Pew Research Center reported in 2021 that 45% of US Jews said caring about Israel is essential to what being Jewish means to them, and that nearly six in ten felt very or somewhat emotionally attached to it, so the claim the criticism targets is widely held among American Jews and not unanimous. The criticism itself is older than the state: a rabbinical conference meeting near Pittsburgh in November 1885 declared that its signers considered themselves “no longer a nation, but a religious community,” and the one Jewish member of the British Cabinet wrote in August 1917 that “there is not a Jewish nation.” Between those texts and the present sit three published definitions of antisemitism, issued between 2016 and 2024, each of which contains a clause on attributing a state’s conduct to Jews as such, and which part company on where criticism crosses into that.
Key Findings
- Four dated texts carry the objection in their authors’ own words: the Declaration of Principles adopted at Pittsburgh in November 1885, the Bund’s congress resolutions of December 1899 and April 1901, a British War Cabinet paper of 23 August 1917 held at The National Archives as CAB 24/24/71, and a statement presented to President Woodrow Wilson on 4 March 1919, which two wire reports of March 1919 said carried 300 signatures.
- Pew Research Center reported in Jewish Americans in 2020, published 11 May 2021, that 45% of US Jews call caring about Israel essential to what being Jewish means to them and that 25% are very and 32% somewhat emotionally attached to it; Pew states it cannot say whether attachment has changed since 2013, because the survey mode changed.
- Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported for the beginning of 2024 that 7.1 million of the world’s 15.7 million Jews lived in Israel, 45% of the total, against 449,000 of 16.6 million in 1939, or 3%.
- The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism of 25 March 2021 states the disputed attribution outright in its guideline 7, “Holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s conduct or treating Jews, simply because they are Jewish, as agents of Israel,” and the three published definitions diverge sharply on whether a double standard is itself evidence of antisemitism.
- The American Jewish Committee, an organization with an advocacy mission, reported in The State of Antisemitism in America 2025 that about 31% of American Jews said they were the personal target of antisemitism during the year, rising to 47% among those aged 18 to 29 against 28% of those 30 and older.
Which objections do the critics themselves put in writing?
The earliest of the four dated texts read here was adopted at a rabbinical conference held from 16 to 19 November 1885 near Pittsburgh, and it states the objection in one clause: the signers “consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state.”
The body that publishes that text today reversed the clause. The Central Conference of American Rabbis, founded on 9 July 1889 and so not present in 1885, adopted the Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism in 1937, whose paragraph headed “Israel” affirmed “the obligation of all Jewry to aid in its upbuilding as a Jewish homeland”; in a platform accepted on 24 June 1997 the Conference wrote that “by 1937 the CCAR had reversed its stand on Jewish peoplehood.”
The Jewish workers’ party in the Russian Empire reached a similar position from a different direction and wrote it into congress resolutions. Its Third Congress, held at Kovno from 23 to 25 December 1899, resolved, in this report’s translation from the Russian, that the party put forward among its political demands “the demand only for civil, and not national, equality of rights.” Its Fourth Congress of late April 1901 chose autonomy without territory: on the Central Committee’s own printed report of August 1901, the congress held that the state should become “a federation of nationalities, with full autonomy for each of them on all questions bearing on nationality,” and that the territorial alternative “had not a single defender at the congress.”
In London, the Secretary of State for India circulated a secret Cabinet paper on 23 August 1917, prompted by correspondence between Lord Rothschild and the Foreign Secretary and written, in its author’s words, “as the one Jewish Minister in the Government.” It laid down four principles, the first reading “I assert that there is not a Jewish nation,” and called Zionism “a mischievous political creed, untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom.” It answers a draft, and predates the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 by ten weeks.
In the United States, a statement drafted by a Philadelphia rabbi, a University of Pennsylvania professor and a Cincinnati layman was presented to President Wilson by a California congressman on 4 March 1919. Its fifth objection holds that “it is an error to assume that the bond uniting them is of a national character,” and that “nothing in their present status suggests that they form in any real sense a separate nationalistic unit.”
Is it often said that Israel is central to Jewish identity?
It is often said that Israel is central to what being Jewish means, and on the measured shares it is central for many American Jews without being so for all. Pew Research Center reported in Jewish Americans in 2020, published on 11 May 2021, that 45% of US Jews said caring about Israel is essential to what being Jewish means to them.
A further 37% said caring about Israel is important but not essential, so the 45% is the top tier alone rather than the full share who place the link somewhere in their account of Jewish identity. On the separate attachment item, 25% of US Jews said they were very and 32% somewhat emotionally attached to Israel, which Pew reports as nearly six in ten.
Two properties of the instrument matter for the question. The item asks what being Jewish means to the respondent, not what the respondent thinks of any government, and Pew reported in a separate release of 21 May 2021 that US Jews hold widely differing views on Israel. Attachment and criticism are measured separately and coexist in the same sample.
The base is also narrower than the claim. Both figures are shares of US Jewish adults, so neither speaks to Jews in Israel, France, Argentina or anywhere else, and the distribution of world Jewry is a separate record examined below. Within that base, the numbers concede much of the premise and refuse its universal form. A large share report attachment, and a substantial minority, on the same items in the same survey, do not. That minority is the population whose existence the criticism usually asserts, and it is measurable rather than hypothetical. How the assertion of a link differs from the link itself is also where the relationship between Zionism and Judaism enters the argument, because the founding texts above name the two as separate things.
Which US Jews report the weakest attachment to Israel?
Jews who identify with no particular branch of Judaism. Pew Research Center reported in Jewish Americans in 2020 that 59% of them said they were “not too” or “not at all” emotionally attached to Israel, and that roughly one-quarter said caring about Israel is essential to their Jewish identity.
The other denominations do not line up in the order a reader might expect. Pew reported that two-thirds of Conservative Jews called caring about Israel essential, against 53% of Orthodox and 49% of Reform Jews. On the attachment item the order changes: Orthodox Jews are the only subgroup in which a majority, 60%, said they were very attached to the Jewish state. The two items measure different things, and the denomination that leads on one does not lead on the other.
Scale matters for reading those shares. Pew found Reform the largest stream, at 37% of US Jewish adults, with 32% identifying with no particular branch, 17% Conservative and 9% Orthodox. The no-branch group is therefore close to a third of the population Pew surveyed, which is why its low attachment is not a fringe finding.
Age runs in the expected direction. Pew reported that, as in 2013, Jews aged 50 and older are much more emotionally attached to Israel than younger Jews, and that caring about Israel is more central to the Jewish identity of those 50 and older than of adults under 30. Pew also reported that having been to Israel tracks attachment, while stating that the survey cannot tell which way that relationship runs.
Every figure here is a share of US Jewish adults. Pew’s 2020 sample was 4,718 Jewish adults, surveyed online and by mail between 19 November 2019 and 3 June 2020, so subgroup figures are substantial but carry wider margins than the topline.
Has attachment fallen since 2013?
Pew says it cannot tell. Its 2013 survey was conducted by telephone and its 2020 survey online and by mail, and Pew states that “the results of the two surveys on this question are not directly comparable, and this report is unable to say whether U.S. Jews’ levels of emotional attachment to Israel have changed appreciably since 2013.”
The reason is measured, not assumed. A methodological experiment run alongside the 2020 survey found, in Pew’s words, that Jewish respondents “tend to report lower levels of attachment to Israel when they are responding in private (either online or by mail) than when they are speaking to a live interviewer (by phone).” On the essential item the effect runs the other way: respondents online and by mail were more likely to call caring about Israel essential, and Pew states that the 2020 results on that item “are not directly comparable to those obtained in 2013” either.
Set the two headline pairs side by side and the problem is visible. Attachment reads lower in 2020 than in 2013, and the essential item reads slightly higher, and each moved in exactly the direction the mode change alone would push it. A report that subtracts the 2013 figure from the 2020 one and calls the difference a decline has measured, in part, the switch from a telephone to a questionnaire.
What survives is the pattern within each survey rather than the change between them. In both years older Jews reported more attachment than younger ones, which Pew states directly. That is a cross-sectional gap at two dates, and it cannot say whether individuals changed, whether each generation answers differently throughout its life, or whether the population’s composition shifted between the two samples.
One dating point bears on any trend. Pew’s 2020 fieldwork ended on 3 June 2020, before the May 2021 escalation, the October 2023 attacks and the Gaza war. Pew’s later work, including its report fielded from 22 to 28 September 2025 among 3,445 US adults, measures a different subject, whether Israel’s military action has gone too far, so it does not extend this series.
How many of the world’s Jews live in Israel today?
The demographic record answers the question the founding texts could only assert about. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported that at the beginning of 2024, 7.1 million of the world’s 15.7 million Jews lived in Israel, or 45% of world Jewry, with 6.3 million in the United States, 40%.
The same release gives the two historical benchmarks, and the movement across them is the largest fact in this report. On the eve of the Second World War in 1939 the world Jewish population stood at 16.6 million, of whom 449,000, or 3%, lived in what became Israel. On the eve of the state’s establishment in 1948 the world total was 11.5 million, of whom 650,000, or 6%. The share rose from 3% to 45% in eighty-five years.
These are the Bureau’s own compiled figures rather than an independent count, and the Bureau discloses that for every country except Israel it uses a “core” Jewish population definition drawn from the American Jewish Year Book rather than from its own collection. The underlying estimate is Sergio DellaPergola’s, whose 2024 chapter puts the world core Jewish population at 15,736,800 as of 1 January 2024, with 7,153,000 in Israel and 8,583,800 in the Diaspora, and an increase of 78,800 over his own revised 2023 figure. Those are one author’s estimates, not a census, and he applies his own reading of survey data to the US component.
The distributional point cuts against the 1885 and 1919 objections on their own terms without resolving the argument they were making. Those texts asserted that Jews did not form a nation and that Palestine was not properly associated with them; they wrote when 3% of Jews lived there. They did not address, and could not have, a world in which 45% do.
What does Israeli law tie to a person’s Jewish status?
Three enacted Israeli statutes attach legal consequences to Jewish status, and the most recent addresses the diaspora directly: Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, passed by the Knesset on 19 July 2018, provides in clause 1(c) that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People.”
The Law of Return, 5710-1950, opens with one sentence: “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.” Amendment No. 2, passed on 10 March 1970, added the definition in section 4B, “a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion,” and, in section 4A, extended the same rights to the child, grandchild and spouse of a Jew, and to the spouse of a child or grandchild, excepting “a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion.”
Inside Israel, the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, sets two rules in its first two sections. Section 1 places matters of marriage and divorce of Jews who are nationals or residents under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts; section 2 provides that “marriages and divorces of Jews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law.” The statute defines “Jew” nowhere in its eleven sections.
The 2018 Basic Law was challenged and upheld. In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided on 8 July 2021, an eleven-justice panel dismissed fifteen petitions and let the law stand, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the state’s core character as a Jewish and democratic state. Both halves are the holding.
The law contains no equality clause. That is a fact about the text, not a finding about how anyone is treated, and the same absence runs through Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, which enumerates dignity, life and body, property, personal liberty, exit and entry, and privacy, and contains no occurrence of “equal,” “discrimin-” or “religion.” The equality rule in Israeli law is judge-made: in HCJ 6698/95 Ka’adan, decided 8 March 2000, the Court declared that the state was not permitted to allocate land on the basis of discrimination between Jews and non-Jews, reasoning from the state’s values and the Declaration of Independence rather than from an enumerated right.
Where do the published definitions place collective responsibility?
Three published definitions address the specific attribution at issue, and all three contain a clause on it. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, launched on 25 March 2021 and signed initially by 210 scholars, states it most compactly in guideline 7: “Holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s conduct or treating Jews, simply because they are Jewish, as agents of Israel.”
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition, adopted by its Plenary at Bucharest on 26 May 2016, carries the same attribution among the eleven contemporary examples that follow the adopted two-sentence definition, introduced by the hedge “could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to.” Its framing paragraph on Israel has two limbs that travel together: “Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity,” and “However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”
The Nexus Document, published by the Nexus Project in February 2021 and updated in June 2024, sets the test procedurally. Its second item under “What is Antisemitic?” reads that “whether speech or conduct about Zionism and Israel is antisemitic should be based on the standards for speech or conduct that apply to antisemitic behavior in general,” and its ninth holds it antisemitic “to treat Israel differently solely because it is a Jewish state, using standards different than those applied to other countries.”
The three part company on the double standard. The IHRA examples include “applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” The Jerusalem Declaration’s guideline 15 states that criticism “that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a ‘double standard’, is not, in and of itself, antisemitic.” Nexus states, under “What is Not Antisemitic?”, that “paying disproportionate attention to Israel and treating Israel differently than other countries is not prima facie proof of antisemitism.”
Two limits on all three. The IHRA definition is labelled “non-legally binding” in its own adoption sentence, the Jerusalem Declaration is a scholarly declaration no state adopted, and the Nexus Document derives from a task force white paper. None resolves whether any particular criticism is antisemitic; each supplies wording for whoever applies it. And the IHRA text says nothing about boycotts: the words boycott, divest and sanction appear nowhere in its definition, its examples or its closing paragraphs.
Do Jews report being held answerable for Israel’s actions?
The worry the definitions address has been surveyed. The American Jewish Committee, an organization with an advocacy mission, reported in The State of Antisemitism in America 2025 that about 31% of American Jews said they were the personal target of antisemitism during the year.
The forms reported were 3% targeted by a physical attack, 21% by an in-person remark, 5% by vandalism and 21% by an online remark or post.
Those are self-reported experiences within AJC’s own survey samples rather than incident counts, and the shares do not partition the 31%, since one respondent may report more than one form. The age pattern matches the attachment gradient above in age but not in direction: 47% of Jewish adults aged 18 to 29 reported being targeted in the past year against 28% of those 30 and older, 87% against 70% reported online antisemitism, and 38% against 28% said they had avoided places or events out of fear of antisemitism.
One occupational setting has been measured in the peer-reviewed literature, which reaches the mechanism the definitions describe from a different angle. Fishman and Auerbach reported in the Journal of Religion and Health in 2026, in a pilot survey of 645 Jewish US healthcare professionals, that the odds of reporting experienced antisemitism were lower where colleagues and administrators could identify antisemitism, at an odds ratio of 0.56 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.41 to 0.76, and higher in academic medical centers than community hospitals, at an odds ratio of 4.81 with an interval of 2.42 to 9.54. It is cross-sectional and self-reported, so those are associations rather than causal estimates.
What none of these instruments measures is the attribution itself. None of them asks a respondent whether a particular experience involved being held answerable for Israeli government conduct, so the dual-loyalty and collective-responsibility clauses quoted above have no prevalence figure attached to them on this record.
Has anyone measured this criticism as a discourse pattern?
No published corpus codes criticism of Israel’s attributed centrality to Jewish identity as its own category, so no prevalence figure for this framing exists, and the absence is what the record holds.
What the measured corpora do code are adjacent categories. Jikeli and colleagues reported in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory in 2022, from an expert-annotated corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets collected between January 2019 and August 2020, that 15% of antisemitic tweets containing “Jews” fit the IHRA paragraph on denial of Jewish self-determination, against about 62% fitting the paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power. Becker, Ascone and Troschke reported in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications in 2022, from 4,500 Facebook comments on leading UK, French and German media pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation, that 7.7% of the antisemitic UK comments denied Jewish self-determination.
Self-determination denial is not the framing this report examines. It codes a claim about the legitimacy of a state; the objection in the 1885, 1901, 1917 and 1919 texts is a claim about what Jewish identity consists of. The two are separate propositions, and the coding schemes both papers used, which are built on the IHRA paragraphs, contain no category for the second.
Three bounds apply to the survey evidence this report does rest on. The Pew readings measure US Jewish adults only, with fieldwork from 19 November 2019 to 3 June 2020, so nothing in them speaks to Jewish populations elsewhere or to the period after mid-2020. The AJC figures are self-reports within that organization’s own samples. And the Yale Youth Poll of Fall 2025, which reported that 10% of US voters aged 18 to 34 agreed with all three antisemitic statements it tested, including that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America, against 2% of voters 65 and older, surveys registered voters generally rather than Jewish respondents, so it measures who holds the dual-loyalty view and not who is subjected to it.
Methodology
This report draws on four source types, each labelled where it appears.
Primary and enacted texts, quoted from the issuing or adopting body. The Pittsburgh Declaration of Principles is quoted from the Central Conference of American Rabbis, which publishes it as the successor body and did not exist in 1885; the two published transcriptions agree on the clause quoted here and diverge in a later article. The Bund documents are quoted in this report’s own English translation from the Russian of a 2010 documentary edition of party records; the 1901 material is the Central Committee’s printed report of the congress, not the resolution’s own text. The 1917 Cabinet paper is held at The National Archives, Kew, as CAB 24/24/71, with a second copy at CAB 21/58; the archive publishes only its first page, and the remaining two pages were read from a reproduction of the same print. The 1919 statement survives in reproduction rather than in any located scan of the original; its signatory count of 300 comes from two wire reports of March 1919 and not from the document, which states no total. Israeli statutes are quoted from the English texts the Knesset publishes; the Knesset marks its Basic Law translations unofficial, and the statutes in its selected-legislation series carry no such marking. The Law of Return is quoted as enacted in 1950 and amended in 1970; a 1954 amendment is not in the Knesset’s English series.
Survey measurement. The Pew figures come from Jewish Americans in 2020 (11 May 2021). Pew states that its attachment and essential items cannot be compared directly with its 2013 survey, because the mode changed from telephone to online and mail and a measured experiment found the change moves both items, so no 2013 to 2020 trend is reported here. Subgroup figures carry wider margins of error than toplines.
Organizational surveys and monitoring counts, distinguished from measured shares throughout. The American Jewish Committee’s figures are self-reported experiences within its own samples, published by an organization with an advocacy mission. The Yale Youth Poll is an academic poll of registered voters.
Peer-reviewed measurement. The discourse corpora are keyword-filtered samples within platform-specific collections, not population prevalence; the health-sector study is cross-sectional and self-reported, so their findings are associations.
Definitional documents are cited for their own wording. Applying any of them to a particular case is an act performed by whoever performs it. The Nexus Document is quoted from its June 2024 revision; the February 2021 original was not retrievable, and nothing here is attributed to it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why does the Pittsburgh Platform’s position not reflect Reform Judaism today?
Because the movement’s own successor body reversed it. The Central Conference of American Rabbis adopted the Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism in 1937, affirming “the obligation of all Jewry to aid in its upbuilding as a Jewish homeland,” and in a platform accepted on 24 June 1997 wrote that “by 1937 the CCAR had reversed its stand on Jewish peoplehood.” The 1885 clause has not been restored in any of the four platforms the Conference has published since.
What does “oleh” mean in the Law of Return?
It is the statutory status the law confers, and the Knesset’s published text glosses it in a translator’s note: “aliya means immigration of Jews, and oleh (plural: olim) means a Jew immigrating, into Israel.” Section 1 grants every Jew the right to come “as an oleh,” so the word carries a defined legal status and not a general right of entry. The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s own page paraphrases section 1 without the word, which changes what the sentence grants.
How many Jews live outside Israel?
Sergio DellaPergola’s 2024 estimate puts the Diaspora core Jewish population at 8,583,800 as of 1 January 2024, against 7,153,000 in Israel. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reports the next largest communities after Israel and the United States as 438,000 in France, 400,000 in Canada, 313,000 in the United Kingdom, 170,000 in Argentina, 125,000 in Germany, 123,000 in Russia and 117,000 in Australia.
Do the three definitions of antisemitism agree on anything?
All three contain a clause on attributing a state’s conduct to Jews as such, which is the point closest to this question. Their disagreement concentrates on the double standard: the IHRA examples name it as a possible manifestation, while the Jerusalem Declaration’s guideline 15 and Nexus both state that treating Israel differently is not by itself proof of antisemitism.
Which countries have adopted the IHRA definition?
IHRA names 46 UN member states with dates on its own page, earliest the United Kingdom on 12 December 2016 and latest Costa Rica on 24 July 2025. IHRA publishes no total and adds a footnote that “different countries and organizations will use different terminology, including adopt, endorse, embrace, recognize, support,” so a single count of adoptions asserts a uniformity the publisher disclaims.
Does the Bund’s 1901 position amount to the same objection as the Pittsburgh Platform’s?
No. The 1885 conference held that Jews formed a religious community and not a nation; the Bund’s Fourth Congress resolved unanimously in April 1901 that the concept of nationality “is fully applicable” to Jews, and then located that nationality in a federation of nationalities with autonomy over language, education and culture rather than in territory. The congress recorded separately that the territorial model it rejected in that resolution was the Polish Socialist Party’s, and dealt with Zionism nine sections later, in section XVII, in a different resolution.
Conclusion
So is Israel important to Jews, and what are people objecting to when they question it? Pew’s measurement settles the first part: in 2020, 45% of US Jews called caring about Israel essential to what being Jewish means to them and nearly six in ten reported emotional attachment, which makes the claim widely true and false as a universal. What the objection turns out to be, in the words its authors wrote down, is not a claim that Jews do not care. It is a claim about what Jewish identity consists of, and it was in writing before the state existed.
The measured picture is sharper than either side’s shorthand. The trend everyone cites cannot be read, because Pew itself says a change of survey mode moved both items. What can be read is the split: 59% of Jews with no particular branch reported little or no attachment, while two-thirds of Conservative Jews called caring about Israel essential. The share of world Jewry living in Israel went from 3% in 1939 to 45% at the beginning of 2024, on Israel’s own official count, which is a transformation the 1885 and 1919 signers were writing before rather than against. Israeli law attaches consequences to Jewish status in three enacted statutes and one Basic Law, whose clause 1(c) makes self-determination in the state “exclusive to the Jewish People,” and whose text contains no equality clause. All three published definitions of antisemitism name the attribution of a state’s conduct to Jews as such, and they split on whether a double standard is evidence of it. Nobody has coded the framing itself: the corpora measure self-determination denial and dual loyalty, and neither is the proposition at issue here.
That leaves one gap where the argument actually lives. The AJC recorded that 47% of American Jews aged 18 to 29 said they were personally targeted in 2025, and the Yale Youth Poll recorded that 10% of voters aged 18 to 34 agreed that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. The younger adults who report weaker attachment to Israel also report the highest rate of being targeted, and the dual-loyalty charge circulates among people of roughly the same age. Whether asserting the link, or contesting it, feeds the accusation that a Jew answers for a government is the thing nothing on this record measures. Four sets of authors between 1885 and 1919 thought the assertion itself was the danger, and nobody has since measured whether they were right. Were they describing a hazard, or supplying the vocabulary for one?
Sources
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- Becker, M., Ascone, L., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
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- Bund, 1898 to 1901. Founding-period documents, in Bund: Dokumenty i materialy, 1894-1921, ed. Amiantov, Lyashenko, Rozental, Peregudova and Tikhonova. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010. Documentary edition of party records.
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- Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1937. The Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism (“The Columbus Platform”). ccarnet.org. Movement platform.
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