Is Boycotting Israel or Its Territories Antisemitic? Reading the Published Definitions, the Official Adoptions and the Survey Record

Of the three definitional texts most often applied to this question, only one names boycotts at all: the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, issued in March 2021, states in its guideline 14 that boycott, divestment and sanctions are “commonplace, non‑violent forms of political protest against states” and that in the Israeli case they are “not, in and of themselves, antisemitic.” The working definition adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance on 26 May 2016, which governments and public bodies have adopted far more widely, contains no reference to boycotts and instead lists denial of Jewish self‑determination and discriminatory double standards among its illustrations. The question a shopper or a student union faces is not about a shelf or a contract; it is about what a refusal is taken to mean, and the published record answers that in three separate registers: what the texts say, what governments and courts have determined, and what surveys measure about the people who hold the position.

Key Findings

• The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (March 2021), signed by more than 200 scholars, states in guideline 14 that boycotting Israel is “not, in and of itself, antisemitic”; the IHRA working definition, adopted 26 May 2016, does not mention boycotts.
• 1,216 entities had ratified the IHRA working definition by the end of 2023, 97 of them during that year, per the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism’s own count.
• 23% of US adults said it is acceptable to protest Israel by boycotting American Jewish individuals or Jewish events, against 77% who said it is unacceptable, in the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism in America report for 2024.
• 67% of adults surveyed worldwide said they would not want their country to boycott Israeli products and businesses, in the Anti‑Defamation League’s Global 100 wave released in 2022, the organization’s own poll.
• Conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti‑Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies, in a model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti‑Israel attitudes (Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila, 2026, peer‑reviewed).

Do the published definitions call boycotting Israel antisemitic?

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, issued in March 2021, is the only one of the three most‑circulated definitional texts that addresses boycotts directly, and its guideline 14 states that boycott, divestment and sanctions are “commonplace, non‑violent forms of political protest against states” and that in the Israeli case they are “not, in and of themselves, antisemitic.”

The IHRA working definition, adopted in Bucharest on 26 May 2016, takes a different route. Its text says nothing about boycotts. It offers a short core definition and then a set of contemporary illustrations, among them “denying the Jewish people their right to self‑determination” and “applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” Whether a given boycott campaign falls under either illustration is an application of the text, not a statement in it.

The Nexus Document, published in 2021, states that boycotting goods produced in Israel or in the West Bank is not antisemitic unless the boycott singles Israel out because of its Jewish character. The Anti‑Defamation League, a monitoring organization with an explicit advocacy mission, takes the opposite view of the movement as a whole, holding in its published backgrounder on the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign that the movement’s founding demands are antisemitic in effect because they would deny the Jewish people the right to self‑determination.

Source: each document as published by its issuing body.

The four texts are not answering quite the same question. Two assess an act, one assesses a movement’s stated demands, and one assesses neither and is applied to both.

Is the boycott aimed at a state rather than at Jews?

Two of the three definitional texts locate the target in a state rather than in a people. The Jerusalem Declaration (March 2021) describes boycotts as protest “against states,” and the Nexus Document (2021) states that boycotting goods from Israel or the West Bank is not antisemitic unless the boycott singles Israel out because of its Jewish character. On the face of the texts, the distinction is a matter of what a campaign is directed at.

The survey record adds a distribution the texts cannot supply. In the 2019 survey of British adults conducted by Ipsos MORI for the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Community Security Trust, agreement with boycotting Israel rose in step with the number of anti‑Jewish statements a respondent endorsed. The relationship is an association across a national sample, reported as such: it describes how positions cluster in a population, and it does not establish what any individual respondent meant or what any campaign intends.

A second British measurement runs in the same direction with a sharper caveat from its authors. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023), a preregistered cross‑sectional study of 1,790 UK adults in a YouGov quota sample fielded in December 2021 and published in Scientific Reports, found coronavirus conspiracy suspicion correlated positively with all three measured forms of antisemitism, generalised, Judeophobic and anti‑Zionist, with the correlation to Judeophobic antisemitism, meaning attitudes toward Jews as Jews, notably stronger. Their exploratory analysis indicated that the anti‑Zionist link was accounted for by its overlap with the Judeophobic measure.

Both findings sit at the level of populations. They record that endorsement of a boycott position is not evenly distributed with respect to measured anti‑Jewish attitudes, and they carry their authors’ correlational language without exception. Neither measures boycott participation, and neither speaks to a particular campaign, contract or vote.

Which official bodies have determined the boycott is antisemitic?

1,216 entities had ratified the IHRA working definition by the end of 2023, 97 of them during that year, per the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism’s own count in its annual report, a figure compiled by a government body and not independently verified. The definition those entities adopted contains no reference to boycotts, so the determinations that describe boycott campaigns as antisemitic sit in separate documents.

The Israeli government publication “Behind the Mask,” issued by the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and hosted on gov.il, states that BDS campaigns rely on antisemitic rhetoric and personnel. It is a party’s own determination about a movement organised against it, and it is labelled here as that.

In the United States, testimony submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security on 15 January 2020 under the title “The Anti‑Semitic Nature of Boycotts Singling Out Israel,” written by law professor Eugene Kontorovich, argued that selective boycotts of the Jewish state meet the discriminatory‑treatment standard. Submitted testimony is part of the congressional record; it is one witness’s argument entered into that record, not a finding of the committee.

The United Kingdom Parliament took up the question as procurement law rather than as definition. The Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill, introduced in the House of Commons in 2023, would have barred public bodies from letting political disapproval of a foreign state drive their procurement and investment decisions; Parliament published the written evidence submitted to its committee stage, which runs on both sides of the question.

The one domestic court ruling on the point in the United States answered a different question again. In Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip, decided by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc in June 2022, the court upheld the state’s requirement that public contractors certify they will not boycott Israel, holding that the statute regulates commercial conduct rather than protected expression. The ruling addresses the First Amendment status of a state contracting condition. It makes no finding about whether a boycott is antisemitic, and the two questions have separate answers in separate forums.

Does the answer change when the boycott targets people rather than products?

23% of US adults said it is acceptable to protest against Israel by boycotting American Jewish individuals or Jewish events, against 77% who said it is unacceptable, in the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism in America report for 2024, the organization’s own survey of the general public rather than a peer‑reviewed measure.

That item is the boundary the definitional texts draw in words. The Nexus Document (2021) places a boycott outside its exemption when it singles Israel out because of its Jewish character; the Jerusalem Declaration, in the same set of guidelines that exempts boycotts of the state, states that holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s conduct is antisemitic. Both texts treat the shift from a state to Jewish people or institutions as the point where the classification changes.

What the AJC figure measures is stated acceptability in a general‑public sample, not a count of boycotts of individuals, and no named body publishes such a count. The organization’s parallel survey of American Jews recorded that 31% said they were the personal target of antisemitism during 2025, including 21% who reported an in‑person remark and 21% an online remark or post, again self‑reported experience within the survey sample rather than an incident tally.

The two measurements answer adjacent questions. One records how a national sample judges a tactic aimed at Jewish individuals; the other records how often Jewish respondents say they were targeted by anything. Neither connects a specific campaign to a specific experience, and the reported figures should not be read as doing so.

Do boycott attitudes track measured antisemitic beliefs?

Conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, with the model accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, in three preregistered studies by Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026), peer-reviewed in American Psychologist.

The three studies drew on samples of 373, 243 and 493 participants.

The same studies report what did not mediate: conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results. The authors also record a partisan asymmetry, with Democrats expressing less antisemitism than Republicans but stronger anti‑Israel attitudes and greater endorsement of anti‑Israel and anti‑Zionist conspiracy beliefs. The report of this study is abstract‑sourced, and the design is correlational and predictive rather than causal.

Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), published in the International Journal of Intercultural Relations, ran two British experiments with samples of 354 and 490 that primed participants with war‑in‑Gaza material. They report two distinct pathways to anti‑Jewish hostility: one running through social dominance orientation and positively associated with right‑leaning political orientation, and a separate identity‑based pathway in which out‑group identity fusion with the Palestinian people was negatively associated with conservative orientation. The finding is that hostility toward Jews reaches the same outcome by different routes on different parts of the political map.

Hersh and Royden (2022), in Political Research Quarterly, embedded several experiments in an original survey of about 3,500 US adults with an oversample of young adults, and found overt antisemitic attitudes rare on the political left and more common on the right, with the highest concentration among young adults on the far right, a result they present as contrary to horseshoe theory.

None of these three studies measures boycott participation. They measure attitudes toward Israel, attitudes toward Jews, and the beliefs that connect them, which is why they bear on how a boycott position distributes and not on what any campaign is. The measured association between anti‑Zionist expression and antisemitism, and the scholarly dispute over where the boundary falls, is treated at length in the Institute’s report on anti‑Zionism and antisemitism.

How many people actually support boycotting Israeli products?

67% of adults surveyed worldwide said they would not want their country to boycott Israeli products and businesses, in the Anti‑Defamation League’s Global 100 survey wave released in 2022, an organizational poll conducted by a monitoring body with an advocacy mission rather than a peer‑reviewed measurement.

The US picture is younger and more divided. The Yale Youth Poll’s Fall 2025 survey of registered voters found two‑thirds of voters rejected all three antisemitic statements it tested, that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America, that Jews have too much power, and that it is appropriate to boycott Jewish American‑owned businesses to protest the war in Gaza. About one in five respondents aged 18 to 34 supported the boycott item, and 10% of that age group agreed with all three statements, against 2% of voters aged 65 and older.

The two figures measure different objects and must not be stacked. The ADL item asks about a country boycotting a state’s products; the Yale item asks about boycotting Jewish American‑owned businesses, which is the people‑directed form the definitional texts treat as a separate case. A respondent could hold the first position and reject the second, and the poll reports no crosstab that would settle how often that happens.

The age gradient is consistent with the concentration Hersh and Royden (2022) found among young adults, though the two surveys used different instruments, different samples and different years, so the agreement is directional rather than a replication.

Has academic boycott activity coincided with recorded campus incidents?

1,694 antisemitic incidents on US campuses were counted for 2024, 84% more than in 2023, in the Anti‑Defamation League’s Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, the organization’s own tally on its own definitions. ADL discloses that since October 2023 it counts certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests, a change it states added 1,350 incidents, or 15%, to the 2023 total and carries into 2024, so the two years are not a clean comparison.

Bass and colleagues (2024), peer‑reviewed in Frontiers in Social Psychology, set US Department of Education Section 117 disclosures for 2014 to 2019, covering about $18 billion from 158 countries to 349 institutions, against campus antisemitic‑incident counts. Institutions receiving Section 117 funding showed elevated incident counts, with an effect size of about Cohen’s d 0.74, and about 0.77 for funding from member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The authors report no evidence on mechanism, found only weak evidence for the student‑exposure survey pathway they tested, and call the results preliminary pending replication.

Farber (2025), in the peer‑reviewed journal Israel Affairs, argues from financial records, organizational documents and social media that the BDS movement functions as an ideological component and that campus protests after October 2023 were strategically integrated rather than spontaneous. The paper documents no money trail, and its claim is about ideological integration.

The AMCHA Initiative maintains a per‑campus database of reported antisemitic incidents from 2015 onward. It is a monitoring organization with an advocacy mission, and its per‑campus totals track reporting intensity and institutional prominence as much as underlying incidence, so the counts do not rank campuses against one another.

What the record supports is coincidence in time and place, stated in the vocabulary the studies themselves use. It does not establish that academic boycott activity produced the incident counts, and none of the three sources claims it does. The Institute has examined which measured factors track campus antisemitism counts separately.

Where do the definitions’ own authors disagree?

More than 200 scholars signed the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism when it was issued in March 2021, offering it explicitly as an alternative to the IHRA working definition adopted on 26 May 2016, whose own text presents its examples as illustrations and describes itself as a non‑legally binding working definition.

The disagreement runs through the IHRA text’s own drafting history. Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the definition later adopted by IHRA, told the US House Judiciary Committee in written testimony in November 2017 that the definition “was not drafted, and was never intended, as a tool to target or chill speech on a college campus,” and has since published objections to its use against campus boycott campaigns. That is the author of one text stating a limit on its application, and it sits in an official congressional record.

The IHRA text supports the point on its own terms. It introduces its contemporary examples with the qualification that they “may serve as illustrations” to guide the alliance in its work, and the alliance labels the whole instrument non‑legally binding. An adoption by a government or a university is therefore an adoption of a working definition with illustrative examples, not of a rule that classifies particular tactics.

The Nexus Document (2021), produced by the Nexus Task Force, occupies a third position: it accepts that anti‑Zionism can be a vehicle for antisemitism while stating that boycotting goods from Israel or the West Bank is not antisemitic unless the boycott singles Israel out because of its Jewish character.

Set beside one another, the texts differ less on principle than on where the burden sits. The Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document start from the act being ordinary protest and name the conditions that would change that; the ADL backgrounder starts from the movement’s founding demands and reads the act through them; the IHRA definition supplies criteria and leaves the application to whoever adopts it. Each is dated, published and quotable, and none of them is silent.

How does boycott language appear in measured antisemitic content?

26.9% of 1,504 comments on the Facebook pages of leading UK media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation were coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme, in the peer-reviewed study by Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022).

The same study found 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments coded antisemitic, in the same corpus.

Within the UK antisemitic comments, the study reports which frames were present: the “evil” stereotype in 39.8%, Israel’s sole guilt in 27.9%, child murder or blood libel in 8.1%, denial of Jewish self‑determination in 7.7%, the apartheid analogy in 5.2% and the Nazi analogy in 4.2%. The categories are non‑exclusive. Thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, which is a statement about how the coding was done as much as about the comments.

The Twitter corpora point the same way. Jikeli and colleagues (2022), working from an expert‑annotated gold‑standard corpus of 4,016 English‑language tweets built against the IHRA definition, found that 11.2% of conversations containing “Jews” between January 2019 and August 2020 were antisemitic and 13.1% of tweets containing “Israel” between January and August 2020. About 62% of the antisemitic “Jews” tweets fit the IHRA paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power, and 15% fit denial of Jewish self‑determination.

One thing these corpora do not report is a measured share of boycott advocacy inside antisemitic content. The coding schemes classify tropes, allegations and analogies, not campaign tactics, so no figure exists in this literature for how often calls to boycott appear in material already classified as antisemitic. The absence is a property of the instruments, and it is recorded here rather than filled.

Methodology and limitations

This report measures three things: what the published definitional texts state, what official bodies have adopted or determined, and what named surveys and content studies have counted. It does not assess the merits of any boycott campaign or of the political dispute behind it.

Sources are drawn in the Institute’s standing order of priority. Primary and official records include the IHRA working definition as adopted on 26 May 2016, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism of March 2021, the Nexus Document of 2021, testimony entered into the record of the US House Committee on Homeland Security on 15 January 2020, written testimony to the US House Judiciary Committee in November 2017, the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill and its published committee evidence, and the Eighth Circuit’s 2022 en banc decision in Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip. Peer‑reviewed research includes Harber and colleagues (2026), Ozer and colleagues (2025), Hersh and Royden (2022), Allington and colleagues (2023), Becker and colleagues (2022), Jikeli and colleagues (2022), Bass and colleagues (2024) and Farber (2025). Monitoring‑organization material, labelled as such throughout, includes the Anti‑Defamation League’s Global 100 wave released in 2022, its Audit of Antisemitic Incidents for 2024, its published backgrounder on the BDS campaign, the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism reports for 2024 and 2025, and the AMCHA Initiative’s campus tracker.

Several limits carry into the figures. The Harber and Ozer studies are abstract‑sourced, so the reported detail is what those abstracts state. ADL and AMCHA counts rest on each organization’s own definitions and on voluntary reporting, and ADL discloses that since October 2023 its audit counts certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests, a change it states added 1,350 incidents, or 15%, to the 2023 total; year‑over‑year comparison across that change is not clean. Figures published by the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism and by the Ministry of Strategic Affairs are that government’s own compiled counts and determinations, produced by a party to the dispute. The 2019 Ipsos MORI survey for the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Community Security Trust is reported here as a measured direction of association because no percentage from it is carried in this report’s source set.

All associations between attitudes, beliefs and boycott positions are correlational, as the authors of each study state. No source cited here measures boycott participation, and no source cited here reports a share of boycott advocacy within content classified as antisemitic.

Conclusion

So does refusing to buy the product say something about a state, or about Jews? The published texts do not converge. Guideline 14 of the Jerusalem Declaration (March 2021) says the act is protest against a state and not, by itself, antisemitic; the Nexus Document (2021) agrees and names the condition that would change it; the IHRA working definition of 26 May 2016, adopted by 1,216 entities by the end of 2023 on the Israeli ministry’s own count, says nothing about boycotts and supplies criteria instead; the ADL reads the movement’s founding demands and reaches the opposite conclusion. The drafter of the IHRA text told a congressional committee in 2017 that it was never intended as a campus speech tool. Four documents, four registers, and no arbitration between them.

The measured record answers a different question, and answers it consistently. In Britain in 2019, agreement with boycotting Israel rose with the number of anti‑Jewish statements a respondent endorsed. In three preregistered studies published in 2026, conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists carried the association between antisemitism and anti‑Israel attitudes in a model explaining over 55% of the variance. Worldwide in 2022, 67% told the ADL they did not want their country to boycott Israeli products, and in the United States in 2024, 77% told the AJC that boycotting Jewish individuals or Jewish events was unacceptable while 23% said it was acceptable. In the antisemitic comment corpora themselves, the apartheid analogy appears in 5.2% and self‑determination denial in 7.7%, while calls to boycott are coded nowhere at all.

That last gap is the sharp edge. A tactic the texts argue over sits inside populations where endorsement of it rises alongside measured anti‑Jewish belief, while the instruments built to detect antisemitism in text do not look for the tactic and so cannot say how often it travels with the tropes. Somewhere between the label on a package and the 23% who would extend the refusal to a neighbour, a political position and a prejudice are running in partial parallel, and nobody has yet built the measurement that would tell them apart. Whether that parallel is one of the inputs feeding antisemitism, or the place where existing inputs surface in a form the definitions can argue about, is a question the current evidence poses and cannot close.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which text do most governments and universities actually adopt?

The IHRA working definition, adopted on 26 May 2016, is the most widely ratified: 1,216 entities had adopted it by the end of 2023, 97 of them during that year, per the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism’s own count. The Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document are scholarly and academic project texts rather than instruments adopted by public bodies.

Does adopting the IHRA definition mean an institution has classified boycotts as antisemitic?

No. The IHRA text contains no reference to boycotts, and the alliance describes it as a non‑legally binding working definition whose examples “may serve as illustrations.” Applying it to a particular campaign is a decision by the adopting body, not a provision of the text.

How do US courts treat state laws requiring contractors not to boycott Israel?

In Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc in June 2022, upheld Arkansas’s certification requirement, holding that it regulates commercial conduct rather than protected expression. The ruling answers a First Amendment question about a contracting condition and makes no finding about antisemitism.

Why do the Jerusalem Declaration and the ADL reach opposite conclusions?

They assess different objects. The Jerusalem Declaration (March 2021) assesses the act of boycotting a state; the ADL’s published backgrounder assesses the founding demands of the BDS movement and reads the act through them. Neither is applying the other’s framing.

Is there evidence that campus boycott activity causes antisemitic incidents?

No source establishes cause. Bass and colleagues (2024), peer‑reviewed, report an association between Section 117 foreign funding and elevated campus antisemitic incidents at an effect size of about Cohen’s d 0.74, while stating they have no evidence on mechanism and calling the results preliminary.

Do young Americans hold different views on boycott questions?

Yes, by a measured margin. In the Yale Youth Poll’s Fall 2025 survey of registered voters, 10% of respondents aged 18 to 34 agreed with all three antisemitic statements tested, against 2% of those 65 and older, and about one in five in the younger group supported boycotting Jewish American‑owned businesses over the war in Gaza.

Has anyone measured how often boycott calls appear in antisemitic online content?

No published corpus reports that figure. The annotation schemes used by Becker and colleagues (2022) and Jikeli and colleagues (2022) code tropes, allegations and analogies against IHRA‑based categories, and campaign tactics are not among the coded categories.

Sources

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• American Jewish Committee, 2024. The State of Antisemitism in America 2024. ajc.org. Monitoring organization survey (advocacy mission).
• American Jewish Committee, 2025. The State of Antisemitism in America 2025. ajc.org/AntisemitismReport2025. Monitoring organization survey (advocacy mission).
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