Nine characteristics, spread across two documents, sit behind the phrase: Amnesty International’s February 2022 report sets out four strategies and Human Rights Watch’s April 2021 report sets out five practices, and both present their lists as evidence of one element, domination by one group over another, which the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid places at the centre of its definition. The population figures underneath those characteristics come from two national statistical offices: the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents of the West Bank and 1,899,291 residents of the Gaza Strip in its 2017 census, and Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2.114 million Arabs within a total population of 10.094 million in 2025. Neither enumeration attaches a population figure to each characteristic it lists.
Key Findings
- The 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid defines the crime, in Article II, as inhuman acts “committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.” The 1998 Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(h), requires that the acts be committed “in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination” and “with the intention of maintaining that regime.”
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents of the West Bank and 1,899,291 residents of the Gaza Strip in its 2017 census, the most recent full enumeration conducted in either area.
- Sergio DellaPergola’s World Jewish Population chapter for 2019 put 418,900 core Jews in the West Bank and 221,800 in the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods incorporated after 1967, alongside 6,001,700 within Israel’s pre-1967 borders.
- Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted by the Knesset in 2018, states at clause 1(c) that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People,” and at clause 7 that “the State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value.”
- In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided 8 July 2021, an eleven-justice panel of Israel’s Supreme Court dismissed fifteen petitions against that Basic Law and upheld it, while holding that the Knesset, even as constituent authority, has no power to deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic.
Which characteristics do the published descriptions name?
Two documents carry the enumerations most often reproduced, and between them they list nine items. Amnesty International’s report of February 2022 sets out four strategies. Human Rights Watch’s report of April 2021 sets out five practices. Both are monitoring-organization determinations reached on those organizations’ own definitions and published on their own authority.
The four strategies Amnesty International names are fragmentation into domains of control, dispossession of land and property, segregation and control, and deprivation of economic and social rights. The five practices Human Rights Watch names are movement restrictions, including the Gaza closure and the West Bank permit regime; confiscation of more than a third of West Bank land; forcible transfer in parts of the West Bank; denial of residency rights to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and their relatives; and suspension of basic civil rights for millions living under military rule. B’Tselem’s position paper of January 2021 reaches the same characterisation and organises it around the same domination element rather than around a numbered list of that shape.
The nine listed items overlap at three points: movement restriction, land and property, and the separation of populations under different administrative arrangements appear in both enumerations under different headings. Amnesty International’s “segregation and control” and Human Rights Watch’s grouping of the permit regime with military-law administration describe the same feature at different levels of aggregation, which is why reproductions of the two lists together typically run to six or seven bullets rather than nine.
The lists also differ in kind. Amnesty International’s four items are described as strategies, that is, as characterisations of policy direction. Human Rights Watch’s five are described as practices, three of which carry a quantity in the text: a land proportion, a residency figure given as hundreds of thousands, and a military-rule figure given as millions. What each of those quantities rests on, and what it does not, is the subject of the third section below.
Is it often said Palestinians live under two legal systems?
Yes, and the parallel-regime characteristic is the one item common to all three published descriptions. The official base rate under it comes from two statistical offices. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents of the West Bank in its 2017 census, and Sergio DellaPergola’s 2019 yearbook chapter put 418,900 core Jews in the same territory at the start of that year.
The description that those two populations are governed under different legal frameworks in the same territory, Israeli civil law for the one and military orders for the other, is the characterisation offered by Amnesty International in 2022, Human Rights Watch in 2021 and B’Tselem in 2021. The population counts are separately published by the two statistical offices and are not part of those determinations.
For citizens, the governing instrument is enacted text. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, adopted in 2018, states at clause 1(b) that “the State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination,” and at clause 1(c) that the realisation of that right in the state “is exclusive to the Jewish People.” The Knesset labels its English text an unofficial translation.
Two scope conventions have to be held apart when the populations are compared. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counts residents of East Jerusalem and Israeli residents of the West Bank inside Israel’s own total, which is why its Independence Day 2025 release reports 2.114 million Arabs within 10.094 million residents. The Palestinian census counts the residents present in the West Bank and Gaza on 1 December 2017 and no one else. The two series therefore overlap in East Jerusalem, where the Palestinian office used administrative estimates rather than direct enumeration.
How many people does each named characteristic reach?
One characteristic carries a proportion. Human Rights Watch’s 2021 report states that more than a third of the land in the West Bank has been confiscated, its own figure reached on its own definitions. Two more of its five practices carry only an order of magnitude, and the four strategies in Amnesty International’s 2022 report carry no population figure at each item.
The residency practice is given by Human Rights Watch as denial of residency rights to “hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and their relatives,” and the military-rule practice as suspension of basic civil rights for “millions.” Neither is resolved to a count in the report. That is a property of the source, stated here as it stands.
The denominators against which those orders of magnitude can be read are published elsewhere and by other bodies. For the West Bank, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 2,881,687 residents in 2017. For Jerusalem, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported for the end of 2023 that the city’s residents passed one million and that 39.5% of them were Arabs, against 60.5% recorded as Jews and Others. For Israel’s total population, the same bureau reported 2.114 million Arabs in 2025, 20.9% of 10.094 million, with 248,000 foreigners counted as a separate 2.5%.
Those totals do not decompose into the enumerated characteristics. No published figure states how many people fall under the residency practice, how many under the movement-restriction practice, or how many under more than one at once, and no body has published such a breakdown. The counts that exist are population counts by area and group, produced by two statistical offices for their own purposes, and the characteristics are categories produced by two monitoring organisations for theirs. A reader working from the reproduced bullet lists is working with two vocabularies that were never aligned to a common denominator.
Which characteristic is treated as the defining element?
Domination. The 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid defines the crime, at Article II, as inhuman acts “committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them,” and each published enumeration presents its listed items as evidence of that element rather than as free-standing features.
The 1998 Rome Statute restates the element and adds two words that matter for how the lists function. Article 7(2)(h) defines the crime of apartheid as inhumane acts “committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.” Both texts are treaty instruments, and both make purpose or intention part of the definition rather than a consequence inferred from conduct.
That structure explains a feature of the published descriptions that the bullet-list form obscures. Amnesty International’s four strategies and Human Rights Watch’s five practices are not offered as nine independent attributes of a system. They are offered as the acts through which the two organisations argue the institutionalised-regime element and the intent element are satisfied. Remove the domination element and the remaining items describe administrative arrangements; the determinations turn on the element, not on the count of practices beneath it.
This is also where the enumerations and the official record part company. A land confiscation proportion, a permit regime and a residency status are each documented in some record: land declarations, military orders, population registers. Purpose is not a quantity any statistical office publishes. Amnesty International in 2022 and Human Rights Watch in 2021 reach the intent element by inference from the pattern of the practices they list, and both say so in their own texts. The element that carries the label is the one element in the definition that no count establishes, which is why the dispute over the characterisation is largely a dispute about that inference rather than about the underlying administrative facts.
Which of these characteristics appear in Israel’s own records?
The counts appear; the characterisation does not. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported 2.114 million Arabs, 20.9% of a population of 10.094 million on the eve of Independence Day 2025, preliminary and based on the 2022 census, within a total that by the bureau’s own scope includes residents of East Jerusalem and Israeli residents of the West Bank.
The scope choice is itself documented. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit, writing for POMEPS in 2020, trace how the Central Bureau of Statistics has handled the territories since 1967: East Jerusalem moved into the general population count for Israel in the 1968 yearbook, a 1970 footnote folded settlers into Israel’s total as “Israeli residents in the Administrated Territories,” by 1983 settlement localities were counted among Israeli localities, and in 1997 the separate territories chapter was removed. They describe the sequence as a normalisation of settlements, which is their analytic framing. They also note that the bureau excludes unrecognised outposts, of which Peace Now documented about 121 in 2019.
For Jerusalem, the bureau’s Jerusalem Day release for 2024 records that the city’s population passed one million at the end of 2023, 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs, and that it grew by 13,400 during that year. The bureau publishes the city as one municipal population, so the 39.5% sits inside Israel’s national total.
The enacted text sits alongside the statistics. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People states at clause 4(a) that “Hebrew is the language of the State” and at 4(b) that “Arabic has a special status in the State,” with 4(c) preserving the status Arabic held in practice before the law came into force. Clause 7 states that “the State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” The law contains no equality clause and no individual-rights clause. That is a fact about the text of the statute, and it is not a finding about how the state treats any person.
Which characteristics are said to apply to Gaza?
Closure and movement restriction, and not the rest of the list. Human Rights Watch’s 2021 enumeration attaches the Gaza closure to Gaza while attaching the permit regime, forcible transfer and military-law administration to the West Bank, where the two populations live in the same territory. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 1,899,291 residents of the Gaza Strip in its 2017 census.
That distinction is lost whenever the two enumerations are merged into a single set of bullets applied uniformly to Palestinians in Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. The published texts assign different characteristics to different areas, and the residency characteristic in particular is written about East Jerusalem and family reunification rather than about Gaza.
The Palestinian statistical office’s own year-end brief for 2025 puts Gaza at about 2.13 million, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which it states is a decrease of 10.6% against its pre-aggression population estimates, and attributes the change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. The same brief separately reports roughly 2.2 million people living in Gaza on the eve of the war, nearly two million of them subsequently displaced, and roughly 100,000 who have left the Strip. That eve-of-war figure is not the base of the 10.6%: the decline and the percentage fix their own base at about 2.384 million, some 184,000 above it, so the two cannot be divided into one another. These are estimates rather than enumeration, and the figure is a demographic net change, not a casualty count.
Israel publishes its own counts on the movement of goods, and they are the counts of a party to the events. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that over 70,000 tons of aid, including over 6,500 tons of medical supplies, had entered Gaza as of 16 December 2023. COGAT, the Israeli Ministry of Defense unit, reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, more than 70,000 cubic metres of water per day facilitated through external lines and desalination, and 18,000 tons of medical supplies since the ceasefire began. COGAT states that tonnages rest on self-declaration by humanitarian organisations and private providers rather than weighing at the crossings. What each body counts in Gaza, and on what basis, is set out in the Institute’s report on the counts each body publishes.
Which named characteristics do critics say are absent?
Two documents contest the characterisation by name. The Anti-Defamation League publishes a standing backgrounder, “Allegation: Israel is an Apartheid State,” which rejects the label and disputes the domination element that the treaty definitions place at the centre. A working paper circulated on SSRN, “Why Allegations that Israel Is An ‘Apartheid’ State Are False,” argues the same position outside peer review. Both are advocacy-side documents and are labelled here as such.
The domestic court record they point to is HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided on 8 July 2021, in which an eleven-justice panel of Israel’s Supreme Court heard fifteen petitions against Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People and dismissed them, upholding the law. The judgment cuts in two directions and both belong on the page. The Court held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, deriving that limit from the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law. It set the threshold narrowly: whether the amendment denies the core democratic identity of the state or inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core of its identity as Jewish and democratic. The law was found not to cross it.
The equal-citizenship argument rests on the founding text and on the population counts. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, read on 14 May 1948, pledges that the state “will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex” and appeals to “the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel” to participate “on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.” The Knesset’s English text reads “citizens” in the equality sentence; other widely used translations render the word as “inhabitants.” The Central Bureau of Statistics counts those citizens as a fifth of the population. Neither the Declaration nor the census speaks to the administration of the West Bank, which is where the contested enumerations locate most of their listed practices, and the two documents contesting the label engage that point through the intent element rather than through the population counts. The enacted statutes at issue in the dispute are examined in the Institute’s report on the laws described as Jewish supremacist.
Where does this vocabulary appear in measured antisemitic discourse?
5.2% of the UK comments coded antisemitic by Becker, Ascone and Troschke in their peer-reviewed 2022 study invoked the apartheid analogy, making it the fifth of six recurring framings they coded, ahead only of the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. The corpus was 4,500 comments on the Facebook pages of leading British, French and German media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation.
The study coded 1,504 UK comments, of which 26.9% were antisemitic under its IHRA-based scheme, against 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments. Within the UK antisemitic comments the ranking ran: the “evil” stereotype at 39.8%, Israel’s sole guilt at 27.9%, child murder or blood libel at 8.1%, denial of Jewish self-determination at 7.7%, the apartheid analogy at 5.2% and the Nazi analogy at 4.2%. The authors also record that thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, so the coding rests on more than the words of the single comment.
The measured association between attitudes toward Israel and antisemitic belief is reported separately. Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila, in three preregistered studies published in American Psychologist in 2026, report that their Conspiracies Mediated Model of New Antisemitism accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association between antisemitism and those attitudes, while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel and a general conspiratorial mindset did not. The design is correlational and the authors present it as such.
Two things follow from the measurement and nothing beyond them does. The apartheid framing appears in an antisemitic comment corpus at a measured share, and it appears there far less often than the older stereotype framings. And in survey data a specific class of Israel-focused conspiracy belief, not criticism of Israel as such, is what carries the measured statistical relationship.
Methodology and limitations
This report assembles four kinds of evidence and keeps them separate. Treaty texts are quoted directly from the instruments: the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1998 Rome Statute. Enacted Israeli law is quoted from the Knesset’s published English translation of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which the Knesset labels unofficial, and from the Provisional Government’s Declaration of 14 May 1948. The court record is the judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset of 8 July 2021, a domestic court adjudicating a domestic statute. Population figures come from two national statistical offices and one academic yearbook estimate.
The enumerations of characteristics are the published determinations of Amnesty International (February 2022), Human Rights Watch (April 2021) and B’Tselem (January 2021), reached on those organisations’ own definitions and not independently audited. Their figures are reported as their own counts. The land proportion, the residency figure and the military-rule figure carried in the Human Rights Watch text are that organisation’s own, and two of the three are given as orders of magnitude rather than counts.
Israeli official statistics carry their own scope conditions. The Central Bureau of Statistics counts East Jerusalem residents and Israeli residents of the West Bank inside Israel’s total; the Independence Day 2025 figures are preliminary and based on the 2022 census; from 2023 the estimates include foreigners, which is why they are reported as a third category. Palestinian figures rest on the 2017 census, the last full enumeration, so every later total in the series is a projection rather than a count, and the 2025 year-end Gaza figures are the statistical office’s estimates. Figures published by COGAT, the Israel Defense Forces and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs are those bodies’ own counts as parties to the events described.
The discourse measurement is what it measures and no more. Becker, Ascone and Troschke sampled comments on three national media pages during one escalation in May 2021, and their shares are of that sample. Harber and colleagues report correlational findings from preregistered survey studies, and this report is sourced from the published abstract. Nothing in that section establishes a causal relationship, and the studies’ authors do not claim one.
Two absences are part of the finding. No published source resolves the residency and military-rule characteristics to a population count, and no Israeli official record uses the term at issue, so the characterisation and the counts come from different bodies with different purposes and were never reconciled to a common denominator.
Conclusion
So what does the phrase name? Nine items across two documents, published fourteen months apart, of which three overlap and one is not like the others. The four strategies and five practices are administrative descriptions: land, movement, residency, the reach of civil law and military orders. Above them sits the element the treaty texts make definitional, domination pursued with the intention of maintaining it, and that is the element the enumerations exist to establish rather than one more feature in the list.
The record beneath the descriptions is unevenly quantified. The Palestinian census counts 2,881,687 people in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza; Israel’s bureau counts 2.114 million Arabs inside a total of 10.094 million and has counted East Jerusalem and the settlements within that total since the 1968 yearbook; DellaPergola’s chapter counts 418,900 Jewish residents of the West Bank. A land proportion is published as more than a third. Residency and military rule are published as hundreds of thousands and millions. Purpose is published as an inference, contested as an inference by the Anti-Defamation League’s backgrounder, and left standing as a Jewish and democratic state by Israel’s own Supreme Court in 2021 under a threshold the Court set narrowly and said the Knesset could have crossed.
The vocabulary then travels. In the one peer-reviewed corpus that coded it, the apartheid analogy appeared in 5.2% of antisemitic comments during a single escalation, well behind the older stereotype framings, while survey work locates the measured association with antisemitism in a specific class of Israel-focused conspiracy belief rather than in the criticism itself. A word that begins as a legal element in a 1973 treaty ends as a term in a comment thread, and the two uses answer to different standards of proof. Which standard is operating when a reader meets the word is the thing worth knowing before the argument starts.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do published totals for the West Bank and Gaza differ between sources?
They rest on the same census with different treatments layered on it. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents in 2017; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators put the combined West Bank and Gaza economy at 5,289,152 for 2024, and the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects 2024 revision underlies a UNFPA figure of about 5.6 million including East Jerusalem. Every post-2017 total in either series is a projection off the census base rather than a count.
How does Israel’s statistical bureau treat East Jerusalem in its population totals?
It counts East Jerusalem residents inside Israel’s own total and reports Jerusalem as one municipal population. Hirsch-Hoefler and Ben Shitrit (2020) date the convention to the 1968 yearbook, the first published after 1967. The bureau’s Jerusalem Day release for 2024 accordingly reports the city as 60.5% Jews and Others and 39.5% Arabs within Israel’s national figures.
How large are the non-Jewish population groups Israel’s own statistics record?
The Central Bureau of Statistics reported 1.707 million Moslems at the end of 2021, 18.1% of all residents, about 152,000 Druze in a preliminary February 2024 estimate, and approximately 184,200 Christians in a preliminary December 2025 estimate, about 1.9% of the population, of whom 78.7% were Arab Christians at the end of 2024. The Christian figure excludes people absent from the Population Register, so it undercounts foreign nationals.
Does the Nation-State Law say anything about the Arabic language?
Yes. Clause 4(a) states that “Hebrew is the language of the State,” clause 4(b) that “Arabic has a special status in the State,” and clause 4(c) that nothing in the article “shall compromise the status given to the Arabic language in practice, before this basic-law came into force.” The Knesset publishes this translation as unofficial.
How much of Gaza’s population change does the Palestinian statistical office attribute to the war?
Its year-end 2025 brief reports a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which it states is a decrease of 10.6% against its pre-aggression population estimates, leaving about 2.13 million. It attributes the change to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration, and reports separately that roughly 2.2 million people lived in Gaza on the eve of the war.
Which peer-reviewed work measures a link between attitudes toward Israel and antisemitic belief?
Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026) report that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies, while a general conspiratorial mindset did not. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023), surveying 1,790 UK adults, found coronavirus conspiracy suspicion correlated with all measured forms of antisemitism, with the strongest correlation for attitudes toward Jews as Jews. Both are correlational.
Sources
- Allington, D., Hirsh, D., and Katz, L., 2023. Correlation Between Coronavirus Conspiracism and Antisemitism: A Cross-Sectional Study in the United Kingdom. Scientific Reports. DOI 10.1038/s41598-023-41794-y. Peer-reviewed.
- Anti-Defamation League, no date. Allegation: Israel Is an Apartheid State. Backgrounder, adl.org. https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/allegation-israel-apartheid-state. Monitoring organization (advocacy mission).
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), 2026. Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire. https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il. Official record (party’s own reported counts).
- DellaPergola, S., 2019. World Jewish Population, 2019. American Jewish Year Book 2019, vol. 119, Springer (Berman Jewish DataBank reprint). Academic reference.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., and Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Anti-Israel Attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., and Ben Shitrit, L., 2020. So, How Many Settlements Are There? Counting, Tracking, and Normalizing Jewish Settlements in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1967 to the Present. POMEPS. Organizational report (not peer-reviewed).
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022. The Moslem Population in Israel: Data on the Occasion of Eid al-Adha. Media Release 217/2022. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day, 2024. Media Release 165/2024. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. The Druze Population of Israel on the Occasion of the Nabi Shu’ayb Festival 2024. Media Release 124/2024. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Israel’s Independence Day 2025. Media Release 134/2025. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Christmas 2025: Christians in Israel. Media Release 413/2025. Official record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Israel-Hamas Conflict 2023: Humanitarian Efforts. gov.il. Official record (party’s own reported counts).
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Official (unofficial English translation), main.knesset.gov.il. Official record (enacted legislation).
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017: Final Results. Ramallah. Official record (national census).
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. Ramallah. Official record.
- Provisional Government of Israel, 1948. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Official Gazette Number 1, 14 May 1948; Knesset English text. Official record (founding instrument).
- Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset. Judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record (court judgment).
- United Nations, 1973. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Article II. Treaty text (primary record).
- United Nations, 1998. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(h). Treaty text (primary record).
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024. World Population Prospects 2024. population.un.org/wpp. Official record (statistical series).
- Why Allegations that Israel Is An “Apartheid” State Are False. SSRN working paper 4343950. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4343950. Working paper (not peer-reviewed).
- World Bank, 2024. World Development Indicators: West Bank and Gaza, total population. data.worldbank.org. Official record (compiled statistical series).