The two-state solution is failing on a record that can be counted: three decades after the 1993 Declaration of Principles deferred Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders to a final-status stage, none of the five has been closed by a signed agreement. What is failing is the mechanism the Declaration set up, an incremental exchange in which the hardest questions were postponed, and each of the five files below is a measured account of where that postponement now stands. In the same period the population living in the land partition would divide has been counted and recounted: Sergio DellaPergola, in the American Jewish Year Book chapter “World Jewish Population, 2019,” recorded 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank and a further 221,800 in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods incorporated after 1967, 640,700 between the two territories at the start of that year. The Israeli and Palestinian statistical agencies each publish a total that includes East Jerusalem, so the two series overlap on the very ground the question turns on, and the analysts who study the impasse disagree about whether the binding constraint is territory, enforcement or the unclosed final-status file.
Key Findings
- Sergio DellaPergola, in “World Jewish Population, 2019,” counted 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank, 221,800 in East Jerusalem neighborhoods incorporated after 1967, and 23,200 on the Golan Heights, a territorial breakdown that shows why published settler totals differ by roughly 200,000 depending on scope.
- Israel’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted in 2018, states in clause 7 that “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” Israel’s Supreme Court dismissed fifteen petitions against the law on 8 July 2021 in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset.
- Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted more than one million Jerusalem residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% of them Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, the population inside the Jerusalem question the 1993 text deferred.
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza in its 2017 census, the last full enumeration; its end-of-2025 brief puts Gaza at about 2.13 million after a decline of roughly 254,000 people.
- The 2016 United States and Israel Memorandum of Understanding sets $38 billion over fiscal years 2019 to 2028 and states that the levels are “subject to the appropriation and availability of funds”; four recorded congressional votes between 2021 and 2024 carried Israel assistance by 420 to 9, 226 to 196, 366 to 58 and 79 to 18.
Which conditions does partition require, and which are unmet?
Partition requires three things a document can record: a territory that can be divided, one authority on each side able to sign and implement, and a text that closes the final-status questions. The 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements closed none of the five it named first, deferring Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders to permanent-status negotiations. No signed agreement has since closed them.
The second condition is recorded in the statistical series themselves. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, established after the Oslo Accords, has conducted three censuses, in 1997, 2007 and 2017, and reports the West Bank and Gaza as separately administered populations. The last general election to the Palestinian Legislative Council was held in January 2006; no successor election appears in the record since.
The first condition, a divisible territory, is the one the official counts speak to most directly. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s resident total, a scope choice the Bureau applies consistently and which differs from the convention international monitors use. Its Jerusalem Day release of 3 June 2024 records that the city passed one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, with the population growing by 13,400 during 2023. Those residents sit inside Israel’s published national figures.
Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Lihi Ben Shitrit, reviewing the Bureau’s yearbooks from 1967 onward in a 2020 study for the Project on Middle East Political Science, document when each classification changed: East Jerusalem entered the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” by 1983 settlement localities were counted in the total number of Israeli localities, and in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. The authors call the trend a normalization of settlements, their own analytic framing.
Is it often said settlements made a contiguous state impossible?
It is often said that the settler population has passed 600,000 across more than 140 settlements, and that this alone forecloses a contiguous Palestinian state.
On the published territorial breakdown the first half of that claim is close to the record: DellaPergola’s “World Jewish Population, 2019” counted 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank at the start of 2019, plus 221,800 in the annexed East Jerusalem neighborhoods and 23,200 on the Golan Heights.
What separates one published total from another is scope, and there are two scope decisions. The first is East Jerusalem: DellaPergola’s two components differ by 221,800, so a total that folds the annexed neighborhoods in runs roughly a fifth higher than one that does not, which accounts for most of the gap between figures quoted in the 600,000 range and figures quoted near 700,000. The second is what counts as a settlement. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) record that the Central Bureau of Statistics excludes unrecognized outposts from its locality counts, and that Peace Now documented about 121 such outposts in 2019. They also record a boundary case: the Green-Line-straddling locality of Shani Livne is placed by the Bureau in Israel’s South District, while Peace Now and other monitors count it as a settlement.
Two further cautions travel with these numbers. DellaPergola counts a core Jewish population by territory of residence, which is a demographic category, not a legal or administrative settler register, and the figures are dated to the start of 2019. And a population count is not a map: it records how many people live where, not how much of the West Bank’s area is built on, zoned or reserved, and the contiguity claim is a claim about geography rather than about headcount. The territorial pattern behind those residents is examined in the Institute’s report on settler expansion and the West Bank population record.
What do Israel’s enacted texts record about settlement policy?
Israel’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted in 2018, states in clause 7 that “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” That is the enacted text, in the Knesset’s own published English translation, which the Knesset labels unofficial. It is the highest-tier instrument on the subject, and it is where any argument about settlement policy as state policy begins.
The same law states in clause 1(b) that “The State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination,” and in clause 1(c) that “The realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People.” Clause 3 states that “The complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.” Clause 4 makes Hebrew the language of the State and gives Arabic “a special status,” while preserving the status Arabic held in practice before the law came into force.
Fifteen petitions challenged the law. An eleven-justice panel of the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, heard argument on 22 December 2020 and delivered judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Akram Hasson v. Knesset on 8 July 2021. The petitions were dismissed and the Basic Law was upheld. The Court also held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, deriving that limit from the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law. Both halves of that judgment are the record: the law stands, and the Court set a constitutional limit it could have crossed.
The 1948 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, in the text the Knesset publishes, pledges that the state “will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes the same sentence with “all its inhabitants.” Both are Israeli government translations of the Hebrew original, and the wording differs on the word the clause turns on.
Which final-status issues remain unagreed after three decades?
Each side’s stated condition is on the record, and the two do not meet. The Institute for National Security Studies, in “What Is the Problem With the Palestinian Problem?”, locates the central obstacle in decisive talks in the Palestinian side’s unwillingness to permanently renounce the right of return and to accept the finality of claims that a permanent-status agreement would require. That is a named Israeli research institute stating what it treats as the binding item.
The Brookings Institution, in “After Oslo: Rethinking the Two-State Solution,” names the concessions on the other side that were never made: evacuation of settlements, transfer of territory, and division of Jerusalem. Read together, the two analyses do not describe a negotiation stuck on detail. They describe two conditions each of which the other party has treated as non-negotiable.
The refugee item rests on a displacement whose scale is documented and whose cause is disputed by named historians. Benny Morris, in the 2004 second edition of “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,” carries roughly 700,000 as his archival estimate and attributes the exodus to multiple causes varying by locality and phase, rejecting both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. The Israel Law Review article “1948 Refugees” records that about 400 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed in the course of the military operations, resulting in the expulsion and flight of about 80% of the residents of the Palestinian regions on which the State of Israel was established. Ilan Pappé, in “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine” (2006), holds that the displacement was planned. The arguments made from that record are set out in the Institute’s report on the moral arguments for the Palestinian right of return.
The Jerusalem item has a population attached to it. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted more than one million residents in Jerusalem at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, with about 29.2% of all city residents estimated as ultra-Orthodox Jews on a 2022 model. Any division of the city is a division of that population.
Which Palestinian authority would sign and implement an agreement?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza in its 2017 census, 4,780,978 in total, and reports the two as separate territories with separate administrations. That census is the last full enumeration; every later total in the Bureau’s series, and in the international series built on it, is a projection off that measured base.
The two populations have since moved apart further. The Bureau’s brief “A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025” puts Gaza at about 2.13 million at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which the Bureau states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates, attributing the change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. The same brief reports roughly 2.2 million people living in Gaza on the eve of the war, of whom nearly two million were displaced and roughly 100,000 have left the Strip. These are the Bureau’s own estimates rather than an enumeration, and the change is a demographic net decline, not a casualty count.
East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated in the 2017 census, and administrative estimates were used there. That is the same ground Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts inside its own municipal and national totals, so the two national statistical authorities publish overlapping figures for the same residents.
On the electoral record, the last general election to the Palestinian Legislative Council was held in January 2006, and no subsequent legislative election appears in the record.
The Brookings Institution, in “This Is What the Death of the Two-State Solution Looks Like,” ties the outcome to dysfunction in Israel’s party system and to what it calls a decayed Palestinian national leadership. That is an argument, named and attributable. The counted populations under separate administration, and the interval since the last legislative vote, are the record beneath it.
Does the population record still show two separable majorities?
The two statistical agencies still publish two distinct majorities, and both include some of the same people. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded a resident population of about 10.148 million in September 2025, comprising roughly 7.758 million Jews and Others and 2.130 million Arabs.
The Bureau’s published shares of 78.5% and 21.5% are shares of the 9.888 million those two groups sum to; the remaining roughly 260,000 residents are foreigners, counted in the total but outside the two groups.
DellaPergola, in “World Jewish Population, 2024,” put Israel’s core Jewish population at 7,153,000 as of 1 January 2024, an increase of 92,100 or 1.30% over his revised 2023 figure, and the world total at 15,736,800.
On the Palestinian side the World Bank’s World Development Indicators give about 5.29 million for West Bank and Gaza in 2024, and the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects 2024 carries State of Palestine at about 5.6 million including East Jerusalem. Both are projections off the 2017 census rather than counts, and the World Bank publishes the West Bank and Gaza as one combined economy with no separate Gaza series.
Because Israel’s Bureau counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside its total, and the Palestinian series covers the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the two national totals cannot be added. That overlap is examined further in the Institute’s report on Israeli and Palestinian population growth.
The Palestinian counts themselves are the subject of a named dispute. Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid and Michael Wise, in the 2006 Begin-Sadat Center report “The Million Person Gap,” calculated 2.49 million rather than the 3.83 million the Palestinian Bureau reported for mid-2004, a gap of 1.34 million. Ian Lustick, in the peer-reviewed 2013 Middle East Journal article “What Counts is the Counting,” audits that campaign and concludes it rests on systematic manipulation of data rather than a genuine over-count, documenting the annexation proposals attached to it. Sergio DellaPergola, in a 2005 paired brief with Zimmerman, built his Palestinian base from Israeli rather than Palestinian data and still reached about 3.4 million.
Who would enforce a signed agreement, and on what terms?
The largest standing instrument in the relationship is a security-assistance framework, not an implementation guarantee. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, signed at Washington on 14 September 2016, sets $38 billion over fiscal years 2019 to 2028.
The Congressional Research Service reports this as $33 billion in Foreign Military Financing plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations, requested at $3.8 billion a year.
The Memorandum’s own text states that the funding levels “are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds.”
The Congressional Research Service report RL33222 records that Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of United States foreign assistance since the Second World War, at $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding in current dollars, and that Congress appropriated $8.7 billion in combined Foreign Military Financing and missile defense funding in fiscal year 2024. The accompanying 2016 letter records Israel’s commitment not to seek Foreign Military Financing above the agreed levels for the duration of the framework.
The recorded votes show how that assistance moves through Congress.
H.R. 5323, the Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, passed the House 420 to 9 with 2 voting present on 23 September 2021. H.R. 6126, paired with a rescission of IRS funding as its offset, passed 226 to 196 on 2 November 2023. H.R. 8034, essentially the same Israel assistance without the offset, passed 366 to 58 on 20 April 2024, and the Senate agreed to H.R. 815 by 79 to 18 on 23 April 2024. The two 2024-numbered House votes differ by 140 members, and the variable between them was the domestic offset rather than the assistance.
The Princeton essay “Two-State Solution” frames the enforcement problem structurally: the exchange on offer is asynchronous, with irreversible territorial withdrawal traded now against future compliance, and no trusted enforcer stands behind the later half of the bargain.
Where do analysts disagree about whether partition is still possible?
The named analyses disagree about which constraint binds, and the disagreement is substantive rather than rhetorical. The Brookings Institution, in “How the Peace Process Killed the Two-State Solution,” locates the failure in incentives: Israeli leaders faced no incentive to make the concessions a deal required, and the process itself supplied reasons to defer them. That is a political constraint, and a political constraint can in principle be changed.
The same institution, in “This Is What the Death of the Two-State Solution Looks Like,” places the constraint in the party systems on both sides, arguing that neither polity is currently structured to sustain the bargain. In “After Oslo: Rethinking the Two-State Solution,” Brookings names the specific unmade concessions, settlement evacuation, territorial transfer and division of Jerusalem, which locates the constraint in the content of a deal rather than in the parties’ character.
The Princeton essay “Two-State Solution” treats the constraint as structural and independent of who governs: an exchange in which one side gives up territory irreversibly in return for behavior it cannot verify or enforce is one that a rational party declines regardless of goodwill. On that reading, a change of leadership does not remove the problem; only an enforcer does.
The Institute for National Security Studies locates the constraint in an unclosed legal and political question, the right of return and finality of claims, which is neither a matter of incentives nor of enforcement but of what the parties are willing to sign.
The four positions imply different tests. If the constraint is incentives, the diagnostic is whether the political cost of concessions changes. If it is party systems, the diagnostic is coalition composition. If it is enforcement, the diagnostic is whether a guarantor with capacity and credibility appears, and the instrument that exists sets an assistance schedule expressly subject to annual appropriation. If it is finality of claims, the diagnostic is textual: whether either side’s stated condition on refugees moves. None of the four analyses reports a measurement, and none claims one. They are arguments from named institutions, and they should be weighed as such.
Does the failure narrative track measured attitudes toward Jews?
The measured work on this connection is associational and comes from three peer-reviewed studies with modest samples. The clearest of these, by Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh, primed participants with war-in-Gaza material and found two separate pathways to anti-Jewish hostility: one running through social dominance orientation, associated with right-leaning political orientation, and one running through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people, in which attitudes toward Israel and prejudice toward Jews were conflated.
Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh published this work in a 2025 International Journal of Intercultural Relations article, based on two experiments with British samples of 354 and 490 participants.
Huesmann and colleagues, in a 2012 Journal of Research on Adolescence study of 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students, found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes. The association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed, and both groups held more negative stereotypes about the out-group than the in-group, with ethnic identity correlating with implicit out-group stereotyping at r = -0.70. The authors’ own framing is that exposure alone was not the operative variable.
Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila, in a 2026 American Psychologist article reporting three preregistered studies with samples of 373, 243 and 493, found that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, and that their model accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes. Conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate the association, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results. The same paper reports that Democrats, compared with Republicans, expressed less antisemitism but stronger anti-Israel attitudes.
All three are correlational designs, and each set of authors states that limit. None measures a stalled negotiation framework directly, and no study in this literature measures whether the absence of a partition agreement, as distinct from the conflict itself, is associated with any change in attitudes toward Jews. What the studies do measure is that conflict-related framing and attitudes toward Israel sit in a measured relationship with attitudes toward Jews, through identifiable pathways, at these sample sizes.
Methodology and limitations
This report draws on four source types, each labeled where cited. Primary and official records: Israel’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018, in the Knesset’s published English translation, which the Knesset labels unofficial), the 1948 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, the judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset (8 July 2021), the 1993 Declaration of Principles, the 2016 United States and Israel Memorandum of Understanding, four recorded congressional votes at congress.gov, the Congressional Research Service report RL33222, and the published series of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Peer-reviewed research: Lustick (2013), Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), Huesmann and colleagues (2012), Harber and colleagues (2026), and the Israel Law Review article “1948 Refugees.” Academic reference works and scholarly books: DellaPergola’s American Jewish Year Book chapters for 2019 and 2024, Morris (2004) and Pappé (2006). Think-tank analyses, named and treated as arguments rather than measurements: the Brookings Institution, the Institute for National Security Studies, the Princeton essay, the Begin-Sadat Center report of 2006 and the Project on Middle East Political Science review of 2020.
Four limitations bear on the figures. First, DellaPergola counts a core Jewish population by territory of residence at a stated date; it is a demographic category, not a legal or administrative settler register, and it is not a measure of built area or territorial contiguity. Second, the Israeli and Palestinian statistical series both include East Jerusalem residents, so their totals overlap and must never be summed. Third, the Palestinian Bureau’s last full enumeration was the 2017 census; its later totals, and the World Bank and UN Population Division series built on them, are projections, and the end-of-2025 Gaza figures are the Bureau’s estimates rather than a count. Fourth, the psychological findings in the final section are correlational at samples between 89 and 493, and each set of authors states that limit.
The Zimmerman, Seid and Wise estimate of 2006 is carried as a contested think-tank figure, not an official or measured population, alongside the peer-reviewed audit by Lustick (2013) that rejects it and the demographic critique by DellaPergola (2005). Morris (2004) and Pappé (2006) are presented as the two poles of a named scholarly dispute over the causes of the 1948 displacement.
Conclusion
So which conditions has partition lost? On the record assembled here, all three have loosened at once. The 1993 text deferred Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders, and none of the five has been closed by a signed agreement in the three decades since. DellaPergola counted 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank and 221,800 in annexed East Jerusalem at the start of 2019, and Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics has counted both populations inside its national total since a series of classification changes that Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit date to 1968, 1970, 1983 and 1997. The Basic Law of 2018 names Jewish settlement as a national value in clause 7, and Israel’s Supreme Court dismissed the petitions against it on 8 July 2021 while holding that the Knesset could not deny the state’s core democratic identity.
On the second condition, the Palestinian Bureau’s 2017 census counted 2,881,687 residents in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza as separately administered populations, its end-of-2025 brief puts Gaza at about 2.13 million after a decline of roughly 254,000, and the last legislative election was held in January 2006. On the third, the guarantor instrument that exists is a $38 billion assistance schedule expressly subject to annual appropriation, carried by margins of 420 to 9, 226 to 196, 366 to 58 and 79 to 18 depending on what else was attached to it. The named analyses disagree about which of these binds hardest: Brookings on incentives and party systems, Princeton on the unverifiable exchange, the Institute for National Security Studies on finality of claims.
What sits alongside that record is a smaller literature with a different subject. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) traced two distinct pathways from conflict framing to hostility toward Jews in British samples of 354 and 490, and Harber and colleagues (2026) found conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists accounting for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies. A framework that stays unresolved keeps supplying the discourse that those studies measure. Whether a partition that recedes year after year is itself one of the inputs feeding what they found, and what that would mean for people who have no part in the negotiation at all, is the question this record raises and cannot settle.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents in its 2017 census, 2,881,687 in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza. Later figures are projections off that base: the World Bank’s 2024 indicators give about 5.29 million for 2024, and the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects 2024 carries about 5.6 million including East Jerusalem.
Why do published settler figures differ so widely?
Two scope decisions drive the gap. DellaPergola’s 2019 breakdown separates 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank from 221,800 in annexed East Jerusalem, so totals differ by roughly 220,000 depending on whether the annexed neighborhoods are folded in. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) record that Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics also excludes unrecognized outposts, of which Peace Now documented about 121 in 2019.
Which court has ruled on Israel’s Nation-State Law?
Israel’s Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, heard fifteen petitions in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset before an eleven-justice panel on 22 December 2020 and dismissed them on 8 July 2021. The Court upheld the law while holding that the Knesset, even as constituent authority, cannot deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic.
How much United States assistance to Israel is fixed in advance?
None of it is legally fixed. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding sets $38 billion over fiscal years 2019 to 2028 and states that the levels are “subject to the appropriation and availability of funds.” The Congressional Research Service records $174 billion in cumulative bilateral assistance and missile defense funding, and $8.7 billion appropriated in fiscal year 2024.
Why can the Israeli and Palestinian population totals not be added together?
Both series include East Jerusalem residents. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts them inside its municipal and national totals, recording more than one million Jerusalem residents at the end of 2023, and the Palestinian Bureau’s census covers the West Bank including East Jerusalem, where it used administrative estimates because direct enumeration was not possible.
Which figures on the 1948 displacement are documented?
Benny Morris’s 2004 archival study carries roughly 700,000 displaced as his own estimate and attributes the exodus to causes varying by locality and phase. The Israel Law Review article “1948 Refugees” records about 400 towns and villages destroyed and about 80% of residents of the affected regions expelled or in flight. Ilan Pappé (2006) holds that the displacement was planned; Morris rejects a single master plan.
What has been measured about attitudes toward Jews during the conflict?
Three peer-reviewed studies measure associations, not causes. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) found two pathways to anti-Jewish hostility in British samples of 354 and 490. Huesmann and colleagues (2012) found media exposure predicted stereotypes only through identification with the portrayed groups. Harber and colleagues (2026) found Israel-implicating conspiracy beliefs accounted for over 55% of variance in anti-Israel attitudes.
Sources
- Brookings Institution. After Oslo: Rethinking the Two-State Solution. brookings.edu/articles/after-oslo-rethinking-the-two-state-solution/. Think-tank analysis.
- Brookings Institution. How the Peace Process Killed the Two-State Solution. brookings.edu/articles/how-the-peace-process-killed-the-two-state-solution/. Think-tank analysis.
- Brookings Institution. This Is What the Death of the Two-State Solution Looks Like. brookings.edu/articles/this-is-what-the-death-of-the-two-state-solution-looks-like/. Think-tank analysis.
- Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel), 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024, 3 June 2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel), 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. Media release, September 2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- DellaPergola, Sergio, 2019. World Jewish Population, 2019. American Jewish Year Book 2019, vol. 119, Springer. Academic reference.
- DellaPergola, Sergio, 2025. World Jewish Population, 2024. American Jewish Year Book 2024, Springer. Academic reference.
- Harber, Kent, Bulska, Dominika, Malloy, Thomas, and Vila, Jessica, 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan, and Ben Shitrit, Lihi, 2020. So, How Many Settlements Are There? Counting, Tracking, and Normalizing Jewish Settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the Present. Project on Middle East Political Science. Organizational report.
- Huesmann, L. Rowell, Dubow, Eric, Boxer, Paul, Souweidane, Violet, and Ginges, Jeremy, 2012. Foreign Wars and Domestic Prejudice. Journal of Research on Adolescence. DOI 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x. Peer-reviewed.
- Institute for National Security Studies. What Is the Problem With the Palestinian Problem? inss.org.il/publication/the-palestinian-problem/. Research-institute analysis.
- Israel Law Review. 1948 Refugees. Cambridge University Press. Peer-reviewed.
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Official English translation, main.knesset.gov.il. Official record.
- Lustick, Ian S., 2013. What Counts is the Counting: Statistical Manipulation as a Solution to Israel’s “Demographic Problem.” The Middle East Journal, 67(2), pp. 185 to 205. DOI 10.3751/67.2.12. Peer-reviewed.
- Morris, Benny, 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. Scholarly book.
- Ozer, Simon, Obaidi, Milan, and Bergh, Robin, 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017: Final Results. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Pappé, Ilan, 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. Scholarly book.
- Princeton University. Two-State Solution. cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/wb08-essay.html. Analytical essay.
- Provisional Government of Israel, 1948. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Official Gazette Number 1, 14 May 1948. Official record.
- Supreme Court of Israel, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Akram Hasson v. Knesset. Judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. population.un.org/wpp. Official record.
- US Congress, 2021 to 2024. Recorded votes on Israel security assistance: House Roll Call 275 (2021), House Roll Calls 577 (2023) and 152 (2024), Senate Record Vote 154 (2024). congress.gov. Official record.
- US Congressional Research Service. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments, RL33222. congress.gov. Official record.
- US Department of State, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Israel on Security Assistance, signed 14 September 2016. Official record.
- World Bank, 2024. World Development Indicators, West Bank and Gaza. data.worldbank.org. Official record.
- Zimmerman, Bennett, Seid, Roberta, and Wise, Michael L., 2006. The Million Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. Think-tank report.
- Zimmerman, Bennett, and DellaPergola, Sergio, 2005. What is the True Demographic Picture in the West Bank and Gaza? A Presentation and a Critique. Jerusalem Issue Brief, 4(19). Organizational policy brief.