Are Jews Foreign Occupiers of Israel? Reading the Treaty Definition, the Population Registers and the Founding Instruments

The word occupier, in the treaty text that supplies its legal meaning, attaches to territory rather than to a people: Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 provides that territory “is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army,” and the land at issue in the modern dispute is what Israel has held since 1967, outside which 6,001,700 of Israel’s 6,665,600 core Jews, or 90.0%, lived at the beginning of 2019 on Sergio DellaPergola’s territorial breakdown in the American Jewish Year Book. The demographic record runs alongside the legal one: Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics puts the share of Jews in Israel who are Sabras, born in Israel, at about 80%, while recording over 3.5 million immigrants arriving since 1948. Two dated instruments, the League of Nations Mandate of 22 July 1922 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, put a Jewish historical connection and a partition plan on the international record, and Israel’s own statutes describe arrival there as return. Two words in the phrase do different work, and each has a separate record behind it.

Key Findings

• Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 defines occupied territory as territory “actually placed under the authority of the hostile army,” a test applied to land rather than to a population; the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 addressed the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, territory held since 1967.
• Of Israel’s 6,665,600 core Jews at the beginning of 2019, DellaPergola’s breakdown records 6,001,700 inside the pre-1967 borders, 418,900 in the West Bank, 221,800 in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods and 23,200 on the Golan Heights.
• Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics records the state’s population at 806,000 in 1948 and 10.094 million on the eve of Independence Day 2025, with over 3.5 million immigrants arriving in that period and about 80% of Jews in Israel born in the country.
• Of the 7.1 million Jews living in Israel at the beginning of 2024, the Bureau reports 5.7 million born in Israel and 1.4 million born abroad, 1.0 million of the latter in Europe or America and 275,000 in Africa.
• The Mandate for Palestine, adopted by the League of Nations Council on 22 July 1922, records in its preamble “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”; Resolution 181 was adopted on 29 November 1947 by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions.
• In an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets, Jikeli and colleagues (2022) found 15% of the antisemitic tweets mentioning Jews fit the paragraph on denial of Jewish self-determination and 62% the paragraph on allegations of Jewish collective power.

Which territory do occupation findings actually cover?

Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 fixes the term to land: territory “is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army,” and the occupation “extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” The territory in the modern dispute is what Israel has held since 1967, and 90.0% of Israel’s core Jewish population lived outside it at the beginning of 2019.

That share comes from DellaPergola’s territorial decomposition in the American Jewish Year Book 2019, which splits Israel’s 6,665,600 core Jews four ways: 6,001,700 within the pre-1967 borders, 418,900 in the West Bank, 221,800 in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods incorporated after 1967, and 23,200 on the Golan Heights. The four components sum exactly to the total. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 addressed the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, and not territory inside the 1949 armistice lines.

The reason a reader has to go to an academic breakdown for that split is a counting convention. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s total; its September 2025 population release carries them there without a separate line. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), writing for POMEPS in a think-tank review rather than a peer-reviewed study, trace how that convention was built: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” by 1983 settlement localities were counted among Israeli localities, and in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. International monitors keep the two series apart. Neither convention is a finding about anyone’s status; each is a scope choice, and a report that does not state which one it is using produces a number the reader cannot place. The legal standard applied to settlements turns on the same territorial distinction.

Is it often said Israel was built by foreign settlers?

About 80% of Jews in Israel are Sabras, born in the country, the figure Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics carried in its 2025 Independence Day release.

It is often said that Israel was built by settlers who came from elsewhere, and the arrival counts on the official record bear out the first half of that sentence. The part the claim does not reach is generational, and the Bureau attaches no separate period to that share, carrying it in its 2024 release for the end of 2022 as well.

The migration record is not in dispute and is published by the same body. The Bureau puts Israel’s population at 806,000 at the establishment of the state in 1948 and at 10.094 million on the eve of Independence Day 2025, a preliminary estimate based on the 2022 census. Over 3.5 million immigrants have arrived since 1948, about 1.66 million of them, 47.8% of the total, since 1990, alongside about 158,000 immigrating citizens since 1970, meaning people born abroad to an Israeli citizen who entered intending to settle. In the eleven and three-quarter months to 22 April 2026 the Bureau recorded about 21,000 immigrants against about 177,000 births.

For the pre-state period the Bureau publishes two dated points for the land itself: 449,000 Jews in 1939, which it puts at 3% of a world Jewish population of 16.6 million, and 650,000 on the eve of the establishment of the state in 1948, 6% of a world total of 11.5 million. Against the 7.1 million Jews it records in Israel at the beginning of 2024, those two figures set the scale of what arrived and what was born.

Where did Israel’s Jewish population come from?

Of the 7.1 million Jews living in Israel at the beginning of 2024, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports 1.4 million born abroad and 5.7 million born in Israel.

Within the foreign-born group the Bureau records 1.0 million born in Europe or America and 275,000 born in Africa.

Birthplace and origin are different quantities, and the Bureau’s own Ethiopian series shows the gap plainly. Its 2023 release counts 168,800 residents of Ethiopian origin at the end of 2022, constructed as approximately 92,100 people born in Ethiopia plus approximately 76,800 born in Israel to Ethiopian-born fathers; a further 6,144 Israeli-born residents whose mother was born in Ethiopia sit outside that total. Applied across every origin group, that construction means a place-of-birth table understates how many origins are represented, because arrivals of the 1950s are counted by their Israeli-born descendants’ birthplace.

Two published waves account for much of the foreign-born figure. Berthomière (1995), in a peer-reviewed analysis of post-1989 emigration from the former Soviet Union, records more than 500,000 arrivals in Israel from 1989. Factor and Habib (1993), modelling service costs for the elderly in a peer-reviewed journal, note Israel’s population rising about 10% between 1990 and 1993 with growth above 30% projected by the end of that decade.

For the arrivals of the state’s first years, the closest published origin breakdown covers Holocaust survivors specifically. The Bureau’s 2025 Holocaust Day release records 36.9% of the roughly 120,000 survivors then living in Israel as born in Asian and African countries, including 16.8% in Morocco, 10.9% in Iraq and 6.6% in Tunisia and Libya, against 60.7% born in Europe. Those are shares of the survivor population, not of Israeli Jews generally. On DellaPergola’s 2025 estimate for the American Jewish Year Book, Israel held 7,153,000 of a world core Jewish population of 15,736,800 at the beginning of 2024, with over 85% of world Jewry in Israel and the United States.

How many Jews lived there before modern Zionist immigration?

The earliest figure in Israel’s own official series for the land is 449,000 Jews in 1939, which the Central Bureau of Statistics puts at 3% of a world Jewish population of 16.6 million that year. That point sits well after organized Zionist immigration began in 1882, and for the decades before it the record consists of administrative reconstruction rather than enumeration.

Alexander Schölch’s study The Demographic Development of Palestine, 1850 to 1882, published in the International Middle East literature in 1985, reconstructs the region’s population for exactly that window from Ottoman administrative records and contemporary accounts. Reconstructions of that kind carry a different evidentiary weight from a census: the underlying documents were kept for taxation and administration, not for demographic measurement, and this report carries no population figure from that literature.

The census record for the territory is short and recent on both statistical registers. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has conducted three censuses, in 1997, 2007 and 2017; the authority itself was established after the Oslo Accords, and Palestinian figures for years before 1997 have no census basis, being modelled or back-estimated. The 2017 round counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza on a reference date of 1 December 2017, and East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated, so administrative estimates were used there. Every later total in the UN and World Bank series for the territory is a projection off that measured base. The region’s census record governs what can be said about presence in either direction.

What follows is a limit on the form of the answer rather than on the subject. A continuous-presence claim for the pre-1882 period can be documented from administrative records and scholarship; it cannot be given as an enumerated count, because no enumeration of that kind exists for the period, and the official statistical series for the land begins in the twentieth century.

Which instruments recorded a Jewish historical connection?

The League of Nations Council adopted the Mandate for Palestine on 22 July 1922, and its preamble states that “recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.” Article 2 charges the mandatory power with placing the country under conditions securing the establishment of that national home.

The instrument is a treaty-tier record, and its scholarly treatment is separate from its text. What the Palestine Mandate did and did not say in international law is argued over at the level of interpretation; the preamble sentence itself is not in dispute as text, and this report quotes it rather than resting on any reading of it.

The second instrument is a recorded vote. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947 by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions, 56 delegations recording a position. That is the checkable form of the claim that a partition plan was internationally adopted, and it is also the checkable form of the claim that it was contested: 13 delegations voted against.

Israel’s founding text then recites both. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, read on 14 May 1948 and published in Official Gazette Number 1, carries its own historical chain in its recitals: the First Zionist Congress of 1897 convened by Theodor Herzl, the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, the League of Nations Mandate, and the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, which it describes as a recognition that “is irrevocable.” Those recitals are the founding document’s own account of its lineage, and are cited here as what the text asserts rather than as independent historical findings.

Does Israeli law describe Jewish immigration as return?

Yes, and the framing sits in the enacted text. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted by the Knesset in 2018, states at clause 5 that the State “shall be open to Jewish immigration, and the ingathering of the exiles,” and at clause 1(b) that the State “is the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.” The Knesset labels its English translation unofficial.

The statute governing arrival, passed in 1950, is titled the Law of Return, and the choice of noun in the title is itself the state’s characterisation. The 1948 Declaration uses the same register, declaring “THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL,” and appealing “to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship.” Its equality clause reads differently in the two official English translations: the Knesset text pledges “complete equality of social and political rights to all its citizens,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs text “all its inhabitants.” The Hebrew is the original and both English versions are translations of it; the Knesset wording is the one quoted here. All of this is a party’s own enacted and published text, not a neutral finding.

The 2018 Basic Law has been tested in Israel’s own courts. In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, an eleven-justice panel of the Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice heard fifteen petitions on 22 December 2020 and dismissed them on 8 July 2021, upholding the law. The Court also held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the state’s core character as a Jewish and democratic state, deriving that limit from the Declaration, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law. The law contains no equality clause and no individual-rights clause; that is a fact about the text of the statute.

Where do scholars disagree about the settler framing?

Three named works published between 2018 and 2025 take three positions on whether Zionism is usefully described as settler colonialism, and none of the three measured anything: each is an interpretive argument, and the figures inside them are quoted from other authors.

Ukashi (2018), in Peace and Conflict Studies at Nova Southeastern University, argues for reconsidering Zionism as an Indigenous emancipation movement against imperial and settler-colonial characterisations. The journal is double-blind peer-reviewed; the author states his conclusion in his introduction and describes his purpose as an intervention in a live argument, and the demographic figures he reproduces are block quotations from Karsh (2008) that belong to that author.

Dowty (2022), an Israel Studies scholar writing for the Stroum Center for Jewish Studies at the University of Washington in a signed faculty essay with no referees, no DOI and no reference list, argues against the settler-colonial characterisation.

Locker-Biletzki (2025), in the Review of Radical Political Economics, argues for settler-colonialism and empire-building in Palestine and Israel across 1920 to 1956. The piece was refereed but is typed by the publisher as a meeting report, the conference-paper category, inside a themed symposium; the publishing body is the Union for Radical Political Economics, which states an explicit political economy commitment.

The archival pole of the same dispute runs on the events of 1948 rather than on the origin claim. Morris (2004), working from Israeli military and state archives, carries roughly 700,000 displaced Palestinians as his own estimate and attributes the exodus to multiple causes varying by locality and phase, rejecting both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. Pappé (2006) argues the displacement was a planned ethnic cleansing. The disagreement across all five works is about origin and intent on one side and outcome on the other, and it is open on the published record; indigeneity claims sit inside the same unsettled dispute.

How does occupier language about Jews appear in measured data?

15% of the antisemitic tweets mentioning Jews in an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets fit the IHRA paragraph on denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, Jikeli and colleagues reported in 2022 in a peer-reviewed journal; 62% fit the paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power. Across the full corpus, drawn from January 2019 to August 2020, 23.1% of tweets were antisemitic.

Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), coding 4,500 comments on the Facebook pages of leading British, French and German media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation, found 26.9%of 1,504 UK comments antisemitic, against 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments. Within the UK antisemitic set they recorded denial of Jewish self-determination in 7.7% of comments, the apartheid analogy in 5.2% and the Nazi analogy in 4.2%, alongside an “evil” stereotype in 39.8% and sole guilt attributed to Israel in 27.9%. Thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK cases.

The occupier formulation also travels as an acronym. Zannettou and colleagues (2020), in a peer-reviewed conference paper covering over 100 million posts, recorded the word “jew” in 1,993,432 posts on 4chan’s /pol/ board (3.0%) and 763,329 Gab posts (2.0%) between 2016 and 2018, with the term rising 16.44-fold across the collection period; in random samples of 100 posts containing “jew,” 42% were judged hateful on each platform. Kikkisetti and colleagues (2024), in a 659-post methodological pilot on alt-tech platforms, surfaced coded terms including “Deep State” and “White Genocide”; that pilot is a preprint and reports no prevalence.

On attitudes rather than posts, Harber and colleagues (2026) report in a peer-reviewed journal, across three preregistered studies, that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, with their Conspiracies Mediated Model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes; conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate it, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results. The authors report an association measured across their samples, not a cause, and their finding does not classify any individual expression. The ZOG acronym carries the same formulation into a longer conspiracy lineage.

Methodology

This report measures three separate records and keeps them separate: the treaty and instrument texts that define occupation and record a historical connection, the official population statistics of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, and the peer-reviewed discourse corpora that measure how the occupier formulation is used online. It does not assess who is entitled to the land.

Source types are labelled at first use. Primary and official records here are the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Mandate for Palestine of 22 July 1922, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, Israel’s Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel of 14 May 1948, Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People of 2018, the Supreme Court judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset of 8 July 2021, and the media releases and abstracts of the Israeli and Palestinian statistical bureaus. Israel’s enacted texts and statistical series are that state’s own official record, cited as such and not as independently verified. The Knesset labels its English translation of the 2018 Basic Law unofficial, and the two official English translations of the 1948 Declaration differ on one word in the equality clause; the Knesset wording is the one quoted, and the divergence is stated where it arises.

Israel’s Independence Day figures are preliminary, rest on the 2022 census, and cover 11.75 months to 22 April 2026 in the latest release; from 2023 the estimates include foreigners staying in Israel, so the series is not continuous with earlier years, and the Bureau states that the total increase does not equal the difference between its component figures. Outside Israel the Bureau counts a “core” Jewish population, a narrower definition than the one it applies inside Israel. DellaPergola’s territorial and world figures are that author’s own estimates published in the American Jewish Year Book, not a government count, and the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics hosts the 2025 file without having written it. Percentages here are computed only against the base their own source publishes, and where a share belongs to a different denominator than a nearby count, the base is named.

Two counting conventions are in play throughout. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s total; international monitors report the West Bank and East Jerusalem as separate series. Neither is a finding, and figures from the two conventions are not summed or compared.

On the pre-1882 period the limit is evidentiary and is stated rather than filled: no census of the territory exists before 1997 on the Palestinian register or before the twentieth century on the Israeli one, and reconstructions such as Schölch’s study of 1850 to 1882 rest on Ottoman administrative and travel records kept for taxation, so no population figure for that period is carried here. On the settler-colonial dispute, the three named works are interpretive arguments of differing publication type, one of them not peer-reviewed, and the archival dispute between Morris (2004) and Pappé (2006) is reported as an open scholarly disagreement.

The discourse figures are shares within keyword-defined samples, not shares of a platform or of a population. Jikeli and colleagues (2022) drew their tweets from queries on “Jews” and “Israel”; Becker and colleagues (2022) coded comments under specific media pages during a single escalation; Zannettou and colleagues (2020) note their meme counts are a conservative lower bound. Kikkisetti and colleagues (2024) is a preprint pilot of 659 posts reporting no prevalence. Harber and colleagues (2026) report measured associations across preregistered samples, carried here in correlational language matching the authors’.

Conclusion

So which record answers the question, the one about a people or the one about territory? They are not the same record, and the phrase joins them. Occupation, in the Hague Regulations of 1907, is a status of land held under the authority of a hostile army, and the land at issue since 1967 is where 663,900 of Israel’s 6,665,600 core Jews lived at the beginning of 2019 on DellaPergola’s breakdown, with 6,001,700 inside the pre-1967 lines. Foreignness is a claim about people, and the registers answer it in generations: about 80% of Jews in Israel are Sabras on the Central Bureau of Statistics’ reporting, 5.7 million of the 7.1 million living there at the beginning of 2024 were born in the country, and 1.4 million were born abroad, 275,000 of them in Africa. The immigration is on the record too, over 3.5 million arrivals since 1948 against a 1948 population of 806,000, and neither figure cancels the other.

The instruments are dated and their contents are checkable. The Mandate the League of Nations Council adopted on 22 July 1922 records “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”; Resolution 181 passed on 29 November 1947 by 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions, which is both the adoption and its contest in one line; the 2018 Basic Law states self-determination in Israel as exclusive to the Jewish People and carries no equality clause, and Israel’s own Supreme Court upheld it in 2021 while holding the Knesset could not lawfully deny the state’s democratic core. Where the argument moves from text to origin and intent, three named works from 2018, 2022 and 2025 disagree and none of them measured anything, and the archival dispute between Morris and Pappé over 1948 remains open in print.

What the corpora add is where the phrase goes once it leaves the territorial question. In an annotated corpus of 4,016 tweets, Jikeli and colleagues found 15% of antisemitic tweets about Jews fitting the self-determination-denial paragraph and 62% the collective-power paragraph; Becker and colleagues found the same framing in 7.7% of antisemitic UK comments during one escalation; Harber and colleagues report conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, accounting for over 55% of the variance in the latter. A statement about who holds which territory can be checked against Article 42 and a population register. A statement about who belongs anywhere cannot, and it is that second sentence the measured corpora keep finding. Which of the two is a reader reaching for when the words arrive fused, and what happens to a legal term once it has been transferred from a map to a people?

Frequently Asked Questions

Why do Israeli and international population figures for the West Bank differ?

Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s total, while international monitors report the West Bank and East Jerusalem as separate series. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) date the Israeli convention’s steps, including East Jerusalem entering the general count in the 1968 yearbook and the removal of the separate territories chapter in 1997. The two conventions cannot be summed.

When was the last census in the West Bank and Gaza?

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics conducted its third and most recent census with a reference date of 1 December 2017, counting 4,780,978 residents. East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated, so administrative estimates were used there, and every UN and World Bank total for the territory since is a projection off that base.

How many Jews live in Israel compared with the rest of the world?

DellaPergola’s 2025 estimate in the American Jewish Year Book puts Israel at 7,153,000 of a world core Jewish population of 15,736,800 at the beginning of 2024, with over 85% of the world total in Israel and the United States and another 14% in the 23 other countries holding 10,000 Jews or more. These are the author’s own estimates, not a government count.

Which pre-state figures does Israel’s statistical bureau publish for the land?

The Central Bureau of Statistics publishes 449,000 Jews in the land in 1939, 3% of a world Jewish population of 16.6 million, and 650,000 in 1948, 6% of a world total of 11.5 million. Outside Israel the Bureau counts a narrower “core” Jewish population than the definition it applies inside Israel.

What did Israel’s Supreme Court say about the 2018 Basic Law?

In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, an eleven-justice panel dismissed fifteen petitions on 8 July 2021 and upheld the law, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and cannot, even by Basic Law, deny the state’s core character as Jewish and democratic. The Court derived that limit from the Declaration, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law.

How large was the post-Soviet immigration wave to Israel?

Berthomière (1995), in a peer-reviewed analysis, records more than 500,000 arrivals in Israel from the former Soviet Union from 1989. Factor and Habib (1993) note Israel’s population rising about 10% between 1990 and 1993 in a modelling study of elderly service costs; that figure is migration-driven population growth, not a birth rate.

Does the Israeli record distinguish country of birth from country of origin?

Yes, and the difference is large. The Central Bureau of Statistics builds its 168,800 residents of Ethiopian origin at the end of 2022 from approximately 92,100 people born in Ethiopia plus approximately 76,800 born in Israel to Ethiopian-born fathers, with a further 6,144 whose mother was Ethiopian-born sitting outside the total.

Which antisemitism definition do the discourse studies apply?

Jikeli and colleagues (2022) and Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) both code against schemes built on the IHRA working definition, which is why their category names, including denial of Jewish self-determination and allegations of collective power, match. Both report shares within keyword or page-defined samples rather than shares of a platform or a population.

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