental measurement, including the age gradient and the psychological mechanisms below.

Media exposure, the reason most often offered, is the one where the measurement complicates the intuition. Huesmann, Dubow, Boxer, Souweidane and Ginges (2012), surveying 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students, found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes; the association ran through identification with the groups as they were portrayed. Both groups held more negative stereotypes about the out-group than the in-group, with ethnic identity correlating with implicit out-group stereotyping at r = -0.70.

Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), in two experiments with British samples (Study 1 N = 354, Study 2 N = 490) that primed participants with war-in-Gaza material, report two separate pathways to anti-Jewish hostility: one running through social dominance orientation, the other through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Both are correlational associations within primed samples, as the authors describe them.

One quantity is absent from this record. No survey here measures the share of people who name a particular reason for the characterization; the surveys measure how many hold it and what it travels with.

Is it often said that Israel’s use of force is disproportionate?

It is often said that Israel’s use of force is disproportionate, and on each party’s own published count the disparity in recorded deaths runs at roughly 43 to 1: the Palestinian Ministry of Health recorded 70,942 deaths in Gaza through December 2025, as relayed in the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief, against 1,664 Israelis confirmed killed in the war in the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies count. The two end dates differ, so the ratio is approximate.

The Begin-Sadat figures are current to 5 September 2024 and also record 17,809 Israelis wounded in the war and 1,184 Israelis confirmed killed on the single day of 7 October 2023. No official body is credited on that page for the killed and wounded totals.

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (2025) reaches a lower civilian figure by its own arithmetic, subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s count of Hamas fighters killed from the Gaza health ministry total to produce a stated ceiling of at most 41,000 civilians for war-related causes through October 2025. The same page states that “Neither the Hamas claim of 67,000 total Gazan deaths nor the Israel estimate of 21,000 Hamas fighters killed has been independently confirmed, and the Hamas claim has been challenged.” That is a ceiling derived from party inputs, not a count.

A separate figure circulates alongside these and measures something else. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief for the end of 2025 puts Gaza at about 2.13 million people, a decline of approximately 254,000 or 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates, and attributes that change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration together. It is a demographic net decline, not a death toll. What each of these bodies counts, and on what basis, is the subject of the Institute’s work on the counts each body publishes.

What does the 1967 record show about who struck first?

The LaGuardia Community College Library Guides page on the conflict, which carries no publication year, states that Israel launched an attack on neighbouring Arab states on 5 June 1967 and subsequently occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. That is the dated sequence and the territorial result, from a tertiary library reference source.

The security reading of the same events is set out in “Should Israel Become a ‘Normal’ Nation?”, published in The Washington Quarterly in October 2010 and hosted by Columbia International Affairs Online, which frames Israeli strategic posture as the product of sustained threat perception rather than of territorial appetite. Two readings of one dated action, from two sources of different type.

The counting convention that followed 1967 shapes every population comparison built on it. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics reported Israel’s resident population at about 10.148 million in September 2025, of whom roughly 7.758 million were counted as Jews and others and 2.130 million as Arabs, with the remainder foreign residents. That total includes East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers, a scope choice the Bureau makes and international monitors do not, which is why two figures for the same territory can both be correct and differ.

Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), reviewing the Bureau’s yearbook from 1967 onward, document when each of those choices was made: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories”, settlement localities entered the count of Israeli localities by 1983, and the separate territories chapter was removed in 1997. The authors call this trend normalization, their own analytic framing. The dates are the record; the framing is theirs.

What does Israel’s own record state about restraint and review?

The IDF’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported more than 1,000 incidents from the Gaza war identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism as of 3 August 2024, out of which 74 criminal investigations had been opened. Both are the military’s own counts of its own processes, not independently verified.

The threshold that produces those counts is stated in the same document, in the Corps’ own words: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The 74 are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions.

The stated standard sits in the IDF’s published ethical code, which requires under Purity of Arms that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” That is doctrine: it records what the force requires of itself and carries no evidence about conduct in any particular case.

On humanitarian access the Israeli record is self-reported and stated in tonnages. COGAT’s July 2026 situation report records 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, with tonnages resting on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private-sector providers rather than weighing at the crossings. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 19 August 2025 that it had delivered over 1.9 million tons of aid since the start of the war, a floor rather than an exact figure. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 14 September 2025 that 207 hostages had returned or been recovered, 148 alive and 59 deceased, with 48 remaining in captivity. Every figure in this paragraph is a party’s own count of its own activity.

Does news framing attribute agency to one side more often?

CAMERA, coding the headlines of over 2,500 BBC News articles published between 7 October 2023 and 7 October 2025, reports that 35% were critical of Israel against 11% critical of Hamas. CAMERA is an advocacy monitoring organization and performed the coding itself against its own judgment of what counts as critical, so the share is its own count, not an independently replicated measurement.

The same tally records 45 headlines featuring claims of genocide, famine or starvation in Gaza across those 24 months, and 21 uses of the words starving or starvation in headlines. CAMERA’s earlier 2023 count took a different measure of attention, dividing the combined population of the countries covered by CNN’s 99 new Middle East articles from July to September 2023 to produce a figure of 324,316 Israelis and Palestinians per article. That is CAMERA’s own calculation from its own article count and World Bank population data.

Volume and direction are two different measurements, and the coding question underneath both is narrower still: whether a headline names an actor or removes one. The Institute’s own study of how Gaza-war headlines name the agent of violence takes up that question, and its reading of how the most-watched explainers frame the conflict takes up the video format.

No peer-reviewed measurement of agency attribution in war headlines appears in this record. The framing counts available for this question come from monitoring organizations that state an advocacy mission, and they must be read as those organizations’ own coding.

Why do younger Americans hold this view most strongly?

The Yale Youth Poll’s Fall 2025 national survey of US registered voters recorded 10% of voters aged 18 to 34 agreeing with all three antisemitic statements it tested, against 2% of voters 65 and over, and reported that younger voters were more likely both to hold those attitudes and to hold anti-Israel views. Two-thirds of all voters rejected all three statements.

The three statements were that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America, that it is appropriate to boycott Jewish American-owned businesses to protest the war in Gaza, and that Jews have too much power. About one in five young respondents supported boycotting Jewish-owned businesses over the war. These are measured shares of overt agreement only.

The partisan split moved on a similar timetable in Gallup’s series. In February 2023, Democrats sympathized more with the Palestinians (49%) than the Israelis (38%) for the first time in the trend; by February 2025, Republicans stood at 75% with the Israelis and Democrats at 59% with the Palestinians. Across the same 2025 reading, 55% of US adults favored establishing an independent Palestinian state, in line with readings since 2020.

On exposure, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2025) ran 10 TikTok profiles posing as 15-year-olds plus Rumble accounts over 14 days, yielding over 5,500 recommended videos, and reports that a profile of a 15-year-old boy interested in male-lifestyle-influencer content was shown antisemitic conspiracy theories within about an hour, with stickers, sounds and comment sections bridging benign videos to overt content. Rumble surfaced more overt antisemitic material from the outset. That is a structured organizational audit of what a feed serves, not a measurement of what a viewer comes to believe.

Does a party’s perceived power change how its actions are judged?

Hadar, Halevy, Cohen, Apfelbaum and Chan (2026), in American Psychologist, report converging support across six national samples (the United States, Mexico, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland) for a model in which perceived Jewish power, defined as perceived control over valued resources, is associated with antisemitism through two routes. The finding is correlational, and the entry is drawn from the published abstract.

The two routes are what make the model relevant to a characterization applied from both political directions. Among people who support social hierarchy, perceived power registers as a threat to ingroup dominance; among people who oppose hierarchy, it registers as a threat to egalitarian ideals. The authors present that as an account of why antisemitism appears at opposing ends of the ideological spectrum.

Bilewicz, Cohen and Feinberg (2026), reviewing the psychological literature in the same journal, argue that antisemitism does not fit standard models of stereotyping, power and minority status, because the trope attributes high status and hidden power rather than low status. Dong, Shih and Pittinsky (2026) extend that argument conceptually, proposing that positive stereotypes such as high intelligence and financial achievement reinforce prejudice through othering, social alienation and scapegoating. That paper is a mechanism framework and reports no measured figures.

One study in this record bounds the mechanism rather than extending it. Keller and Shan (2026), across three studies in China including a survey of white-collar workers and an investment-scenario experiment, found that perceived Jewish financial success did not trigger antisemitism there: managers described as adhering to Chinese views of Jewish managerial behavior were rated more profitable and more ethical, an effect mediated by how strongly the behavior was perceived as Jewish. The perceived-power route is culturally contingent, not automatic.

None of these studies measures the aggressor characterization directly. They measure perceived power, threat attribution and antisemitism, and the connection to how a state’s actions are judged is an inference the reader is left to weigh against that limit.

Where do analysts disagree about the aggressor characterization?

Four publications in this record characterize the same conflict in opposite terms, and each measures a different period, which is the first thing to establish before weighing any of them against another.

The oldest branch of the disagreement is historical and has two named poles. Benny Morris, in the 2004 second edition of “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,” works from Israeli military and state archives, carries roughly 700,000 as his own displacement estimate for 1948, and attributes the exodus to causes that varied by locality and phase, rejecting both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. Ilan Pappé, in “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine” (2006), argues that the same displacement was planned ethnic cleansing. These are two scholarly positions on one archival record, dated and named.

Where the record thins is in the middle. Of the four publications above, the two arguing an aggression frame carry no stated publication year on the records consulted, and the two arguing a defensive-operations reading are research-institute publications rather than peer-reviewed work. The Jerusalem Center’s own page states that its two central inputs, the Gaza health ministry total and Israel’s fighter estimate, have not been independently confirmed. No peer-reviewed study in this record measures the characterization itself; the peer-reviewed work measures attitudes, exposure and casualties in specified operations.

Does this perception coincide with shifts in attitudes toward Jews?

Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026), across three preregistered studies (N = 373, 243 and 493), report a model that accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association between antisemitism and those attitudes. The design is correlational mediation, and the entry is drawn from the published abstract.

Two null results in the same paper narrow the finding. Conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate the association, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results. The authors also report that Democrats, compared with Republicans, expressed less antisemitism but stronger anti-Israel attitudes and greater endorsement of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist conspiracy beliefs.

Enstad (2026) measures one specific framing in two nationally representative Norwegian surveys (Study 1 N = 1,575, and a preregistered replication, Study 2 N = 1,653): endorsement of Holocaust inversion, the belief that Israel treats Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated during the Second World War. In both studies, endorsement was associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews, with refusal to take a stance against such aggression, and with refusal to answer questions measuring blatant antisemitic prejudice. The replication confirmed the first study.

Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) locate a second pathway in British samples primed with war-in-Gaza material, in which conservative political orientation was negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people, an identity-based route the authors describe as conflating attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward Jews.

All three are measured associations in survey and experimental samples, reported with the authors’ own caveats. None of them tests whether the aggressor characterization produces the attitudes it travels with, or the reverse.

Methodology and limitations

This report assembles the published records offered in support of a perception and measures the perception itself where survey data exist. Four source types carry the findings, each labelled where it appears: primary and official records, including Israeli statistical releases and Israeli military publications; peer-reviewed research; named survey organizations; and research and monitoring organizations that state a mission.

Party-published counts are the largest category here and are attributed accordingly. The Gaza death total is the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s own count, relayed in the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief and cited to the ministry that measured it. The Israeli casualty, aid, hostage, investigation and doctrine figures are the Israeli government’s and military’s own counts of their own activity and processes, none independently verified. COGAT states that its tonnages rest on self-declaration by suppliers rather than weighing at the crossings. Where a ratio is derived from two party counts, the differing end dates are stated with it.

Three limits sit on the survey evidence. Gallup’s sympathies question is a forced choice between two named parties, so it measures relative sympathy and nothing about policy views, and Gallup’s own 2018 methodology article documents that question placement within a survey changes the shares produced. The Yale Youth Poll measured overt agreement with three specific statements, not the full distribution of opinion. Harber and colleagues (2026), Enstad (2026), Ozer and colleagues (2025), Hadar and colleagues (2026), Keller and Shan (2026) and Dong and colleagues (2026) are carried from published abstracts, and every association reported from them is correlational.

Three absences are part of the finding. No survey in this record measures the share of people who attribute the characterization to a particular reason. No peer-reviewed measurement of agency attribution in war headlines appears here, so the framing counts come from monitoring organizations that coded the material themselves against their own criteria. Two of the four publications that argue an aggression frame carry no stated publication year on the records consulted, and the 1967 sequence is available here from a tertiary library reference guide that carries no year either.

Conclusion

Two viewers of the same footage reach for opposite words, and the question is whether the record settles which word fits. It does not converge on a word. It converges on which quantities each side publishes, and on how far apart those quantities are.

What the record does establish is a set of measured facts that fit together into one portrait. The movement in American sympathy is real and steep, 17 Gallup points in fifteen years to the lowest reading in 25 years of that trend. The disparity in recorded deaths is large and one-sided at roughly 43 to 1, and both of its numbers were published by parties to the conflict rather than by an independent counter. Israel’s own record documents a stated ethical code, more than 1,000 incidents referred and 74 investigations opened, and aid tonnages it declared itself, alongside the threshold that determines how many of those referrals become investigations at all. The framing counts that circulate come from organizations that state a mission and did their own coding. The age gradient is fivefold, 10% against 2%. And in three preregistered studies the characterization travels with a measured set of attitudes toward Jews that accounts for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists sitting in the middle of the path.

That last measurement is where the question stops being about one conflict. A word arrives in a conversation before any of these counts do, and Hadar and colleagues report across six national samples that a party perceived as powerful is judged by a different standard from one perceived as weak, while Keller and Shan find the same success stereotype producing no hostility at all in China. So when the label lands ahead of the numbers, what is it carrying with it, and how much of what follows was already decided by the perception of power rather than by the count?

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Gaza’s population decline measure the death toll?

No, and the body that published it says so. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief for the end of 2025 reports a decline of approximately 254,000 people, or 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates, and attributes it to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration together. The same brief separately reports 70,942 deaths, attributed to the Palestinian Ministry of Health rather than measured by the Bureau.

How fast did antisemitic online content rise after 7 October 2023?

Sear and Johnson (2023), a preprint mapping hate-and-extremism communities across 26 platforms, report that antisemitic hate rose almost instantaneously in the minutes following the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, before Israel had responded, and that Islamophobia rose to a much lesser extent. The same work describes a hate-community core of roughly 50 million individuals with direct online access to more than a billion mainstream community members.

Do recommender algorithms drive exposure to this content?

The measured effect is real but partial. Kalra (2025), a preprint reporting an experiment with about 8 million users of a large video platform in India, found that replacing the engagement-ranking feed with random content reduced toxic posts viewed by 27% while overall usage fell about 35%, with treated users sharing a higher proportion of the toxic posts they did see. Haroon and colleagues (2023), in PNAS, found problematic-channel recommendations on YouTube at a maximum of 2.5% of recommendations, encountered by 36.1% of audited accounts.

Was the online conversation during the war coordinated?

Elmas and colleagues (2026), a preprint analyzing 4,570,633 tweets from 1,521,433 users between 1 September and 15 December 2023, identified 11 coordinated groups involving 541 accounts, using low-complexity tactics and receiving little engagement from non-coordinated accounts; of 191 highly amplified coordinated posts, 12 were assessed as misleading. Ng and Carley (2023), across six political and social activism events, found synchronization predominantly organic rather than bot-driven.

Does rising search interest in antisemitism measure how much of it there is?

No. Google Trends data for the query “antisemitism” in United States web search shows indexed annual averages rising from about 5 in 2015 to 38 in 2025, with the highest sustained level after October 2023. The index measures search attention within one query, region and date range, and is not a measure of prevalence of antisemitism or of antisemitic content.

Why do the population figures for the same territory differ between sources?

Because the scope choices differ and are documented. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s resident total of about 10.148 million as of September 2025. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza in its 2017 census, the most recent full census, using administrative estimates for East Jerusalem because it could not be directly enumerated. Every later total in either series is a projection off a different measured base.

Sources

• Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2025. The Gaza Terror Offensive, 1 August to 5 September 2024. BESA Center situation report. besacenter.org. Research institute, not peer-reviewed.
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