Ask what machinery a Palestinian state would run on and the record answers in dated instruments: a police district established in September 1994 that opened 12,865 cases across the West Bank in 2020, a statistical authority with three censuses to its name, and 354,550 households living in verified displacement sites in Gaza in May 2026. The prevailing answers run on adjectives instead, fragmented, weak, unresolved, corrupt, and not one of them names a body, a date or a figure. This report reads the registers, the censuses, the audits and the court files. Where the record is specific it is quoted and dated, and where nothing measures the thing the adjective asserts, most sharply in the absence of any published series reporting Gaza as an economy of its own, the absence is recorded.
Key Findings
- Israel’s state audit institution recorded 12,865 cases opened in 2020 in the police district holding jurisdiction over the West Bank, on its own count, in a report published with sections withheld, so the figure is a floor (State Comptroller of Israel, 2022).
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza on 1 December 2017. The 1997, 2007 and 2017 rounds are the only censuses it has conducted, and Palestinian figures before 1997 have no census basis at all.
- The same audit estimated NIS 270 million in traffic fines issued to Palestinian drivers and left uncollected between 2014 and 2021, on its own estimate; 36,074 of 48,371 tickets the district issued in 2020 went to Palestinians, a share the report writes as about 75%.
- The Site Management Cluster counted 1,591 active displacement sites in Gaza holding an estimated 1,708,822 individuals across 354,550 households, at an extraction of 16 May 2026, with 83% of the sites makeshift.
- The World Bank publishes the West Bank and Gaza as one combined economy with Gaza not published separately, and its totals after 2017 are projections off the census rather than counts, about 5.29 million for 2024; the World Population Prospects series likewise publishes no separate Gaza figure.
Which police force holds jurisdiction over the West Bank today?
The Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police opened 12,865 cases in 2020 for disturbing public order, security violations and damage to property, on the State Comptroller’s own count. The district was established in September 1994 and runs from Mount Hebron in the south to the Megiddo region in the north.
The audit is a follow-up. The State Comptroller examined the police, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the Civil Administration and the military between February and August 2021, testing whether deficiencies raised in an earlier audit of the same district had been rectified, and reported to the Knesset State Audit Committee on 15 February 2022.
Some had been. The district control centre had been staffed, trained and shielded, and an alternative centre opened at national headquarters in November 2020. From October 2019 the military and the Military Police held the authority to examine and investigate gunfire by Border Police officers operating under military command that injured or killed Palestinians.
Others had not. The audit records bulletproof vehicles unsuited to the district’s missions and unchanged in kind and number as of June 2021, most ceramic vests past the expiry date of their plates, no transfer of Palestinian vehicle and driver licensing information from the Civil Administration to the police, and no investigation of falsified real-estate transactions.
Two properties of the document govern how its numbers read. The Comptroller published it while imposing confidentiality on sections of it, so every count is a floor over a partially published record. And the output is a chapter, not a series: the audit examines a named body over a stated window and closes, stating that its findings are valid as of the date of its presentation.
Is it often said Palestinian institutions cannot run a state?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents of the West Bank and Gaza on 1 December 2017, in the third census it has conducted. It is often said that Palestinian institutions could not run a state; that census is the base on which the World Bank and the World Population Prospects series both build.
The count divides 2,881,687 in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza, on a de facto basis: every person present on the reference date, regardless of citizenship. The Bureau states that East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated and that administrative estimates were used there.
The scope of the record is as specific as the count. The 1997, 2007 and 2017 rounds are the only censuses the authority has conducted, and the authority itself was established after the Oslo Accords. Palestinian figures for years before 1997 have no census basis at all, being modeled or back-estimated. The 2017 round is the most recent, so every later total in either international series is a projection off that base rather than a count.
The claim and the record measure different things. Three census rounds across twenty years, executed on a de facto standard with a stated exclusion, describe a statistical authority’s output; whether institutions could run a state is not a quantity any census reports. What the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics does establish is that the base figure the international series build on is a Palestinian enumeration rather than an estimate produced elsewhere.
Which administration was supposed to receive Area C, and when?
Area C comprises “around 60 percent of the West Bank” and was “supposed to be transferred gradually from Israeli administration to Palestinian control by 1997,” in the words of a policy analysis by the Jerusalem-based human rights lawyer Alaa Mahajna (Mahajna, 2026).
That labelling matters for how the sentence reads. It is an argument about a transfer that did not happen rather than a measurement of one, and the Arab Center Washington DC analysis states no measuring body for any of the shares it reports.
The shares themselves: 18.4% of Area C was registered as state land before 1967; 24.5% was declared state land afterwards; and around 57% of Area C lands remain subject to the Israeli land registration plan. They are quoted here as the author’s own statement, because the piece attributes them to no register, survey or agency a reader could open.
The date is the part a reader can check against other instruments. A 1997 deadline places Area C inside a schedule, which means the administration holding it today holds it past a date that schedule set. The Institute’s report on land registration in the West Bank examines the two Israeli government decisions of February 2026 that prompted the analysis.
What no source here supplies is the schedule itself. The transfer arrangement sits in the Oslo-era interim agreement, and the sentence quoted above reaches it second-hand, through a lawyer’s summary rather than the treaty text. Read strictly, this section documents a claim about a deadline, made in 2026 by a named lawyer, carrying the weight a policy analysis carries and no more. The instrument that would settle it is not in the record read here.
How much of the West Bank has a registered title?
A large majority of the West Bank remains unregistered, and the Palestinian Authority has not settled a clear registration strategy, relying instead on regulations the authors describe as contradictory (Fayyad and Al-Sinnawi, 2023).
The Land Use Policy paper reports on sporadic registration, the parcel-by-parcel route a claimant takes where no systematic settlement of title has been carried out over their area. Its subject is the obstacles along that route: the legal framework, the administrative process, and what the claimant has to produce.
No numeric share is citable from it, and that is a property of the evidence rather than an omission here. The authors state the unregistered majority qualitatively, and the Area C shares above are a different denominator over different territory, so the two may not be merged into one figure.
What the process demands of a claimant is described by a short essay arguing that consecutive administrations left the territories without a functioning registration system and that the absence blocks development planning (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2009). That essay carries no named author and no references, so its own quantities are not citable; its description of the procedure is the only use it permits.
The consequence for a state’s machinery is direct rather than symbolic. A land register is the instrument that makes property taxable, mortgageable and defensible in court, and it is the document a planning ministry consults before approving anything. The peer-reviewed record states that across most of the West Bank there is no such entry to point at, and no settled strategy for producing one. It is stated in words rather than a share because the share is not in the literature.
How long does a ruling on private land take to execute?
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled on 2 August 2011 that the Migron outpost be evacuated, setting a deadline of 31 March 2012. It refused a request to delay to 2015 on 25 March 2012 and reset the deadline to 1 August 2012.
The land status was not in dispute. The State did not dispute that the lands were registered under private Palestinian ownership, within the confines of the villages of Burqa and Dir Dabwan, or that the outpost was illegal. The Court held that its erection and continued expansion were blatant and defiant violations of the law and of the Palestinian landowners’ property rights.
The second case runs the same way on different dates. In HCJ 9949/08 the Court ordered the Amona outpost removed on 25 December 2014, within two years, and refused a further delay on 14 November 2016.
What the pair records is the interval between a judgment and its execution, and the interval is filled with applications to extend it. Migron was petitioned on 30 June 2006 and heard five times between February 2007 and July 2011 before the final order. The State reported the outpost as established in May 2001 without any government resolution, holding some 60 prefabs and 43 families in June 2006, and some 45 families and about 250 residents by February 2009.
Evacuation dates are not holdings of either judgment. Migron was cleared in September 2012 and Amona from 1 February 2017, and those are events recorded by contemporaneous reporting and by the petitioners’ counsel. The judgments establish the order, the deadline and the refusal to extend it.
What happens to the fines that district issues?
NIS 270 million in traffic fines issued to Palestinian drivers went uncollected between 2014 and 2021, which Israel’s state audit institution states as its own estimate, and until December 2021 the Civil Administration did not bar non-paying drivers from entering Israel.
The volume behind the estimate sits in the same audit. The State Comptroller recorded 48,371 traffic tickets issued in the district in 2020, of which 36,074 went to Palestinians, a share the report writes as about 75% and which is carried here with that hedge rather than as an exact figure.
The two counts come from different universes and cannot be set against the criminal caseload above. A ticket is an administrative penalty and a case opening is a criminal file; the audit reports them separately, and dividing one into the other produces a ratio that describes nothing.
What the pair records is a revenue line that exists on paper and does not arrive. A fine issued and not collected is an enforcement fact and a fiscal fact at once, and the mechanism the audit identifies is administrative rather than judicial: entry was not conditioned on payment until the end of the audit window.
This is also the only revenue figure the record read here holds for the territory, and it is an Israeli audit’s estimate of what went uncollected rather than a Palestinian ledger of what came in. No budget, no revenue series, no clearance-revenue account and no fiscal report appears in any source this report stands on. That absence sits directly under the question asked, because revenue is the first instrument an administration needs and the last one this record describes.
Which residents does neither statistical authority enumerate directly?
Jerusalem passed one million residents at the end of 2023, 60.5% of them Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, on figures Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics published for Jerusalem Day 2024. The Bureau counts the city, including the neighbourhoods annexed after 1967, as a single municipal population.
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, for its part, states that East Jerusalem could not be directly enumerated in the 2017 census and that administrative estimates were used there instead.
So the same residents sit inside one authority’s total and outside the other’s enumeration. One counts them as part of a municipal population; the other cannot reach them and models them. Neither body describes the other’s treatment as an error, and neither figure is a correction of the other.
The Jerusalem Day release records the components of the change as well as the level. The city grew by 13,400 during 2023, of which about 20,500 came from natural increase and 4,000 from the international migration balance. About 29.2% of residents were ultra-Orthodox Jews, on an estimate drawn from a model of the 2022 population rather than from the count, so that share and the municipal total are different kinds of number inside one release.
For the machinery question the consequence is concrete. A register from which a state issues documents needs a row for every resident it serves, and the residents of the annexed neighbourhoods appear in an Israeli municipal enumeration and in a Palestinian administrative estimate, and in a direct Palestinian enumeration not at all. That is the sort of gap a civil registry cannot carry indefinitely.
Gaza is not published separately inside the 5.29 million
The World Bank publishes the West Bank and Gaza as one combined economy, with Gaza not published separately, and its total for 2024 is about 5.29 million people, a projection off the 2017 census rather than a count.
The same absence holds in the other international series. The World Population Prospects series publishes the State of Palestine as one area, and Gaza is not published there as a separate area, so no Gaza-specific figure exists in it either. The two series denote the same territory under different names, so a reader comparing them is comparing labels rather than populations.
What follows from the absence is narrow and worth stating exactly. There is no published population or national-accounts series in which Gaza appears as an economy of its own, which means no growth rate, no output per head, no labour-force share and no fiscal balance for Gaza alone can be quoted from either series. Figures that circulate for Gaza by itself come from elsewhere: from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in its own year-end accounting, from humanitarian enumeration, or from assessment exercises. Each measures something different, and none is a national series.
The projection status matters as much as the aggregation. Palestinian values before 1997 in the World Bank series are modeled; totals after 2017 are projections off the census; and values after October 2023 carry a war-adjusted mortality treatment applied by the United Nations rather than a Bank measurement. One number for the territory therefore holds three kinds of estimate inside a single series, and the publisher says so.
Which population would a Palestinian state’s own register cover?
Approximately 711,000 was the Technical Committee’s estimate, dated 7 September 1949, of the refugees from Israel-controlled territory, which the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine published in its General Progress Report of 1950.
The Committee wrote that phrase itself. It records a count and attributes no cause, and no causal word rests on it here.
Its authors bounded it in their own text. The Technical Committee stated the estimate to be only as accurate as circumstances permit, considered a census, and concluded that one was not advisable. The relief rolls of the time carried a higher number, which the Committee attributed to duplicated ration cards, to people displaced from areas other than Israeli-held ones, and to people destitute without having been displaced. It counts refugees from Israel-controlled territory only, so no internal-displacement figure can be derived from it and no second number added to it.
Set against the census scope, the figure marks the boundary of what a Palestinian register would cover. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics states that its census does not cover the global Palestinian population including the refugee diaspora. So the population a state’s own civil register would hold and the population claiming a connection to it are two different sets, and only the first is enumerated anywhere.
The property attached to that population is a separate file, treated in the Institute’s report on the absentee property law. The 711,000 is a head count and carries nothing about property, compensation or return.
How many households in Gaza would need housing at once?
354,550 households, an estimated 1,708,822 individuals, were living in verified active displacement sites in Gaza at an extraction of 16 May 2026, on the Site Management Cluster’s own field enumeration rather than a relayed figure.
The Site Management Cluster confirmed 1,591 active sites of 1,856 targeted, across all five governorates, with 165 trained enumerators from twelve partner organisations working 116 neighbourhoods between 3 February and 19 April 2026. 83% of the sites are makeshift, meaning informal, open-air and tented; about 11% are collective centres in schools and public buildings; scattered sites of fewer than ten households make up the remainder.
The cluster is explicit about what the number is. It states that the 1,591 is a social count, a measure of how many organised displaced communities were identified and reached rather than a census of discrete physical locations, and that all population figures in the assessment are estimates. The household count is derived rather than enumerated: a standard household size of five is applied where disaggregated data was unavailable.
Shelter density turns the count into a housing requirement. About 1.5 million residents were living in approximately 246,000 tents or tent-like shelters, an average of about six people per tent against a standard emergency tent designed for five, and about 59,000 shelters held more than eight people.
Read as a housing question rather than a humanitarian one, the enumeration states a quantity of dwellings that does not exist and names the date on which it was counted. The Institute’s report on what each body counts in Gaza sets this series beside the other counts published for the territory.
How many displaced households received no shelter assistance?
136,000 households, 38% of all households in displacement sites, received no shelter assistance in the six months preceding the survey, on the Site Management Cluster’s own enumeration.
A smaller group inside the same survey had no shelter at all. The Site Management Cluster recorded 7,700 households, about 38,500 individuals, sleeping outdoors, present in 19% of surveyed sites rather than concentrated in a few of them.
The two figures answer different questions and are not stacked on one another. One counts households that received nothing across a period; the other counts households with nothing over their heads on the day of the visit.
The survey’s own limits bound both. A single interview was conducted per site, which the cluster states makes its figures for persons with disabilities and for female-headed households underestimates. Sex- and age-disaggregated data exist for only 253 of the 1,591 sites, so every demographic share rests on a subsample. The earliest data were about four months old at publication, the cluster calls the exercise a baseline rather than a point-in-time snapshot, and it states that its correlations are not causal.
For a housing administration that does not yet exist, these two counts set the order of the task in a way an adjective cannot. 136,000 households outside any assistance stream, and 7,700 with no shelter at all, are not a description of need; they are counts of households, produced by named organisations working from a master list, on a stated date, with the imputation rule published alongside them.
What did the first partition plan attach to the Arab state?
A grant of £2,000,000 to the proposed Arab State sits at Chapter XXII, paragraph 27 of the report the Palestine Royal Commission signed on 22 June 1937 and Britain presented to Parliament the following month.
The grant sat inside a plan for two states. The Peel Commission recommended that the Mandate for Palestine terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria, under which two sovereign independent States would be established, the one an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan united with part of Palestine, the other a Jewish State.
The Commission was a British government-commissioned review of Britain’s own obligations, issued by Royal Warrant on 7 August 1936. The Palestine Royal Commission reported hearing 60 witnesses at 30 public sessions and 53 witnesses at 40 private sessions, all in Jerusalem, and concluded that the obligations Britain had undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews had proved irreconcilable.
None of it was enacted. The Woodhead Commission found the plan impracticable the following year and the White Paper of 1939 abandoned it, so the sum is a recommendation on the record rather than a transfer that occurred.
What makes it worth setting beside a stack of registers and censuses is that it is the earliest official statement of what an Arab state in the territory would be given to begin with, expressed as a figure rather than as a description. It is a sum attached to an administration, in a document a reader can open, at a paragraph number the document supplies. No later instrument in this report attaches another one.
Which outside support does the comparative record tie to durable peace?
Support for politics and governance explains the largest share of the peaceful cases across all 36 post-civil-war peace episodes between 1990 and 2014 (Mross, Fiedler and Grävingholt, 2022), a peer-reviewed configurational analysis in International Studies Quarterly.
The study compares five areas of international support: peacekeeping, nonmilitary security support, support for politics and governance, support for socioeconomic development, and support for societal conflict transformation. It reports peacekeeping as one important component among the five rather than the decisive one.
Two further findings carry the same weight in the published abstract. Only combined international efforts across all the support types address difficult contexts, and countries neglected by the international community are highly prone to experiencing conflict recurrence.
The scope has to travel with the finding. The unit of analysis is the peace episode, never a named power, so the International Studies Quarterly study reports which configurations of support accompany a peace that held and cannot be read as a claim about any particular state’s effect on any particular settlement. The window ends in 2014. The study carries nothing about this conflict, and its figures are taken from the abstract rather than the full text.
Set beside the rest of this report, the finding names the category the rest of it is made of. A land register, a census, a police district, a revenue line and a housing stock are all support for politics and governance in the study’s own vocabulary, and across a case universe that does not include this conflict, that is the category associated with the largest share of the peaceful episodes.
Methodology and limitations
This report reads a set of named instruments about administrative machinery, each labelled where cited. Primary and official records: the follow-up audit of the Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police (State Comptroller of Israel, 2022); the census of 2017 and its scope note (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018); the Jerusalem Day release of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (2024); two judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court, HCJ 8887/06 and HCJ 9949/08; the Palestine Royal Commission report of 1937; and the General Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (1950). Compiled international statistical series: the World Development Indicators and the World Population Prospects series. Peer-reviewed research: Fayyad and Al-Sinnawi (2023) on land registration, and Mross, Fiedler and Grävingholt (2022) on post-conflict support, the latter taken from its abstract. Field enumeration: the Gaza site verification of the Site Management Cluster (2026). Policy analysis and organisational description: Mahajna (2026) and the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (2009), both arguments rather than measurements.
Five limitations bear on the figures. The police audit was published with sections withheld, so its counts are floors over a partial document, and its output is a dated chapter rather than a tracked series. The 2017 census could not directly enumerate East Jerusalem, and every later total in the international series is a projection off that base. The Area C shares are quoted from a policy analysis naming no measuring body for them. The Gaza displacement figures are a social count with household size imputed at five where disaggregated data was unavailable, and the assessment’s demographic shares rest on 253 of 1,591 sites. The comparative peace study covers 36 episodes ending in 2014, none of them this conflict.
Two absences belong to the finding rather than to the reading. No published series reports Gaza as a separate economy, and no Palestinian fiscal series appears in any source here, so the only revenue figure available for the territory is an audit’s estimate of fines that went uncollected. The sources assembled here measure administrative machinery; none measures whether a state would be viable.
Conclusion
So what would a Palestinian state require to function, once the West Bank and Gaza record is read instead of the adjectives? The record answers with a list of instruments and the condition of each: a police district that is not its own, a land register most of its territory does not appear in, a census taken three times, a revenue line measured only by what went uncollected, and a housing stock that 354,550 households are currently outside.
Every one of those is specific and dated, and together they are more assertive than any of them alone. Israel’s state audit institution counted 12,865 case openings in the West Bank district in 2020 and put NIS 270 million of fines issued to Palestinian drivers in the uncollected column, on its own count. The Israeli Supreme Court ordered an outpost on registered private Palestinian land evacuated in August 2011, then reset the deadline seven months later when the State asked for three more years. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents in 2017 and stated that it could not enumerate East Jerusalem. The Site Management Cluster confirmed 1,591 sites in May 2026 and found 136,000 households that had received no shelter assistance in six months. The Palestine Royal Commission attached £2,000,000 to an Arab state in 1937, and Britain never enacted it.
The vaguest thing in the whole file is the instrument a state would need first. There is no register saying which land belongs to whom across most of the West Bank, and no series anywhere reporting Gaza as an economy of its own, so the two questions a finance ministry opens with, what can be taxed and what is being produced, have no document to answer them. When the same question gets settled in public with a word like fragmented or weak, which of those missing documents is the word standing in for, and who would have to publish it before anybody could check?
Frequently Asked Questions
How does a de facto census differ from a register of residents?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics conducted the 2017 round on a de facto basis, counting every person present in the West Bank and Gaza on 1 December 2017 regardless of citizenship. That is a snapshot of presence on one date, taken three times in twenty years, rather than a continuously maintained roll of entitlement.
Which body produced the Area C land shares quoted in this report?
The 18.4%, 24.5% and roughly 57% come from a 2026 policy analysis for Arab Center Washington DC, which names no register, survey or agency behind them. They are quoted as the author’s own statement, and they are a different denominator from any share reported for the West Bank as a whole.
Why can the 1,591 displacement sites not be read as a count of buildings?
The Site Management Cluster states that the figure is a social count, a measure of how many organised displaced communities were identified and reached rather than a census of discrete physical locations. Sites range from collective centres in schools to scattered clusters of fewer than ten households.
Which household size does the Gaza displacement assessment assume?
Five. The cluster applies a standard household size of five wherever disaggregated data was unavailable, so the 354,550 households is a derived figure rather than an enumeration, and any per-household calculation carries that imputation with it.
Why are the State Comptroller’s counts described as floors?
The Comptroller published the report while imposing confidentiality on sections of it, so what appears is a partial document. A count drawn from a partially published record is a minimum, and the English text available is the published abstract rather than the full Hebrew chapter.
How many peace episodes does the comparative study cover, and until when?
All 36 post-civil-war peace episodes between 1990 and 2014. The unit is the episode rather than a country or a donor, the window closes in 2014, and the study carries nothing about the Israeli-Palestinian case.
Sources
- Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2009. The Dilemma of Land Registration in the West Bank. ARIJ, Bethlehem, 20 January 2009. arij.org. Palestinian advocacy and monitoring organisation, self-published.
- Fayyad, M., and Al-Sinnawi, A. R., 2023. Challenges of sporadic land registration in Palestine. Land Use Policy, Elsevier. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837723001898. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2024/165/11_24_165e.pdf. Official record (national statistics bureau).
- Israeli Supreme Court, 2011. HCJ 8887/06 al-Nabut v. Minister of Defense (Migron), judgment of 2 August 2011. Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice. Official record (court judgment).
- Israeli Supreme Court, 2014. HCJ 9949/08 Hamad v. Minister of Defense (Amona), judgment of 25 December 2014, with the refusal of further delay of 14 November 2016. Official record (court judgment).
- Mahajna, A., 2026. Annexation Through Law: Land Registration and Palestinian Dispossession in the West Bank. Arab Center Washington DC, 7 May 2026. arabcenterdc.org. Think-tank policy analysis.
- Mross, K., Fiedler, C., and Grävingholt, J., 2022. Identifying Pathways to Peace: How International Support Can Help Prevent Conflict Recurrence. International Studies Quarterly, 66(1), sqab091. DOI 10.1093/isq/sqab091. Peer-reviewed, abstract-sourced.
- Palestine Royal Commission, 1937. Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (the Peel Commission), Cmd. 5479. His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London. Official record (government-commissioned review).
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017. Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2017 (Third Round): Final Results. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record (national census).
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017, final results and scope note. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record (national census).
- Site Management Cluster in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2026. Gaza Displacement Site Verification Assessment: Baseline Findings for May 2026 Humanitarian Planning and Coordination, 22 June 2026. https://www.cccmcluster.org/resources/gaza-displacement-site-verification-assessment-baseline-findings-may-2026-humanitarian. Humanitarian coordination body, primary field enumeration.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Interdisciplinary Audit: Samaria and Judea District of the Israel Police, Follow-up Audit. State Comptroller Report, May 2022, Chapter Four. mevaker.gov.il. Official record (state audit institution reporting to the Knesset).
- United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1950. General Progress Report and Supplementary Report, A/1367/Rev.1, covering 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950. Official record (intergovernmental commission report).
- United Nations Population Division, 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. population.un.org/wpp. Official record (intergovernmental statistical series).
- World Bank, 2024. World Development Indicators, 2024 vintage (West Bank and Gaza). data.worldbank.org. Official record (compiled international statistical series).