Data Reportby The Hanover InstituteNovember 16, 2026

What is the IHRA definition of antisemitism, and where does anti-Zionism fit? The 2016 text beside its two rivals

IHRA’s 2016 definition is two sentences, with 11 examples on a separate line. How it and two rival texts treat Israel, Zionism and criticism.

What is the IHRA definition of antisemitism, and where does anti-Zionism fit? The 2016 text beside its two rivals

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) adopted, at its Plenary in Bucharest on 26 May 2016, a “non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism” that opens: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews.” Most readers bring a plainer question to the text: does opposing Zionism count as antisemitism under it? The two adopted sentences do not mention Israel. The 11 illustrations printed after them on a separate line do, hedged “taking into account the overall context,” and the paragraph that introduces the Israel material adds that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” The website of the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, launched in 2021 with 210 scholars as initial signatories, states in its FAQ that the IHRA text “blurs the difference between antisemitic speech and legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism.”

Key Findings

  • The IHRA Plenary adopted on 26 May 2016 a two-sentence “non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism” that names Jews, their property, Jewish community institutions and religious facilities, and names no state (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 2016).
  • IHRA’s 11 illustrative examples follow the adoption sentence on their own line, “To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations,” and are introduced as cases that “could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to” the list (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 2016).
  • IHRA’s own adoption roll names 48 UN member states, from the United Kingdom on 12 December 2016 to the Dominican Republic on 24 August 2026, and IHRA publishes no total (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 2016).
  • The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, launched on 25 March 2021 and “Initially signed by 210 scholars,” proposes itself “as an alternative to the IHRA Definition” (Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, 2021).
  • Annotators applying the IHRA definition labelled 1,250 of 6,941 English-language tweets about Jews, Israel and antisemitism, or 18%, antisemitic, in posts from January 2019 to December 2021 (Jikeli, Karali, Miehling and Soemer, 2023, preprint).

What does the IHRA working definition of antisemitism say?

The IHRA working definition runs to two sentences, adopted by the Plenary in Bucharest on 26 May 2016 as a “non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism.” In full: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

The decision itself reads, in IHRA’s English text: “On 26 May 2016, the Plenary in Bucharest decided to:” followed by “Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism:”. IHRA publishes the text in 29 language versions and states on the same page that “in the event of any discrepancies, the English translation takes precedence.”

The qualifier “non-legally binding” appears in at least three places in IHRA’s own presentation: in the adoption sentence, in the lede of the web page carrying the text, and in the filename of IHRA’s two-page typeset PDF, which is headed “IHRA non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism.” IHRA is an intergovernmental organization of 35 Member Countries, and its Plenary is the body that took the decision.

The instrument ties criminality to national law rather than to itself. Its closing paragraph states: “Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries).” On that sentence, an antisemitic act acquires criminal status through a legislature’s own statute, and the Plenary’s 2016 decision creates no offence.

The two adopted sentences name Jews, Jewish and non-Jewish individuals, their property, Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. They name no state, no territory and no political movement. Israel enters the instrument in the material printed after the definition: a framing paragraph and a list of contemporary examples. The definition’s core term, “a certain perception of Jews,” is not glossed further in the adopted text, and its second sentence describes where manifestations are directed rather than what content makes them antisemitic. Everything the instrument says about Israel, Zionism or self-determination therefore sits outside the two sentences the decision quotes.

Who says the definition brands anti-Zionism as antisemitic, and since when?

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism was launched on 25 March 2021 with 210 scholars as its initial signatories, and the FAQ on its website states that the IHRA Definition “blurs the difference between antisemitic speech and legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism.” The Declaration offers itself, in its own words, “as an alternative to the IHRA Definition.”

The Declaration’s publisher states on its own page that it “has now more than 400 signatories.” No state, parliament or intergovernmental organization adopted it. Its authority is the standing of the scholars who signed it, and it describes itself as non-legally binding. The preamble pairs its critique with an offer: “Institutions that have already adopted the IHRA Definition can use our text as a tool for interpreting it.”

The preamble’s own critique rests partly on a count. It states that the IHRA Definition “includes 11 ‘examples’ of antisemitism, 7 of which focus on the State of Israel.” Part of that checks directly against IHRA’s text. The examples number eleven on IHRA’s own web page, and IHRA’s framing paragraph does say that manifestations of antisemitism “might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” A description of the IHRA instrument as reaching Israel-related speech is an accurate description of its examples.

The count of seven is different in kind. It is the Jerusalem Declaration’s own allocation of the eleven examples, and IHRA’s text states no such figure. A text parse of IHRA’s own typeset PDF returns the examples as unnumbered bullets, while its web page renders them 01 to 11, so any grouping of the eleven into Israel-related and other examples is an act of reading performed by whoever does the grouping. The count of seven belongs to the Jerusalem Declaration, dated 2021, in its own words.

The Declaration also sets its own Israel-related limits. Its section B, headed “examples that, on the face of it, are antisemitic,” includes guideline 7: “Holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s conduct or treating Jews, simply because they are Jewish, as agents of Israel.” Its preamble instructs that guidelines 6 to 15 “should be taken together,” each read “in the light of the others and always with a view to context.” Measured surveys of how attitudes toward Zionism track attitudes toward Jews are collected in the Institute’s report on anti-Zionism and antisemitism.

Were the eleven examples adopted along with the definition?

IHRA’s 2016 decision quotes two sentences after its adoption clause, and the examples follow on a separate line: “To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations:”. The adoption clause, “Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism:”, closes on a colon, and the two-sentence definition is the text that sits inside the decision’s quotation marks.

In IHRA’s English page and in its own two-page PDF, the sequence runs in the same order: the decision sentence, the quoted definition, then the line introducing illustrations, then a framing paragraph, then the list. The two copies agree word for word. The verb attached to the examples is “may serve as illustrations,” and the stated purpose is “To guide IHRA in its work.”

IHRA’s FAQ on the same page describes the process in these words: “The experts in the IHRA’s Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial built international consensus around a non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism, which was then adopted by the Plenary, the IHRA’s decision-making body made up of representatives from all IHRA Member Countries.” The FAQ names the definition as the object of adoption and does not separately mention the examples.

Whether the examples share the definition’s adopted status is the question on which readings of the instrument most often divide, and the layout is the evidence on which they divide. The Jerusalem Declaration’s 2021 preamble treats the examples as part of what it calls “the IHRA Definition,” stating that it “includes 11 ‘examples’.” The adopting body’s own sequence places the decision, the definition and the examples in three distinct positions on the page.

A reader can set the two sentences side by side, in the order IHRA prints them:

  1. “Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism:”
  2. “To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations:”

The first introduces the definition. The second introduces the list. Neither sentence states the relationship of the list to the decision, and IHRA’s FAQ, quoted above, adds no sentence on it.

Which IHRA examples mention Israel, and how are they hedged?

IHRA’s 2016 text introduces its list with two hedges: the examples “could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to” what follows. The first hedge makes each example context-dependent; the second makes the list non-exhaustive. An example quoted without either reads as a rule, which the introducing sentence does not make it.

The full introducing sentence reads: “Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:”. The list covers settings from the workplace to religious life, and Israel appears in several entries.

Two entries sit next to each other in the list and are best read together, because the second takes its pronoun from the first:

“Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.”

“Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”

The “it” in the second example refers to the State of Israel named in the first. Quoted alone, the double-standards example points at nothing in its own words. The first example also carries an internal structure: the general category is “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination,” and the racist-endeavor claim follows “e.g.” as one instance of it.

IHRA’s web page numbers the examples 01 to 11, while a text parse of the PDF returns them as bullets, so the instrument’s own text supplies no stable numbering. Each example is identified here by its wording.

The two examples above are the ones most often quoted when the definition is applied to anti-Zionist argument, and neither contains the word “Zionism.” Read with the introducing sentence, the racist-endeavor example describes a claim that could, in context, be one manifestation of antisemitism, in a list that does not claim to be complete. The examples also sit beside a framing paragraph, set out in the next section, that limits how Israel-related material is to be read.

Does the definition count criticism of Israel as antisemitic?

IHRA’s 2016 framing paragraph answers in two sentences that travel together: “Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” The first opens the door to Israel-related cases; the second sets a comparison test for criticism.

Each half carries a qualifier. The first says manifestations “might include” targeting of Israel, and only of Israel “conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” The second is categorical (“cannot be regarded”) but conditional on comparability: criticism “similar to that leveled against any other country.” Quoting the first half alone presents the instrument as reaching criticism of Israel generally; quoting the second alone presents it as excluding Israel from scope. The text does neither.

The comparison test in the carve-out mirrors the double-standards example quoted above, which refers to behavior “not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” Both measure Israel-related speech against how other states are treated.

The Jerusalem Declaration (2021) addresses the same terrain with different wording. Its guideline 15 states that political speech “does not have to be measured, proportional, tempered, or reasonable” to be protected under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that criticism “that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a ‘double standard’, is not, in and of itself, antisemitic.” Its guideline 13 adds: “even if contentious, it is not antisemitic, in and of itself, to compare Israel with other historical cases, including settler-colonialism or apartheid.” Both guidelines sit in section C, headed “examples that, on the face of it, are not antisemitic.”

The two texts therefore use the double-standard concept in opposite directions. IHRA lists applying double standards to Israel as a possible example of antisemitism, in context. The Jerusalem Declaration lists criticism “reflecting a ‘double standard’” as not antisemitic in and of itself. Both qualify their statements, IHRA with “taking into account the overall context” and the Declaration with “in and of itself” and “on the face of it.”

How do the texts phrase the Jewish right to self-determination?

Israel’s Knesset enacted in 2018 the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, whose clause 1(b) describes Israel as “the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.” The Knesset publishes the English text as an unofficial translation. IHRA’s example and the Jerusalem Declaration’s guideline use the same concept in different terms.

Text Wording on self-determination Source
IHRA illustrative example, 2016 “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination” International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, 2016
Basic Law, clause 1(c), 2018 “The realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People.” Knesset, 2018 (unofficial translation)
Jerusalem Declaration guideline 10, 2021 “Denying the right of Jews in the State of Israel to exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews, in accordance with the principle of equality.” Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, 2021

The three formulations differ in subject and scope. IHRA’s example speaks of “the Jewish people” and their right to self-determination, without naming a territory or a form. The Basic Law places the right “in the State of Israel” and states it is “exclusive to the Jewish People.” The Jerusalem Declaration speaks of “Jews in the State of Israel,” of a right “to exist and flourish, collectively and individually,” and attaches the qualifier “in accordance with the principle of equality.” The Declaration lists its guideline 10 in section B, as an example that, “on the face of it,” is antisemitic.

The Jerusalem Declaration also states, in guideline 12, that it is not antisemitic to support “arrangements that accord full equality to all inhabitants ‘between the river and the sea’, whether in two states, a binational state, unitary democratic state, federal state, or in whatever form.” Set beside guideline 10, the Declaration separates the existence and flourishing of Jews in Israel from any particular constitutional form of the state.

The Basic Law contains no equality clause and no individual-rights clause; that is a fact about the enacted text and carries no finding about how the State treats anyone. Clause 7 adds that “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value.” The definitions’ treatment of self-determination is compared at greater length in the Institute’s reading of three definitions on the Jewish right to a state.

How many governments have adopted or endorsed the definition?

IHRA’s own adoption roll names 48 UN member states, each with a date, the earliest the United Kingdom on 12 December 2016 and the latest the Dominican Republic on 24 August 2026. IHRA publishes no total and no percentage; 48 is a count of names on the roll, read on 16 November 2026.

The roll carries its own disclaimer about what the names represent. Its footnote reads: “Different countries and organizations will use different terminology, including adopt, endorse, embrace, recognize, support, and so on.” A government that “endorses” the text and a government that “adopts” it may have taken different domestic steps, and the roll groups both under one list. A sentence stating that 48 countries “adopted” the definition attributes a uniform act to a list whose publisher describes several.

The roll and IHRA’s membership are separate universes. IHRA is an intergovernmental organization of 35 Member Countries, whose representatives make up the Plenary that took the 2016 decision. The adoption roll lists UN member states that have taken some domestic action on the text, a group that is not defined by IHRA membership. The two figures count different things.

The span of the roll, from December 2016 to August 2026, shows adoptions continuing across more than nine years after the Plenary decision. The roll records dates, not the instrument used, so it carries no information on whether a given state acted by statute, cabinet decision, ministerial statement or parliamentary resolution.

What the roll can support is narrow and checkable: a named state appears on IHRA’s list with a named date. What a reader needs from the state’s own records, in each case, is the act itself, since the closing paragraph of the IHRA text ties criminal consequences to acts “so defined by law,” and the non-legally binding status of the 2016 text means any domestic effect comes from the domestic instrument.

Why does Israel’s ministry count 1,216 adopters, not 48?

Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism reported that 1,216 entities had ratified the IHRA working definition by the end of 2023, with 97 new adoptees during the year. The figure is the ministry’s own count, compiled with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel, and is not independently verified.

The ministry’s figure and IHRA’s roll count different universes, on different terms. IHRA’s roll names UN member states. The ministry counts “entities,” a category the reported total does not restrict to states. The ministry’s verb is “ratified”; IHRA’s footnote lists “adopt, endorse, embrace, recognize, support, and so on.” The two figures were also fixed at different times: the ministry’s at the end of 2023, IHRA’s roll as read in November 2026 with a latest entry dated August 2026.

Because the universes differ, the two figures are not rival totals for one quantity and are neither summed nor set against each other. The 48 answers how many UN member states appear on the adopting body’s roll. The 1,216, on the ministry’s own reporting, answers how many entities of all kinds the ministry counts as having ratified the text.

The ministry published the count in The State of Antisemitism Report for 2023, an annual review produced in cooperation with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel and drawn from the ministry’s own incident database. Adoption of the IHRA definition appears there as one of the ministry’s tracked indicators, alongside its own programme activity. The ministry is a body of the Israeli government, which places its count in the category of a party’s own reported total rather than an independent tally.

The 97 new adoptees in 2023 are also the ministry’s own count, three of them countries (Latvia, Croatia and Panama). On the ministry’s own figures, the 1,216 comprises 45 states, 514 nonfederal government entities, 345 institutes of higher learning and 312 organizations. A reader seeking any one adoption has to go to the adopting entity’s own record of its decision.

Where does the Nexus Document draw the line on Zionism?

The Nexus Task Force’s Nexus Document, in its June 2024 revision, states under “What is Not Antisemitic?”, item 1: “As a general rule, criticism of Zionism and Israel, opposition to Israel’s policies, or nonviolent political action directed at the State of Israel and/or its policies should not, as such, be deemed antisemitic.” IHRA’s text never uses the word “Zionism”; the Nexus Document names it in a stated rule, as the Jerusalem Declaration does in its guidelines 8 and 12.

The document sets a limit on the other side. Under “What is Antisemitic?”, item 9 reads: “It is antisemitic to treat Israel differently solely because it is a Jewish state, using standards different than those applied to other countries.” Item 2 on the same list adds: “Whether speech or conduct about Zionism and Israel is antisemitic should be based on the standards for speech or conduct that apply to antisemitic behavior in general.” The two lists are numbered separately, so an item number identifies a sentence only together with the list it sits in.

Item 9 and IHRA’s double-standards example address the same comparison with different conditions. IHRA’s example refers to “requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation,” read in “the overall context.” The Nexus item adds a motive condition: different treatment “solely because it is a Jewish state.” Under “What is Not Antisemitic?”, item 5 reads in part: “Paying disproportionate attention to Israel and treating Israel differently than other countries is not prima facie proof of antisemitism.”

The document gives its own provenance. It states that it derives “from a White Paper drafted by the Nexus Task Force” and is “designed as a guide for policymakers and community leaders.” Its trailer, in the publisher’s PDF, reads: “The White Paper was published in December 2020. The Nexus Document was published in February 2021 and updated in June 2024.” The quotations here are from that June 2024 revision. The Task Force is stated to be affiliated with the Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College, and the Nexus Project states on its own site that it “is fiscally sponsored by the New Israel Fund.” Like the Jerusalem Declaration, it is a non-binding document adopted by no state or intergovernmental body.

How do researchers apply the IHRA examples to online posts?

Annotators in a study led by Gunther Jikeli labelled 1,250 of 6,941 English-language tweets on Jews, Israel and antisemitism, or 18%, as antisemitic under the IHRA definition, in posts dated January 2019 to December 2021. The study, by Jikeli, Karali, Miehling and Soemer (2023), is a preprint, and its figures here come from its abstract.

Source: Jikeli, Karali, Miehling and Soemer, 2023, preprint (abstract-sourced). n = 6,941; the second slice is 6,941 minus 1,250.

The study is presented as a guide to high-quality annotation and a labelled dataset, which places the IHRA text in a specific working role: a coding scheme that annotators apply post by post. The corpus was drawn on three subjects at once, Jews, Israel and antisemitism, so Israel-related posts sit inside the 6,941 alongside posts about Jews and posts about antisemitism.

The abstract reports one overall share. It gives no separate rate for Israel-related tweets and no count of how often the Israel-related examples were the basis for a label, so the 18% carries no information on how the examples examined in the sections above performed against anti-Zionist content specifically. The share is a property of this sample of 6,941 tweets, selected on these subjects, and not a rate for English-language social media as a whole.

The fieldwork period also bounds the finding. The posts end in December 2021, before the October 2023 attack and the war that followed, so the measured share describes discourse in the three years before those events. It is a measurement of how one research team’s annotators classified a defined corpus under one definition, and a different definition applied to the same posts could yield a different share.

Methodology and limitations

The evidence here is drawn from three source types. Primary and official records: the IHRA working definition (2016) and its adoption roll, read on 16 November 2026 in two copies published by IHRA itself, an English web page and a two-page typeset PDF, which agree word for word; the Knesset’s 2018 Basic Law, in the Knesset’s own English translation, which it labels unofficial, with amendments through 1 May 2022; and the State of Antisemitism Report for 2023 by Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, a government body’s self-reported count. Instruments without adoption by any public body: the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (2021), read in the signatories’ web text and PDF, quoted from the PDF unless stated; and the Nexus Document, quoted from the publisher’s June 2024 PDF revision. Peer-review status: the tweet study by Jikeli and colleagues (2023) is a preprint, and its figures come from its abstract.

Each instrument is quoted for its own words and is cited for nothing beyond them. No application of any example to a particular campaign, utterance or person is attributed to the instrument.

Several limits attach to the record. The Jerusalem Declaration’s two copies differ in six places, including punctuation and the name of the 1948 Universal Declaration; the Nexus Document’s two copies differ on the White Paper’s month (December or November 2020) and on several item wordings. The February 2021 original of the Nexus Document could not be retrieved, so nothing here is attributed to it. IHRA’s adoption roll publishes no total, and the ministry’s 1,216 is the ministry’s own count, not independently verified. The tweet study reports no separate share for Israel-related posts, and its fieldwork ended in December 2021.

Conclusion

So does opposing Zionism count as antisemitism under the IHRA definition? The two sentences the Plenary adopted in 2016 never mention Israel or Zionism. The Israel material sits after them: illustrations introduced on their own line, hedged “taking into account the overall context” and “not limited to,” framed by a paragraph that both admits the targeting of Israel “conceived as a Jewish collectivity” and excludes criticism “similar to that leveled against any other country.”

Across every axis measured, the texts converge on concepts and diverge on wording. All three name a self-determination or existence limit, and each states it differently: IHRA’s “the Jewish people,” the Basic Law’s “exclusive to the Jewish People,” the Jerusalem Declaration’s “in accordance with the principle of equality.” All three invoke a comparison with other states, and they turn it in different directions: IHRA lists double standards as a possible example, the Declaration clears criticism “reflecting a ‘double standard’” in and of itself, and the Nexus Document draws its line at different treatment “solely because it is a Jewish state.” The adoption picture splits the same way, with 48 names on IHRA’s roll and 1,216 entities on the Israeli ministry’s own count, two universes rather than one total.

The boundary that matters in practice is the one an annotator, a university or a ministry draws when it applies a hedged example to a real sentence. In one corpus coded against the IHRA text, 18% of posts crossed it. When institutions choose where that line falls, by which text and with which hedges kept or dropped, how much of what they record as antisemitism, and how much of what antisemitism feeds on, depends on the choice of wording itself?

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the IHRA definition create a criminal offence?

No. IHRA’s 2016 text states that “Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law,” naming Holocaust denial and distribution of antisemitic materials “in some countries” as examples. Criminal status comes from a national statute, and the adoption sentence describes the definition as “non-legally binding.”

Does the IHRA text mention boycotts or BDS?

No. A search of the full IHRA text, definition, eleven examples and closing paragraphs, finds zero occurrences of boycott, divestment, sanction, BDS, goods, product or West Bank. Any reading of the definition on boycotts reasons from the self-determination and double-standards examples, since the text addresses boycotts nowhere.

What does the Jerusalem Declaration say about boycotts?

The Jerusalem Declaration’s guideline 14 (2021) states that boycott, divestment and sanctions “are commonplace, non-violent forms of political protest against states” and in the Israeli case “are not, in and of themselves, antisemitic.” Its preamble requires each guideline to be read “in the light of the others and always with a view to context,” so the guideline makes no statement about any particular campaign.

How does the Jerusalem Declaration define antisemitism?

The Declaration’s one-sentence definition (2021) reads: “Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).” It is set out alongside fifteen numbered guidelines in three sections, numbered continuously 1 to 15.

How does the Nexus Document define antisemitism?

The Nexus Document’s June 2024 revision defines antisemitism as “anti-Jewish beliefs, attitudes, actions or systemic conditions,” including “conditions that discriminate against Jews and significantly impede their ability to participate as equals.” Its scope extends to systemic conditions, a category neither the IHRA definition nor the Jerusalem Declaration names in its core sentence.

Which language version of the IHRA text governs?

IHRA publishes the definition in 29 language versions and states that “in the event of any discrepancies, the English translation takes precedence.” Quotations in this piece are from IHRA’s English web page and English PDF, which agree word for word.

Is the Jerusalem Declaration meant to replace the IHRA definition?

The Declaration’s 2021 preamble proposes itself “as an alternative to the IHRA Definition” and adds that institutions which have already adopted IHRA “can use our text as a tool for interpreting it.” It therefore presents two uses for itself: a substitute text, and an interpretive companion to the IHRA one.

Sources

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