The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on 13 September 2007 by 144 votes to 4 with 11 abstentions, and the adopted text contains no definition of “indigenous peoples” at all. The one binding treaty that does set criteria, International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 of 1989, makes self-identification the fundamental criterion and applies only to states that ratify it; Israel has not. In the published record the only designation naming specific groups in this territory comes from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, which names five Bedouin tribes as the Indigenous Peoples of Palestine, while neither Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics nor the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics carries an indigenous category in any release. The word promises a settled answer about who belongs; what it points to is a set of criteria, a recorded vote and two registers that count something else.
Key Findings
- The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on 13 September 2007 by 144 votes to 4 with 11 abstentions, proclaiming it “a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect,” and adopting no definition of the term (United Nations General Assembly resolution 61/295, official record).
- ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989 fixes indigeneity to descent from populations inhabiting a country “at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries,” and states in Article 1(2) that self-identification “shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion.” The convention binds only ratifying states (International Labour Organization, treaty text).
- The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs names the Jahalin, al-Kaabneh, al-Azazmeh, al-Ramadin and al-Rshaida Bedouin tribes as the Indigenous Peoples of Palestine in its 2023 Indigenous World entry, and describes Israel’s Arab Bedouin citizens as indigenous to the Negev/Naqab. That is a monitoring organization’s designation, not a treaty determination.
- Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted about 10.148 million residents in September 2025, classified as Jews and others, Arabs, and foreign residents; the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents in its 2017 census, classified by governorate and locality type. Neither agency publishes an indigenous category or a Bedouin count.
- Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Knesset, 2018) states in Article 1(b) that Israel is “the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.” The Supreme Court dismissed fifteen petitions against it on 8 July 2021 in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset.
Which groups does the published record name as indigenous?
The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, a Copenhagen-based monitoring organization, names five Bedouin tribes, the Jahalin, al-Kaabneh, al-Azazmeh, al-Ramadin and al-Rshaida, as the Indigenous Peoples of Palestine in its 2023 Indigenous World entry, and its Israel profile describes Arab Bedouin citizens of Israel as indigenous to the Negev/Naqab. That designation is a monitoring organization’s own classification, not a treaty determination or a government record.
Two features of it matter for the question as asked. The first is the level at which it operates: the named units are five tribal communities, not either of the two national peoples the question usually contemplates. The second is its standing. No court, no legislature and no statistical office in the territory has adopted the designation, and no intergovernmental body has issued a competing one naming any group in Israel or the Palestinian territories.
That leaves a specific shape to the record. There exists a named, dated designation of specific communities from a civil-society monitor. There exists no determination at all from a body with authority to make one binding, because, as the following section sets out, the instruments that carry the term were written to avoid making lists.
Designations of this kind travel widely once issued, and the distinction between a monitor’s classification and a legal determination is easy to lose in transit. It is worth holding: an organization applying its own criteria has recorded who it regards as indigenous in the region, and a reader can check the entry, the year and the criteria. What the entry cannot supply is a ruling, and it does not claim to.
Is it often said that both peoples are indigenous?
It is often said that both Jews and Palestinians are indigenous to the land, and both characterisations do appear in the published record, issued by organizations rather than by any body with authority over the term. The Hoover Institution’s essay on Jewish roots states that the Jewish people have a very ancient history in the land known both as Palestine and the Land of Israel.
The Institute for Middle East Understanding, in its 2019 fact sheet on Palestinian citizens of Israel, describes those expelled in 1948 as indigenous Palestinians.
So the common formulation is accurate about usage. What it does not carry is a measurement, because neither statement is attached to one. The Hoover essay issues no count. The 2019 fact sheet is an advocacy organization’s own framing of a displacement whose archival reconstruction sits elsewhere.
That reconstruction is where the checkable figures are. Benny Morris, in the second edition of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2004), built from Israeli military and state archives and carries roughly 700,000 displaced during the 1948 war as his own archival estimate, attributing the exodus to causes that varied by locality and phase, including military attack, fear of attack, expulsions in certain sectors and flight. He rejects both a single master expulsion plan and the claim that departures were voluntary. The Israel Law Review’s article “1948 Refugees” records that about 400 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed in the course of the military operations, with about 80% of the residents of the areas on which the State of Israel was established expelled or in flight. Ilan Pappé, in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oneworld, 2006), argues the displacement was planned; Morris and Pappé are the two poles of a named and continuing scholarly dispute over intent.
None of those figures is a finding about indigeneity. They measure displacement, and they are the closest thing in the record to a quantity behind the claim as it is usually stated. The continuous presence of Palestinian populations in the land is a separate documentary question with its own censuses and its own answer.
Does international law define who counts as indigenous?
ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989 is the only binding treaty that sets criteria, and it does so twice over. Article 1(1)(b) covers peoples regarded as indigenous “on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries.” Article 1(2) adds that self-identification as indigenous or tribal “shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion.”
The reference point in that first clause does most of the work, and it is not first arrival. The treaty measures descent from the population present at a moment of conquest, colonisation or boundary-setting, which means the criterion is relational: it fixes on a rupture and asks who was there when it happened. A dispute about who arrived earliest is not the question the treaty text asks.
The convention’s reach is narrow. It binds only states that ratify it, and Israel is not among the ratifying states, so its criteria carry no domestic legal force in the territory the question covers.
The earlier working description most often invoked comes from the study by Special Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, completed in 1983, which described indigenous communities as those having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies on their territories, who consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing there. It is a study, not an instrument, and it defines nobody in particular.
The 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples takes the opposite path from a definition. It contains none, and Article 33(1) provides that indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. Between the treaty and the declaration, the international framework hands the question of who is indigenous back to the group claiming the status, subject in the treaty’s case to the descent criterion above. That is a design choice, and it is why no roster exists to consult.
How did states vote on the indigenous rights declaration?
The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by a recorded vote in which 144 states voted in favour.
The vote, recorded as General Assembly resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007, saw 4 states vote against and 11 abstain.
The four states voting against were Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, each of which subsequently announced support for the declaration.
The instrument the vote produced is a declaration of the General Assembly, proclaimed in its own text “as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect.” That phrase sets its status: a declaration is not a treaty, creates no obligation on any state by its adoption, and requires no ratification. The 144 votes record what states were prepared to endorse as an aspiration in 2007, and nothing about which peoples anywhere qualify.
The pairing of a near-consensual vote with an undefined subject is the substantive point for this question. A body of 159 states recording positions agreed to a rights framework for indigenous peoples while agreeing on no method for identifying them, and the treaty that does set criteria, ILO Convention No. 169, was adopted eighteen years earlier and binds a far smaller set of states. Neither instrument produces a determination for Israel/Palestine, and neither was built to.
How many Bedouin does the record count in the Negev?
Neither statistical agency publishes a Bedouin count. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics recorded 1,707,000 Moslem residents at the end of 2021, 18.1% of all residents, in its 2022 media release on the Moslem population, reporting that population by district, health, education, employment, welfare and transport. The categories the release publishes are religion-based, and Bedouin is not one of them.
The same release records 362,000 Moslem residents of Jerusalem at the end of 2021, 21.2% of all Moslems in Israel and 37.5% of the city’s residents, and 39,703 infants born to Moslem women that year, 21.5% of all infants born. It is a detailed statistical portrait of a population defined by religion, with no ethnic or tribal breakdown inside it.
On the Palestinian side the classification is geographic. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents in its 2017 census, 2,881,687 in the West Bank and 1,899,291 in Gaza, reported by governorate and locality type. That census is the only recent measured enumeration for the territory, and it records no ethnic or indigenous classification either.
What that leaves is an asymmetry worth stating plainly. The only population figures attached specifically to the Naqab Bedouin in the published record are estimates issued by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, the same monitoring organization that issues the designation, covering the pre-1948 and post-1948 periods. There is no official statistical series against which to set them, because neither government’s statistical office counts the category. A reader who wants to know how many people the designation covers is reading one organization’s estimate, labelled as such, and there is no second measurement in the record to compare it against.
Which population categories do the two statistical agencies actually keep?
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics counted about 10.148 million residents in September 2025.
That total comprises about 7.758 million recorded as Jews and others, about 2.130 million recorded as Arabs, and the remaining roughly 260,000 recorded as foreign residents, who are counted in the total but outside both named groups, so the two named groups do not sum to it.
The Bureau defines Arabs as Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze, and “others” as non-Arab Christians, other religions and those registered as not classified by religion.
Beneath those headline groups the Bureau publishes community-specific releases, each on its own reference date. It reported approximately 152,000 Druze in February 2024 as a preliminary estimate, approximately 184,200 Christians in December 2025 as a preliminary estimate, of whom 78.7% were Arab Christians at the end of 2024, and 168,800 residents of Ethiopian origin at the end of 2022, defined as Ethiopian-born residents plus Israeli-born residents with an Ethiopian-born father.
The classification scheme is religion, national grouping, country of origin and locality. Indigeneity appears nowhere in it, and no release ranks or dates any community by length of presence.
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics works to the same kind of scheme on different axes. Its 2017 census enumerated residents present on 1 December 2017 by governorate and locality type, and its year-end 2025 brief reports Gaza at about 2.13 million, a decline of approximately 254,000 people, which the Bureau states is a decrease of 10.6% against its pre-aggression population estimates. Those are counts of residence and of change, not of ancestral standing.
Both offices, in other words, answer a question the term does not ask. That is a fact about the registers rather than about either people, and it is why the question has no official numerator anywhere.
Do Israel’s own enacted texts make a claim of prior presence?
Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, enacted by the Knesset in 2018, states in Article 1(b) that “The State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination,” and in Article 1(c) that “The realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People.” The Knesset labels its English text an unofficial translation.
The 1948 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel makes the historical case in its recitals, which run from the First Zionist Congress convened by Theodor Herzl in 1897 through the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, the League of Nations Mandate and the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, which the text calls “irrevocable.” The same document pledges that the state “will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex” and appeals to “the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel” to participate “on the basis of full and equal citizenship.” Two official Israeli English texts differ on one word in the equality clause: the Knesset publishes “all its citizens,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “all its inhabitants,” both translations of the Hebrew original. The clauses quoted here are the Knesset text.
The Supreme Court addressed the Basic Law directly. Sitting as the High Court of Justice with an eleven-justice panel, it heard fifteen petitions on 22 December 2020 and delivered judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset on 8 July 2021, dismissing the petitions and upholding the law. The Court also held that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic, setting the test as whether an amendment inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core of that identity.
Neither enacted text frames its claim in the language of indigeneity. Both assert a right, historical and natural in the Basic Law’s words, and the domestic court that reviewed the later one upheld it while marking a constitutional limit it could have crossed.
Where do the competing arguments about the category disagree?
The disagreement is not chiefly about chronology. Decolonize Palestine’s essay “Myth: My people were here before your people” argues that indigeneity turns on a people’s relationship to colonisation rather than on who arrived first, while the Hoover Institution’s essay grounds the Jewish claim in ancient historical continuity in the land known both as Palestine and the Land of Israel. Each is a stated argument from a named publisher, and the two are answering different questions.
The treaty language sits closer to the first framing than the second. ILO Convention No. 169 dates descent to conquest, colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries, which is why arguments built on a relationship to colonisation map onto the instrument more directly than arguments built on antiquity. Noting that is a reading of the text, not a resolution of the dispute, and the treaty binds neither party here.
How the colonial frame is deployed in current discourse has been examined in peer-reviewed work from opposite directions. Sunnemark (2025), in Critical Sociology, frames the pro-Palestinian student movement as an organic, locally situated grassroots “solidarity ecology” guided by Palestinian civil-society calls. Farber (2025), in Israel Affairs, argues from financial records, organizational documents and social media that the BDS movement functions as an ideological soft-power component and that campus protests are strategically integrated rather than spontaneous. The two are a documented disagreement in the peer-reviewed literature about the character of the movement carrying the frame, and neither measures the historical claim.
The question of who owned and transferred the land sits alongside this one in the registers and the purchase records, and it is answerable with documents in a way the category question is not. That asymmetry explains much of the argument’s durability: a term with no roster, no adjudicator and a self-identification criterion cannot be settled by producing a record, so the dispute runs on the meaning of the word itself.
How does indigeneity language appear in measured antisemitic content?
Denial of Jewish self-determination appeared in 7.7% of the antisemitic comments coded on leading UK media Facebook pages by Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022, peer-reviewed, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications), who found 26.9% of 1,504 analysed UK comments on the May 2021 escalation to be antisemitic against an IHRA-based coding scheme.
The same category appeared in 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments.
The category recurs in a separate corpus with a different method. Jikeli and colleagues (2022, peer-reviewed, Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory), working from an expert-annotated gold-standard corpus of 4,016 English-language tweets, found that about 15% of antisemitic tweets containing “Jews” fit the IHRA paragraph on denying Jewish self-determination, against about 62% fitting the paragraph on mendacious or stereotypical allegations about Jewish collective power.
On the attitude side, Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila (2026, peer-reviewed, American Psychologist, abstract-sourced) report across three preregistered studies that their Conspiracies Mediated Model accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes, with conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediating the association between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not. The authors’ design is correlational and the association is reported as such.
What these three measure is bounded and should be stated exactly. They measure how often a framing about national self-determination appears in coded content, and how attitudes co-vary in survey samples. They measure nothing about who lived where, and none of them was designed to. The overlap with this question is one word: the claims coded as denial of self-determination are claims about which people holds a rightful national standing in the land, which is the same standing the term indigenous is used to assert. Whether the assertion travels from one register into the other is not established by any of these studies, and none of them makes the claim.
Methodology and limitations
This report measures what the record contains about a category, not the historical question of who lived in the land first. It draws on four source types, each labelled in the text.
Primary and official records carry most of the load: the text of ILO Convention No. 169 (1989), the recorded vote and text of UN General Assembly resolution 61/295 (2007), Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Knesset, 2018, in the Knesset’s unofficial English translation), the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948), the judgment in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset (2021), and the statistical releases of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Two cautions attach to the statistical figures. Israel’s September 2025 counts of Jews and others and of Arabs sum to about 9.888 million, not to the 10.148 million total, because roughly 260,000 foreign residents are counted in the total but outside both groups; the three components are reported here rather than a two-part share. The Christian and Druze totals are preliminary estimates on their own reference dates, and the Christian figure excludes people absent from the Population Register, so it undercounts foreign nationals. The Palestinian 2017 census used administrative estimates for East Jerusalem, which could not be directly enumerated, and every later Palestinian total is a projection off that measured base.
Peer-reviewed research supplies the measured discourse and attitude findings (Becker and colleagues, 2022; Jikeli and colleagues, 2022; Sunnemark, 2025; Farber, 2025), with Harber and colleagues (2026) sourced from its abstract and reported in the correlational terms its authors use. Morris (2004) and Pappé (2006) are scholarly books representing opposite poles of a live dispute about intent in 1948; the Israel Law Review article “1948 Refugees” is peer-reviewed and supplies the village and share figures.
The designation of specific Bedouin tribes is the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs’ own classification, published in its 2023 Indigenous World entry and its Israel profile, and is labelled throughout as a monitoring organization’s designation. The Hoover Institution essay, the Institute for Middle East Understanding fact sheet and the Decolonize Palestine essay are named for the arguments they state, not carried for figures.
One absence shapes the report. No treaty body, court or statistical agency has issued a determination naming an indigenous people of Israel/Palestine, and no official series in either jurisdiction counts a Bedouin population. Those gaps are recorded as they stand.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does ILO Convention No. 169 apply in Israel or the Palestinian territories?
The convention binds only states that ratify it, and Israel is not among the ratifying states, so its 1989 criteria carry no domestic legal force in the territory. Its Article 1 criteria remain the most widely cited definitional text on indigeneity regardless of where they apply.
Why does the 2007 declaration contain no definition?
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides in Article 33(1) that indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions, which places the determination with the group rather than with the Assembly. Its own text proclaims it “a standard of achievement,” not a binding instrument.
Which states voted against the declaration in 2007?
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States were the four states recorded against on 13 September 2007, alongside 144 in favour and 11 abstentions in resolution 61/295. Each of the four later announced support.
How does Israel’s statistical office classify Arab residents?
The Central Bureau of Statistics defines Arabs as Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze, and reported about 2.130 million people in that grouping in September 2025. It also publishes separate releases for Moslems, Christians, Druze and residents of Ethiopian origin, each on its own reference date.
What did the Israeli Supreme Court decide about the Nation-State Law?
In HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, decided 8 July 2021, an eleven-justice panel dismissed fifteen petitions and upheld the law, while holding that the Knesset as constituent authority is “not all powerful” and cannot deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic. The judgment is a domestic court record on a domestic statute.
How is denial of self-determination measured in antisemitism research?
Both Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) and Jikeli and colleagues (2022) code content against the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working definition, which contains a paragraph on denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, and report the share of antisemitic items falling in that category. The two studies used different platforms, languages and corpora, so their shares are not directly comparable.
Does the Palestinian census record ethnicity or origin?
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents present on 1 December 2017 and reports them by governorate and locality type. It records no ethnic or indigenous classification, and it is the most recent full census in the territory, so every later total is a projection off it.
Conclusion
So who are the indigenous people of Israel/Palestine? At the level the question is usually meant, the record names no one. The single designation naming specific groups in the territory is one monitoring organization’s, covering five Bedouin tribes rather than either national people. The binding treaty of 1989 sets a descent criterion tied to conquest, colonisation or boundary-setting and makes self-identification fundamental, and it binds neither party here. The declaration adopted 144 to 4 in 2007 defines nobody at all, by design.
The registers, meanwhile, are counting something else entirely. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded about 10.148 million residents in September 2025 and publishes them by religion, national grouping and country of origin, down to 1,707,000 Moslems, about 184,200 Christians, about 152,000 Druze and 168,800 residents of Ethiopian origin, with no line anywhere for indigeneity and none for Bedouin. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 4,780,978 residents by governorate in 2017 on the same principle. Israel’s enacted texts assert a natural and historical right in the Basic Law of 2018 and a chain of recitals running back to 1897 in the Declaration of 1948, and the Supreme Court upheld the later text in 2021 while setting a limit on what the Knesset may enact. Not one of those instruments uses the category the question turns on.
What has been measured is narrower and sits to one side: denial of Jewish self-determination appeared in 7.7% of antisemitic UK comments coded by Becker, Ascone and Troschke in 2022, and in about 15% of antisemitic tweets in the corpus Jikeli and colleagues annotated the same year.
Which leaves the word itself doing work no instrument authorises it to do. It sounds like a finding of fact, and the texts that carry it hand the determination back to whoever claims it. In a place where two peoples are enumerated in two separate registers, a term that promises to name the rightful claimant by descent is available to both sides and settles nothing for either. Whether reaching for it moves an argument about history toward an argument about who has a right to be there, and what that shift does to the people counted on the other side of the register, is the part the record does not measure and the part worth weighing.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, L., and Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic comments on Facebook pages of leading British, French, and German media outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Decolonize Palestine, undated. Myth: My people were here before your people. decolonizepalestine.com. Advocacy web essay.
- Farber, S., 2025. Weaponisation of academia: the Palestinian BDS movement and anti-Israel campus protests. Israel Affairs. DOI 10.1080/13537121.2025.2516167. Peer-reviewed.
- Harber, K., Bulska, D., Malloy, T., and Vila, J., 2026. Antisemitism, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-Israel attitudes. American Psychologist. DOI 10.1037/amp0001635. Peer-reviewed (abstract-sourced).
- Hoover Institution, undated. Jewish Roots in the Land of Israel/Palestine. hoover.org. Research institute essay.
- International Labour Organization, 1989. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169. Geneva. ilo.org. Official record (treaty text).
- International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2023. The Indigenous World 2023: Palestine; and Israel country profile. iwgia.org. Monitoring organization.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022. The Moslem Population in Israel: Data on the Occasion of Eid al-Adha. Media release 217/2022. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023. The Population of Ethiopian Origin in Israel. Media release 362/2023. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. The Druze Population of Israel on the Occasion of the Nabi Shu’ayb Festival. Media release 124/2024. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Population of Israel on the Eve of Rosh Hashana 5786. Media release 304/2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. Christmas 2025: Christians in Israel. Media release 413/2025. cbs.gov.il. Official record.
- Israel Law Review, undated. 1948 Refugees. Cambridge University Press. cambridge.org. Peer-reviewed.
- Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset, judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record (court judgment).
- Jikeli, G., Axelrod, D., Fischer, R., Forouzesh, E., Jeong, W., Miehling, D., and Soemer, K., 2022. Differences between antisemitic and non-antisemitic English language tweets. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. DOI 10.1007/s10588-022-09363-2. Peer-reviewed.
- Knesset, 2018. Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (unofficial English translation, amendments through 1 May 2022). main.knesset.gov.il. Official record (enacted legislation).
- Morris, B., 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521009676. Scholarly book.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Population, Housing and Establishments Census 2017: Final Results. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2025. A Brief on the Status of the Palestinian People at the End of 2025. Ramallah. pcbs.gov.ps. Official record.
- Pappé, I., 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. Scholarly book.
- Provisional Government of Israel, 1948. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Official Gazette Number 1, Tel Aviv, 14 May 1948. Official record.
- Sunnemark, V., 2025. The Palestine solidarity movement as solidarity ecology. Critical Sociology. DOI 10.1177/08969205251371599. Peer-reviewed.
- United Nations General Assembly, 2007. Resolution 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted 13 September 2007, with recorded vote. Official record.