No court has ruled on whether any single strike in Gaza deliberately targeted a civilian object, and the closest formal record of intent-related examination is Israel’s own: the Israel Defense Forces Military Advocate General’s Corps reported that 74 criminal investigations had been opened as at 3 August 2024, 3 of them into alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity, out of over 1,000 incidents referred for factual assessment. Several bodies have issued determinations of their own, and they measure different things: the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded destruction it said was “not justified by military necessity,” Forensic Architecture inferred a systematic campaign from aggregated incident counts, and a satellite-imagery study published through Harvard’s FXB Center found more than half of healthcare, education and water facilities damaged in the first seven weeks. Those are three different claims, and only one of them is a measurement.
Key Findings
- A satellite-imagery study released through the Harvard FXB Center in April 2024 found more than half of healthcare, education and water facilities in Gaza damaged between 7 October and 22 November 2023, across all five governorates.
- The IDF Military Advocate General’s Corps reported, on its own count, 74 criminal investigations opened as at 3 August 2024: 44 concerning the death of detainees, 8 alleged detainee mistreatment, 13 alleged pillaging, 6 alleged illegal use of force and 3 alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity.
- The same Corps states the threshold that produces those counts: in armed conflict, “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”
- The IDF publishes no count of warnings issued, roof-knocks performed or strikes aborted, so no figure exists for the precautionary measures it states it takes.
- Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) found 26.9% of 1,504 comments under leading UK media Facebook pages during the May 2021 escalation were antisemitic; within those, 27.9% assigned Israel sole guilt for the conflict.
Has any body formally found deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure?
No court has adjudicated any individual strike. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said in February 2024 that it had recorded widespread destruction of residential buildings, schools and universities in areas where fighting was not or was no longer taking place, some of it “not justified by military necessity.”
A second United Nations body reached its own determination: the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices reported in 2025 that 70% of all infrastructure across the Gaza Strip was damaged or destroyed.
It is often said that Israel deliberately targets civilian infrastructure in Gaza. The images that carry the claim are familiar to anyone who has followed the coverage: hospital wards with their walls opened, school buildings collapsed into their own footprints, whole residential blocks reduced to grey rubble. The question underneath the images is narrower than the images themselves. It is not whether civilian buildings were destroyed, which is not in dispute, but whether the destruction was aimed at those buildings as such.
The two UN documents answer parts of that. The Special Committee’s 2025 report lists the categories it says were bombarded and demolished: residential buildings, shelters, schools, hospitals, and religious and cultural sites. Its 70% figure is the committee’s own assessment of damage across the territory, on its own method, and it is a statement about extent rather than about aim. The OHCHR formulation from February 2024 goes one step further and attaches a legal standard, military necessity, to a subset of what it recorded, and it too is that office’s own determination on its own review.
Neither is a court judgment, and neither identifies a strike, an order or a decision-maker. They are findings by bodies that reach their conclusions through their own investigative procedures and publish them under their own names. What they establish, on their own terms, is the scale of destruction and the assessment that some of it fell outside a legal justification. What produces that destruction, strike by strike, is a separate evidentiary question with a separate record, and that record sits in the sections that follow.
Is it said the destruction followed a systematic plan?
Forensic Architecture told a UK parliamentary committee in 2024 that within 998 airstrikes it analysed between 7 October 2023 and 6 July 2024, it recorded 564 attacks on educational facilities, and it described the pattern it observed as a systematic and organised campaign to destroy life-sustaining infrastructure.
The same submission recorded 353 attacks on civilian shelters and 110 on medical facilities within that analysed set. The scale in those counts is not in dispute and is directionally consistent with the satellite work in the next section: large numbers of protected-category buildings were hit, across every category, over a nine-month window.
What the counts establish and what the conclusion asserts are different orders of claim, and the distinction governs the rest of this question. A count of attacks on educational facilities is a tally of incidents matched to a facility type. A finding that the attacks formed an organised campaign is an inference drawn from the shape of the aggregate: the argument runs that the distribution of hits across categories, geography and time is not what unaimed destruction would look like. That inference can be strong or weak depending on the aggregate, and it is a different thing from evidence about any one strike, because it does not identify which of the 998 airstrikes carried the intent the pattern is said to reveal.
The analysed set is also a sample rather than a census. The submission reports what the group analysed, not the total number of airstrikes in the period, so the counts are a floor within a defined analytical window and are not a share of all strikes conducted. That matters for the pattern argument, because the inference depends on what proportion of the whole the analysed incidents represent, and the submission does not supply that denominator.
The record in this section is therefore an organisation’s own incident tally within its own sample, and the organisation’s own reading of what the tally means, published together. Both belong on the page. They are not interchangeable.
Which facility types were damaged, and how early?
A satellite-imagery study released through Harvard’s FXB Center in April 2024 found that more than half of healthcare, education and water facilities in the Gaza Strip were damaged between 7 October and 22 November 2023, in all five governorates, a window of the first seven weeks of the war.
The measurement matters because it is one of the few figures here produced by an instrument rather than by a classification of reported incidents. Satellite damage assessment reads the built environment directly: it does not depend on a report reaching a monitor, and it does not depend on a definition of which incidents count. It also cannot say what caused any individual instance of damage, who struck it, or why. It measures state, not cause.
Two features of the result are load-bearing. The first is timing: the damage to these three service categories was already past half within seven weeks, not accumulated across a long campaign. The second is distribution: the study reports the finding across all five governorates rather than concentrated in one, so the pattern is territory-wide within the measured window.
The press release accompanying the study quotes a co-author, Raz Segal, saying the findings show Israel “intentionally decimated civilian infrastructure.” That sentence is a researcher’s interpretation of the imagery, offered in a press release, and it is a different kind of statement from the imagery finding itself. The satellite analysis measured how many facilities were damaged and when. It did not measure aim, and no imagery method can. Carrying the quotation as though it were the study’s measured result would attach a claim about intent to a technique that produces claims about surfaces.
Kept separate, the two are both usable: a dated, instrument-based figure on the extent and speed of damage to protected-category facilities, and a named researcher’s stated reading of what that extent implies.
How often were civilian sites struck with explosive weapons?
Action on Armed Violence, whose data Oxfam relayed in 2024, recorded explosive-weapon hits on civilian infrastructure in Gaza at an average of one every three hours since the start of the war, with homes hit on average every four hours, tents every 17 hours, and schools and hospitals every four days.
The figure that circulates most widely is the three-hour rate, and it is worth being precise about what produced it. Action on Armed Violence is the body that recorded and coded the incidents; Oxfam published the figure in its own materials. The rate is an arithmetic average across the period, derived by dividing recorded hits by elapsed time, so it describes the density of recorded incidents rather than a steady tempo. Periods of intense bombardment and periods of relative quiet both sit inside it.
The breakdown by target type is the more informative part of the record, because it converts an undifferentiated impression of destruction into a rank order. Homes are the most frequently recorded category by a wide margin, at roughly one every four hours. Tents, the shelter of a displaced population, follow at one every 17 hours. Schools and hospitals, the two categories that carry the strongest protections and generate the most attention, are recorded at one every four days, which is frequent in absolute terms and the least frequent of the four.
An incident-recording rate is a floor. It counts what was recorded from open sources within the recording body’s own criteria for what constitutes a hit on civilian infrastructure, and any category the criteria exclude, or any incident that never surfaced in reporting, sits outside the count. Read as what it is, a coded incident density from a named monitoring body, it establishes frequency and relative distribution. It does not carry information about targeting decisions, and the body that produced it does not present it as doing so.
What does Israel say determines whether a site is struck?
The IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, stated at a briefing on 29 February 2024 that the IDF had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the beginning of the war, a classification that is the IDF’s own and is not independently verified, and the IDF’s published doctrine holds that a civilian site loses its protection when it is used for military purposes.
The doctrine itself is public. The Spirit of the IDF, the force’s own ethical code, states under Purity of Arms that a soldier “will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property,” and under Human Life that a soldier in combat “will put themselves and their fellow soldiers at risk only to the extent required to fulfill their mission.” Under Discipline, the code states that a soldier will ensure they are “only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders.”
Alongside the code sits the operational position. The IDF states that Hamas sites military infrastructure, headquarters, launchers and weapons storage in residential buildings, hospitals, mosques and schools, and that Hamas broadcast messages telling residents to ignore IDF evacuation warnings. On precautions, the IDF states that it warns civilians by telephone calls, text messages and leaflets, uses roof-knocking before striking a building, aborts strikes when civilians are present, and published a numbered evacuation-area map.
For none of those precautionary measures does the IDF publish a count. There is no released figure for warnings issued, roof-knocks performed or strikes aborted, so the stated measures can be described but not sized, and no rate of application can be derived from the party’s own materials.
That is what Israel’s published targeting position holds: a doctrinal standard, a stated claim about how protection is lost, and a set of stated precautions carrying no numbers. It is a party’s own account of its own conduct, and it is evidence of the standard the party states, never evidence of conduct measured against it.
Has Israel investigated specific strikes on protected sites?
The IDF Military Advocate General’s Corps reported that it had opened 74 criminal investigations as at 3 August 2024, and that over 1,000 incidents had been identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, with hundreds still undergoing collection and assessment at the time of writing.
The composition of the 74 is the part that bears on this question directly.
Three of the 74 concern alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity, the category that maps onto the question of infrastructure. The other 71 concern detainee deaths, mistreatment, pillaging and illegal use of force, which are conduct offences of a different kind.
The Corps publishes the threshold that generates those numbers, and it must travel with them. In its own words, in armed conflict “death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity.” The investigation count is therefore a function of that standard: damage alone does not open a file, so the gap between over 1,000 referred incidents and 74 investigations is a product of the threshold, not a residual.
On independence, the Corps states that “the MAG is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence,” and that its decisions are subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged before Israel’s Attorney General and the Israeli Supreme Court. The Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism was created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission and now operates as a permanent body.
Every figure in this section is the IDF’s own count of its own process, published by a party to the events, and no external verification of the counts has been published. The 74 are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions.
What separates recorded damage from a finding of intent?
Amnesty International said in 2024 that air strikes killing 44 civilians were indiscriminate, meaning they failed to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, which is a determination about the conduct of an attack and not about what its planners intended to hit.
Three formulations are in circulation and they measure three different things. An indiscriminate attack, in the sense Amnesty used, is one carried out without the required distinction, and a finding of indiscriminate conduct is compatible with an intent directed at a military objective. Destruction “not justified by military necessity,” the OHCHR formulation from February 2024, is a judgment that a given act of destruction fell outside a legal justification, which addresses the sufficiency of the reason rather than the aim. Deliberate targeting, the Forensic Architecture reading of its aggregated incident counts, asserts that the civilian object was the object.
The three are frequently reported together, and reported together they read as one escalating claim. Held apart, they are three distinct evidentiary standards with three distinct proof requirements. Distinction failures can be shown from the circumstances and effects of an attack. Absence of military necessity requires a judgment about what military advantage was available. Deliberate targeting requires evidence about a decision, which in practice means orders, target lists, communications or testimony, none of which appears in the public documents named in this report.
That is where the record on Gaza currently stands: extensive documented damage, several bodies’ determinations that specific attacks breached specific standards, one organisation’s inference of a systematic aim from an aggregate, one party’s own account of its doctrine and its own count of 3 investigations into destruction of civilian property, and no adjudication of any individual strike. The broader legal picture, including which claims have been formally lodged and where, is examined in the Institute’s report on war crimes claims and the legal record.
Did an earlier conflict produce the same deliberate-destruction finding?
The deliberate-destruction formulation now applied to Gaza was published 17 years earlier, in 2006, when Amnesty International concluded that evidence in the Israel-Lebanon conflict pointed to deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure integral to Israel’s military strategy rather than collateral damage.
That 2006 determination is a document about a different war, in a different territory, against a different adversary, reached on evidence gathered at the time. It is cited here for one reason: the phrase pattern that now organises the Gaza debate, destruction of civilian infrastructure as strategy rather than as by-product, has a dated and locatable origin in the published record, and a reader encountering the formulation in 2026 is encountering a framing with a twenty-year history rather than a novel characterisation.
Two things follow, and they pull in opposite directions. A framing that recurs across conflicts may recur because the conduct recurs, which is how the body that authored it presents the continuity. A framing that recurs may also travel independently of the evidence in any given case, applied to a new conflict because it is available and familiar. The published record supports the observation that the formulation is old; it does not by itself settle which of those two accounts explains its reappearance.
What it does establish is that the Gaza determinations described earlier in this report did not introduce the deliberate-destruction category. They applied an existing one. When a 2024 or 2025 document reports that civilian infrastructure was deliberately targeted, the standard being applied and the language being used were both in use in 2006, and the evidence supporting the newer conclusions is nonetheless entirely separate evidence about a separate conflict. The two determinations share a vocabulary and share nothing else, and reports that stack them as though the earlier corroborated the later are stacking a phrase, not a finding.
Which analysts reject the deliberate-destruction reading?
The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs published in 2025 a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilians in Gaza who had died of war-related causes, derived by subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel’s count of fighters killed from the Gaza Ministry of Health total, and stated on the same page that neither the Ministry’s total nor Israel’s fighter count has been independently confirmed.
That figure is the publisher’s own arithmetic on inputs supplied by parties to the conflict, and the publisher labels it as a ceiling rather than a count. It is presented here not as a casualty estimate but as an example of the methodological objection Israeli research institutes raise: that the totals feeding the deliberate-destruction argument originate with parties or with monitors whose inputs are not independently reconciled, and that arithmetic performed on unreconciled inputs cannot yield a settled number.
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies runs the same accounting from the other side of the ledger, publishing cumulative Israeli casualty totals of 1,664 killed and 17,809 wounded as at 5 September 2024, counted from 7 October 2023, without crediting an official body for the killed and wounded figures. NGO Monitor, an advocacy-mission organisation, directs its 2024 annual report at the documenting organisations themselves, reporting that it identified 157 groups in the United States linked to what it describes as an anti-Israel network, with over 3,000 connections, and 111 groups in Canada with over 1,800 connections.
The methodological point in that mapping is that incident documentation depends on the documenting body’s inclusion criteria, and criteria that are not published cannot be checked. The same test applies to the mapping: NGO Monitor’s own report does not state the method or inclusion criteria behind its network counts, and the $28 million in funding it attributes to its own work is a self-attributed claim rather than an audited total.
What the record holds, then, is a dispute in which each side identifies unstated method in the other’s counts, and in which the identification is accurate in both directions.
How does infrastructure-destruction language appear in antisemitic content?
Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022), analysing comments on leading media Facebook pages during the May 2021 escalation, coded 26.9% of 1,504 UK comments as antisemitic against an IHRA-based scheme.
The same study coded 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments, so the UK share ran at roughly twice the other two.
Within the UK antisemitic comments, the distribution of framings is measurable.
The authors also report that thread context was needed to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, so a substantial share of the coded material is not identifiable from its own wording.
Two peer-reviewed findings sit beside that measurement. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), in two British experiments (N = 354 and N = 490) priming participants with war-in-Gaza material, found political orientation associated with anti-Jewish hostility through two separate pathways: social dominance orientation on one side, and out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people on the other, the latter conflating attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward Jews. Huesmann and colleagues (2012), surveying 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students, found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes; the association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed.
These are correlations reported by their authors with the authors’ own caveats, and the experimental primes measured attitudes toward Jews after exposure to conflict material, not the effect of any particular claim about infrastructure. What the set establishes is that conflict-related framings and antisemitic attitudes co-occur in measurable, structured ways in coded comment corpora and in primed samples, and that the pathway runs through identification rather than exposure alone.
Methodology
This report answers a question about intent using four kinds of evidence, each labelled where it appears.
Peer-reviewed research supplies the discourse and attitudinal findings: Becker, Ascone and Troschke (2022) in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025) in the International Journal of Intercultural Relations, and Huesmann and colleagues (2012) in the Journal of Research on Adolescence. Their figures are measured shares and experimental results within stated samples, carried with the authors’ own correlational language.
Party-published official records supply Israel’s stated doctrine, its stated precautions and its investigation counts: the Spirit of the IDF ethical code, the IDF Spokesperson’s briefing of 29 February 2024, the IDF’s human-shields and precautions materials, and the Military Advocate General’s Corps publication of 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. Every figure from these is the IDF’s own count of its own activity or process, published by a party to the events it describes, and none has been independently verified. The investigation totals are counts of files opened, not of findings, indictments or convictions, and the Corps’ own stated threshold for opening a file is reproduced alongside them because the counts cannot be interpreted without it.
Instrument-based measurement is represented by the satellite-imagery study released through Harvard’s FXB Center in April 2024, which measures damage state across facility categories and cannot speak to cause. The interpretive quotation in its press release is attributed to the co-author who gave it.
Determinations by United Nations bodies, by Forensic Architecture, by Amnesty International and the incident-rate data recorded by Action on Armed Violence and relayed by Oxfam are named and dated in the body as those bodies’ own conclusions on their own definitions, and are not the basis of this report’s answer. Israeli research-institute analyses from the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, the Begin-Sadat Center and NGO Monitor are labelled as research-institute and advocacy-mission material and carry the same treatment.
Two absences are part of the record. No court has adjudicated any individual strike in Gaza, so no judicial finding on targeting exists to cite. And the IDF publishes no count of warnings, roof-knocks or aborted strikes, so its stated precautions can be described but not measured.
Conclusion
The question the images raise is whether the buildings were aimed at. On the public record as it stands, that question has been answered by determination and by inference, and not by adjudication: OHCHR judged some recorded destruction not justified by military necessity in February 2024, the UN Special Committee put damage across the Strip at 70% in 2025, Forensic Architecture read a systematic campaign out of 998 analysed airstrikes, and Amnesty International found strikes killing 44 civilians indiscriminate. Israel’s own files record 74 criminal investigations opened by 3 August 2024, of which 3 concern destruction of civilian property without military necessity, against over 1,000 incidents referred and a stated threshold under which harm to civilian objects does not by itself raise a reasonable suspicion of crime.
Those findings do not stack into one. Indiscriminate conduct, destruction without military necessity, and deliberate targeting are three claims with three proof requirements, and the strongest measurement in the set, the satellite finding that more than half of healthcare, education and water facilities were damaged within seven weeks, establishes extent and speed and says nothing about aim. The deliberate-destruction formulation itself is 17 years older than this war. Every count on both sides of the argument, from a monitoring body’s incident rate to a military’s investigation total, is produced by criteria its publisher chose, and in several cases did not publish.
What travels beyond that record is not the distinction. In coded UK comment corpora from the May 2021 escalation, 26.9% of comments were antisemitic and 27.9% of those assigned Israel sole guilt for the conflict, while British experimental samples in 2025 showed hostility toward Jews reached through identification with a party to the war. The question the Institute puts to that pairing is whether a public argument conducted in three legal registers, and reported as one, is itself among the conditions under which a claim about a state becomes an attitude about a people. Nobody has measured it yet.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do damage counts for Gaza differ so widely between bodies?
Because they measure different things. A satellite study measures the damaged state of buildings, an incident-recording project counts events matched to its own criteria, and a military’s investigation total counts files opened under a legal threshold. The Harvard-released satellite work covering 7 October to 22 November 2023 and the IDF Military Advocate General’s 74 investigations as at 3 August 2024 are not competing estimates of one quantity.
What does “not justified by military necessity” mean?
It is a legal judgment that a specific act of destruction served no sufficient military purpose, which is the formulation the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights used in February 2024. It addresses the adequacy of the reason for an act rather than the aim behind it, and it is distinct from a finding that a civilian object was the intended target.
Has anyone been charged over a strike on a hospital or school?
The IDF Military Advocate General’s Corps reports investigations opened, not outcomes. As at 3 August 2024 it recorded 74 criminal investigations, 3 of them into alleged destruction of civilian property without military necessity, and it publishes no accompanying count of indictments or convictions arising from them.
How many strikes has the IDF said it called off?
No figure exists. The IDF states that it aborts strikes when civilians are present, uses roof-knocking before striking a building, and warns civilians by telephone, text and leaflet, but it has published no count for any of these measures, so their frequency cannot be established from the party’s own materials.
Which figures in this debate come from parties to the conflict?
Israel’s doctrine, precaution claims, investigation counts and the figure of over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists eliminated, stated on 29 February 2024, are all the IDF’s own. The Jerusalem Center’s 2025 ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths is that institute’s arithmetic on inputs supplied by both parties, and the institute states neither input has been independently confirmed.
Does an indiscriminate-attack finding prove deliberate targeting?
No, and the two are frequently reported as though they were the same. Amnesty International’s 2024 finding that strikes killing 44 civilians were indiscriminate concerns a failure to distinguish military objectives from civilian objects during an attack, which is compatible with an intent directed at a military objective.
Do Israeli institutes dispute the underlying counts or the conclusions drawn from them?
Both, and principally the method. The Jerusalem Center’s 2025 arithmetic turns on inputs it says are unconfirmed, and NGO Monitor’s 2024 annual report targets the inclusion criteria of documenting organisations. Its own network counts of 157 US and 111 Canadian groups are published without a stated method, so the same test applies to them.
Sources
- Becker, M., Ascone, E., Troschke, H., 2022. Antisemitic Comments on Facebook Pages of Leading British, French, and German Media Outlets. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. DOI 10.1057/s41599-022-01337-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2025. The Gaza Terror Offensive, 1 August to 5 September 2024. besacenter.org. Research institute.
- Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, 2024. New Study of Satellite Data Shows Israel’s Assault on Hospitals, Schools and Water Infrastructure in the Gaza Strip Was Not Random. fxb.harvard.edu. Established research organization, not peer-reviewed.
- Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Souweidane, V., Ginges, J., 2012. Foreign Wars and Domestic Prejudice. Journal of Research on Adolescence. DOI 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x. Peer-reviewed.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, February 29th, 2024. idf.il. Official record, party’s own reporting.
- Israel Defense Forces. The Spirit of the Israel Defense Forces. idf.il. Official record, party’s own published doctrine.
- Israel Defense Forces. Hamas Use of Human Shields in Gaza, and published evacuation-area materials. idf.il. Official record, party’s own stated position.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. idf.il. Official record, party’s own reporting.
- Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, 2025. The Death of Genocide. jcfa.org. Research institute.
- NGO Monitor, 2025. Annual Report 2024. ngo-monitor.org. Monitoring organization, advocacy mission.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The Impact of Globalized Conflicts: Examining Attitudes Toward Jews Among Britons in the Political Context of the War in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, vol. 107. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed.