The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics recorded Gaza’s population at about 2.13 million at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which the Bureau states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates and attributes to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. That is a demographic net decline, not a casualty count. The question carries two claims inside one word: that restrictions on the entry of goods worsened conditions, which is measured in food, water and malnutrition figures, and that those restrictions constitute a genocidal act, which is governed by Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention and turns on an intent element the deprivation figures do not themselves carry. The bodies that have issued determinations, the courts that have issued orders, and the party operating the crossings each publish something different, and the differences are the story.
Key Findings
- Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention lists five prohibited acts, one of which is “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” and conditions every act on intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported Gaza at about 2.13 million at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, 10.6% against its pre-aggression population estimates, an official national statistical office figure described by the Bureau as an estimate rather than an enumeration.
- COGAT, the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit coordinating the crossings, recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, its own count, resting on self-declaration by suppliers rather than weighing at the crossings.
- The Israel Defense Forces reported over 1.9 million tons of aid delivered since the start of the war as at 19 August 2025, and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported over 70,000 tons as at 16 December 2023; both are a party’s own self-published counts, stated as floors.
- 26.9% of 1,504 comments on leading British media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation were coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme, with the apartheid analogy appearing in 5.2% of those antisemitic comments (Becker, Ascone and Troschke, 2022, peer-reviewed).
Did deprivation in Gaza deepen while the closure held?
UNRWA, the United Nations agency for Palestine refugees, reported in 2022 that 64% of Gaza’s population was food insecure, its own reporting on its own definitions, published to mark fifteen years of closure. The same reporting put dependence on humanitarian assistance at about 80% of residents.
The direction is older than the current war. United Nations reporting in 2009 put roughly 75% of Gaza’s population, more than 1.1 million people, as food insecure following the 2007 closure and the 2008 offensive. UNRWA’s 2022 figures on the economy record 47% unemployment in 2021, 64% youth unemployment in 2021, and per-capita GDP of US$1,049 in 2020. On water, the agency recorded 292 wells used for domestic consumption and for farmland damaged or destroyed between 2007 and 2022, which it attributes to Israeli security forces.
None of these are independently audited measurements. They are the counts a UN agency publishes about the population it serves, and they were compiled by a body that has itself taken a public position on the closure. What they establish is a dated direction of travel across fifteen years: high and persistent food insecurity, high aid dependence, and an economy in which fewer than half of working-age residents were employed.
They do not, on their own, establish attribution. Food insecurity of 64% is a state of the population, not a measurement of what share of that state is produced by restrictions on entry rather than by the wider economic and infrastructural conditions of the territory. The wells figure is the closest thing in the set to a direct physical attribution, and it covers fifteen years and 292 facilities rather than a rate of loss per year of closure.
A reader looking for the base rate has it here. Before the events of October 2023, on the reporting of the agency operating inside Gaza, roughly two thirds of the population was food insecure and roughly four fifths depended on aid, and both figures had stood at comparable levels since the closure regime began.
Is the blockade called a key means of genocide?
Three named bodies issued determinations between 2024 and 2025 identifying restrictions on the entry of food, water, medicine and fuel as central to their findings. Amnesty International’s December 2024 report “You Feel Like You Are Subhuman” states that restrictions on essentials are among the means through which it determines genocide is being committed. Human Rights Watch published its determination the same month.
It is often said that the human rights bodies speak with one voice on this. On the deprivation itself, they largely do: each describes shortages of food, medicine, water and fuel, and each ties those shortages to restrictions on entry. The divergence is in the standard applied and the conclusion reached under it. Human Rights Watch’s December 2024 report is titled “Extermination and Acts of Genocide” and frames the closure as collective punishment and as contributing to conditions of life inflicted on the population. Amnesty International’s report of the same month states a genocide determination outright. In 2025, United Nations experts issued statements on the renewed halt on aid entry, describing hunger, disease and death.
Each of these is an organizational determination, published by a body with a stated human rights mandate, reached under a standard that body sets and applies itself. None is a judicial finding. That distinction is not a technicality about paperwork: the bodies reach their conclusions on the evidence they gather and the definitions they adopt, without the evidentiary rules, adversarial testing or jurisdiction of a court, and they say so in their own methodology sections.
The determinations also differ in what they claim about intent. A finding of collective punishment is a finding about the character of a restriction and whom it falls on. A finding of genocide is a finding about purpose. Reports that reach the first do not automatically reach the second, and the December 2024 documents from the two largest organizations are not interchangeable on this point even though both were published in the same month about the same restrictions.
What must be shown before deprivation counts as a genocidal act?
Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention lists five prohibited acts and one mental element. The third act, Article II(c), is “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” The mental element governs all five: the act must be committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”
Two words in that clause carry the weight. “Deliberately” attaches to the infliction, and “calculated” attaches to the conditions. Neither is satisfied by a measurement of how bad the conditions became. A food insecurity rate, a malnutrition rate and a tonnage figure describe outcomes; the Convention’s text asks what the conditions were designed to produce and whether they were imposed with the specified purpose.
This is why the two halves of the question separate cleanly. Evidence that restrictions worsened conditions is factual, dated and quantifiable, and the previous section’s figures are that kind of evidence. Evidence that restrictions were imposed with intent to destroy a group as such is a different category, drawn from orders, statements, patterns of conduct and the inferences a tribunal is willing to draw from them. The Institute has treated the intent element and the conduct offered to establish it and the Convention standard as applied to the Gaza campaign as their own subjects.
The Convention also contains no threshold of severity that converts one into the other. There is no share of a population that must be food insecure, no tonnage shortfall, and no mortality figure at which Article II(c) is met automatically. A determination under that clause is an assessment of purpose supported by conduct, and a body issuing one is stating that it has drawn that inference.
That is the structure of the question. The deprivation figures answer whether conditions worsened. They are inputs to, and not substitutes for, the finding the second half of the question asks about.
What did the 2025 aid halt change in the measured record?
UNRWA reported in 2025 that acute malnutrition among children under five screened at its clinics more than doubled between March and June, following an eleven-week total halt on the entry of aid, with about one in ten screened children recorded as acutely malnourished.
This is the closest thing in the published record to a before-and-after around a specific restriction period rather than an aggregate wartime figure, and it is what the word “exacerbate” would need. The comparison is internal to one agency’s screening programme across four months, and the population screened is children brought to clinics rather than a random sample of Gaza’s children, so the rate is a measurement of the screened group and not a population prevalence.
The World Health Organization reported in 2025 that the entire population of 2.1 million was facing prolonged food shortages, with nearly half a million people in catastrophic conditions and three quarters of the population in classifications the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification labels Emergency or Catastrophic. The same reporting, citing the IPC, gave nearly 71,000 children under five as expected to be acutely malnourished over the following eleven months if conditions persisted. That last figure is a projection under a stated assumption, not a count of children measured.
Set against the fifteen-year baseline in the first section, the 2025 readings are a step change rather than a continuation. Food insecurity at 64% in 2022 and three quarters of the population in Emergency or Catastrophic classifications in 2025 are not the same measurement on the same scale, so they cannot be differenced, but the classifications the IPC applies in 2025 sit above anything the earlier reporting described.
What the figures record is a deterioration coinciding with a period in which entry of goods was halted. The reporting bodies state that the halt caused or worsened the shortages. Whether the restrictions amount to starvation used as a method of warfare is the legal question layered on top of that measurement.
Has any court addressed the aid restrictions themselves?
Three provisional measures orders of the International Court of Justice, issued 26 January, 28 March and 24 May 2024, directed measures relating to humanitarian access in Gaza. Each order states on its face that it prejudges nothing about the merits, and no merits determination has been delivered.
A provisional measures order is an interim instrument. It is issued on a finding that the rights asserted are plausible and that irreparable prejudice is possible before judgment, which is a threshold deliberately set below proof. An order directing that humanitarian assistance be enabled is therefore a record that a court considered the risk sufficient to act pending judgment, and is not a record that the court found the restrictions to be a genocidal act.
Separately, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued a decision on 21 November 2024 recording reasonable grounds to believe that starvation as a method of warfare was committed. “Reasonable grounds to believe” is the statutory standard for issuing a warrant. It is the lowest evidentiary threshold in that court’s procedure, several steps below the standard required for conviction, and the decision itself is a decision to proceed rather than a finding of guilt.
Three instruments, then, three different thresholds, and none of them a determination on the merits of the aid restrictions. The distinction matters when the three are cited alongside organizational determinations as if all four were the same kind of record: a court order at the provisional stage, a warrant decision at the reasonable-grounds stage, and a report reaching a conclusion under a body’s own standard are three separate categories of evidence.
No ruling by a domestic court on the aid restrictions appears in the record assembled for this report. Israel’s Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice is the forum in which Israeli government conduct is challenged domestically, and its published record includes constitutional judgments such as HCJ 5555/18 on the 2018 Basic Law, but no judgment on the entry of humanitarian goods is carried here.
What does Israel’s own record state about the restrictions?
COGAT, the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit that coordinates the crossings, recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, its own count, not independently verified, resting on self-declaration by humanitarian organizations and private suppliers rather than on weighing at the crossings.
The other Israeli figures run on their own clocks. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported over 70,000 tons of aid entered as at 16 December 2023, including over 6,500 tons of medical supplies, with over 750 patients exiting for care overseas. The Permanent Mission of Israel to the Multilateral Organizations in France reported more than 106,000 aid trucks carrying over two million tons as at 14 September 2025. The Israel Defense Forces reported over 1.9 million tons delivered as at 19 August 2025, and 23,000 tons in the single week ending that date. COGAT’s ceasefire-period report also gives more than 70,000 cubic meters of water per day facilitated, 18,000 tons of medical supplies, and approximately 72% decline in Gaza’s food consumer price index between September 2025 and May 2026, without identifying the source of the price data.
Every one of these is published by a party to the events it describes and none is independently verified. The tonnages are stated as floors, so “over 1.9 million tons” is not restatable as 1,900,000. COGAT’s own comparison, that recorded food entry was nearly threefold the World Food Programme’s monthly requirement benchmark, has a self-reported numerator against an external denominator.
On the measures it states it takes, the Israel Defense Forces publishes no counts at all: it describes telephone calls, text messages, leaflets, roof-knocking and aborted strikes, and gives no number for any of them. Its Military Advocate General’s Corps reported 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, across five categories, none of which concerns restrictions on the entry of goods.
Can the data separate the blockade from the war’s other effects?
292 water wells damaged or destroyed between 2007 and 2022, on UNRWA’s own count, are a fifteen-year input running alongside and separate from any restriction on entry, and no published measurement in this record separates the contribution of one from the other.
“Exacerbate” is a counterfactual word. It asserts that conditions are worse than they would have been without the restrictions, which requires either a comparison period or a model of the alternative. The 2025 malnutrition reporting supplies the first of these for one four-month window and one screened population. Nothing in the record supplies the second.
The reporting bodies are explicit about this. Their causal language is that the restrictions caused or worsened shortages, not that restrictions are the sole cause of the humanitarian situation. The same 2025 reporting from the World Health Organization describes a crisis deepened by the halt on aid entry alongside displacement, damaged water and sanitation infrastructure, and a health system operating far below capacity. Those inputs are simultaneous, and none of the published figures partitions the outcome between them.
Israel’s own counts do not resolve it from the other direction either. A tonnage that entered is not a measurement of a tonnage that was needed, and COGAT’s threefold comparison against a World Food Programme benchmark compares a self-declared numerator to a requirement figure calculated by a different body for a different purpose. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports its end-2025 decline of approximately 254,000 people as the combined product of war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration, and does not decompose it further; roughly 2.2 million people were living in Gaza on the eve of the war, a separate figure the Bureau reports alongside, not the base of that percentage.
So the measured record supports a directional statement and not a magnitude. Conditions deteriorated, the deterioration coincided with periods of restricted entry, and the sources that measured it attribute worsening to the restrictions among other simultaneous inputs. No study in this record isolates the independent contribution of the restrictions from the rest.
Which analyses reject the blockade-as-genocide reading?
The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs published a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilians in Gaza who have died of war-related causes through October 2025, its own arithmetic subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s estimate of fighters killed from the Gaza Ministry of Health total.
That figure is not a count. The Center’s own page states that neither the 67,000 total attributed to the Gaza Ministry of Health nor Israel’s estimate of 21,000 fighters killed has been independently confirmed, and that the former has been challenged. What the analysis disputes is therefore not the existence of deprivation but the inputs and the inference: it argues from casualty magnitudes and population shares that the historical comparisons invoked in genocide determinations do not hold, using figures supplied by parties to the conflict as its own starting material.
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies published cumulative Israeli casualty totals for the war, 1,664 Israelis confirmed killed and 17,809 wounded as at 5 September 2024, including 1,184 killed on 7 October 2023. No official body is credited for the killed and wounded figures in that report. The Center’s line of argument places the restrictions inside an ongoing armed conflict with a documented casualty record on both sides rather than treating them as a standalone programme.
NGO Monitor, in its 2024 annual report published in 2025, disputes the methods of the organizations issuing determinations rather than the deprivation measurements. It reports identifying 157 groups in the United States and 111 in Canada as linked to an anti-Israel network, and attributes $28 million in withdrawn funding to its own work. Those are its own counts, published by an organization with a stated advocacy mission, and the inclusion criteria behind the network mapping are not stated in the report.
The disagreement therefore runs on two separate tracks. One track contests the casualty and combatant figures that determinations rest on. The other contests the standing and method of the bodies issuing them. Neither track contests the food, water or malnutrition measurements themselves.
Where does siege language sit in measured antisemitic discourse?
26.9% of 1,504 comments on leading British media Facebook pages reacting to the May 2021 escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict were coded antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme, according to Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed).
The same study found 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments were coded antisemitic under the same scheme.
Within the UK antisemitic comments, the study coded Israel’s sole guilt in 27.9% and the apartheid analogy in 5.2%. Thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, which is a measurement of how much of this discourse is legible only in its conversational setting rather than in the comment text alone.
On attitudes rather than text, Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025, peer-reviewed) ran two experiments with British samples, 354 and 490 participants, priming war-in-Gaza material and measuring hostility toward Jews. They report two separate association pathways: political orientation associated with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation, and conservative orientation negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. These are measured associations in experimental samples, not claims about any individual or about anyone holding a view on the restrictions.
Huesmann and colleagues (2012, peer-reviewed) surveyed 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students and found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes; the association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed. The measured route was identification, not exposure volume.
Methodology and limitations
This report measures the discourse and the published record around the question, not the contested claim inside it. It draws on five source types, each labelled where used: treaty text, official national statistical records, court and tribunal instruments, parties’ own self-published counts, and peer-reviewed research.
The Convention text is quoted from Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The court instruments are quoted for what each states and for the evidentiary threshold each applies: provisional measures at the plausibility stage, and a warrant decision at the reasonable-grounds stage. Determinations issued by human rights organizations are named and dated in the body as those organizations’ own findings under standards they set and apply, and are distinguished from judicial findings throughout.
Figures published by Israeli government bodies, COGAT, the Israel Defense Forces, the Military Advocate General’s Corps and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are attributed as that party’s own reported counts. None is independently verified. Tonnages are stated by their publishers as floors or approximations and are carried that way. COGAT’s tonnage rests on self-declaration by suppliers rather than weighing at the crossings, and its threefold benchmark comparison has a self-reported numerator against an external denominator.
Figures published by United Nations agencies about the population they serve, including the 2022 and 2025 UNRWA reporting and the 2025 World Health Organization reporting, are attributed inline to the publishing body and dated. The IPC-sourced figure of nearly 71,000 children is a projection under a stated assumption, not a count.
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics end-2025 figures are estimates, not enumeration, and the 254,000 decline is a demographic net change attributed by the Bureau to deaths, missing persons, reduced births and out-migration combined.
Two limits bound what can be said. No domestic court judgment on the aid restrictions appears in the record used here. No study in this record separates the independent contribution of restrictions on entry from displacement, infrastructure damage and health-system conditions occurring at the same time, and the reporting bodies themselves describe worsening alongside those inputs rather than caused solely by restrictions. The discourse findings in the final section are correlational and carry their authors’ own caveats.
Conclusion
Does the blockade exacerbate the Gaza genocide? The question folds two claims together, and the record answers them at different strengths. On deprivation, the direction is documented across fifteen years and sharpened in one measurable window: 64% food insecurity and about 80% aid dependence on UNRWA’s own reporting in 2022, and acute malnutrition among screened children under five more than doubling between March and June 2025 after an eleven-week halt on entry. On the second claim, Article II of the 1948 Convention requires that conditions be deliberately inflicted and calculated to destroy a group as such, and no measurement of how bad conditions became supplies that element.
What sits between the two is a record of unlike instruments treated as one. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published determinations in December 2024 under standards they set themselves. Three International Court of Justice orders in 2024 acted at the provisional stage on their own terms. A Pre-Trial Chamber decision in November 2024 recorded reasonable grounds, the lowest threshold in that court’s procedure. COGAT recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food and the Israel Defense Forces over 1.9 million tons, each its own count, resting on self-declaration and unverified. The Jerusalem Center subtracted its way to a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths from inputs its own page states are unconfirmed. Every one of those is real evidence of something, and no two of them are evidence of the same thing.
The Institute studies the inputs that fuel antisemitism, and the framings around this question are measured inputs: Israel’s sole guilt appeared in 27.9% of coded antisemitic UK comments in the 2021 sample, the apartheid analogy in 5.2%, and 38.7% of those comments required their thread to read at all. So a question worth sitting with. When a factual claim about tonnage and malnutrition and a legal claim about purpose travel through public argument welded into a single word, which of the two is carrying the weight by the time it reaches the comment threads, and what does the other one become?
Frequently Asked Questions
How is a genocide determination by an organization different from a court finding?
An organization reaches its determination on evidence it gathers under a standard it sets and applies itself, as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch each did in December 2024. A court applies procedural rules, an evidentiary threshold and jurisdiction. The International Court of Justice orders of January, March and May 2024 were issued at the provisional stage and state that nothing on the merits is prejudged.
What does “reasonable grounds to believe” mean in the November 2024 warrant decision?
It is the statutory threshold for issuing an arrest warrant, the lowest evidentiary standard in the International Criminal Court’s procedure and several steps below the standard required for conviction. A decision at that threshold records that a chamber considered the case sufficient to proceed, and it is a procedural step rather than a finding on guilt.
Which numbers about Gaza come from Israeli government sources?
The tonnage and crossing figures do. COGAT reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026; the Israel Defense Forces reported over 1.9 million tons as at 19 August 2025; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported over 70,000 tons as at 16 December 2023. Each is a party’s own self-published count, none independently verified.
Why do the aid tonnage figures not add up across sources?
They cover different periods, different units and different scopes, and several are cumulative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs figure runs to December 2023, the Israel Defense Forces figure to August 2025, and the COGAT figure covers the ceasefire period from October 2025. Each is stated as a floor by its publisher, so none can be restated as an exact total or differenced against another.
Does Israel publish counts of the precautions it says it takes?
No count appears in its published material. The Israel Defense Forces describes telephone calls, text messages, leaflets, roof-knocking and aborted strikes, and gives no number for any of them. The quantitative record it does publish is from its Military Advocate General’s Corps: 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024, in five categories, none covering restrictions on the entry of goods.
Why is the Palestinian population decline not a casualty figure?
Because the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics attributes the approximately 254,000 decline to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration combined, and reports it as an estimate rather than an enumeration. It separately reports 70,942 deaths in Gaza to the end of December 2025, attributed to the Palestinian Ministry of Health rather than measured by the Bureau.
Which analyses dispute the genocide characterization, and on what grounds?
The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs disputes the casualty inputs, publishing a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths through October 2025 from figures its own page states are unconfirmed. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies places the restrictions inside a conflict with a documented two-sided casualty record. NGO Monitor contests the methods of the organizations issuing determinations rather than the deprivation figures.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2025. The Gaza Terror Offensive, 1 August to 5 September 2024. besacenter.org. Research institute report.
- COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. gaza-aid-data.gov.il. Official record, Israeli Ministry of Defense unit, self-reported.
- Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Souweidane, V., and Ginges, J., 2012. Foreign Wars and Domestic Prejudice: How Media Exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Predicts Ethnic Stereotyping by Jewish and Arab American Adolescents. Journal of Research on Adolescence. DOI 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Clearing Up the Misconceptions: Everything You Need to Know About the Humanitarian Aid Situation in Gaza. idf.il. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. idf.il. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Israel-Hamas Conflict 2023: Humanitarian Efforts. gov.il. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission to the Multilateral Organizations in France, 2025. Israel’s Objectives and Current Operation. embassies.gov.il. Official record, party’s own reported counts.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. jcfa.org. Research institute report.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., and Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Volume 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record, national statistical office.
- United Nations, 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article II. Treaty text. Official record.
- World Health Organization, 2025. People in Gaza Starving, Sick and Dying as Aid Blockade Continues. who.int. Intergovernmental agency reporting.