The question turns on what is being opposed, and in one forum it has been adjudicated: in February 2024 a UK employment tribunal held, in Miller v University of Bristol, that anti-Zionism qualifies as a philosophical belief protected under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, a ruling about legal protection and not about the belief’s merit. The two published standards most often used to set the line, from the Anti-Defamation League and from the Institute for National Security Studies, both make the object of opposition the operative variable rather than the word itself. Where the discourse has actually been coded, denial of Jewish self-determination appeared in 7.7% of the UK comments Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) classified as antisemitic, against 27.9% attributing sole guilt for the conflict to Israel.
Key Findings
- A UK employment tribunal ruled in February 2024, in Miller v University of Bristol, that anti-Zionism met the threshold for a philosophical belief protected under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, a finding on protection that determined nothing about the belief’s truth or merit (official record).
- The Anti-Defamation League’s Antisemitism Uncovered standard states that criticism of Israeli government policy is not in itself antisemitic, and that opposition becomes antisemitic when it denies the Jewish people’s right to self-determination or holds Jews collectively responsible for the Israeli government’s actions (monitoring organization, advocacy mission).
- The Institute for National Security Studies proposed in 2025 a behavioral rather than definitional test: whether a given practice excludes Jews or Israelis, treats Jewish institutions as proxies for the state, or produces unequal treatment (Israeli policy institute).
- Of 1,504 UK Facebook comments coded by Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed), 26.9% were classified antisemitic; within that subset, 7.7% denied Jewish self-determination, 5.2% used the apartheid analogy and 4.2% the Nazi analogy.
- ADL logged 2,596 of the 9,354 incidents in its 2024 Audit as occurring at anti-Israel rallies, on ADL’s own definitions, which since October 2023 count certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests (monitoring organization tally, not an official statistic).
Where do published standards draw the line on anti-Zionism?
Two named standards address the line directly, and both locate it in what is being opposed rather than in the label. The Anti-Defamation League’s Antisemitism Uncovered entry on anti-Zionism states that criticism of Israeli government policy is not in itself antisemitic, and that opposition becomes antisemitic when it denies the Jewish people’s right to self-determination, calls for the end of the Jewish state, or holds Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.
The second standard shifts the register from definition to conduct. The Institute for National Security Studies, an Israeli policy institute, published a 2025 policy paper arguing that the useful question is not which label a position carries but whether a given practice excludes Jews or Israelis, treats Jewish institutions as proxies for the Israeli state, or produces unequal treatment for people on the basis of their identity. On that construction, two people using the same word can fall on opposite sides of the test, and the test is applied to what is done rather than to what is declared.
Both are position papers from organizations with stated missions: ADL is a monitoring organization with an advocacy mandate, and the Institute for National Security Studies is a policy institute based in Tel Aviv. Neither is an adjudicated ruling, and neither supplies a prevalence figure. They set a criterion; how often expression in the wild satisfies it is a separate, measurable question, and the studies that measure it are further down this page.
What the two standards share is the structural move. Each treats “anti-Zionism” as a container term whose contents vary, and each declines to assign a fixed status to the container. That is also why the moral question in the reader’s mind, whether the stand is legitimate, cannot be resolved by classifying the word. The classification runs on the object: a policy, a legal regime, a state’s existence, or a people’s collective rights. Those are four different objects, and the standards above assign them different statuses.
Is it often said that Israel’s practices are discriminatory?
It is often said that Israeli authorities practice systematic discrimination against Palestinians, and two documents anchor that claim in most retellings. Human Rights Watch published A Threshold Crossed in April 2021, concluding that Israeli authorities are committing the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution. Amnesty International published Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians in February 2022, reaching a parallel characterization.
Both are organizational determinations. Each rests on the publishing organization’s own documentation, its own case selection, and its own legal characterization by its own counsel, and each is issued by a body that advocates for the positions it reaches. That is a distinct evidentiary type from a court judgment, a national statistical series, or a peer-reviewed measurement, and it is the type the strongest version of the moral argument rests on. The documents and the record around them are examined separately in the Institute’s reading of Amnesty International’s published findings.
The characterization is contested by other organizations in the same register. ADL publishes a standing page rejecting the apartheid characterization, also an advocacy-mission document. UN Watch, a Geneva-based advocacy organization, publishes a point-by-point response to the institutional-racism claim. None of these, on any side, is an adjudicated finding, and stacking them by count would measure how many organizations have published rather than what has been established.
The specific quantities that circulate alongside the claim are worth separating from it. The recurring phrase “scores of laws” discriminating against Palestinians is a characterization rather than an enumeration, and the bodies that use it do not attach a single authoritative count to it; the enacted texts and the domestic court record on the statutes usually named are set out in the Institute’s report on the laws described as Jewish supremacist. For the reader weighing the moral question, the relevant fact about this tier is its type: these are the considered positions of organizations that document and advocate, dated 2021 and 2022, and they are the strongest published statement of the premise the question carries.
What did the World Court’s 2024 opinion actually find?
The International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion on 19 July 2024, requested by the United Nations General Assembly, stating that Israeli legislation and measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitute systemic discrimination in breach of Article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The opinion records a separate vote on each operative paragraph and carries appended separate and dissenting opinions from individual judges.
The instrument matters as much as the text. An advisory opinion is issued at the request of a United Nations organ, not by parties in dispute, and it is not binding on any state. It is not a criminal proceeding: it makes no finding against any individual, imposes no penalty, and produces no enforcement obligation. It is also not unanimous by construction, which is why the paragraph-level vote counts and the dissents are published with it. A reader who wants to know how divided the court was reads those, not the summary.
Two further limits bear on the question at hand. First, the opinion addresses the conduct and obligations of a state under treaty law. It says nothing about the moral standing of a political position held by private individuals in other countries, which is the thing the question asks about. Those are different objects in different registers, and the second does not follow from the first as a matter of the document’s own content.
Second, the register in which a belief’s standing is actually determined for a person is domestic law, not international advisory jurisdiction. A United Nations organ can request an opinion on state obligations; whether an individual may hold and express a belief without detriment is decided by national courts and tribunals applying national statutes. That determination exists, it is dated, and it is the subject of the next section.
Has a tribunal ruled that anti-Zionism is a protected belief?
Yes. A UK employment tribunal held in February 2024, in Miller v University of Bristol, that anti-Zionism qualified as a philosophical belief protected under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010. The ruling is an official record of a first-instance tribunal, and its subject is protection from detriment, not the truth, accuracy or moral standing of the belief.
The threshold the tribunal applied is the five-part test set out in Grainger plc v Nicholson: the belief must be genuinely held; it must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available; it must concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and it must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others. A 2024 case note in the Industrial Law Journal (Oxford University Press, peer-reviewed) sets out how the tribunal worked through those criteria and identifies the scope limits legal scholars attach to the result.
Those limits are the reason the ruling answers less than it appears to. The fifth Grainger limb is a low bar by design, framed in the case law as excluding only beliefs akin to Nazism or totalitarianism, so clearing it establishes that a belief is inside the protected category rather than that it is well founded. Beliefs at opposite ends of contested public arguments have cleared the same threshold in other cases. The statutory question is whether a person may be subjected to detriment for holding a belief; the question of whether the belief is right is not before the tribunal and is not decided by it.
Jurisdiction and level bound the finding further. This is a UK employment tribunal applying a UK statute, and a first-instance tribunal judgment does not bind other tribunals. For the reader’s question, the ruling establishes one checkable thing: in the one forum where the standing of anti-Zionism as a belief has been adjudicated at all, it was found protected, and protection was expressly separated from merit.
How do American Jews themselves draw the distinction?
About 31% of American Jews said they were the personal target of antisemitism in 2025, per the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism in America 2025. That figure is a self-reported experience share within AJC’s own paired survey samples of American Jews and the US general public, not an incident count and not an official statistic.
The modalities behind that share divide as follows: 21% reported an in-person antisemitic remark, 21% an online remark or post, 5% vandalism and 3% a physical attack. Age splits the sample sharply. Jewish adults aged 18 to 29 were more likely than those 30 and older to report being targeted in the past year, 47% against 28%, and to report online antisemitism, 87% against 70%. On behavior rather than experience, 38% of the younger group against 28% of the older said they had avoided places or events out of fear of antisemitism.
Where the line falls in the wider electorate has been measured separately. The Yale Youth Poll’s Fall 2025 survey of US registered voters tested three statements: that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America, that Jews have too much power, and that it is appropriate to boycott Jewish American-owned businesses to protest the war in Gaza. Two-thirds of voters rejected all three. Agreement with all three ran at 10% among voters aged 18 to 34 against 2% among those 65 and older, and about one in five young respondents supported boycotting Jewish American-owned businesses over the war in Gaza. Younger voters were more likely both to hold these attitudes and to hold anti-Israel views. The third item is the one that attaches a position on Israeli conduct to Jewish Americans as such, which is the distinction the published standards turn on, and it is measured at a materially different level from the other two.
How often do anti-Israel demonstrations coincide with recorded incidents?
ADL logged 2,596 incidents at anti-Israel rallies in 2024, out of 9,354 antisemitic incidents recorded in its Audit for that year, published April 2025. The Audit is ADL’s own tally on ADL’s own definitions, produced by a monitoring organization with an advocacy mission, and is not an official crime statistic.
The definitional scope carries directly into that subset. Since October 2023 ADL has counted certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests as incidents, a change that by ADL’s own disclosure added 1,350 incidents, 15% of the total, to its 2023 count and carries forward into 2024. Across the 2024 Audit, 5,452 incidents, 58%, were categorized as Israel or Zionism related. An incident logged at an event is a record of something the organization documented at that event; it is not an attribute of the event or of the people who attended it, and the tally supports no inference about the share of demonstrators involved.
The criminal-report universe counts a narrower thing. The FBI’s Reported Crimes in the Nation, 2024 recorded 1,938 anti-Jewish single-bias incidents, the highest since collection began in 1991 and 69% of religion-based hate-crime incidents, from 16,419 participating agencies covering 95.1% of the population. That series is an official record and a known undercount: participation is voluntary, only 3,127 of the participating agencies, 19.0%, reported any hate crime at all, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics found through the National Crime Victimization Survey that about 42% of violent hate-crime victimizations from 2015 to 2019 were never reported to police. The two counts run on different definitions and different universes and are not summed or set against each other; why they diverge is examined in the Institute’s report on two national counts that differ fivefold.
Which positions are measured alongside justifying aggression against Jews?
Endorsement of Holocaust inversion, the belief that Israel treats Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated during the Second World War, was associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews across two nationally representative surveys of the Norwegian population, N = 1,575 and a preregistered replication at N = 1,653 (Enstad, 2026, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced).
The association held in both studies, including the preregistered replication that confirmed the first. Enstad also reports that endorsement of Holocaust inversion was associated with refusal to take a stance against aggression toward Jews, and with refusal to answer the items measuring blatant antisemitic prejudice. These are cross-sectional associations within Norwegian population samples; the design supports correlational statements and no causal ones, and the author frames them accordingly.
A second measurement addresses how such expression is received rather than who holds it. Moon, Barlev and Neuberg (2026, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced) ran three preregistered US experiments with a combined N = 979, presenting participants with a person expressing antisemitism. Absent any justification, that person was generally disliked, more so by liberals than by conservatives. When the identical antisemitic expression was accompanied by a justification referencing disapproval of Israel and the war in Gaza, or Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights, the person was liked more by liberals and not by conservatives, an effect the authors describe as licensing and attribute to ingroup favoritism and alliance politics. The measured outcome is how much participants liked a person expressing antisemitism; the studies make no claim that disapproval of Israel is itself antisemitism, and the distinction is the authors’ own.
A third measurement bears on the overlap between the two attitude sets. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023, peer-reviewed, Scientific Reports) surveyed 1,790 UK adults in a preregistered YouGov quota sample in December 2021 and found coronavirus conspiracy suspicion correlated positively with generalised, Judeophobic and anti-Zionist antisemitism as they measured them, with the Judeophobic correlation notably the stronger; their exploratory analysis indicated the anti-Zionist link was accounted for by its overlap with the Judeophobic measure. Together these bound the empirical question narrowly: certain framings sit in measured company with justification of aggression, and none of these designs identifies a direction of effect.
How often does the discourse deny self-determination rather than criticize policy?
Denial of Jewish self-determination appeared in 7.7% of the UK comments coded antisemitic by Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed), a study that coded 4,500 comments on the Facebook pages of leading British, French and German media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation, against a scheme based on the IHRA working definition.
Of the 1,504 UK comments analyzed, 26.9% were coded antisemitic, against 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments. Within the UK antisemitic subset, the “evil” stereotype accounted for 39.8% and attribution of sole guilt for the conflict to Israel for 27.9%, with the apartheid analogy at 5.2% and the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. The categories are the study’s own coding scheme, and thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, so the shares depend on a coding method the authors publish rather than on surface keywords.
A second corpus gives a comparable order of magnitude. Jikeli and colleagues (2022, peer-reviewed) built an expert-annotated, IHRA-based corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets and found 11.2% of conversations containing “Jews” antisemitic between January 2019 and August 2020, and 13.1% of tweets containing “Israel” antisemitic between January and August 2020. Within the antisemitic “Jews” tweets, about 62% fit the IHRA paragraph on stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power and 15% fit denial of Jewish self-determination. The same group’s 2023 preprint annotated 6,941 tweets and classified 18% antisemitic under its published guide.
Two sampling limits bound all of these. The shares are drawn within keyword queries and within comment threads on specific news events, not from the whole of any platform. And they are shares of content already coded antisemitic, not shares of criticism of Israel, which is a larger and differently composed population the studies did not measure.
Methodology
This report measures the discourse, the published standards and the adjudicated record surrounding the question, not the underlying dispute about Israeli policy. Sources are drawn in the order of the Institute’s evidence hierarchy and are labeled by type in the list below.
Official and primary records used here are the February 2024 UK employment tribunal judgment in Miller v University of Bristol, applying section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, and the FBI’s Reported Crimes in the Nation, 2024 alongside the Bureau of Justice Statistics victimization series. The FBI series is a voluntary-reporting count and a known undercount, and the 2021 NIBRS transition breaks clean year-over-year comparison; the Bureau of Justice Statistics figure on unreported victimization is a five-year aggregate for violent hate crime from 2015 to 2019 and carries sampling error. FBI and ADL counts come from different universes and are never summed or directly compared.
Peer-reviewed measurements are Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), Jikeli and colleagues (2022), Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023), Enstad (2026), Moon, Barlev and Neuberg (2026), Harber and colleagues (2026) and Hersh and Royden (2022). The Jikeli and colleagues (2023) dataset paper is a preprint and is labeled as such at first use. Several of the 2026 American Psychologist entries are sourced from published abstracts, so figures are carried at the level the abstracts state. Every association reported from these studies is correlational; none of the designs identifies a direction of effect, and that limit is carried into the prose rather than left to the reader.
Monitoring-organization material is labeled with its mission: the ADL Audit and the Antisemitism Uncovered standard, the American Jewish Committee survey, and the two organizational apartheid determinations from 2021 and 2022, which rest on each publishing organization’s own documentation and its own legal characterization. Survey shares from AJC and the Yale Youth Poll are self-reported attitudes and experiences within their own samples, not incident counts. The International Court of Justice opinion of 19 July 2024 is an advisory instrument requested by the UN General Assembly, non-binding, with paragraph-level votes and appended dissents.
No single body publishes a rate at which anti-Zionist expression satisfies or fails any of the published criteria across a general population. The prevalence figures available are coded shares within defined corpora, and they are reported here as that and nothing wider.
Conclusion
So is opposition to Zionism a legitimate moral stand against discriminatory practice? The record answers in pieces rather than in a single verdict, and the pieces do not point one way. In law, the only forum that has ruled on the belief itself put it inside the protected category: a UK employment tribunal in February 2024 found it met the section 10 threshold, on a test whose fifth limb screens for compatibility with human dignity rather than for correctness. The published standards that set the moral line, ADL’s and the Institute for National Security Studies’ 2025 paper, both refuse to grade the label and grade the object instead, and on that construction the same word covers propositions the standards place on opposite sides.
What has been counted sits underneath all of that. In the coded corpora, the components differ in size: attribution of sole guilt to Israel ran at 27.9% of the UK comments classified antisemitic, denial of Jewish self-determination at 7.7%, and in the annotated Twitter corpus allegations about Jewish collective power at about 62% of the antisemitic “Jews” tweets against 15% for self-determination denial. In the incident tallies, 2,596 of ADL’s 9,354 recorded 2024 incidents were logged at anti-Israel rallies, on definitions ADL widened in October 2023 and discloses. In the survey work, Holocaust inversion was measured alongside justification of aggression against Jews across two Norwegian national samples, and a justification referencing the war in Gaza raised how much liberal US participants liked a person expressing antisemitism. Each of those is a share within a bounded sample, and each is an association rather than a mechanism.
The distance between the two registers is the finding. The moral argument is made about states, laws and policies; the measurements land on people, on what is said about Jews collectively, and on what is recorded where crowds gather. A reader who has heard the argument in its careful form and then seen the vocabulary in its uncareful one already knows that distance exists. The open question is which of the discourse’s components travel from the first form to the second, and how much of what is counted at the second end began at the first.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does the UK protected-belief ruling apply outside the United Kingdom?
No. Miller v University of Bristol was decided by a UK employment tribunal applying section 10 of the Equality Act 2010, a domestic statute, and a first-instance tribunal judgment does not bind other tribunals even within that jurisdiction. The 2024 Industrial Law Journal case note sets out the scope limits legal scholars attach to it.
How many bodies have adopted the IHRA working definition of antisemitism?
Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism reported 1,216 entities as having ratified the IHRA working definition by the end of 2023, with 97 new adopters during that year. That is the ministry’s own compiled count, published by a government body rather than an independent auditor.
Do antisemitic attitudes concentrate on one side of the political spectrum?
Hersh and Royden (2022, peer-reviewed) surveyed about 3,500 US adults with an oversample of young adults and found overt antisemitic attitudes rare on the political left and more common on the right, with the highest concentration among young adults on the far right. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, peer-reviewed) report two separate pathways in British samples, one through social dominance orientation and one through identity fusion with the Palestinian people.
Do conspiracy beliefs explain the overlap between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes?
Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced) report across three preregistered studies that their Conspiracies Mediated Model accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association while a general conspiratorial mindset did not. The design is correlational and mediational, not causal.
Are antisemitic incident counts comparable across countries?
Not directly. The Community Security Trust recorded 4,296 incidents in the United Kingdom for 2023 on its own definitions and states its figures are indicative of trends rather than absolute measures, while national counts compiled by the Kantor Center at Tel Aviv University for 2025 come from different monitoring bodies applying different rules. Each series is internally consistent and none shares a denominator with another.
How do researchers decide whether an ambiguous comment is antisemitic?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) coded against a scheme based on the IHRA working definition and report that thread context was required to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK comments they classified. Jikeli and colleagues (2022) used expert annotators against a published guide, and their 2023 preprint documents the annotation procedure and agreement handling for a 6,941-tweet dataset.
Sources
- Allington, D., Hirsh, D., Katz, L., 2023. Correlation Between Coronavirus Conspiracism and Antisemitism: A Cross-Sectional Study in the United Kingdom. Scientific Reports. DOI 10.1038/s41598-023-41794-y. Peer-reviewed.
- American Jewish Committee, 2025. The State of Antisemitism in America 2025. ajc.org/AntisemitismReport2025. Monitoring organization survey (advocacy mission).
- Anti-Defamation League, 2025. Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2024. ADL Center on Extremism. adl.org/resources/report/audit-antisemitic-incidents-2024. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
- Anti-Defamation League, 2024. Antisemitism Uncovered: Myth, Anti-Zionism or Criticism of Israel Is Antisemitism. antisemitism.adl.org/anti-zionism/. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
- Anti-Zionism as ‘Protected Belief’: The Case of David Miller, 2024. Industrial Law Journal, 55(1), p. 213. Oxford University Press. academic.oup.com/ilj/article/55/1/213/8339654. Peer-reviewed.
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021. Hate Crime Victimization, 2005 to 2019. US Department of Justice. bjs.ojp.gov. Official record.
- Community Security Trust, 2024. Antisemitic Incidents Report 2023. cst.org.uk. Monitoring organization (community security body).
- Enstad, J. D., 2026. Holocaust Inversion and Justification of Anti-Jewish Aggression: Evidence from Two National Surveys in Norway. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001704. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025. Reported Crimes in the Nation, 2024 (Hate Crime Statistics). UCR Crime Data Explorer. Official record.
- Harber, K. D., Bulska, D., Malloy, T. E., Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Hersh, E., Royden, L., 2022. Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum. Political Research Quarterly. DOI 10.1177/10659129221111081. Peer-reviewed.
- Institute for National Security Studies, 2025. Are We Asking the Wrong Questions about Antisemitism? INSS Insight No. 2144. inss.org.il. Policy institute paper.
- Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., Soemer, K., 2022. Differences Between Antisemitic and Non-Antisemitic English Language Tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- Jikeli, G., Karali, S., Miehling, D., Soemer, K., 2023. Antisemitic Messages? A Guide to High-Quality Annotation and a Labeled Dataset of Tweets. arXiv:2304.14599. Preprint.
- Miller v University of Bristol, 2024. Employment Tribunal judgment, February 2024, on protected belief under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010. Official record.
- Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, 2024. The State of Antisemitism Report for 2023. gov.il. Official record (Israeli government body; self-reported).
- Moon, J. W., Barlev, M., Neuberg, S. L., 2026. Justifying Antisemitism: Political Liberalism and Perceptions of Prejudices. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001702. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Tel Aviv University, Kantor Center, 2026. Antisemitism Worldwide Report for 2025. cst.tau.ac.il. Academic monitoring center.
- Yale Youth Poll, 2025. Fall 2025 Poll on Antisemitic Attitudes and Israel-Palestine. youthpoll.yale.edu. Academic poll.