The emaciated child in a hospital corridor is the image most people carry away from Gaza’s hunger, and the measured question underneath it has an answer: acute malnutrition among children under 5 in northern Gaza was screened at 12.4% to 16.5% in early 2024, against 0.8% before the hostilities, on World Health Organization figures. Four named bodies have since stated that Israeli authorities used starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, the earliest on 9 April 2024 and the most recent in September 2025. Those statements are determinations issued by monitoring organizations and by UN-mandated bodies on their own definitions and records; no criminal judgment has been entered on the question, and the treaty provision they invoke turns on intent, which malnutrition prevalence does not measure. Israel’s own bodies publish tonnage counts for food entering Gaza and counts of investigations opened, each a party’s own reporting of its own conduct.
Key Findings
- Acute malnutrition among children under 5 in northern Gaza rose from 0.8% before the hostilities to 12.4% to 16.5%, on World Health Organization screening figures reported in April 2024.
- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), makes it a war crime to be “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies,” so the provision requires an element the prevalence figures do not address.
- The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories records 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, COGAT’s own count, resting on self-declaration by suppliers rather than weighing at the crossings.
- The Israel Defense Forces Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, of which 44 concerned deaths of detainees, out of more than 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment, under a threshold the Corps itself states.
- Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded 26.9% of 1,504 comments on leading UK media Facebook pages as antisemitic during the May 2021 escalation, and 8.1% of those antisemitic comments invoked child murder or blood libel.
Which bodies have found starvation used as a method of warfare?
Four named bodies issued that determination between April 2024 and September 2025. Human Rights Watch, in a statement dated 9 April 2024, said the Israeli government was using starvation as a weapon of war and that children in Gaza had died of starvation-related complications. A UN-mandated commission of inquiry reached the same characterization in 2024, finding the war crime of intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.
Amnesty International restated the characterization in July 2025, saying Israel “has continued to use starvation of civilians as a weapon of war.” The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the treaty body monitoring the Convention on the Rights of the Child, issued a statement on 9 September 2025 condemning the use of starvation of children and warning that famine and severe malnutrition were worsening.
The four differ by type, and the type governs what each statement is. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are monitoring organizations with declared advocacy missions, applying their own definitions to their own collected record. A commission of inquiry is a body mandated by a UN organ to make findings, and a treaty committee is a monitoring mechanism attached to a convention. Each publishes determinations and allegations. None is a criminal judgment, and each of the four says so in its own framing by identifying the conduct as a war crime alleged rather than adjudicated.
That distinction is not a technicality about wording. A determination records what the issuing body concluded from the material it holds; a judgment records what a court found proved against a defendant under a stated standard of proof. On the starvation characterization in Gaza, the record holds the first and not the second. What each of the four measured, and what none of them measured, is the subject of the sections that follow.
Is it often said that Gaza’s children are being deliberately starved?
It is often said that Gaza’s children are being deliberately starved. On the measured half of that claim the direction is supported: the World Health Organization’s screening of children under 5 in northern Gaza put acute malnutrition at 12.4% to 16.5% in early 2024, against 0.8% recorded before the hostilities began, a baseline-and-after comparison on the same indicator.
What the same figures do not carry is the rest of the claim. A prevalence rate is an outcome measure: it records how many screened children met the case definition for acute malnutrition in a given area and period. It does not identify which party’s conduct produced the rise, and it does not speak to intent, because intent is not an observable property of a nutrition screening.
Those two elements sit in different evidentiary places, and the sections below keep them apart. The outcome side has measured figures, screening prevalence, hospital admissions, food-security classifications and clinical reporting, each with a stated scope. The conduct side has determinations issued by the four bodies named above, each on its own record; the party’s own published counts of what it says entered Gaza; and the treaty text that sets what would have to be shown. The premise, in short, splits into a measured rise and an unmeasured attribution, and the report treats each on the evidence available to it.
How many children’s deaths have been attributed to malnutrition?
Amnesty International’s July 2025 statement put at least 66 children dead of malnutrition-related conditions in Gaza since October 2023, its own tally on its own criteria and cut-off. That figure is a floor as published, not a total, and no single count of child deaths from malnutrition appears in the record as an established number: published figures differ by the body compiling them and by the date the count closes.
The official Palestinian statistical record does not close the gap. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, in its brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2025, reports 70,942 deaths in Gaza through the end of December 2025 and attributes that figure to the Palestinian Ministry of Health rather than measuring it. The Bureau publishes no malnutrition-specific breakdown and no child-specific starvation count within it.
The Bureau’s own demographic figures are a separate quantity again and are frequently misread as a toll. It estimates Gaza’s population at about 2.13 million at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which it states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates, and it attributes that change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration together. It reports separately that roughly 2.2 million people were living in Gaza on the eve of the war and that nearly two million of them were displaced, with roughly 100,000 having left the Strip. The 254,000 is a net demographic decline across four causes, not a count of deaths, and it is not a source for any figure about children.
Where the counts diverge, the divergence is itself part of the record and is visible in the counts each party publishes. A registry count, an advocacy tally and a statistical estimate answer different questions, and none of the three is a substitute for the others.
How many children were hospitalized for acute malnutrition?
Médecins Sans Frontières reported in 2026 that it had admitted 4,950 children under 15 for acute malnutrition from the start of its programme through March 2026, with 98% of them under 5. That is the organization’s own programme count from its own facilities, and it is the narrowest and most clearly bounded of the admission figures in circulation.
The larger admission figure is compiled by a different body over a different period. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs put 18,741 children admitted for acute malnutrition in Gaza by 15 June 2025, a figure relayed in Amnesty International’s July 2025 statement and measured by the humanitarian coordination office rather than by the organization relaying it. Where a figure passes through a second publisher, the count belongs to the body that produced it.
An admission count measures treated cases recorded at reporting facilities during a reporting period. Three things follow, and each limits how the number can be used. It is not a prevalence estimate, because it counts presentations rather than a screened population against a denominator. It moves with access as well as with need: admissions can fall when facilities close or families cannot reach them, and rise when a new programme opens intake, so a rising series is not a clean index of worsening nutrition. And it carries no cause attribution, because an admission record documents a clinical state on arrival, not the chain of decisions that produced it.
The two figures are also not additive. One is a single organization’s programme total through March 2026; the other is a coordination office’s compilation across reporting facilities through June 2025. Summing them, or reading the smaller as a subset of the larger, would produce a number neither body published.
Do the famine classifications count children specifically?
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification determined in 2025 that famine thresholds had been reached for food consumption across most of Gaza. That determination rests on the classification’s three indicator families, household food consumption, acute malnutrition and mortality, and it classifies areas rather than attributing the condition to any party’s conduct.
The widely circulated child figures attached to that classification are derivations from it, not counts within it. Save the Children stated that the classification meant about 930,000 children were at critical risk of famine and one million children at risk of starvation, disease and death. Those are the organization’s own derivations, obtained by applying the classified areas to child population shares, and the underlying classification does not publish a child-specific caseload of that kind.
A third figure in circulation is a projection rather than either a count or a derivation. The UN Children’s Fund stated in 2025 that if the blockade continued, up to 71,000 children under five could suffer acute malnutrition over the following year. The construction of that sentence carries its own limits: “up to” makes it a ceiling, “if the blockade continued” makes it conditional on an assumption about future access, and “could” makes it a projected caseload for a period that had not yet occurred.
Three kinds of number therefore travel together under the same heading. A classification determination is a measured area-level finding on stated thresholds. A derivation is arithmetic performed on that finding by a second body using its own population assumptions. A projection is a forward estimate under stated conditions. Presenting the 930,000, the one million and the 71,000 as measured counts of affected children collapses those three into one, and the classification that anchors them makes no claim about who produced the food-consumption conditions it classified.
What does the peer-reviewed medical literature record about child malnutrition?
Peer-reviewed publication on Gaza’s children is clinical and descriptive rather than statistical: the article “Childhood under siege,” indexed in PubMed Central in 2025, documents malnutrition, infectious disease and displacement among children in Gaza under siege conditions, and The BMJ carried an item on Gaza’s hunger conditions in 2024 (BMJ 385:q1018). Neither publishes a national count of child deaths from malnutrition.
That absence is the substantive finding for this rung, and it shapes how every figure above should be read. The load-bearing numbers in the public record on child hunger in Gaza come from three non-peer-reviewed streams: agency screening and coordination data, organizational programme records, and advocacy tallies. Each is attributable and dated, and none has passed external peer review of its sampling, case definitions or denominators.
The methodological reasons are not obscure. A prevalence estimate requires a sampling frame and access to the sampled population; a cause-of-death attribution requires a certification process; and a national count requires a registry that covers the territory. In an active conflict with displaced populations and damaged health infrastructure, none of those three conditions holds in the form a peer-reviewed prevalence or mortality study would require, which is why the published literature describes clinical presentations in named settings instead.
The consequence for a reader is specific. On the outcome question, the strongest measured evidence available is agency screening data with a stated before-and-after comparison, and its status as agency screening rather than peer-reviewed measurement is part of the citation. On the attribution question, the peer-reviewed medical literature does not speak at all, because attribution of cause between parties is not what a clinical study of malnourished children measures. Where an answer to the wider claim is sought, it has to come from the treaty text, the party records and the investigative machinery, which are the subjects of the next three sections.
What must be shown before starvation counts as a method of warfare?
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) sets the standard in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), which makes it a war crime to be “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”
Two words in that text carry the whole distinction between the measured and the alleged. “Intentionally” attaches to the use of starvation as a method, and “wilfully” attaches to the impeding of relief. Both are mental elements: they describe a state of mind to be proved, not a condition to be observed in a population. Screening prevalence, hospital admissions and famine classifications are observations of condition. They can establish that children were acutely malnourished at a stated rate in a stated area and period, and they cannot, by their construction, establish either mental element.
The relief provision the Statute cross-refers to names children directly. Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) requires each contracting party to allow the free passage of consignments of medical and hospital stores, and to permit the free passage of consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. The Convention text also attaches conditions to that duty, and the argument over whether the duty was discharged is an argument about those conditions, which is why the same treaty language appears in the determinations of the four bodies named earlier and in the rejections named later.
No criminal judgment has been entered on the starvation characterization in Gaza. The same structural gap between an outcome measure and a required mental element governs the Convention’s own standard in the parallel genocide claim, where the elements are set by treaty and the circulating figures measure results.
What does Israel’s own record state about food entering Gaza?
The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories records 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering the Gaza Strip between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, which COGAT sets at nearly threefold the World Food Programme’s monthly food requirement benchmark. Only the numerator in that ratio is COGAT’s own measurement, and the entire tonnage is a party’s own operational count.
The method note COGAT publishes with the figure limits it. The tonnages rest on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private-sector providers rather than on weighing at the crossings, so the series records what suppliers declared, not what an independent weighbridge measured. COGAT’s July 2026 report also states that more than 70,000 cubic meters of water per day were facilitated through external lines and desalination, excluding local wells, and 18,000 tons of medical supplies and medicines since the ceasefire began on 10 October 2025. It reports an approximately 72% decline in the Gaza food consumer price index between September 2025 and May 2026 without identifying the source of the price data.
Two other Israeli publications give earlier totals on their own windows. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 19 August 2025 that over 1.9 million tons of aid had been delivered since the start of the war, including 7,800 tons by the aerial route, both written as floors rather than exact counts. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that over 70,000 tons of aid, including over 6,500 tons of medical supplies, had entered Gaza as at 16 December 2023, with over 750 patients having exited for care overseas.
Read together with the party’s own account of the humanitarian record it publishes, the three sets share one property and one gap. Each is a self-published count by a party to the conflict, none independently verified, and their windows differ, so they form no continuous series. And on the precautionary measures the Israel Defense Forces states it takes, telephone calls, text messages, leaflets, roof-knocking before a strike and a numbered evacuation-area map, no counts are published at all, so the record supports a description of the stated measures and no figure about their frequency.
Which analyses reject the starvation-as-a-weapon characterization?
The Israel Defense Forces Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, out of more than 1,000 incidents referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism for factual assessment. The Corps states that it is subject only to the law on professional matters and that its decisions are reviewable by Israel’s Attorney General and before the Israeli Supreme Court.
The threshold that produces those counts is stated by the Corps in its own words: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The investigation count is therefore a function of that standard, and none of the 74 is a finding, an indictment or a conviction.
Two party-aligned research bodies contest the characterization on the numbers. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, in “The Death of Genocide” (2025), derives a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilians in Gaza dead of war-related causes by subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s count of fighters killed from the Gaza Ministry of Health total, and states on the same page that neither the Hamas figure nor the Israeli estimate has been independently confirmed. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies publishes situation reports carrying cumulative Israeli casualty totals, including 1,664 Israelis confirmed killed and 17,809 wounded as at 5 September 2024, with no official body credited for those counts.
NGO Monitor, an advocacy-mission organization, disputes the methodology of the bodies issuing the findings and reports its own network mapping of 157 groups in the United States and 111 in Canada in 2024, with the inclusion criteria for that mapping unstated.
How does the child-harm framing appear in measured antisemitic content?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed) coded comments on leading British, French and German media Facebook pages during the May 2021 escalation and found 8.1% of the antisemitic UK comments invoked child murder or blood libel, within the 26.9% of 1,504 UK comments coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme.
The French and German shares of antisemitic comments were 12.6% of 1,500 and 13.6% of 1,520.
Child-harm conspiracy narratives also have a measured circulation history independent of any conflict. Paudel and colleagues (2021, preprint) traced 189 conspiracy claims catalogued by Snopes across Reddit and Twitter between June 2016 and April 2021, including child-sacrifice claims, identifying roughly 66,000 Reddit posts, over 288,000 Reddit comments and 379,708 tweets, and found 84.78% of the claims were discussed on Reddit for longer than a year. The 189-claim set is conspiracy theories generally, not antisemitic claims alone.
Two survey programmes measure how conflict-linked framings sit alongside attitudes toward Jews, correlationally and with the authors’ own caveats. Enstad (2026, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced) found across two nationally representative Norwegian surveys, N = 1,575 and a preregistered replication of N = 1,653, that endorsement of Holocaust inversion was associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews and with refusal to take a stance against it. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced), in two British experiments of N = 354 and N = 490 priming participants with war-in-Gaza material, found anti-Jewish hostility associated with political orientation through social dominance orientation on one pathway and with out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people on another.
Methodology and limitations
This report measures four things about a contested claim: which bodies issued the determination and when, what the outcome figures measure, what the treaty text requires, and what each party publishes about its own conduct. It does not assess the underlying claim about intent, because no source in the evidence hierarchy measures intent.
Source types are labelled at each use. Primary and official records here are the Rome Statute (1998), the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics brief for the end of 2025, and the self-published records of COGAT (2026), the Israel Defense Forces (2025), the IDF Military Advocate General’s Corps (2024) and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023). The last four are a party’s own counts of its own conduct, unverified externally, and are cited as such throughout. Peer-reviewed measurement is drawn from Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), Enstad (2026), Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) and the PubMed Central-indexed clinical article “Childhood under siege” (2025); Paudel and colleagues (2021) is a preprint and is labelled at first use. Enstad (2026) and Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) are read from published abstracts, so no full-text detail beyond the reported associations is implied.
Statements issued by monitoring organizations, UN agencies, treaty bodies, humanitarian organizations and food-security classifications are named and dated in the body as each issuing body’s own determination, count or projection on its own definitions, and are not carried as the report’s own measurement. Where such a body relays a figure produced by another, the figure is attributed to the body that produced it: the 18,741 admissions figure is the humanitarian coordination office’s, not the organization that relayed it, and the 70,942 deaths figure is the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s, not the statistical bureau’s.
Three limitations bind the outcome figures. Screening prevalence, hospital admissions, area classifications, organizational derivations and forward projections are five different quantities and are not interchangeable or additive. Admission counts move with access to facilities as well as with need. And no peer-reviewed national count of child deaths from malnutrition in Gaza appears in the published literature, so every circulating figure of that kind is an organizational or agency tally with its own cut-off date. On the conduct side, the investigation counts are a function of the stated threshold that generates them, and are counts of investigations opened rather than of findings.
Conclusion
So does the record answer the image of the starving child in the hospital corridor? On the outcome it does, precisely: acute malnutrition among children under 5 in northern Gaza was screened at 12.4% to 16.5% in early 2024 against 0.8% before the hostilities, one humanitarian organization admitted 4,950 children under 15 for acute malnutrition through March 2026 with 98% of them under 5, and a food-security classification found famine thresholds for food consumption reached across most of the territory in 2025. Children in Gaza were acutely malnourished at rates far above the pre-war baseline, and that is measured, not asserted.
On the second half of the claim the record holds something different in kind. Four named bodies stated between April 2024 and September 2025 that starvation was used as a method of warfare; the treaty provision they invoke requires that the use be intentional and the impeding of relief wilful; and prevalence rates, admission counts, area classifications, organizational derivations and forward projections all measure condition rather than intention. Israel publishes its own tonnage counts, 1,778,363 metric tons of food across an eight-month ceasefire window on self-declared figures, and its own count of 74 criminal investigations opened against more than 1,000 incidents referred, under a threshold it states in its own words. Every one of those numbers has an owner, a definition and a date, and none of them is a verdict.
What travels furthest, though, is neither a tonnage nor a screening rate. It is the sentence about children, and the measured record shows what happens to that sentence in circulation: 8.1% of the antisemitic comments coded on UK media pages during the May 2021 escalation reached for child murder or blood libel, a motif with centuries behind it and, on Paudel and colleagues’ tracing, a documented capacity to persist in web communities for years once it enters them. A child’s hunger is the most morally legible fact in any war, which is exactly why it is the fact a very old accusation can borrow. Whether the child-starvation framing, as it moves from a classification table into a comment thread, is one of the inputs that feeds that accusation is a question the figures here sharpen and do not close, and it is worth society weighing before the next escalation supplies the occasion.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do published counts of child deaths from malnutrition in Gaza differ between publishers?
Because each publisher applies its own case definition, its own inclusion criteria for a malnutrition-related death, and its own cut-off date. Amnesty International’s July 2025 figure of at least 66 children is written as a floor, and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics publishes a total of 70,942 deaths through December 2025 attributed to the Palestinian Ministry of Health with no malnutrition or child breakdown inside it.
What does a hospital admission count measure, and what does it leave out?
It counts presentations recorded at reporting facilities during a stated period, so it depends on how many facilities were reporting and on whether families could reach them. It gives no denominator, so it is not a prevalence rate, and it records a clinical state on arrival rather than the cause of that state.
Does a monitoring organization’s determination carry legal effect?
No. A determination records what the issuing body concluded from the material it holds, applying its own reading of the standard; a judgment records what a court found proved against a named defendant. On the starvation characterization in Gaza no criminal judgment has been entered.
What does “the party’s own count” mean when reading aid tonnage figures?
It means the number was produced and published by a party to the events it describes and has not been independently verified. COGAT states that its tonnages rest on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private-sector providers rather than on weighing at the crossings, and the Israel Defense Forces publishes its aid totals as floors, “over 1.9 million tons,” rather than exact counts.
Which body produced the Gaza death total that the Palestinian statistical office reports?
The Palestinian Ministry of Health. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports 70,942 deaths through the end of December 2025 and attributes that figure to the ministry rather than measuring it, which is why the count belongs to the ministry when cited.
Why is Gaza’s population decline not a death toll?
Because the Bureau attributes the approximately 254,000 net decline it reports for the end of 2025 to four causes at once: war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. It also reports that roughly 100,000 people left the Strip, so the net figure cannot be read as mortality.
Does research measure whether conflict episodes coincide with antisemitic activity online?
Sear and Johnson (2023, preprint) mapped hate-and-extremism communities across 26 platforms and report that antisemitic hate rose sharply in the minutes following the attack of 7 October 2023, before Israel had responded, with Islamophobia rising to a much lesser extent. The finding is a measured coincidence in time, not a causal claim.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2025. The Gaza Terror Offensive, situation report to 5 September 2024. besacenter.org. Research institute report.
- Childhood under siege, 2025. PubMed Central, PMC12406383. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12406383/. Peer-reviewed.
- Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/. Official record, a party’s own reported counts.
- Enstad, J., 2026. Holocaust Inversion and Justification of Anti-Jewish Aggression: Evidence from Two National Surveys in Norway. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001704. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Article 23. Treaty text. Primary and official record.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Clearing Up the Misconceptions: Everything You Need to Know About the Humanitarian Aid Situation in Gaza, as at 19 August 2025. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/humanitarian-missions/. Official record, a party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Defense Forces. Stated precautions in Gaza and the human-shields position. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hamas/hamas-use-of-human-shields-in-gaza/. Official record, a party’s own stated position; no counts published.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza, updated 3 August 2024. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/military-advocate-generals-corps/. Official record, a party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Israel-Hamas Conflict 2023: Humanitarian Efforts, as at 16 December 2023. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/israel-hamas-conflict-2023-humanitarian-efforts. Official record, a party’s own reported counts.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. https://jcfa.org/the-death-of-genocide/. Research institute essay.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. https://ngo-monitor.org/. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/en/post-details/?postId=23319. Official record.
- Paudel, P., Blackburn, J., De Cristofaro, E., Zannettou, S., Stringhini, G., 2021. Soros, Child Sacrifices, and 5G: Understanding the Spread of Conspiracy Theories on Web Communities. arXiv:2111.02187. Preprint.
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv). Treaty text. Primary and official record.
- Sear, R., Johnson, N., 2023. Unprecedented Reach and Rich Online Journeys Drive Hate and Extremism Globally. arXiv:2311.08258. Preprint.
- The BMJ, 2024. Item on hunger and malnutrition conditions in Gaza. BMJ 385:q1018. https://www.bmj.com/content/385/bmj.q1018. Peer-reviewed journal.
- World Health Organization, 2024. Acute malnutrition screening among children under 5, northern Gaza; figures as relayed in April 2024 reporting. UN agency screening data.