Two acronyms circulate for the same army, and the difference between them is one word: the force was established by order of the Provisional Government of Israel on 26 May 1948 as Tzva Ha-Hagana Le-Yisrael, which the army renders in English as the Israel Defense Forces, and the substituted phrase replaces defense with occupation. The replacement word is not only rhetorical. Israel’s own High Court of Justice applies the law of belligerent occupation to military conduct in the West Bank, while the government-commissioned Levy Report of 2012 concluded that Israel’s presence there does not meet the classical definition of belligerent occupation, a conclusion the cabinet never adopted. In peer-reviewed comment corpora the vocabulary of occupation and its neighbouring framings sits inside sets of antisemitic-coded content at measured rates: Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) coded 26.9% of 1,504 British media comments as antisemitic, and the apartheid analogy appeared in 5.2% of those.
Key Findings
- The army was established by order of the Provisional Government of Israel on 26 May 1948, unifying the Haganah and other pre-state formations under the name Tzva Ha-Hagana Le-Yisrael, according to the Israel Defense Forces’ own published account of its origins.
- The Levy Report, commissioned by the Israeli government in 2012 to review the status of West Bank building, concluded that Israel’s presence there does not meet the classical definition of belligerent occupation. Its conclusions were never adopted by the cabinet.
- In a September 2024 survey of 1,000 Israeli adults by the Israel Democracy Institute (±3.10%), 83% of the Jewish sample gave the army high grades for ethical conduct during the war, while more than two thirds of the Arab sample gave low grades.
- The IDF’s Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, drawn from over 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment, its own count of its own processes.
- Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), peer-reviewed, coded 26.9% of 1,504 comments on leading British media Facebook pages as antisemitic; within those, the apartheid analogy appeared in 5.2% and the Nazi analogy in 4.2%.
What is the army’s official name, and who set it?
The Israel Defense Forces was established by order of the Provisional Government of Israel on 26 May 1948, unifying the Haganah and other pre-state formations into a single army under the Hebrew name Tzva Ha-Hagana Le-Yisrael, on the army’s own published account of its origins, which is its own reported history and not an independent one. Twelve days earlier, on 14 May 1948, that same Provisional Government had proclaimed the state.
The founding instrument is a primary record. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel was published in Official Gazette Number 1 in Tel Aviv on 14 May 1948 and signed by the 37 members of the People’s Council, and it declares “THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.” The army order followed from that authority. The Cambridge Dictionary records IDF as the standard expansion of the initials in English.
It is often said that the army is properly called the Israeli Occupation Forces, and that the official name is a euphemism the institution chose for itself. The first half of that is checkable and settles quickly: the phrase appears in no Israeli founding order, no Basic Law, and no Israeli government publication drawn on here. It is a substitution applied to the institution from outside it, and the institution has never used it.
That leaves the substantive part of the claim, which is about the second word rather than the acronym. The question a reader is actually asking is whether the word occupation describes what the army does, and whether the word defense describes what it does. Those are separable questions, answerable from different registers of evidence: the legal and administrative record on the first, the army’s own doctrine and published counts on the second, and measured discourse corpora on how the substituted phrase travels once it is in circulation. The sections below take them in that order.
Is the army’s role in the territories described as occupation?
Occupation carries a legal register in Israel’s own record and not only a critic’s one. Civil affairs in the West Bank are administered through the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, a unit of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, and Israel’s High Court of Justice has applied the law of belligerent occupation to military conduct there. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2024 treating the territories as occupied.
The claim in its strongest form is therefore not that occupation is a slogan. It is that the word is the operative legal category for how the territory has been governed since 1967, that Israeli courts have applied that category to Israeli soldiers, and that the administration of Palestinian civil affairs runs through a chain of command inside the Ministry of Defense rather than through a civil ministry. Each of those is a matter of official record rather than characterisation.
Israel’s statistical practice records the same territorial question from the other side. The Central Bureau of Statistics reported that Jerusalem’s population passed one million at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, and it counts the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods annexed after 1967 inside that single municipal population. Its Independence Day releases count West Bank settlers inside Israel’s national total. International monitoring convention counts those same residents separately. Neither convention is an error; they are different scope choices, and a report that mixes them produces totals that do not reconcile.
Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020), in a think-tank review that is not peer-reviewed, document the sequence in the Bureau’s own yearbooks: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel proper in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” by 1983 settlement localities were counted among Israeli localities, and in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. The authors call this normalisation, which is their framing rather than the Bureau’s. The dated changes are the record; the reading is theirs. The legal standard applied to those localities is the subject of a separate report on why Israeli settlements are treated as unlawful.
Has Israel’s own record ever rejected the occupation designation?
The Levy Report of 2012, commissioned by the Israeli government to examine the status of building in the West Bank and chaired by former Supreme Court Justice Edmond Levy, concluded that Israel’s presence there does not meet the classical definition of belligerent occupation, and that settlement building is therefore not unlawful on that ground. The cabinet never adopted its conclusions.
That is the strongest form the Israeli objection takes in a government-commissioned document, and its status matters as much as its content. A commissioned review is an official record of what a body appointed by the government concluded. It is not enacted law, it is not a court ruling, and non-adoption means it did not become state policy. Reports that cite it as Israel’s position overstate it; reports that omit it leave the objection unnamed and unsourced.
The same state’s judicial practice runs the other way. Israel’s High Court of Justice has adjudicated petitions concerning military conduct in the West Bank by reference to the law of belligerent occupation, which is the body of law the Levy Report held does not classically apply. Israel’s record therefore contains both a commissioned rejection of the designation and a judicial practice that assumes it, and the disagreement is internal rather than between Israel and its critics alone.
The Court has drawn a limit around the legislature elsewhere on a related question. In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided on 8 July 2021 by an eleven-justice panel, the Court dismissed fifteen petitions and upheld Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic. The ruling cuts in both directions and is usually cited in one: the law stood, and the Court asserted a constitutional limit the law could have crossed.
So the answer to the rung is yes, once, in a review the government commissioned and then left on the shelf. That is a narrower fact than “Israel disputes the characterization,” and it is the checkable version of it.
How many Israelis pass through the institution being renamed?
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded a population of 10.094 million on the eve of Independence Day 2025, according to preliminary figures.
Of that total, 7.732 million (76.6%) were Jews and Others, 2.114 million (20.9%) were Arabs, and 248,000 (2.5%) were foreigners, per the bureau’s preliminary breakdown.
The label attaches to the army of that state, and assessments of the army inside it split along the same line the statistics record.
The Israel Democracy Institute surveyed 1,000 Israeli adults from 15 to 19 September 2024, 800 interviewed in Hebrew and 200 in Arabic, with a maximum sampling error of ±3.10% at 95% confidence. It reported that 83% of the Jewish sample gave the army high grades for its ethical conduct during the war, while more than two thirds of the Arab sample gave low grades. The Institute published no high-grade share for the Arab sample. By 2022 vote, it reported that 78% of voters for Arab parties and 73% of non-voters considered the army’s ethical conduct poor or very poor. The subsample error is wider than the whole-sample figure quoted.
The Peace Index, a joint product of the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University conducted by Professor Tamar Hermann, scored the army on a 1 to 5 scale in fieldwork of 30 to 31 October 2017 and reported the two respondent groups on the same dimensions.
Ethical conduct is where the two columns diverge and budgetary conduct is where they meet exactly. Earlier, the Jewish People Policy Institute reported from 1,070 weighted questionnaires fielded in May 2022 among the Israeli Jewish public only, sampling error 3.1%, that three out of four Israeli Jews agreed the army “is the most moral army in the world,” with 47% calling that claim highly accurate. That fieldwork predates the war entirely. Every figure in this section measures opinion about the army, never the army’s conduct.
What word does the army’s own ethical code build its identity on?
Six values are stated in The Spirit of the IDF, the army’s published ethical code, and the first of them is Purity of Arms, which requires in the code’s own words that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property.” The substituted acronym replaces exactly the word that code is built on.
The code also states that a soldier “will recognize the critical importance of human life,” and that a soldier “will ensure they are only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders.” This is doctrine, and doctrine is evidence of a stated standard rather than evidence of conduct measured against it. Quoting the code establishes what the institution requires of itself and nothing about any particular action.
The counts live in a different document. The Military Advocate General’s Corps reported that 74 criminal investigations had been opened as at 3 August 2024, drawn from over 1,000 incidents identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, with hundreds still under assessment. These are the army’s own counts of its own processes, published by a party to the events, not independently verified, and they are counts of investigations opened rather than of findings, indictments or convictions.
The threshold that produces those counts travels with them. The Corps states that in armed conflict “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The ratio of 74 to over 1,000 is a function of that standard, and the claim that the army is the world’s most moral is measured against the same two documents.
How does swapping one word inside a name work online?
Over 300 coded terms are catalogued in the glossary Mendelsohn, Le Bras, Choi and Sap published at the 2023 Association for Computational Linguistics conference: expressions carrying one meaning to a broad audience and a second, often hateful, meaning to an in-group. Their peer-reviewed study found that harmful content containing such terms evaded automated toxicity detection.
The canonical antisemitic example in that glossary is “cosmopolitan,” which reads as worldly to most readers and as Jewish to a narrow in-group. The glossary spans many targeted groups, and the authors report that a large language model’s ability to decode the terms varied widely by term type and by targeted group.
Taylor, Peignon and Chen (2017), in a preprint, documented a different construction: ordinary words given an alternate meaning inside a community, including the 2016 scheme in which “Skype” stood in for a Jew, alongside “googles” and “yahoos.” Their reported figures are annotator agreement on whether a word was used for hate speech, Cohen’s kappa 0.871 on extremist-community data against 0.676 on keyword-collected data, which measure agreement between coders rather than detection accuracy or prevalence.
Kikkisetti, Mustafa, Melillo, Corizzo, Boukouvalas, Gill and Japkowicz (2024), in a preprint pipeline over 659 posts scraped from alt-tech platforms, seeded from the American Jewish Committee Translate Hate Glossary plus one Southern Poverty Law Center term, surfaced known coded terms including “White Genocide” and “Deep State” and flagged emerging candidates for human review. At 659 posts it is a methodological pilot, and the authors present no prevalence estimate.
The limits are as load-bearing as the findings. None of these three studies measured the phrase at issue in this report, and none coded it. A substituted word inside an institution’s name is also a different linguistic form from the covert code words these studies measure: a code word conceals its target from outsiders, while a renamed acronym is legible to every reader on first contact and states its claim openly. The mechanism literature describes how substitutions travel and how they defeat keyword moderation. It does not classify this substitution, and no measurement carried here does.
How often does occupation vocabulary appear in antisemitic comment corpora?
26.9% of the 1,504 British comments analysed by Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), a peer-reviewed study of reactions on leading media Facebook pages to the May 2021 escalation, were coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme.
The same study coded 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments.
Within the British comments coded antisemitic, the study reported the distribution of framings.
The authors also report that thread context was required to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the British antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, so a coder reading a single comment in isolation would have missed roughly two in five of them.
Jikeli, Axelrod, Fischer, Forouzesh, Jeong, Miehling and Soemer (2022), peer-reviewed, annotated an IHRA-based gold-standard corpus and found that 13.1% of tweets containing “Israel” between January and August 2020 were antisemitic, which they extrapolated to an estimated 2,392,129 tweets, against 11.2% of conversations containing “Jews” across January 2019 to August 2020. Denial of Jewish self-determination fitted 15% of the antisemitic “Jews” tweets, while 62% fitted the IHRA paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power. These are shares of samples drawn within keyword queries, not of all of Twitter.
At the platform level, Zannettou, Finkelstein, Bradlyn and Blackburn (2020) found the word “jew” in 1,993,432 4chan /pol/ posts, 3.0% of 67,416,903 posts, and judged 42% of a random 100-post sample containing it hateful.
None of these corpora coded for the phrase “Israeli Occupation Forces.” What they measure is the prevalence of Israel-related framings inside content already coded antisemitic, with stated denominators, and that is a different quantity from the status of any single phrase.
Do anti-Israel framings track measured antisemitic attitudes in surveys?
Over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes was accounted for by the Conspiracies Mediated Model of New Antisemitism in three preregistered studies by Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026) in American Psychologist, where conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes.
The samples were 373, 243 and 493 participants, two of the three longitudinal. The authors report two negative results alongside the mediation: conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate the association, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the findings. They also report that Democrats, compared with Republicans, expressed less antisemitism but stronger anti-Israel attitudes and greater endorsement of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist conspiracy beliefs. These are associations in survey data, not causal findings, and the figures come from the published abstract.
Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023), in a preregistered cross-sectional study of 1,790 UK adults published in Scientific Reports, found coronavirus conspiracy suspicion correlated positively with generalised, Judeophobic and anti-Zionist antisemitism, with the correlation notably stronger for Judeophobic antisemitism, attitudes toward Jews as Jews. Their exploratory analysis indicated the anti-Zionist link was accounted for by its overlap with the Judeophobic measure, which is the authors’ own qualification and belongs with the finding.
Hersh and Royden (2022), peer-reviewed, ran experiments inside an original survey of about 3,500 US adults with an oversample of young adults and found that overt antisemitic attitudes were rare on the political left and more common on the right, concentrated among young adults on the far right, contrary to horseshoe expectations.
Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) ran two British experiments, 354 and 490 participants, priming war-in-Gaza material. They report two distinct pathways: political orientation associated with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation, and conservative orientation negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people, an identity-based route on which attitudes toward Israel and prejudice toward Jews converge.
None of these instruments asked which acronym a respondent uses, and none measured phrase choice at all. The boundary between criticism of Israel and antisemitism remains a contested scholarly question, and these are measured associations within it rather than a settlement of it.
Methodology and limitations
This report answers a question about naming and measures the discourse around it. It does not adjudicate the legal status of the territories, and the sources are separated by what each one can support.
Four source types are drawn on. Primary and official records include the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948), the Israel Defense Forces’ published account of its own origins, the Central Bureau of Statistics releases for Independence Day 2025 and Jerusalem Day 2024, and the Supreme Court of Israel’s judgment in HCJ 5555/18 (2021). A government-commissioned review, the Levy Report of 2012, is cited as a commissioned conclusion that the cabinet did not adopt. A party’s own reporting includes The Spirit of the IDF and the Military Advocate General’s Corps document of 2024, both published by a party to the events they describe and neither independently verified. Peer-reviewed research supplies the corpus and survey measurements.
Five limitations bear on how the figures may be read. First, the Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and West Bank settlers inside Israel’s national total, a scope choice distinct from international monitoring convention, and figures from the two conventions do not reconcile. Second, the army’s investigation counts are a function of the threshold the Corps states, so the 74 and the over 1,000 are not comparable without it. Third, the Israel Democracy Institute publishes its 2024 Jewish and Arab sample findings in opposite directions, a high-grade share for one and a worded low-grade finding for the other, so the two cannot be set side by side as a single scale; the ±3.10% is a whole-sample figure and the Arabic subsample of 200 carries a wider error. Fourth, the Jewish People Policy Institute survey was fielded in May 2022, before the war, and its broader agreement figure is published as a fraction rather than a percentage. Fifth, Mendelsohn and colleagues (2023), Taylor and colleagues (2017) and Kikkisetti and colleagues (2024) are cited for a mechanism, and Kikkisetti and Taylor are preprints; none measured the phrase this report concerns.
The corpus studies coded antisemitic content and reported the distribution of framings inside it. No source located here measures how often the substituted acronym appears in antisemitic-coded content, or how its users score on any attitude instrument, and no figure of that kind appears in this report.
Conclusion
Two acronyms, one word apart. The founding order settles the first half of the question in a line: the Provisional Government of Israel named the army on 26 May 1948, and the substituted phrase was applied later, from outside, by people who reject the word the order used.
The second half does not resolve as cleanly, and the record is more interesting than either acronym. Occupation is a legal category Israel’s own High Court has applied to its own soldiers, and West Bank civil affairs run through a unit of the Ministry of Defense; the one government-commissioned review that rejected the designation, in 2012, was left unadopted. Defense is the word the army’s own six-value code is built on, and the same institution’s Military Advocate General reports 74 criminal investigations opened from over 1,000 incidents referred, under a stated threshold that treats civilian harm as most often the aftermath of lawful activity rather than a suspicion of crime. Inside Israel, 83% of the Jewish sample and more than two thirds of the Arab sample in the same 1,000-person September 2024 survey reached opposite verdicts on the army’s ethical conduct, and in 2017 the two groups scored the identical dimension 4.25 and 2.53 while agreeing exactly on budgets. The contest over the second word is being run inside the country as well as outside it.
What the measurements add is a caution about where the vocabulary ends up once it circulates. In British comments on the May 2021 escalation, 26.9% of 1,504 were coded antisemitic, and among those the apartheid analogy carried 5.2%, the Nazi analogy 4.2%, denial of Jewish self-determination 7.7%. In annotated tweets containing “Israel,” 13.1% were coded antisemitic. Those are shares within coded corpora, and no study measured this phrase.
So the durable question the record leaves is not which acronym is correct. It is what happens to a legal designation once it is fused into a name and repeated as a chant, and whether a word that a court applies to conduct behaves the same way when it is applied instead to an institution and everyone in it.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does the Hebrew name of the army mean?
The army was established on 26 May 1948 under the Hebrew name Tzva Ha-Hagana Le-Yisrael, which the Israel Defense Forces renders in English as its official name. The Cambridge Dictionary records IDF as the standard English expansion of the initials.
What does Israel’s founding declaration say about the state’s Arab inhabitants?
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948) appeals “to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.” Two official English translations of the declaration differ on one word in the equality clause, the Knesset publishing “all its citizens” and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “all its inhabitants,” so any quotation should name which text it uses.
Who reviews decisions made by Israel’s Military Advocate General?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps states that the MAG “is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence,” and that its decisions are subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged before Israel’s Attorney General and before the Israeli Supreme Court. That is the Corps’ own description of its own accountability structure.
How has Israel’s Supreme Court described the limits of the Knesset’s power?
In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided 8 July 2021 by an eleven-justice panel, the Court dismissed fifteen petitions and upheld Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful.” The Court set the test narrowly, at whether an amendment denies the core democratic identity of the state or inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core of its identity as a Jewish and democratic state.
Is most measured antisemitic language online explicit or implicit?
In over 1.26 million posts from two QAnon subreddits between December 2017 and September 2018, Weinberg, Levy, Edwards, Kopstein, Frey and colleagues (2025) found explicit antisemitic language in 0.66% of posts and implicit terms in 8.6%, roughly thirteen times as often. The authors describe their user-level shares as lower-bound proxies.
Does measured antisemitic content online move around offline events?
Verma, Sear and Johnson (2024), peer-reviewed in npj Complexity, measured a 117.57% rise in antisemitic content across hate communities in the window of 7 to 11 November 2020 against 2 to 6 November, alongside a 269.5% rise in anti-immigration content. The authors report an association with the election period and make no causal claim.
Sources
- Allington, D., Hirsh, D., Katz, L., 2023. Correlation Between Coronavirus Conspiracism and Antisemitism: A Cross-Sectional Study in the United Kingdom. Scientific Reports. DOI 10.1038/s41598-023-41794-y. Peer-reviewed.
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Cambridge University Press, no date. IDF, entry in the Cambridge Dictionary. dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/idf. Reference database.
- Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Israel’s Independence Day 2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. gaza-aid-data.gov.il. Official record, the party’s own reporting.
- Government of Israel, 2012. Report of the Commission to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and Samaria (the Levy Report). Government-commissioned review; conclusions not adopted by the cabinet.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Hersh, E., Royden, L., 2022. Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum. Political Research Quarterly. DOI 10.1177/10659129221111081. Peer-reviewed.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, How Many Settlements Are There? Counting, Tracking, and Normalizing Jewish Settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the Present. POMEPS. Organizational report, not peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2021. The Origins of the Israel Defense Forces. idf.il. Official record, the party’s own account.
- Israel Defense Forces, no date. The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces. idf.il. Official record, the party’s own published doctrine.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. idf.il. Official record, the party’s own counts.
- Israel Democracy Institute, Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, 2024. Special Survey on Public Assessment of the IDF. en.idi.org.il/articles/56081. Research-institute survey.
- Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University, 2017. Peace Index IDF Report Card. en.idi.org.il/articles/18949. Research-institute survey.
- Jewish People Policy Institute, 2022. Morals and Interests: The Israeli Jewish Public on the IDF. jppi.org.il. Research-institute survey.
- Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., Soemer, K., 2022. Differences Between Antisemitic and Non-Antisemitic English Language Tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- Kikkisetti, D., Mustafa, R., Melillo, W., Corizzo, R., Boukouvalas, Z., Gill, J., Japkowicz, N., 2024. Using LLMs to Discover Emerging Coded Antisemitic Hate-Speech in Extremist Social Media. arXiv:2401.10841. Preprint.
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, official (unofficial) English translation. main.knesset.gov.il. Official record, enacted legislation.
- Mendelsohn, J., Le Bras, R., Choi, Y., Sap, M., 2023. From Dogwhistles to Bullhorns: Unveiling Coded Rhetoric with Language Models. ACL 2023. arXiv:2305.17174. Peer-reviewed conference.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Provisional Government of Israel, 1948. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Official Gazette Number 1, 14 May 1948; Knesset English text. Primary and official record.
- Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset. Judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record, court judgment.
- Taylor, J., Peignon, M., Chen, Y., 2017. Surfacing Contextual Hate Speech Words within Social Media. arXiv:1711.10093. Preprint.
- Verma, A., Sear, R., Johnson, N., 2024. How U.S. Presidential Elections Strengthen Global Hate Networks. npj Complexity. DOI 10.1038/s44260-024-00018-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Weinberg, D., Levy, A., Edwards, K., Kopstein, J., Frey, S., and colleagues, 2025. Hidden in Plain Sight: Antisemitic Content in QAnon Subreddits. PLoS ONE. DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0318988. Peer-reviewed.
- Zannettou, S., Finkelstein, J., Bradlyn, B., Blackburn, J., 2020. A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online Antisemitism. ICWSM 2020. DOI 10.1609/icwsm.v14i1.7343. Peer-reviewed conference.