In the largest coded sample of conflict-driven comment discourse available, 26.9% of 1,504 comments on the Facebook pages of leading British media outlets reacting to the May 2021 escalation were antisemitic under an IHRA-based coding scheme, Becker, Ascone and Troschke reported in 2022 in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. In the Anti-Defamation League’s own 2024 tally, 5,452 of 9,354 recorded US incidents (58%) contained Israel- or Zionism-related elements, the first majority in an audit series the organization has run since 1979. The two figures measure different things, and the gap between them is where the argument lives: one counts what a body of language contained, the other counts what a monitoring organization classified on its own definitions. What no source in either register measures is a speaker’s interior motive, so the measurable question is narrower than the one people ask: what does the language carry, whom do the recorded incidents reach, and what travels with the framing when it is measured against attitudes?
Key Findings
- 26.9% of 1,504 UK comments on leading media Facebook pages during the May 2021 escalation were coded antisemitic, against 12.6% of 1,500 French and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments (Becker, Ascone and Troschke, 2022, peer-reviewed).
- 5,452 of 9,354 US incidents recorded by the Anti-Defamation League in 2024 (58%) were Israel- or Zionism-related, up from 3,162 of 8,873 (36%) in 2023; the organization discloses that a definitional change adopted after October 2023 added 1,350 incidents (15%) to the 2023 total.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation recorded 1,938 anti-Jewish single-bias hate-crime incidents in 2024, 69% of all religion-based incidents, in a collection whose only motive field is bias type, with nothing recorded about political framing.
- A model in which conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediate the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies, while a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results (Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila, 2026, peer-reviewed).
- 541 accounts in 11 coordinated groups, about 0.04% of the 1,521,433 users in the sample, accounted for the coordinated amplification detected in 4,570,633 tweets posted between September 1 and December 15, 2023 (Elmas and colleagues, 2026, preprint).
Does anti-Zionist language carry classic anti-Jewish tropes?
26.9% of the 1,504 UK comments Becker, Ascone and Troschke coded in 2022 were antisemitic under an IHRA-based scheme. The corpus was drawn entirely from reactions to the May 2021 Arab-Israeli escalation on the Facebook pages of leading British, French and German media outlets, so every comment in it sits inside conflict discourse rather than in general conversation about Jews.
Within the UK antisemitic comments, the categories the authors coded were not evenly distributed. The “evil” stereotype appeared in 39.8%, attribution of sole guilt to Israel in 27.9%, child-murder or blood-libel imagery in 8.1%, denial of Jewish self-determination in 7.7%, the apartheid analogy in 5.2% and the Nazi analogy in 4.2%. The categories are non-exclusive. The same study found 12.6% of 1,500 French comments and 13.6% of 1,520 German comments antisemitic, so the share varied by a factor of about two across three national samples of the same event.
The authors also recorded how much surrounding text a coder needed. Thread context was required to infer the antisemitic meaning in 38.7% of the UK antisemitic comments, about 62% of the French and 48.3% of the German, which is a measurement of how much of the meaning sits outside the sentence itself.
Corpora built on keywords rather than events give a second reading. In an expert-annotated gold-standard set of 4,016 English tweets, Jikeli and colleagues (2022) found 13.1% of tweets containing “Israel” antisemitic against 11.2% of conversations containing “Jews,” and reported that about 62% of the antisemitic “Jews” tweets fit the IHRA paragraph on stereotypical allegations of Jewish collective power while 15% fit denial of Jewish self-determination. In a later 6,941-tweet annotated set spanning January 2019 to December 2021, the same group reported 1,250 tweets (18%) antisemitic per the IHRA definition (Jikeli and colleagues, 2023, preprint).
Is it often said the label is a disguise?
It is often said that anti-Zionism functions as a cover for older anti-Jewish hostility. The Anti-Defamation League, a monitoring organization with an advocacy mission, states in its Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2024, published April 22, 2025, that in 2024 “hatred toward Israel was a driving force behind antisemitism across the U.S.,” and reports that 5,452 of 9,354 recorded incidents (58%) were Israel- or Zionism-related.
The directional claim is supported by the organization’s own series. In its Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2023 the same body recorded 3,162 Israel- or Zionism-referencing incidents out of 8,873 (36%). The 2024 figure is the first majority share since the audit began in 1979, and 2,596 of the 2024 incidents occurred at anti-Israel rallies.
Two features of that record govern what the share can carry. First, the audit counts incidents its analysts classified, on the organization’s own definitions, not the beliefs of people who describe themselves as anti-Zionist; it is a tally of events, not a survey of ideologies. Second, the organization discloses that after October 7, 2023 it began counting certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests, a definitional change that by its own statement added 1,350 incidents (15%) to the 2023 total and carries into 2024. Part of the movement in the Israel-related share therefore reflects what was brought inside the count.
Other named bodies hold the distinction rather than the equation. The American Jewish Committee publishes a standing explainer holding that criticism of Israel comparable to criticism leveled at other states is not antisemitism, while treating rejection of the Jewish state’s existence and discrimination against Jews as a different matter. Its State of Antisemitism in America 2025 survey reports that about 31% of American Jews said they were the personal target of antisemitism in 2025, including 21% by an in-person remark and 21% by an online remark or post, which measures reported experience rather than the ideology behind it.
Whom do the recorded incidents actually reach?
Of the 9,354 US incidents the Anti-Defamation League recorded in 2024, 1,694 (18% of the total) occurred on college campuses, an 84% rise on the organization’s 2023 campus count.
Another 2,596 occurred at anti-Israel rallies.
The audit also records 196 assaults with at least 250 victims, up 21%, and 2,606 acts of vandalism, up 20%.
The United Kingdom’s Community Security Trust, a community security body counting on its own definitions, reported 4,103 antisemitic incidents in 2023 as first published, later revised to 4,296. Of the figure as first published, 2,699 (66%) fell on or after October 7, 2023, against 392 over the same dates in 2022. Its category breakdown for the year records 266 assaults, 305 threats and 182 incidents of damage and desecration of Jewish property, and 1,282 incidents online (31%), of which 704 occurred on X. Over the 35 days from October 7 to November 10, 2023 the same body logged a provisional 1,205 incidents against 191 in the equivalent 2022 window, with 681 in Greater London and 221 in Greater Manchester, and logged a further 762 reports it did not classify as antisemitic.
Germany’s Bundesverband RIAS, the federal umbrella for civil-society reporting offices, recorded 202 verified incidents connected to the Hamas attacks between October 7 and 15, 2023, against 59 in the same window of 2022, and stated the increase as at least 240% because reports were still arriving. Of the 202, 15 occurred in the victim’s residential environment, 6 were attacks and 7 were cases of targeted property damage, and the organization could assign no political background in 64% of cases.
Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism published its own three-week tally for October 7 to 25, 2023, reporting a 500% rise in the overall volume of antisemitic events worldwide against the same period a year earlier, a 330% rise in violent incidents and about a 128% rise in desecration of Jewish places such as cemeteries, with the document itself hedging the figures (“it appears that”, “about”) and publishing no baseline counts or method. In the ministry’s accompanying survey of Jewish communities abroad, 87% of respondents reported a dramatic decrease in personal security, with no sample size or field dates given.
Across all four registers the recorded target is a person, a residence, a communal building or a campus, not a state institution.
What do official hate-crime records capture about motive?
1,938 anti-Jewish single-bias hate-crime incidents were recorded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for calendar year 2024, the highest since national collection began in 1991, up 5.8% from 1,832 in 2023, and 69% of all religion-based incidents. The collection’s motive field is bias type. Nothing in it records whether an offender invoked Zionism, Israel or any political framing.
The 2024 collection drew on 16,419 participating law-enforcement agencies covering 95.1% of the population and recorded 11,679 hate-crime incidents in total, so anti-Jewish bias accounted for 16% of all reported hate crimes. It also recorded 178 anti-Jewish aggravated and simple assaults, up from 174 in 2023. The Bureau restricts trend analysis to a matched agency panel because the 2021 transition to the National Incident-Based Reporting System breaks a clean year-over-year read.
Two coverage facts bound the series. Of the 16,419 participating agencies, only 3,127 (19.0%) reported any hate crime at all. And the Bureau of Justice Statistics, drawing on the National Crime Victimization Survey for 2015 to 2019, found about 42% of violent hate-crime victimizations were never reported to police, with 9% of violent hate-crime victimizations motivated by religious bias and no standalone anti-Jewish subfigure published. Its 2019 estimate of 305,390 hate-crime victimizations sits against roughly 7,300 incidents reported to the Bureau that year, a gap the agency itself declines to treat as a precise undercount magnitude because the two collections use different methods, units and goals.
The consequence for this question is specific. The official record establishes the count and the bias category of anti-Jewish offences and establishes nothing about the vocabulary or stated politics of the person who committed them, so it can neither support nor contradict the fig-leaf claim in either direction. Where the claim is tested at all, it is tested in coded language corpora and in attitude surveys, both of which are non-governmental instruments with their own samples and their own bounds.
Does the framing travel with conspiracy belief?
A model in which conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediate the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes accounted for over 55% of the variance in anti-Israel attitudes across three preregistered studies (N = 373 longitudinal, N = 243 cross-sectional, N = 493 three-wave longitudinal), Harber, Bulska, Malloy and Vila reported in 2026 in American Psychologist. Conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not mediate the association, and a general conspiratorial mindset did not explain the results.
The same study reports a partisan asymmetry within its samples: Democrats, compared with Republicans, expressed less antisemitism but stronger anti-Israel attitudes and greater endorsement of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist conspiracy beliefs. These are measured associations in survey samples, and the design does not establish direction.
A separate national setting shows the same variable carrying weight. In two surveys of Malay adults in Kuala Lumpur, Swami (2012) found attitudes toward Israel the strongest predictor of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory (standardized beta 0.56) in a model accounting for 39% of the variance, and found that once ideological variables were accounted for, general conspiracist ideation was no longer a significant predictor. In Study 1 (n = 368) the correlation between Jewish-conspiracy belief and general conspiracist ideation was only r = 0.22.
The relationship also runs the other way in a preregistered UK sample. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023), surveying 1,790 UK adults through YouGov in December 2021, found coronavirus-conspiracy suspicion correlated positively with all measured forms of antisemitism, with the correlation notably stronger for Judeophobic antisemitism (attitudes toward Jews as Jews) than for anti-Zionist antisemitism; their exploratory analysis indicated the anti-Zionist link was accounted for by its overlap with the Judeophobic measure.
All three studies measure covariance between attitudes held by the same respondents. None measures concealment, and none establishes that a given respondent’s stated political position was adopted as a cover for another.
Are Jews asked to disavow Zionism at work?
75.4% of Jewish medical students and professionals surveyed reported exposure to antisemitism, Schwartz, Leiba, Feldman, Spence, Oratz, Wald and Roth reported in 2025 in the Journal of Religion and Health, in a study that paired that survey with social media posts from 220,405 US healthcare-professional accounts and a review of the medical literature. In the same study, publications and posts about antisemitism rose more than fivefold and posts promoting antisemitic stereotypes rose two- to fourfold.
Workplace conditions correlate with what gets reported. In a pilot survey of 645 Jewish US healthcare professionals, Fishman and Auerbach (2026) found the odds of reporting experienced antisemitism lower where colleagues and administrators could identify antisemitism (odds ratio 0.56, 95% confidence interval 0.41 to 0.76) and higher in academic medical centers than in community hospitals (odds ratio 4.81, 95% confidence interval 2.42 to 9.54). Both are self-reported measures, and the study is described by its authors as a pilot.
On campus, Morstead and DeLongis (2025) collected 812 weekly survey responses from 253 Jewish college and university students in early 2024. Within-person increases in antisemitism-related stress and in stress attributable to the Israel-Palestine conflict were each independently associated with heightened depressive symptoms; increased avoidance coping was associated with heightened symptoms and approach coping was protective. The American Jewish Committee’s 2025 survey reports that Jewish adults aged 18 to 29 were more likely than those 30 and older to report being targeted in the past year (47% against 28%) and to report online antisemitism (87% against 70%), and that 38% against 28% said they had avoided places or events out of fear of antisemitism.
What none of these instruments records is the specific transaction the question names. No study in this record measures how often Jewish employees, clinicians or students report being asked to state a position on Zionism as a condition of participation. The measured quantities are exposure, stress, avoidance and the setting in which reporting is more or less likely, and each rests on respondents’ own accounts within named samples rather than on an audit of workplaces or campuses.
Are these framings amplified by coordinated accounts?
541 accounts, organized in 11 coordinated groups, accounted for the coordinated activity that Elmas, Silva, Pote and colleagues detected, according to their 2026 preprint.
The activity emerged from 4,570,633 tweets posted by 1,521,433 users between September 1 and December 15, 2023, meaning the coordinated accounts made up about 0.04% of the accounts in the sample.
The paper’s description of what those groups did is as load-bearing as the count. The campaigns relied on low-complexity tactics, retweet amplification and copy-paste diffusion, promoted divergent narratives, and operated as a fragmented landscape with no centralized control, each organized around a small set of amplified accounts that drew little engagement from non-coordinated accounts. Of 191 highly amplified coordinated posts, 12 were assessed as misleading, concentrated in 3 of the 11 groups; the authors describe the remaining groups as primarily engaged in advocacy, religious solidarity or humanitarian mobilization. The paper documents amplification and makes no finding of centralized or external financing.
Whether coordination is machine-driven is a separate measurement. Ng and Carley (2023), applying a combined synchronization index to six political and social activism events on Twitter covering about 1.8 million unique users and 4.3 million original tweets, found human users scored higher on synchronization than bots in most of the six events, and that bot-and-human pairs were the most synchronized account-pair type. The six events do not include the Israel-Hamas conflict, so the finding travels only as general mechanism evidence.
Network-level measurement supplies a third quantity, timing rather than authorship. Verma, Sear and Johnson (2024), tracking a cross-platform hate network of about 50 million accounts with classifiers the authors report at 91% accuracy or higher, measured a 117.57% rise in antisemitism between November 2 to 6 and November 7 to 11, 2020, alongside a 269.5% rise in anti-immigration content, and recorded a 299% rise in Telegram connections in the hate-to-hate network between November 1 to 3 and November 4 to 7, 2020. The authors describe the new content as aligned with Great Replacement narratives attributing demographic change to Jewish influence, and write in correlational terms about the relationship to the election.
Where do researchers disagree about measuring the overlap?
10% of US voters aged 18 to 34 agreed with all three antisemitic statements tested in the Fall 2025 Yale Youth Poll, against 2% of voters 65 and older, while two-thirds of all voters rejected all three. Where such items should sit relative to attitudes toward Israel, and whether standard instruments separate the two at all, is the point on which named researchers differ.
Hersh and Royden (2022), running experiments inside an original survey of about 3,500 US adults with a young-adult oversample, found overt antisemitic attitudes rare on the political left and more common on the right, with the highest concentration among young adults on the far right, contrary to horseshoe theory. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), in two British experiments (N = 354 and N = 490) priming war-in-Gaza material, report two distinct pathways: political orientation associated with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation, and conservative orientation negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people, an identity-based route the authors describe as conflating attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward Jews.
The disagreement is partly about instrument construction. Harber and colleagues (2026) report that conspiracy beliefs implicating Israel and Zionists mediated the antisemitism-to-anti-Israel-attitudes association while conspiracy beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel did not, which places the discriminating content in the Israel-referencing items themselves. Allington, Hirsh and Katz (2023) measured generalised, Judeophobic and anti-Zionist antisemitism as separate constructs in one preregistered survey and found the anti-Zionist scale’s association with conspiracism accounted for by its overlap with the Judeophobic scale, a result that turns on how the scales were built.
Bilewicz, Cohen and Feinberg (2026), reviewing the field in American Psychologist, argue antisemitism does not fit standard models of stereotyping, power and minority status, because the trope attributes high status and hidden power rather than low status, and name anti-Zionist expressions of antisemitism as one of four reviving research traditions alongside memory-defensive antisemitism, conspiracy mentality and intergroup threat. Hadar, Halevy, Cohen, Apfelbaum and Chan (2026) report converging evidence across six national samples that perceived Jewish power registers as a threat both to people who support social hierarchy and to people who oppose it, which is the measurement problem in compact form: the same perception is associated with hostility at opposite ends of the ideological range.
Methodology
This report measures discourse, incident records and attitude measurements bearing on the relationship between anti-Zionist framing and antisemitism. It does not assess the political question of Zionism itself.
Four source types carry the findings, and each measures something different. Peer-reviewed research supplies the coded language corpora (Becker, Ascone and Troschke, 2022; Jikeli and colleagues, 2022) and the attitude and mediation studies (Harber and colleagues, 2026; Allington, Hirsh and Katz, 2023; Swami, 2012; Hersh and Royden, 2022; Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh, 2025; Schwartz and colleagues, 2025; Fishman and Auerbach, 2026; Morstead and DeLongis, 2025; Verma, Sear and Johnson, 2024; Ng and Carley, 2023). Preprints, labelled at first use, supply the later tweet-annotation set (Jikeli and colleagues, 2023) and the coordination analysis (Elmas and colleagues, 2026). Official records supply the US hate-crime counts (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2025) and the victimization survey (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021). Monitoring and community-security organizations supply the incident tallies (Anti-Defamation League, 2024 and 2025; Community Security Trust, 2023 and 2024; Bundesverband RIAS, 2023), each counted on the organization’s own definitions and labelled as that organization’s own count.
Three limits govern the incident figures. The Anti-Defamation League’s audit counts events its analysts classified, and the organization discloses that a post-October-2023 definitional change adding certain expressions of opposition to Zionism at protests contributed 1,350 incidents (15%) to the 2023 total, so the Israel-related share is partly a function of the definition. The Community Security Trust states its definition is narrower than the criminal justice system’s, that its totals mix crimes with non-crime incidents, and that its statistics are indicative of trends rather than absolute measures; it revised its 2023 total from 4,103 as first published to 4,296. Bundesverband RIAS calls its October 2023 count a preliminary snapshot and its increase figure a floor. None of these tallies may be summed with police data or compared directly to it.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s collection is voluntary: of 16,419 participating agencies, 3,127 (19.0%) reported any hate crime, and the 2021 transition to the National Incident-Based Reporting System breaks clean year-over-year comparison. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimate of unreported victimization (about 42% for violent hate crime, 2015 to 2019) is survey-based and is not a precise measure of the gap between the two collections.
The survey and mediation findings are correlational. Where studies report associations between attitudes toward Israel, conspiracy belief and antisemitism, that is covariance among attitudes held by the same respondents within named samples, and none of the designs establishes that any respondent adopted one position to conceal another. Self-report instruments in the workplace and campus studies measure what respondents reported, in samples of 645, 253 and 220,405 accounts respectively. Where the literature disagrees, the competing studies and the measurement point at issue are named in the body.
Conclusion
The question puts a motive on the table: that the argument about Israel is a covering for the older hostility toward Jews. The corpora answer the part of it that is measurable. In the coded UK sample of comments on the May 2021 escalation, 26.9% were antisemitic, and within those the “evil” stereotype ran at 39.8%, blood-libel imagery at 8.1% and denial of Jewish self-determination at 7.7%. The vocabulary of the old accusation is present in the new argument at measured shares, and the annotated tweet corpora put the antisemitic share of Israel-keyword messages at 13.1% and of Jews-keyword conversations at 11.2%.
The rest of the record is firm about different things. One monitoring organization’s tally now puts 58% of the US incidents it recorded in Israel- or Zionism-related terms, the first majority in a series running since 1979, with 2,596 incidents at anti-Israel rallies and 1,694 on campus, and the same organization discloses the definitional change that added 1,350 incidents to the previous year. The targets in the British, German and Israeli-government tallies are homes, communal buildings, cemeteries and students, not state institutions. The mediation studies place the strongest measured association not in a general suspicion of power but in conspiracy beliefs naming Israel and Zionists specifically, at over 55% of variance explained, while beliefs about Jews unrelated to Israel carried none of it. And the federal record, which counts 1,938 anti-Jewish incidents and 69% of all religion-based hate crime, holds no field at all for what an offender said about politics.
So the measurements converge on language and on targets, and they stop short of the interior. Coordination analysis found the amplifying accounts numbered 541 out of 1,521,433, which locates most of the volume with ordinary users writing for themselves. That is the uncomfortable shape of it: the tropes are widely distributed, the targets are Jewish, and the motive field is empty by construction in every instrument that could have filled it.
Which leaves the person standing in the overlap. The Jewish nurse in the 75.4% who reported exposure, the student in the weekly panel whose depressive symptoms tracked conflict-related stress, the household in the 15 German incidents that reached a residence: none of them meets a motive, they meet a sentence and a spray-painted wall. If the vocabulary arrives whether or not the intent does, what is the argument’s obligation to the words it carries?
Frequently Asked Questions
Why does a justification change how people judge an antisemitic remark?
In three preregistered experiments with 979 US participants, Moon, Barlev and Neuberg (2026) found that a person expressing antisemitism was generally disliked, more so by liberals than conservatives, but was liked more by liberals when the same expression was justified by disapproval of Israel or by Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights. The authors attribute the effect to ingroup favoritism and alliance politics. The measured outcome is how much participants liked the speaker, not a claim about the content of the speech.
Does Holocaust inversion track justification of violence against Jews?
In two nationally representative Norwegian surveys, Study 1 (N = 1,575) and a preregistered replication (N = 1,653), Enstad (2026) found endorsement of Holocaust inversion, the belief that Israel treats Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated in the Second World War, associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews and with refusal to take a stance against it. Endorsement was also associated with refusing to answer items measuring blatant antisemitic prejudice, which the author treats as a measurement complication.
Which words carry an antisemitic meaning while looking harmless?
Mendelsohn, Le Bras, Choi and Sap (2023) compiled a glossary of over 300 coded terms carrying one meaning to a broad audience and a second to an in-group, with “cosmopolitan” the canonical antisemitic case, and found that harmful content containing such terms evaded automated toxicity detection. Taylor, Peignon and Chen (2017, preprint) documented the 2016 substitution scheme in which “Skype” stood in for a Jew, with annotator agreement of Cohen’s kappa 0.871 on extremist-community data.
How much of the antisemitic content in conspiracy communities is explicit?
In over 1.26 million posts across two QAnon subreddits, Weinberg, Levy, Edwards, Kopstein, Frey and colleagues (2025) found explicit antisemitic language in 0.66% of posts and implicit terms in 8.6%. Of the 82 implicit terms found, 95.1% appeared in sample sentences invoking a dimension of antisemitism or an antisemitic conspiracy narrative, and the authors describe their user-level shares as lower-bound proxies.
Do recommender systems surface this material to young users?
The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2025), running 10 TikTok profiles posing as 15-year-olds across 14 days and over 5,500 recommended videos, reported that a profile interested in male-lifestyle-influencer content was shown antisemitic conspiracy content within about an hour, and that Rumble surfaced more overt antisemitic content from the outset. In a general audit using 100,000 sock-puppet accounts, Haroon and colleagues (2023) found problematic-channel recommendations at a maximum 2.5% share but encountered by 36.1% of users.
How quickly did antisemitic content move after October 7, 2023?
Sear and Johnson (2023, preprint), mapping hate-and-extremism communities across 26 platforms, report that antisemitic hate rose almost instantaneously in the minutes following the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, before Israel had responded, and that Islamophobia rose to a much lesser extent. The authors also report a hate-community core of roughly 50 million individuals with direct access to more than a billion mainstream community members, a description of network structure rather than of individual exposure.
How large was the online conversation itself?
Chen, He, Burghardt, Zhang and Lerman (2024, preprint) assembled 412,258 Reddit submissions and 8,089,095 comments from 100 subreddits between August and November 2023, including 126,107 submissions and 2,516,114 comments in the Zionism and antisemitism topic set. Those counts measure the volume of discussion on a topic, not the prevalence of antisemitism within it.
Do the two most-cited US counts measure the same thing?
No. The Anti-Defamation League recorded 9,354 incidents in 2024 on its own definitions, including non-criminal harassment and vandalism, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation recorded 1,938 anti-Jewish single-bias criminal incidents for the same year through voluntary agency reporting. The two draw on different universes and different thresholds, so they are not summed and not compared directly.
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- Ng, L., Carley, K., 2023. A combined synchronization index for evaluating collective action on social media. Applied Network Science. DOI 10.1007/s41109-022-00526-3. Peer-reviewed.
- Ozer, S., Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., 2025. The impact of globalized conflicts: examining attitudes toward Jews among Britons in the political context of the war in Gaza. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. DOI 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184. Peer-reviewed.
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- Sear, R., Johnson, N., 2023. Unprecedented reach and rich online journeys drive hate and extremism globally. arXiv:2311.08258. Preprint.
- Swami, V., 2012. Social psychological origins of conspiracy theories: the case of the Jewish conspiracy theory in Malaysia. Frontiers in Psychology. DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00280. Peer-reviewed.
- Taylor, J., Peignon, M., Chen, Y., 2017. Surfacing contextual hate speech words within social media. arXiv:1711.10093. Preprint.
- Verma, A., Sear, R., Johnson, N., 2024. How U.S. presidential elections strengthen global hate networks. npj Complexity. DOI 10.1038/s44260-024-00018-8. Peer-reviewed.
- Weinberg, D., Levy, A., Edwards, K., Kopstein, J., Frey, D., and colleagues, 2025. Hidden in plain sight: antisemitic content in QAnon subreddits. PLoS ONE. DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0318988. Peer-reviewed.
- Yale Youth Poll, 2025. Fall 2025 poll on antisemitic attitudes and Israel-Palestine. Yale University. youthpoll.yale.edu. Academic poll.