On 19 July 2024 the International Court of Justice advised, by 11 votes to 4, that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (the Court’s term) “is unlawful”. That was the narrowest of the 4 majorities recorded across the 9 separately voted subparagraphs of the opinion. The obligation to cease new settlement activity carried 14 votes to 1, and the duty of other states not to recognise the situation carried 12 votes to 3. The opinion answered a request from the UN General Assembly rather than a case between two states. Israel’s own Supreme Court ordered settlers off registered private land in 1979 and again in 2011, on the facts of each case.
Key Findings
- The International Court of Justice held, by 11 votes to 4 on 19 July 2024, that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory “is unlawful”. By the same margin, it held that this presence must end “as rapidly as possible” (International Court of Justice, 2024).
- Four different majorities decided the 9 subparagraphs of paragraph 285 (International Court of Justice, 2024):
- unanimity on jurisdiction;
- 14 to 1 on settlements and reparation;
- 12 to 3 on the duties of states and international organizations;
- 11 to 4 on unlawful presence.
- Judge Tomka voted against the unlawful-presence finding but joined the majority on settlements, reparation and third-state duties. Vice-President Sebutinde voted against 8 of the 9 subparagraphs (International Court of Justice, 2024).
- Israel’s Supreme Court ruled 5 to 0 on 22 October 1979, in the Elon Moreh case, that one requisition order was invalid as to the petitioners’ plots. It expressly left Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention undecided (Israeli Supreme Court, 1979).
- On 2 August 2011 Israel’s Supreme Court issued a final order to evacuate the Migron outpost by 31 March 2012. The State had conceded that the land was registered private Palestinian property (Israeli Supreme Court, 2011, 2014).
What did the Court conclude about the occupation in July 2024?
The International Court of Justice held on 19 July 2024, by 11 votes to 4, that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory “is unlawful”. The finding sits in paragraph 285(3) of its advisory opinion. Fifteen judges voted, so the finding carried 11 of the 15 members of the bench.
Paragraph 285(4) carried the same margin of 11 to 4. It states that Israel is under an obligation “to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible.” The operative words name no calendar date.
The word “immediately” does appear in the dispositif, but in the next subparagraph, on settlements. Paragraph 285(5), carried 14 votes to 1, sets an obligation “to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers.” Paragraph 285(6), also 14 votes to 1, sets an obligation “to make reparation for the damage caused.” The opinion therefore uses two different time words for two different obligations, and each was carried by a different majority.
The dispositif is paragraph 285, and the Court voted on each of its subparagraphs separately. The opinion is published at ICJ Reports 2024, page 753. It closes with the attestation “Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative”, so the English quotations of the opinion in this report are from the governing text and not from a translation.
The holdings are the Court’s. What the record adds to them is the tally: how many of the 15 judges stood behind each sentence. That tally varies from subparagraph to subparagraph, as the sections below set out.
Who asked the Court whether the occupation is lawful, and when?
The UN General Assembly requested the opinion in resolution A/RES/77/247 of 30 December 2022. The International Court of Justice delivered its answer about 19 months later, on 19 July 2024 (International Court of Justice, 2024). The request asked the Court two questions on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.
On the core premise, the record is direct. The Court did conclude, by 11 votes to 4, that Israel’s continued presence in that territory is unlawful.
How the question reached the Court shapes what the answer is. The opinion arose under Article 65 of the Court’s Statute, which lets authorised organs ask for advisory opinions. It is not a contentious case, in which one state sues another and the Court decides between them. No state filed the 2024 proceedings against Israel, and Israel did not appear as a respondent in the sense that a contentious case uses the word.
Before reaching the merits, the Court took two preliminary votes, both recorded in paragraph 285:
- Jurisdiction (subparagraph 1). The Court found unanimously that it had jurisdiction to give the opinion.
- Whether to answer (subparagraph 2). The Court decided by 14 votes to 1 to comply with the request. Vice-President Sebutinde cast the vote against.
A court with jurisdiction can still decline to give an advisory opinion, so the second vote records a separate choice. One judge would have declined to answer at all.
The procedure also explains a feature of the dispositif. The opinion identifies obligations for Israel, for all states, for international organizations and for the UN’s political organs. It does this because the General Assembly asked about legal consequences generally, not about a dispute between two named parties. The same Court was hearing a contentious case concerning Gaza in 2024, South Africa v. Israel, under different rules of procedure. The section on binding effect sets the two side by side.
Did the judges agree on every part of the ruling?
No. The International Court of Justice decided the ruling by 4 different majorities.
The International Court of Justice decided the 9 subparagraphs of paragraph 285 with these splits: unanimity, 14 to 1, 12 to 3 and 11 to 4.
The finding that Israel’s presence is unlawful, and the obligation to end it, drew the fewest votes in the opinion (International Court of Justice, 2024).
The four majorities group the subparagraphs as follows:
- Unanimous: jurisdiction, subparagraph (1).
- 14 to 1: the decision to comply with the request, subparagraph (2); ending settlement activity and evacuating settlers, (5); reparation, (6).
- 12 to 3: non-recognition and non-assistance by states, (7); the same duty for international organizations including the United Nations, (8); consideration of further action by the General Assembly and Security Council, (9).
- 11 to 4: unlawful presence, (3); the obligation to end it, (4).
The settlement and reparation findings drew 3 more votes than the finding that the presence itself is unlawful. The 14 to 1 margin is the one most easily attached to the whole opinion, and it describes subparagraphs (2), (5) and (6) only. Applied to paragraph 285(3), it would overstate the central holding by 3 judges.
The groupings also show that the judges did not divide along a single line. A judge could reject the unlawful-presence finding and still vote for the settlement obligation, and three judges did exactly that. The next section names them.
Which judges voted against the unlawfulness finding?
Four judges voted against paragraph 285(3): Vice-President Sebutinde and Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu, according to the dissents the International Court of Justice recorded on 19 July 2024. Those four did not vote together on the rest of the dispositif. Only one of them, Vice-President Sebutinde, voted against the settlement and reparation obligations.
| Judge | Voted against | Joined the majority on |
|---|---|---|
| Vice-President Sebutinde | Subparagraphs (2) to (9) | (1) jurisdiction |
| Judge Tomka | (3) and (4) | (1), (2), (5) to (9) |
| Judge Abraham | (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) | (1), (2), (5), (6) |
| Judge Aurescu | (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) | (1), (2), (5), (6) |
Source: International Court of Justice, 2024, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, paragraph 285.
Three patterns follow from the table:
- Judge Tomka dissented only on unlawful presence and the obligation to end it. He joined the majority on settlements, reparation, non-recognition, the duty of international organizations and further UN action.
- Judges Abraham and Aurescu voted identically. They dissented on unlawful presence and on all three third-party findings, and voted with the majority on settlements and reparation.
- Vice-President Sebutinde voted against every subparagraph after jurisdiction, including the decision to give the opinion at all. She appended a dissenting opinion.
This is why the margins move as they do. The 14 to 1 votes on settlements and reparation lost only Vice-President Sebutinde. The 12 to 3 votes on third-party duties lost her plus Judges Abraham and Aurescu. The 11 to 4 votes on unlawful presence lost those three plus Judge Tomka.
The judges are named here as the authors of their recorded votes, which the Court publishes in the dispositif. A recorded vote shows where a judge stood on each subparagraph. It does not show why, and no reasoning is attributed here to any dissenting judge beyond the vote itself.
Is the 2024 opinion binding on Israel?
The International Court of Justice gave the 2024 opinion under Article 65 of its Statute, on a General Assembly request. It is therefore an advisory opinion, not a judgment between parties. The Court’s own orders in South Africa v. Israel, issued the same year, attach “binding effect” to measures addressed to a party to a contentious case (International Court of Justice, 2024).
In its order of 26 January 2024, paragraph 83, the Court described how binding effect works in a contentious case. It wrote that orders under Article 41 of the Statute “have binding effect and thus create international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed.” In its order of 28 March 2024, paragraph 44, it cited Article 59 of the Statute: a judgment has “no binding force except between the parties.”
| Feature | Advisory opinion, 19 July 2024 | Orders in South Africa v. Israel, 2024 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| How the case began | General Assembly request, Article 65 | Application by South Africa against Israel | International Court of Justice, 2024 |
| Who is addressed | Israel, all states, international organizations, UN organs | Parties to the case only | International Court of Justice, 2024 |
| Binding effect stated | Not a judgment between parties | “binding effect” for parties addressed, Article 41 | International Court of Justice, 2024 |
The contrast is the Court’s own. The opinion uses the vocabulary of obligation: Israel is “under an obligation” to end its presence, and all states are “under an obligation not to recognize as legal” the situation. Its last subparagraph switches register, saying the General Assembly and Security Council “should consider” further action.
Those obligations are stated in an advisory proceeding with no respondent party. The 2024 opinion is therefore accurately described as the Court’s answer to the General Assembly’s questions. It is not accurately described as an order made against Israel, and the opinion itself contains no order addressed to Israel as a litigant.
Which obligations did the Court say Israel had breached?
Paragraph 274 of the International Court of Justice’s 2024 opinion names 2 obligations erga omnes, meaning obligations owed to the international community as a whole, among those it found Israel violated. They are respecting the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, and the prohibition on using force to acquire territory (International Court of Justice, 2024).
The Court’s wording, in full, is that “Among the obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the obligation arising from the prohibition of the use of force to acquire territory as well as certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”
The same paragraph opens by stating that “the obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga omnes.” The enumeration therefore has two layers:
- Named specifically: self-determination and the prohibition on acquiring territory by force.
- Named by category: “certain” obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. That sentence does not list which ones.
The erga omnes classification connects to the third-party findings. In paragraph 280, the Court tied the duty of international organizations to “the serious breaches of obligations erga omnes under international law.” The breaches named in paragraph 274 are the basis the Court gave for extending consequences beyond Israel. That reasoning carried 12 votes to 3, not 11 to 4.
The Court also addressed the length of the occupation, which began in 1967. It wrote: “The fact that an occupation is prolonged does not in itself change its legal status under international humanitarian law.” It added that “the passage of time does not release the occupying Power from the obligations that it bears, including the obligation to refrain from exercising acts of sovereignty.”
Read together, these passages show that the Court did not rest the unlawfulness finding on duration alone. Paragraph 274 locates the breaches in specific obligations. The passages on duration state that time neither ends an occupation’s legal character nor releases the occupying power from its duties.
What does the ruling ask of other states and the UN?
The International Court of Justice found by 12 votes to 3 that all states are “under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence” and “not to render aid or assistance in maintaining” it. The finding is paragraph 285(7) of its 2024 opinion. Vice-President Sebutinde and Judges Abraham and Aurescu dissented.
The reasoning sits in paragraph 279, which the Court wrote this way: “in view of the character and importance of the rights and obligations involved, all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”
The Court addressed three sets of actors beyond Israel, each by 12 votes to 3:
- States, under paragraph 285(7), as quoted above.
- International organizations, including the United Nations, under paragraph 285(8). Paragraph 280 extends “the duty of non-recognition specified above” to them.
- The General Assembly and Security Council, under paragraph 285(9). These organs “should consider the precise modalities and further action required.”
Paragraph 278 makes the state duty concrete. In their dealings with Israel, Member States must distinguish “between the territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.” The Court reasoned from its 1971 Namibia opinion, an earlier advisory opinion that set out third-state duties toward territory held unlawfully. What that distinction means in trade and treaty practice is examined in a separate report on third-state duties.
The margin matters for how these duties are reported. Judge Tomka, who dissented on unlawful presence, voted for all three third-party findings. Judges Abraham and Aurescu, who voted with the majority on settlements and reparation, voted against all three.
The third-party findings therefore carried 1 vote more than the unlawful-presence finding they depend on, and 2 votes fewer than the settlement obligation.
Does the ruling apply to Gaza and East Jerusalem?
The International Court of Justice treated the Occupied Palestinian Territory, East Jerusalem included, as “from a legal standpoint... a single territorial unit”. It also held that Israel’s obligations in Gaza after its 2005 withdrawal “remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control” (International Court of Justice, 2024).
On Gaza, the Court set out the factual premise first: “By 2005, Israel had completed the withdrawal of its army and the removal of the settlements in the Gaza Strip.” It then gave the legal consequence: “Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.”
The standard is graduated, not uniform. On the Court’s own wording, the obligations Israel bears in Gaza rise and fall with the control it exercises there. The settlement obligation in paragraph 285(5) has no current object in Gaza in the Court’s own account, since the Court records that the settlements there were removed by 2005.
East Jerusalem falls inside the single territorial unit. That places it within the duty in paragraph 278 to distinguish Israel’s territory from “the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967”. As the next section sets out, Israel’s own legislation treats Jerusalem differently.
The 2024 opinion is not the Court’s first on this territory. It cites the Court’s advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall throughout, and at paragraph 155 “reaffirms”, citing it, its conclusion on the settlements. The two are separate opinions, given 20 years apart in response to separate General Assembly requests:
- The 2004 opinion concerned the barrier.
- The 2024 opinion concerns the policies and practices of the occupation as a whole.
A finding from one is not a finding of the other. The vote margins reported here are the 2024 margins only. How the word “occupation” is defined and applied across the territory is the subject of a separate report on what the term designates.
What does Israel’s own record say about the territory in question?
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted about 10.148 million residents in September 2025 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025). This is an official count published by a party to the events. On the Bureau’s own stated scope, the total includes residents of East Jerusalem and West Bank settlers, a scope choice that differs from the international convention.
Read beside paragraph 278 of the 2024 opinion, the Bureau’s count draws the line differently. The Court asked states to distinguish Israel’s territory from territory occupied since 1967. Israel’s national population total counts residents of both inside one figure.
Israel’s statute book draws the same line differently. The Knesset’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Knesset, 2018) is quoted here from a translation the Knesset itself labels unofficial. Two clauses bear directly on the territory the Court addressed:
- Clause 3: “The complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.”
- Clause 7: “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.”
| Record | Text or figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| National population total | About 10.148 million, including East Jerusalem residents and settlers, the Bureau’s own count | Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025 |
| Basic Law, clause 3 | “The complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.” | Knesset, 2018 |
| Closed-area order, 1967 | “a closed military area”, entry and exit by permit only, COGAT’s own published instrument | COGAT, 2022 |
The military record runs on a third legal frame. COGAT, the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit that administers the permit regime and so a party to the events, published a permit instrument updated to 8 February 2022. Its opening clause rests on the Order Concerning Closed Areas (West Bank Area) (Amendment) (No. 34), 1967. Under that order, the area of Judea and Samaria “is a closed military area and not to be entered or exited without a permit issued on behalf of the military commander” (COGAT, 2022). The instrument records what COGAT authorised itself to issue as of that date, not conditions after it.
None of the three documents answers the opinion. The Basic Law dates from 2018 and the permit instrument from February 2022, both before the opinion. The Bureau’s 2025 release is a statistical count that makes no reference to it.
Has Israel’s Supreme Court ever ordered settlers off occupied land?
Yes. Israel’s Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ruled 5 to 0 on 22 October 1979 in the Elon Moreh case, HCJ 390/79. It declared Order of Possession 16/79 invalid as to the petitioners’ plots and ordered the respondents to vacate from those lands “the civilian settlers who settled on them” (Israeli Supreme Court, 1979).
The ground was specific to the facts. Deputy President Landau, who wrote the leading opinion, found that “the initiative came from the political echelons, which then reached out to the Chief of the General Staff for his professional opinion.” Applying a dominant-purpose test, he held that “the military consideration was subordinate to the primary, political decision to build the settlement.”
He added a second, independent ground: a military administration cannot create “‘facts on the ground’ for the purposes of its military needs that were in advance intended to exist past the end of the military rule.”
The same judgment set limits on what it decided, in three ways:
- Requisition in principle. Landau accepted that taking private land for a civilian settlement “is potentially justified under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations”, the international rules governing what an occupying army may requisition.
- The Beit El precedent. He distinguished, rather than overruled, the 1978 Beit El case, in which the Court had upheld such a requisition.
- The Geneva question. The Court left Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the provision on transferring an occupier’s population into occupied territory, undecided.
Two later rulings ordered outposts removed:
- Migron, HCJ 8887/06. On 2 August 2011 the Court issued “a final order requiring the State to evacuate the Outpost of Migron”, setting a deadline “until March 31, 2012.” The State conceded that the land was “registered lands under private Palestinian ownership.”
- Amona, HCJ 9949/08. On 25 December 2014 the Court ordered the outpost removed within two years. On 14 November 2016 it refused the government’s request for further delay (Israeli Supreme Court, 2011, 2014).
Both halves of this domestic record stand. Israel’s High Court has ordered settlers removed on findings of private ownership and improper purpose. In these judgments it did not hold settlement as such unlawful, a question the World Court’s 2024 opinion answered by its own majorities. How the treaty clause and Israel’s court record relate is examined in a separate report on settlements and occupation law.
Methodology and limitations
This report rests on three kinds of record, each labelled by type.
The International Court of Justice’s texts. The primary document is the advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, ICJ Reports 2024, page 753. It was read in full from the Court’s 107-page fascicle, whose English text the Court designates as authoritative.
- Vote tallies were counted from the dispositif in paragraph 285 and the dissents recorded there. They were taken from the opinion itself, not from the Court’s press release, which reproduces the conclusions without the margins.
- Separate opinions were not drawn on. No reasoning is therefore attributed to any judge beyond the recorded vote.
- Comparison documents. The three South Africa v. Israel orders of 26 January, 28 March and 24 May 2024 were read in full for the Court’s own statements on binding effect. The 28 March order is authoritative in French, so its English is a translation.
Israeli official records. These are labelled throughout as published by a party to the events:
- the Central Bureau of Statistics release of September 2025, whose total includes East Jerusalem residents and settlers on the Bureau’s stated scope;
- the Knesset’s 2018 Basic Law, in a translation the Knesset marks unofficial;
- COGAT’s permit instrument, updated to 8 February 2022, which predates the opinion and the events of October 2023.
Israeli Supreme Court judgments. No official English text exists for any of the three:
- Elon Moreh is quoted from the Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project’s unofficial translation, made from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press, and the Hebrew governs. That translation prints the date as October 10, 1979. 1 Cheshvan 5740 corresponds to 22 October 1979, the date used here.
- Migron is quoted from the Judicial Authority’s own translation, marked “subject to editorial and textual changes”.
- Amona exists in Hebrew only and is reported from the Law Library of Congress summary.
A recorded vote shows where a judge stood, not the reasoning behind the position. A domestic judgment decides the case before it and publishes no series or rate.
Conclusion
So what did the Court rule? By 11 votes to 4, the International Court of Justice advised that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful and must end “as rapidly as possible”. The answer came in an advisory proceeding the General Assembly started, not in a judgment against a respondent state.
The record behind that sentence has more than one layer:
- Majorities. The widest substantive majorities, 14 to 1, attach to ending settlement activity and to reparation, not to the presence finding.
- Third parties. The duties of other states and the UN carried 12 to 3.
- The judges. The four dissenters split three ways, and Judge Tomka rejected the central holding while backing the third-party duties.
- Gaza. The Court made Israel’s obligations there commensurate with effective control.
- Israel’s own records. Israel’s statistics count East Jerusalem residents and settlers inside the national total, and its Basic Law names united Jerusalem as the capital.
- Israel’s own courts. Its Supreme Court has ordered settlers off private land on the facts of particular cases since 1979, and kept the treaty question out of those rulings.
The opinion’s most quoted sentence is its least supported one in votes, and its most supported sentences concern settlements and reparation. A public argument about the occupation can rest on either. If it cited the full set of margins rather than the headline, would it describe a court that divided once, or a court that agreed on more than the headline suggests?
Frequently Asked Questions
In which language is the 2024 opinion authoritative?
The opinion of 19 July 2024 closes “Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative” (International Court of Justice, 2024). The English quotations of the opinion in this report therefore come from the governing text. The March 2024 order in South Africa v. Israel is the reverse case: its French text governs.
How does the wording on settlements differ from the wording on the presence itself?
Paragraph 285(5), carried 14 votes to 1, uses “cease immediately” for new settlement activity (International Court of Justice, 2024). Paragraph 285(4), carried 11 votes to 4, uses “as rapidly as possible” for ending the presence. The two obligations differ in both their time words and their margins.
Does Israeli law treat the Fourth Geneva Convention as binding in its courts?
In 1979 Deputy President Landau wrote that the Convention, “as part of treaty-based international law, it is not binding law in an Israeli Court”. He held that the Hague Regulations, as customary law, “do indeed bind the military administration” (Israeli Supreme Court, 1979). Justice Witkon added that the Convention “does apply, though... it is not ‘justiciable’ in this Court.”
Who carried the burden of proof in the Elon Moreh case?
Justice Witkon wrote in 1979 that “the burden is upon the respondents”. In his view, a commander’s assertion of military need is not a presumption: “We need not be convinced of the sincerity of the consideration, but rather of its correctness” (Israeli Supreme Court, 1979).
Did the Elon Moreh ruling annul the whole seizure?
No. Order 16/79 covered about 700 dunams, while the petitioners’ registered plots totalled about 125 dunams, and the annulment ran to their plots alone (Israeli Supreme Court, 1979). Order 17/79, covering the access road, drew no order, because none of the petitioners held ownership rights in the road lands.
Were the South Africa v. Israel orders addressed to anyone besides Israel?
All measures in the three 2024 orders are addressed to “The State of Israel”. Paragraph 44 of the 28 March order explains why: the Court can indicate measures only to the parties before it (International Court of Justice, 2024). In its reasoning, the Court separately called for the release of hostages “held since then by Hamas and other armed groups”.
Why did the vote counts in South Africa v. Israel fall from 15 to 13?
The bench changed size across the three orders: 17 judges in January, 16 in March and 15 in May 2024 (International Court of Justice, 2024). Thirteen of 15 in May is a larger share of the bench than 15 of 17 in January.
Sources
- COGAT, 2022. Status of Authorizations for entry of Palestinians into Israel; for their passage from Judea and Samaria into the Gaza Strip; and for their departure abroad. Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, Operations Department, updated to 08 February 2022. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/authorizationsforentry/en/Status%20of%20Authorizatios%2008.02.2022.pdf. Official record (a party’s own published instrument).
- International Court of Justice, 2024. Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024. ICJ Reports 2024, p. 753, requested by General Assembly resolution A/RES/77/247. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-jud-01-00-en.pdf. Official record (advisory opinion of an international court).
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. Media release, September 2025. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2025/304/11_25_304e.pdf. Official record (national statistics bureau).
- Israeli Supreme Court, 1979. HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Government of Israel (the Elon Moreh case), judgment of 22 October 1979. Unofficial English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project. https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Dweikat%20et%20al.%20v.%20State.pdf. Official record (court judgment).
- Israeli Supreme Court, 2011, 2014. HCJ 8887/06 al-Nabut v. Minister of Defense (Migron) and HCJ 9949/08 Hamad v. Minister of Defense (Amona). https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts/06/870/088/n45&fileName=06088870.N45&type=4 and https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2016-11-25/israel-supreme-court-rejects-government-request-to-further-delay-eviction-of-settlement-built-on-land-privately-owned-by-palestinians/. Official record (court judgments).
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Official English translation, marked unofficial, amended through 1 May 2022. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/activity/documents/BasicLawsPDF/BasicLawNationState.pdf. Official record (enacted legislation).
